



Opposition Parties and Populist Strategies: Mobilizing the Urban Poor in African Democracies

by Danielle Elise Resnick

This thesis/dissertation document has been electronically approved by the following individuals:

van de Walle, Nicolas (Chairperson)

Roberts, Kenneth (Minor Member)

Moehler, Devra Coren (Minor Member)

OPPOSITION PARTIES AND POPULIST STRATEGIES:
MOBILIZING THE URBAN POOR IN AFRICAN DEMOCRACIES

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Danielle Elise Resnick

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OPPOSITION PARTIES AND POPULIST STRATEGIES:
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Danielle Elise Resnick, Ph.D.

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When and why do the urban poor in African democracies support opposition parties? Given that Africa has the world's highest urbanization rates and is experiencing an expansion in urban poverty, the region's urban poor increasingly represent a key constituency for electoral mobilization. Yet, opposition parties within the region have exhibited differential success at garnering votes from the urban poor.

Based on the cases of Senegal and Zambia, this study argues that opposition parties that employ a populist strategy are more likely to win support from the urban poor than parties that employ alternative modes of mobilization. A populist strategy is characterized by the combination of an anti-elitist discourse and a policy message firmly focused on social inclusion, a charismatic leader who professes an affinity with the under-class, and the targeting of election campaigns in low-income urban areas. The advantage of a populist strategy is that it provides greater differentiation than the myriad of purely personalistic parties within the region and greater congruence with the policy priorities of the urban poor, including service delivery, jobs, and housing.

The argument is based on a novel set of primary data collected from 400 informal sector workers in Dakar and Lusaka, in-depth interviews with slum dwellers, and semi-structured interviews conducted with political elites. Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, this data illustrates the different modes of mobilization used by various parties in these two countries and shows why a populist strategy in particular generates the most support from the urban poor. Furthermore, the data allows for the testing of alternative hypotheses for the urban poor's voting behavior: 1)

vote-buying, 2) ethnic alignments, 3) retrospective economic voting, and 4) associational membership.

The second part of the study examines when an opposition party will adopt a populist strategy with the urban poor. A populist strategy is alienating to other voters, such as rural residents whose support is still necessary to win national elections in most African countries. As such, a populist strategy is only feasible if an opposition party can mobilize a segment of rural constituents through appeals to a politically salient ascriptive identity. In such cases, an opposition party can form a minimum winning coalition that consists of the urban poor, to whom populist policies are directed, and a segment of rural voters, who provide sufficient votes to win electoral majorities.

Overall, the study emphasizes how demographic and socioeconomic trends intersect with party strategizing and voting behavior. Furthermore, the study holds important implications for democratic contestation and consolidation in Africa, scholarship on party-citizen linkages, and cross-regional comparisons of the evolution and manifestations of populism.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Danielle Elise Resnick received a B.S. from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, where she majored in International Political Economy and minored in African Studies. She also holds a M.Sc. in Development Studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science. Prior to pursuing her Ph.D. at Cornell University, she worked as a Research Analyst at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in Washington, D.C. In summer 2010, she will join the United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) as a Research Associate.

For James

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

(AFP)	<i>Alliance des Forces du Progrès</i>
(AJ/PADS)	<i>And-Jëf/Parti Africain pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme</i>
(ANC)	African National Congress
(APC)	All People's Congress
(APIX)	<i>Agence pour la promotion de l'investissement et les grands travaux</i>
(ASSOTSI)	<i>Associação dos Operadores e Trabalhadores do Sector Informal</i>
(AZIEA)	Alliance for Zambia Informal Economy Associations
(BAM)	Botswana Alliance Movement
(BBC)	British Broadcasting Corporation
(BDP)	Botswana Democratic Party
(BEE)	Black Economic Empowerment
(BNF)	Botswana National Front
(CAADP)	Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program
(CAP21)	Convergence of Actions around the President for the 21st Century
(C.E.N.A.)	<i>Commission elettorale nationale autonome</i>
(CFA)	<i>Communauté financière d'Afrique</i>
(CGT)	<i>Confédération Générale du Travail</i>
(COPE)	Congress of the People
(COSATU)	Confederation of South African Trade Unions
(CPA)	<i>Coalition populaire pour l'alternance</i>
(CPC)	<i>Cadre Permanent de Concertation</i>
(CPP)	Convention People's Party
(CSO)	Central Statistical Office
(CSPR)	Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
(DA)	Democratic Alliance

(DfID)	Department for International Development
(DP)	Democratic Party
(DS)	<i>Démocratie et Solidarité</i>
(ECOWAS)	Economic Community of West African States
(ECZ)	Electoral Commission of Zambia
(EDF)	European Development Fund
(ESAM)	<i>Enquête Sénégalaise auprès des Ménages</i>
(FAL)	<i>Front de l'Alternance</i>
(FDD)	Forum for Democracy and Development
(FORD)	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
(FPTP)	First-past-the-post
(FRA)	Food Reserve Agency
(FSD)	<i>Front pour la Socialisme et la Démocratie</i>
(FSP)	Fertilizer Support Program
(GEAR)	Growth, Employment, and Redistribution
(HP)	Heritage Party
(IMF)	International Monetary Fund
(JCTR)	Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection
(JICA)	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
(KANU)	Kenyan African National Union
(LCC)	Lusaka City Council
(LCMS)	Living Conditions Monitoring Survey
(LD-MPT)	<i>Ligue-Démocratique-Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail</i>
(LDP)	Liberal Democratic Party
(LITA)	Lusaka Informal Traders Association
(LOASP)	<i>Loi d'Orientation Agro-Sylvo-Pastorale</i>

(LPI)	Lived Poverty Index
(MACO)	Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
(MAS)	<i>Movimiento al Socialismo</i>
(MLGH)	Ministry of Local Government and Housing
(MMD)	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
(MRS)	<i>Mouvement Républicain Sénégalais</i>
(MUFIS)	Malawi Union for the Informal Sector
(MVR)	<i>Movimiento V República</i>
(NARC)	National Rainbow Coalition
(NCC)	National Constitutional Conference
(NDP)	National Democratic Party
(NGOs)	Non-Governmental Organizations
(NP)	National Party
(NRC)	National Registration Card
(ODM)	Orange Democratic Movement
(OECD)	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(PA)	People's Alliance
(PAI)	<i>Parti Africain de l'Indépendance</i>
(PDS)	<i>Parti Démocratique Sénégalais</i>
(PF)	Patriotic Front
(PIT)	<i>Parti de l'Indépendance et du Travail</i> [Sénégal]
(PIT)	<i>Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs</i> [Côte d'Ivoire]
(PNU)	Party of National Unity
(PR)	Proportional Representation
(PREG)	Politically Relevant Ethnic Group
(PRI)	<i>Partido Revolucionario Institucional</i>

(PS)	<i>Parti Socialiste</i>
(PVD)	<i>Parti de la vérité pour le développement</i>
(RDP)	Reconstruction and Development Program
(REVA)	<i>Retour vers l'Agriculture</i>
(RTS)	<i>Radio-Télévision Sénégalaise</i>
(SACP)	South African Communist Party
(SLFP)	Sri Lanka Freedom Party
(TGP)	<i>Très Grands Projets</i>
(TRS)	Two-round system
(TUC)	Trades Union Congress
(UDA)	United Democratic Alliance
(ULP)	United Liberal Party
(UNACOIS)	<i>Union Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels du Sénégal</i>
(UNDP)	United Nations Development Program
(UNIP)	United National Independence Party
(UPND)	United Party for National Development
(UPS)	<i>Union Progressiste Sénégalaise</i>
(URD)	<i>Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique</i>
(USAID)	United States Agency for International Development
(WEAZ)	Workers Education Alliance of Zambia
(ZANAMA)	Zambian National Marketeers' Association
(ZATMA)	Zambian Traders and Marketeers Association
(ZCTU)	Zambian Confederation of Trade Unions
(ZDC)	Zambia Democratic Congress
(ZNCB)	Zambian National Commercial Bank
(ZRA)	Zambian Revenue Authority

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

“No power, no votes!” was the chant hurled at Rupiah Banda, the presidential candidate for the ruling Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), when he toured Kanyama township during Zambia’s 2008 electoral campaign. Kanyama, one of Lusaka’s poorest and most populous neighborhoods, suffered from frequent electricity outages and frustrated residents were determined to withhold their one source of currency, their votes, until the problem was rectified (Chilemba 2008). Ultimately, the MMD suffered a crushing electoral defeat both in Kanyama constituency and the rest of Lusaka, losing to an opposition party known as the Patriotic Front (PF).

On a micro-scale, this example illustrates how the urban poor in African democracies vote for the opposition when those issues most relevant to their own lives, such as the delivery of basic goods and services, remain unaddressed by incumbents.¹ The puzzle, however, is why in other African countries, where the urban poor face equally difficult living and working conditions, this sector of society nevertheless remains loyal to incumbents and less inclined to support the opposition. This dissertation aims to address this puzzle by examining the interaction between the strategies employed by political parties and the voting behavior of Africa’s urban poor.

The preferences of the urban poor are increasingly relevant to multi-party politics within the region. In the past, urban centers frequently represented the locus of political contention and change in Africa. Between the 1930s and 1950s, African

¹Throughout this study, “Africa” refers only to those countries in the sub-Saharan region of the continent.

cities were the source of anti-colonial strikes throughout the region, ranging from railway workers in Senegal to dockworkers in Kenya. A few decades later, in the struggle for political liberalization from authoritarian and one-party regimes, cities were once again where citizens and state authorities clashed. From the *villes mortes* campaign in Cameroon to the bloodier Soweto uprising in South Africa, the inability to govern the city placed political regimes in highly vulnerable positions.²

Today, with some form of multi-party democracy prevailing in many African countries, cities on the continent are gaining even greater prominence. African cities are growing faster than in any other region of the world, with urban population rates averaging five percent per annum over the last twenty years. Future demographic projections indicate no abatement of this process, with an expected tripling of the region's urban population within the next 30 years, resulting in urbanites becoming the majority for the first time in Africa's history (Kessides 2006). Although rural-to-urban migration is still prominent, urban-to-urban migration and natural population growth within cities increasingly are driving Africa's urbanization (Freund 2007; UNFPA 2007; UN-Habitat 2009). Moreover, Freund (2007) notes that while urban Africans still maintain linkages with relatives in the countryside, returning there in a pattern of circular migration is becoming an increasingly less attractive option.

The economic processes accompanying this urbanization have resulted in a dual pattern of development. While urban areas generate approximately 60 percent of Africa's economic growth, employment opportunities remain scarce and incomes are either stagnant or falling (Sisk 2004). This is largely because capital investment in these cities is oriented towards commercial businesses, finance, and tourism instead of

² The *villes mortes* campaign was a general strike in the towns and cities of Cameroon during the early 1990s as a protest against President Paul Biya's opposition to constitutional reform and multi-party elections. The impetus for the Soweto uprising of 1976 was opposition by South African youth to being forced by the apartheid regime to learn Afrikaans in school.

industrial and manufacturing enterprises where more jobs are usually created (Myers and Murray 2007). High unemployment and underemployment, environmental hazards, and sub-standard public service delivery all indicate the strains imposed on government management by rapid urbanization.³ These challenges are compounded by the fact that most African countries retained legal frameworks for urban development aimed at containing settlement instead of confronting rapid growth (Hansen and Vaa 2004). One indication of this is that the region's slum population nearly doubled within the last 15 years, prompting the United Nations to claim that urbanization in Africa is "virtually synonymous with slum growth" (UNFPA 2007: 16).⁴

Indeed, many analysts have noted that both income indicators and other measures of human deprivation, such as health and access to public services, point to an increase in urban poverty within the region. For instance, according to household survey data for 26 African countries, Ravallion *et al.* (2007) discovered that while overall poverty declined in Africa since the early 1990s due to large-scale out-migration from rural areas, urban poverty actually increased.⁵ In fact, the share of urbanites comprising the region's total poor population grew from 24 percent in 1993 to 30 percent in 2002. A review of recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers revealed that the share of the urban population living below the poverty line is more than 40 percent in certain African countries, such as Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Malawi, Niger, Senegal, and Zambia (Mitlin 2004). Haddad *et al.* (1999) found that the absolute number of the urban poor and undernourished in a number of developing

³ In fact, as of 2008, 35 African countries suffered electricity shortages due to growing demand coupled with increased prices for oil and coal (Childress 2008).

⁴ Between 2000 and 2010, Africa's urban slum population increased from 103 million to 200 million people (UN-Habitat 2010).

⁵ This process contributes to the decline in rural poverty not only by reducing the amount of people living in rural areas but also by providing the opportunity for remittances to be sent back from family members living in the cities. Ravallion *et al.* (2007) arrived at these figures based on defining poverty as living below \$1.08 a day in 1993 purchasing power parity.

countries, including those in Africa, has both increased over the last 15-20 years and outstripped corresponding changes in rural areas. Satterthwaite (2003) likewise argues that urban poverty not only is growing but also has been severely underestimated in the past.⁶

Yet, while these trends are generating alarm amongst demographers, development practitioners, and urban planners, the political implications of such dynamics have thus far received little attention. This contrasts starkly with scholarship in other regions of the world that has examined how contemporary demographic and economic changes impact political party strategies and voter behavior (e.g. Clark and Lipset 2001; Mair et al. 2004; Roberts and Wibbels 1999).

As such, this study examines the political implications of rapid urbanization and the expansion of urban poverty in Africa by addressing two research questions. The central research question asks when and why do the urban poor in African democracies support opposition parties? This study argues that such voting decisions depend on the strategies used by political parties to incorporate the urban poor into the political arena. Populist strategies in particular are more likely to attract the urban poor than alternative approaches. As defined in more detail in Chapter Two, a populist strategy represents a mode of mobilization that involves an anti-elitist discourse, a policy message oriented around social inclusion, and a charismatic leader who professes an affinity with the under-class. Its advantage in mobilizing the urban poor is twofold. First, a populist strategy offers voters greater *differentiation* from the multitude of parties within the region that are defined solely by a party leader's

⁶ There are a few reasons for why this may be true. First, few countries use differentiated poverty lines for rural and urban areas. Therefore, urban poverty is estimated to be lower because the higher cost of living in cities is not taken into account (Bapat, 2009; Mitlin, 2004). Moreover, such poverty lines are usually based on food expenditures, ignoring that non-food expenditures, such as rent, transport, and fuel, are a large source of expenditure in urban areas. In addition, while access to certain services is greater in urban areas, few indicators measure the quality of the services, which can be lower in urban areas due to higher population densities (Satterthwaite 2003, 2004).

personality. Secondly, it provides greater policy *congruence* with those issues most relevant to the urban poor's living and working conditions. Where an opposition party employs a populist strategy, then that particular party is more likely than its competitors to gain a plurality of votes from the urban poor during presidential elections.

The second research question asks why and when do opposition parties choose a populist strategy to actively mobilize the urban poor? Two conditions are required. First, a country needs to have a sufficient share of its population living in urban areas for politicians to have an incentive to employ a populist strategy with the urban poor. Even if this condition is met, a second requirement is that an opposition party can form a minimum winning electoral coalition that consists of the urban poor and a segment of rural dwellers. The latter are more likely to be mobilized according to a politically relevant identity cleavage, such as ethnicity, language, or religion. Where such cleavages exist, an opposition party can obtain national electoral majorities by relying on a populist strategy to win over the urban poor in the cities and appealing to a segment of rural dwellers along identity lines.

Addressing voting behavior and party strategies in tandem offers an interactive approach that accounts for both the participation of the urban poor and the behavior of political elites. A multi-level research strategy that spans two countries, Senegal and Zambia, and their respective capitals of Dakar and Lusaka illustrates the argument. Qualitative evidence on party strategies, based on interviews with political elites and local experts, is complemented by a quantitative analysis of survey data on political preferences collected from the urban poor within each city. This latter data is significant because it represents a unique and novel set of information on both the voting decisions of the urban poor as well as their perceptions regarding the effectiveness of their country's respective political parties.

Who are the urban poor?

Before addressing this study's central research questions, it is first necessary to understand the actors at the core of the analysis. In this particular study, the urban poor consist of low-income residents of Africa's largest cities. They are predominantly unemployed, underemployed, or laboring in the informal sector and often living in illegal or sub-standard housing. Importantly though, the study does not focus on those living in absolute poverty, such as those who survive by begging or sleeping in city streets. For such individuals, the quest for everyday survival takes precedence over participation in political life.

Deriving this conceptualization of the urban poor involved a number of considerations. First, by definition, the urban poor reside in their country's major centers of population and economic activities. This study in particular focuses on those living in their country's largest city as measured by population. The largest city is not necessarily a primate city, which is defined as containing at least twice the national population of the country's second largest city (Jefferson, 1939).⁷ Aside from Abidjan, Dar es Salaam, Lagos and Johannesburg, most of Africa's largest cities are also their country's capital city. Similarly, by definition, the urban poor survive on less money than other urbanites. However, there is no specific level of income that can be uniformly applied across urban households to classify them categorically as poor or not. In fact, measuring urban poverty by incomes alone obscures important differences in the prices faced by urban consumers across different countries and the quality of their access to certain goods and services (Satterthwaite 2003).

Since it is well-recognized that poverty is multi-dimensional and extends beyond income measures (e.g. Atkinson 1987; Sen 1999), other indicators of deprivation also need to be taken into account. Specifically, the urban poor

⁷ The reason for making this distinction is that some countries, such as Ghana and South Africa, do not have a primate city and therefore, they would be excluded from any cross-country analyses.

predominantly reside in substandard housing, made of fragile materials and prone to frequent maintenance. Their communities are variously referred to as squatter settlements, informal settlements, slums, and shantytowns, and such terms will be used interchangeably in the present study. According to UN-Habitat (2006: 19), all terms refer to housing that lacks one or more of the following: durable structures, sufficient living area, access to improved water, access to sanitation, and secure tenure. In such communities, the number of household members in each dwelling far exceeds what can be comfortably withstood by these housing structures. Today, approximately 72 percent of Africa's urban population lives in such housing conditions (UNFPA 2007).

Besides how they live, where the urban poor live is also a distinguishing factor. Hazardous terrains prone to flooding, next to railroad tracks, or under electricity pylons represent common areas of settlement for the urban poor (Davis 2004). Combined with inadequate access to clean water and unsuitable sanitation facilities, such conditions increase the urban poor's susceptibility to water-borne diseases, such as cholera and malaria. For instance, based on data from the Africa Population and Health Research Centre, infant mortality, under-five child mortality, and diarrhea prevalence in Kenya is much higher for the slums of Kibera and Embakasi than for either Nairobi as a whole or rural Kenya (cited in Kessides 2006). Analyzing time-series data from the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS), Brokerhoff & Brennan (1998) likewise found that reductions in infant mortality between the 1970s and 1990s was lower in urban areas of Africa with over one million people than in rural areas.

The employment opportunities available to the urban poor are either scarce or low-paid and insecure. Poor macroeconomic conditions, lack of education and training, and bad health are just a few of the factors that prevent the urban poor from finding well-paid work (Baharoglu & Kessides 2002). The problem has been

exacerbated by the number of youth entering African cities each year looking for jobs (World Bank 2009a). As a result, most of the urban poor resort to toiling in the informal sector which, according to the International Labor Organization (ILO 2002: 3), means that they are not recognized or protected under the legal and regulatory frameworks within their respective countries. More specifically, they receive no social protection, are subject to highly erratic incomes and unstable employment, possess little security of property rights, and rely on informal channels for information, training, and credit. Those in the informal sector are, for example, engaged in street vending, marketeering, shoe-shining, domestic work for households, or self-employed in micro-enterprises. While true that not all those who work in the informal economy earn low incomes and that not all those who are poor work in the informal sector, average incomes in the informal economy are on the whole much lower than in the formal economy (ILO 2002: 31).⁸ Moreover, as Myers and Murray (2007: 6) note, escaping poverty via the informal sector is very difficult: “The socioeconomic survival of the poor depends upon a downward spiral of self-exploitation...where the competitive subdivision of already overcrowded marginal niches in the ‘shadow economies’ of the urban milieu generates only miniscule returns, despite the extensive expenditure of time and effort.” Overall, the informal sector is believed to account for 61 percent of urban employment in Africa (Kessides 2006: 12) and is estimated to be the source of more than 90 percent of additional jobs that will be created in Africa’s urban areas within the next decade (UN-Habitat 2003: 103).

⁸ There is actually a debate over the proper definition of the informal sector, with some analysts preferring a more restrictive conceptualization that simply refers to those who are engaged in untaxed activities. However, given that there is no metric by which to judge one definition as superior to another, the official one used by the ILO, which is the multi-lateral organization in charge of labor and employment issues, is used here.

Admittedly, urban poverty in Africa takes on multiple and diverse manifestations across the continent and even within the same city, the poor are not a homogenous entity. Moreover, classifying individuals inevitably results in oversimplifications that obscure important differences and potentially misrepresents how those individuals actually view themselves. Nevertheless, the features discussed above collectively distinguish the urban poor from their compatriots and help refine the focus of this study.

Why focus on the urban poor?

Given that they comprise the majority of residents in African cities, and that their numbers continue growing, the urban poor can have a potentially significant impact on the region's political landscape. Indeed, they represent an example of what Kitschelt (2000: 849) terms "vote-rich but resource-poor constituencies." While they may be ignored by politicians during normal times, the urban poor's numerical advantage means that they are actively courted by political parties during election campaigns. Dietz and Shildo's (1998: 284) observations from Latin America also holds for Africa: "Numerous studies over recent decades have shown that the urban poor are not a homogeneous mass that behaves or votes in predictable or uniform ways, but their sheer numbers inevitably have made them targets for politicians now and in future" (Dietz and Shildo 1998: 284). For instance, Kersting and Sperberg (2003) note that in the Ivory Coast, political authorities only visit shantytowns during an election year. More generally, Africa's urban poor often comprise a large share of party cadres, and frequently are transported to political rallies by parties to generate a sense of popular momentum around a particular candidate.

Though Lewis' (1959, 1966) analysis of subaltern groups in Mexico and Puerto Rico popularized the notion that the urban poor are generally politically

quiescent and apathetic, other studies in the developing world reveal more nuanced behavior. Thornton (2000) found that workers in Mexico City's small-scale informal sector were more likely to vote in elections than formal workers. In India, Yadav (1996: 96) has described a "second democratic upsurge" in which electoral participation rates are increasingly higher among low caste, poorer, and less well-educated citizens. Based on two rounds of Afrobarometer data, Bratton (2006) noted that by 2005, Africa's urban poor were turning out to vote more often than they had in the late 1990s.⁹ Moreover, survey research in Kenya and the Ivory Coast revealed that voter turnout amongst shantytown dwellers exceeded the national average (Kersting and Sperberg 2003). All of this suggests that voter turnout in Africa, and its attendant implications for parties' electoral fortunes, often depends on mobilizing the urban poor.

Yet, the voting decisions of the urban poor in contemporary Africa are not well-understood. The historically small size of this sector of society is one explanation for this omission. In addition, the urban bias literature of the 1970s and 1980s, popularized by Bates (1981) and Lipton (1977), emphasized that African policymakers kowtowed to the wishes of urban dwellers at the expense of exploiting the agricultural sector. The belief that an urban bias in government practices still persists, and that Africa's urban dwellers remain privileged over their rural counterparts, traditionally has caused urban poverty in Africa to be sidelined as an area of study (Maxwell *et al.* 2000).

Literature that has examined the impact of urbanization and urban poverty on political dynamics in Africa is insightful but based on analyses that pre-date much of the region's transitions to multi-party democracy. For instance, Baker's (1974) study

⁹ Afrobarometer is a project that conducts public opinion surveys in 20 African countries at regular intervals.

of the impact of demographic processes on political change in Lagos provides an in-depth, historical view over fifty years, but the study ends in 1967, only shortly after Nigeria received independence from Britain. Theoretically-rich and broad-sweeping analyses of political participation and party responses to the urban poor in developing regions, such as Nelson (1970, 1979) and Huntington and Nelson (1976) were conducted at the height of one-party regimes in Africa. They also preceded much of the region's adoption of structural adjustment programs, which are believed to have exacerbated the extent of urban poverty (White 1996). In Tripp's (1997) study of Tanzania, the urban poor, represented by Dar es Salaam's informal sector, are placed at the forefront of analysis. Yet, the focus is on their role in lobbying for economic and political liberalization over the course of the mid-1980s and early 1990s rather than their preferences and behavior in the country's post-transition period.

This research gap contrasts starkly both with current empirical trends in Africa as well as with the vast theoretical literature on the urban poor and political parties in other regions of the developing world. Particularly in Latin America, which experienced the same twin processes of massive urbanization and economic decline during the 1980s and 1990s, the political participation of the urban poor and the linkages forged with them by political parties comprise a substantial share of the literature on that part of the world. For instance, the ties created with the urban poor by the Peronists in Argentina (e.g. Stokes 2005; Auyero 2001), by the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) in Mexico (e.g. Eckstein 2001; Fox 1994), and by Hugo Chávez' *Movimiento V República* (MVR) in Venezuela (e.g. Canache 2004; Rincon 2007) are well-documented. Moreover, social and economic conditions cause such ties to evolve so that traditional clientelist links between ruling parties and the urban poor in countries such as Mexico and Brazil may be eroding as people recognize that access to certain goods and services should be their rights as citizens rather than a

reward for their vote (Fox 1994; Gay 2006). Increasingly, scholars of Latin America observe that relationships between the urban poor and political parties there are transforming into “associative networks” that involve a diversity of actors, a dynamic bargaining over demands and resources, and less inequality amongst participants (Chalmers *et al.* 1997; see also Collier & Handlin 2009). The comparative dearth of knowledge about both the voting alignments of Africa’s urban poor, as well as how political parties interact with this growing sector of society, therefore motivated the decision to place the urban poor at the center of analysis.

Outcomes of Interest

One of the main dependent variables examined in the present study concerns the voting behavior of the urban poor during presidential elections. Voting behavior encompasses who an individual supported as well as whether she/he chose to abstain from elections. Both types of choices provide indications of the appeal of the available opposition parties as well as the degree of satisfaction with the status quo.

Political participation among the urban poor has many manifestations besides voting. On the one extreme lie subversive forms of resistance, such as Tripp’s (1997) study of the non-compliance of urban informal sector workers to economic policies implemented by the Tanzanian state during the mid-1980s. At the other extreme are openly violent acts spurred by a growing political consciousness among the urban poor who become angry over their relative deprivation (Gutkind 1973). Indeed, the United Kingdom’s Commission for Africa (2005: 29) warned in its official report that “[Africa’s] slums are filled with an increasingly youthful population, unemployed and disaffected. Africa’s cities are becoming a powder keg of potential instability and discontent.” The deadly riots in Nairobi’s slums in the aftermath of that country’s 2007 presidential elections and widespread support of Antananarivo’s poor for the

undemocratic overthrow of Madagascar's president in early 2009 lends some credibility to this warning. Active involvement in organized protest movements, such as those detailed by Piven and Cloward (1977) with respect to the poor in the United States, occupies a space in between such extremes.

Yet, in most countries, voting is the most common and easiest mode of political participation. This is especially true for the urban poor, who have limited resources for activities beyond their daily survival (Dietz 1998), and survey research elsewhere suggests that voting is the most frequent form of political participation engaged in by this group (see Kersting and Sperberg 2003). Voting behavior provides one outcome indicator of whether the urban poor are taking advantage of the existence of multiple parties in the hope of having their demands for jobs, services, and infrastructure addressed. According to Huntington and Nelson (1979: 75), voting provides a powerful tool for eliciting responsiveness by elites: "By and large, the evidence from recent studies reinforces that from earlier ones: political participation via the ballot is a potent weapon of the urban poor in achieving higher levels of certain material benefits and thus in helping to reduce economic inequality." Moreover, although election data in Africa is not always entirely accurate, it remains more complete and comparable than other forms of political participation.

The primary motivation for specifically focusing on voting in presidential elections is because they usually arouse strong emotions and often attract the most participation amongst all classes. The major presidential candidates and their respective parties are often better known by the broader populace than those running for more local elections. Moreover, voters' calculations of who to support in legislative or local elections may vary significantly from those for presidential ones, as well as depend on whether or not local elections are held concurrently with national

ones.¹⁰ In addition, considering the low degree of fiscal decentralization in many African countries and the high dependence of local governments on transfers from the central government (Brosio 2000; Olowu 2007), voters may still hold national representatives rather than local ones accountable at the ballot box when urban public services are insufficient and inefficient.

Political parties' linkage strategies to the urban poor represent both the main causal influence with respect to the study's primary research question and the main outcome under investigation in the secondary research question. The concept of "linkages" refers to the manner in which support and influence is exchanged between voters and parties (Barr 2009: 34). Kitschelt (2000) delineates three types of linkages according to the mode by which parties mobilize constituents. Clientelist linkages involve the disbursement of selective benefits in exchange for votes and are usually forged with lower-income constituents. This may be in the form of money and gifts during campaigns or development projects and legal concessions only in those neighborhoods where residents showed loyalty at the ballot box. Parties that rely on programmatic linkages can map their policy programs along an ideological spectrum. In contrast to clientelist linkages, programmatic linkages imply that all constituents experience the impact, both good and bad, of those policies rather than just those who supported the party. Personalistic linkages constitute a third category and involve appeals to constituents almost entirely via a politician's charisma.

This study argues that populist strategies represent an amalgam of Kitschelt's three linkages. A populist strategy relies on a constituency base of poorer, subaltern, and often unorganized groups (Roberts 1995; Weyland 2001). As with personalistic linkages, a populist strategy involves mobilization via the charisma of a party leader

¹⁰ For instance, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) argue that non-concurrent elections tend to increase the probability of the executive and legislature being held by different political parties.

and fosters unmediated ties between the leader and his/her followers (Barr 2009). At the same time, a populist strategy contains key programmatic components that manifest through an anti-elitist discourse and a policy message that promotes social inclusion. In addition, a populist strategy can potentially mobilize voters through “an economic project that utilizes widespread redistributive or clientelistic methods to create a material foundation for popular sector support” (Roberts 1995: 88). As detailed in Chapter Two, each of these linkage strategies in turn holds implications for a party’s organizational structure.

To Vote or Not to Vote for the Opposition?

The viability of opposition parties is critical to the consolidation of democracy. As Dahl (1971) noted, political competition is one of the two key dimensions of democracy because it provides voters with choice. By extension, such competition and the availability of choices are impossible without strong, credible opposition parties. This is especially true for Africa’s young democracies, many of which are characterized by the entrenchment of incumbent parties (e.g. Bratton 1998; Bogaards 2000; Doorenspleet 2003).

When voting data from presidential elections is examined, divergent support for opposition parties by the urban poor appears across African countries experiencing similar demographic changes. Specifically, Table 1.1 examines patterns of party support and level of urbanization across 15 African countries. Level of urbanization is used as a proxy for the relative weight of the urban poor in the population. The 15 countries presented here were selected based on their conformity to a minimal notion of electoral democracy, which is a prerequisite for understanding party competition and the participation of the urban poor. Specifically, following Lindberg (2007), those countries included have held at least two elections, not endured an electoral

breakdown caused by a coup or other military intervention, and obtained a rating of 4 or better on “political rights” by Freedom House at the time of their last elections.¹¹ The “political rights” category assesses a country’s electoral process, degree of political pluralism and participation, and government functioning, including the pervasiveness of corruption.¹² As such, it captures key elements of an electoral democracy.

As a result of using these criteria, Guinea Bissau and Madagascar were excluded due to democratic reversals in 2009. Moreover, disaggregated election data was not available for Cape Verde, Niger, São Tome e Principe, and Seychelles so, urban preferences could not be discerned. In Mauritius, the National Assembly and prime minister are elected from multi-member constituencies with each voter having three votes and thus, it is not possible to determine the exact percentage of voters who supported each party.

For the remaining countries, the results of the most recent presidential elections are provided here where presidential systems exist while parliamentary results are provided for those countries, such as Botswana, Lesotho, and South Africa, which are not purely presidential. If, at the time of elections, a party belonged to the opposition and received a plurality of votes in the largest city, then the respective country is classified as “opposition party dominant.” Similarly, if the incumbent party at the time of elections received a plurality of votes in the largest city, the country is categorized as “ruling party dominant.” Those countries highlighted in bold have an

¹¹ Notwithstanding some criticisms of this measure (Munck and Verkuilen 2002), it offers a comparative measure of political rights that is available for a broad time period across a wide range of countries. The Freedom House scale assigns a 1 to countries that best fulfill the political rights category and a 7 to those that are the worst performers in this dimension. As such, among the other criteria mentioned, those countries included obtained a ranking ranging from 1 to 4 in their last elections.

¹² For more specific details, see Freedom House (2009).

opposition party in control of the municipal council of the largest city. More specific details about this election data can be found in Appendix One.

Table 1.1: Patterns of Political Party Support in Africa's Largest Cities

Level of Urbanization^a	Ruling Party Dominance in National Elections (year)	Opposition Party Dominance in National Elections (year)
Low (Below 35%)	Malawi (2009) Mali (2007) Mozambique (2009) Tanzania (2005)	Lesotho (2007)
High (35% and above)	Botswana (2009) Namibia (2009) Senegal (2007) South Africa (2009)	Benin (2006) ^b Ghana (2008) Kenya (2007) Nigeria (2007) ^c Sierra Leone (2007) Zambia (2008)

Sources: Countries included based on calculations from Freedom House (2010); Urbanization classification based on data from the UN's World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database, available at <http://esa.un.org/unup/>.

Notes:

Countries chosen for inclusion are those which fit the following criteria: 1) have held at least two elections, 2) have not had a coup or other military intervention to reverse those elections, and 3) received a rating of 4 or better on "political rights" by Freedom House. The bold-faced countries are those in which the largest city is actually governed by an opposition party.

^a Based on the 2007 UN Population Database, 35 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's total population lives in urban areas as of 2005. Thus, those countries with an urbanization rate below this regional average are classified as "low" and those above are classified as "high."

^b In Benin, the candidate supported by the incumbent party, FARD-ALAFa, was Daniel Tawéma and he only obtained 0.6 percent of the vote. The national vote was won by an independent candidate, Yayi Boni but, in Cotonou, the PRD candidate Adrien Houngbédji obtained the majority of votes and Nicéphore Soglo of the opposition RB is the mayor.

^c Lagos does not have a mayor but rather its affairs are run by the governor of Lagos state.

Importantly, Table 1.1 illustrates that the level of urbanization plays an important role in determining the success of opposition parties. In fact, those countries in which the opposition has obtained a plurality of votes in the largest city predominantly are more urbanized, meaning that a higher share of their population lives in urban areas. Another noticeable feature of this Table is that conventional institutional explanations about voting outcomes are not supported. Countries in which opposition parties have won a plurality of votes in the largest city span a variety of institutional types. Indeed, they have done just as well in presidential regimes, such

as Nigeria and Kenya, as they have in parliamentary ones like Lesotho. Moreover, the opposition has garnered the plurality of votes in countries with first-past the post electoral systems, such as Zambia, as well as in countries with two round majority run-off systems, like Benin and Sierra Leone.

Table 1.2: Patterns of Political Party Support across Selected Poor Neighborhoods
(Most recent presidential election)

Country (Largest City)	Opposition dominance in largest city?	Poorest Neighbor-hood(s)	Constituency	Opposition vote share in constituency (party), %	Ruling vote share in constituency (party), %
Botswana (Gaborone)	No	Old Naledi	Gaborone South	34 (BNF)	41 (BDP)
Namibia (Windhoek)	No	Katutura	Katutura East & Central	25 (RDP)	48 (SWAPO)
South Africa (Johannesburg)	No	Orange Farm	Ward 3, Region G	6 (COPE)	89 (ANC)
Tanzania (Dar es Salaam)	No	Temeke	Temeke	29 (CUF)	66 (CCM)
Ghana (Accra)	Yes	Old Fadama	Ododiodioo	59 (NDC)	41 (NPP)
Kenya (Nairobi)	Yes	Kibera	Langata	69 (ODM)	24 (PNU)
Zambia (Lusaka)	Yes	Chaisa	Mandevu	63 (PF)	29 (MMD)

Sources: The sources and accompanying notes for the data in the above table can be found in Appendix Two.

Since voting data is not disaggregated by income group, the vote share in the largest city accorded to opposition parties acts only as a proxy for estimating the degree of support amongst the urban poor. Admittedly, this is an imperfect indicator because cities are not uniformly poor. Yet, additional details at the municipal level increase confidence that voting patterns in the largest city reflect the preferences of the urban poor. Table 1.2 provides the voting shares for the opposition and ruling parties for the electoral constituencies in which some of the poorest neighborhoods are

located for selected countries. The poorest neighborhoods were based on secondary research, detailed in Appendix Two, that identifies where each city's largest slums exist or where objective indicators of deprivation, such as income and access to basic services, are most extreme. The Table suggests that amongst those countries where the main opposition party has obtained the plurality of votes within the largest city during the country's most recent presidential election, those living within some of the poorest neighborhoods of those cities contributed to that outcome. A similar conclusion can be drawn in those countries where the ruling party obtained a large share of support in the largest city.

Afrobarometer data for a sub-sample of the countries presented in Table 1.1 offers another means for exploring the party preferences of the urban poor. Afrobarometer represents a public opinion poll assessing Africans' socioeconomic conditions and perspectives on the health of their respective country's democracy. Table 1.3 presents the share of Afrobarometer respondents who admitted two things: 1) they feel close to a particular party and 2) the party to which they feel closest belongs to the opposition. The classification of respondents as "poor" and "non-poor" was based on calculations of a Lived Poverty Index (LPI) for urban residents. As described by Mattes and Bratton (2009), an LPI captures the multi-dimensional aspects of poverty by averaging people's rankings of their living conditions according to five components: access to cash income, medical care, food, clean water, and cooking fuel. Since the Table does not actually capture whether a respondent voted for an opposition party in the last elections, the results here should be considered suggestive rather than definitive.

Table 1.3: Share of respondents who feel closest to an opposition party

Country	Poorest Half in Urban Areas, % (N)	Wealthiest Half in Urban Areas, % (N)	All Rural, % (N)
Botswana	36.2 (38)	30.7 (27)	27.9 (117)
Ghana	49.3 (74)	28.2 (35)	35.9 (147)
Kenya	80.2 (69)	76.1 (51)	78.6 (456)
Lesotho	39.1 (27)	43.3 (29)	31.8 (146)
Malawi	34.4 (21)	37.0 (20)	24.2 (161)
Mozambique	6.2 (8)	6.0 (6)	5.9 (34)
Namibia	34.3 (51)	45.1 (41)	23.9 (119)
Nigeria	54.9 (112)	61.1 (96)	52.8 (322)
Senegal	27.2 (31)	37.5 (27)	23.1 (98)
South Africa	26.6 (114)	40.2 (138)	15.3 (73)
Tanzania	13.0 (15)	9.6 (9)	7.3 (36)
Zambia	65.0 (89)	88.5 (69)	52.2 (224)

Sources: To be comparable with trends presented in Table 1.1, Afrobarometer Round 4 is used for all countries that had elections in 2008 and 2009 after Round 4 was conducted or countries where the main opposition party was formed subsequent to the Round 3 data collection (e.g. Lesotho, Kenya, and Nigeria). Otherwise, Round 3 data was used for countries that had their last election prior to the Round 4 collection (e.g. Senegal and Tanzania).

Notes: The base sample for these calculations was all those respondents who answered that they “felt close” to a particular opposition party in their respective country. The “poor” were determined by first calculating the LPI for all respondents, then choosing a cut-off LPI for the population in the urban areas within that country. The cut-off value was simply the median value for that population group. Since the LPI is ranked such that higher values indicate worse welfare, those with an LPI above that median threshold were classified as “poor.” The value of this measure is that it respects the location-specific nature of poverty, addressing claims that the urban poor are often under-calculated because they are measured by the same standards of rural poverty (see Satterthwaite, 2003). In other words, the urban poor are classified here relative to the overall degree of deprivation within that country’s urban areas rather than in comparison to the living conditions of the rural population. The 50 percent threshold is somewhat arbitrary but also provides a more conservative estimate of the urban poor given that their share varies across countries and cities.

Notwithstanding this caveat, Table 1.3 highlights three main patterns. First, in those countries where the opposition obtained a plurality of votes in major urban centers, a large share of the urban poor in particular claimed to have felt closest to one

of the parties that belong to the opposition. Secondly, in almost all countries, the urban poor favored the opposition more than their rural counterparts, though the variation between the urban poor and rural dwellers is larger in some countries than others. Thirdly, in some countries, there are distinct differences between the urban poor and urban non-poor in terms of their preferences for the opposition while in others, there is more cohesiveness. For example, Senegal's urban non-poor are more supportive of the opposition than the urban poor whereas the reverse is true in urban Ghana. However, in other countries, such as Kenya, Nigeria, and Zambia, a majority of urbanites appear to feel closest to the opposition regardless of their socioeconomic standing. This highlights that while broad urban voting patterns generally mirror the preferences of the urban poor, particularly since this group comprises the majority in most African cities, the views of the urban poor do not always differ from those of other urbanites.




Figure 1.1: Affinity to Opposition among Urban Poor¹³

¹³ Calculations were based on Afrobarometer Round 4 (2008) for all countries that had elections in 2008 and 2009 or countries where the main opposition party was formed subsequent to the Round 3 (2005) data collection (e.g. Lesotho, Kenya, and Nigeria) Otherwise, Round 3 data was used for countries that had their last election prior to the Round 4 collection (e.g. Senegal and Tanzania).

Figure 1.1 also highlights that, according to the Afrobarometer data, there is no exact relationship between the level of urban deprivation and support for opposition parties amongst the poor. Indeed, a large share of support exists for the opposition in countries with a relatively low average urban LPI, such as in Ghana, as well as in countries with very high average LPIs, such as Kenya. Likewise, minimal support for the opposition is clearly visible across countries spanning a wide range of urban LPIs.

The Argument: Populist Strategies and the Urban Poor

Such patterns prompt the primary research question at the heart of this study: when and why do the urban poor support opposition parties in some countries and in some elections but not in others? As the tables and figure above illustrate, addressing this variation requires delving into the internal dynamics between political parties and socioeconomic groups within each country. Yet, few explanations for the voting behavior of Africa's urban poor exist because, as already noted, the literature on this group during the multi-party era is relatively scarce. Consequently, one is forced to either rely on explanations of the urban poor in other areas of the world or evaluate whether common claims about general voting behavior in Africa are easily applicable to the region's urban poor.

There are at least four schools of thought in this respect, which are elaborated in further detail in Chapter Two. First, the literature on vote-buying claims that political parties encourage loyalty among the urban poor by disbursing money, T-shirts, soap, food, etc. during electoral campaigns. Voters see such handouts as an indicator of future benefits they may receive if that particular party came into office. Thus, by extension, voting disparities across Africa would be attributed to how much

For information about how the LPI was calculated, please see the notes accompanying Table 1.3.

largesse that ruling and opposition parties accordingly provided to poor communities before their respective presidential elections.

A second school of thought posits that ethnicity plays a powerful role in shaping electoral preferences in Africa. In a context where education levels are low and party platforms are indistinguishable, ethnicity can serve as an “information shortcut” for voters about which candidate is most likely to be sympathetic to their needs. This may be particularly true in urban areas. Indeed, contrary to the claims of modernization theorists, some scholars have argued that urbanization only exacerbates the salience of ethnicity in the political, social, and economic domains of African city life (e.g. Bates 1983; Melson & Wolpe, 1970). As such, this school of thought implies that the urban poor are more likely to support a particular opposition party when the ethnicity of that party’s leader corresponds to their own.

Economic voting represents a third strand of scholarship. There are at least two types of economic voting. Sociotropic economic voting occurs when constituents decide whether or not to support the incumbent based on the performance of the overall macro-economy (e.g. Lewis-Beck 1988). When party support is predicated on the vagaries of personal economic circumstances, egotropic economic voting occurs. The urban poor are particularly vulnerable to economic downturns because they are more dependent than their rural counterparts on monetized goods and services (Fay 2005; Kessides 2006), but they have fewer resources than the urban elite to withstand such downturns. The retrospective, sociotropic economic voting would therefore imply that the urban poor support the opposition in countries where macroeconomic conditions deteriorate prior to elections. Likewise, the retrospective, egotropic voting hypothesis would postulate that the urban poor vote for the opposition when their personal economic conditions worsen in the period preceding elections.

Finally, the degree of participation in associational life represents another factor that can influence voting behavior. Among Africa's urban poor, associational life is increasingly vibrant, whether in the form of self-help groups or organizations for slum dwellers and informal sector workers. From a social capital perspective, membership in such associations may increase political activism (e.g. Putnam 1993). From a corporatist perspective (e.g. Schmitter 1974), political parties that cater to the demands of, or are formally aligned with, such organizations are more likely to garner the votes of those organizations' members.

For either empirical or theoretical reasons detailed in Chapter Two, all four of these explanations are found incomplete on their own for explaining the disparate voting patterns of Africa's urban poor. Instead, this study focuses on the types of relationships formed between political parties, the urban poor, and other groups of citizens within different countries and over time.

Specifically, the initial assumption of this study is that both parties and the urban poor are rational, utility-maximizers. The urban poor want improvements to their welfare, and parties want to win votes. Compared with both rural dwellers and higher-income urbanites, the urban poor face distinct challenges towards securing improved welfare. Most critically, prices tend to be higher in urban areas and access to goods and services is highly monetized whereas in rural areas, basic goods such as shelter, fuel, and food, may not be marketed but rather self-provisioned (Bratton 2006; Mitlin 2004; Satterthwaite 2004). Most taxes are paid in cities and used to subsidize service provision in rural areas, where taxes on income are extremely rare (UN-Habitat 2003). Even when the urban poor do not pay income taxes, they pay value-added taxes on consumer goods, such as food and beverages. At the same time, the urban poor enjoy fewer informal safety nets in the form of kinship and community networks than their rural counterparts, making poor economic circumstances

particularly difficult to handle (Maxwell *et al.* 2000). Vis-à-vis other urbanites, the urban poor are viewed as a threat to state authority by circumventing property laws and building homes on land for which they lack an official title (e.g. Centeno and Portes 2006). They also lack the resources of other urbanites to privately secure certain services, such as electricity generators and private security guards, when the state is under-providing such goods. Compared to urban professionals, such as teachers and nurses, the urban poor lack the leverage to engage in strike activity to obtain concessions from the state. Overall then, the urban poor are uniquely dependent on the state for their well-being and therefore, choosing which party to elect to national office can hold particularly important implications for them.

Opposition parties intent on winning votes are most likely to gain the support of the urban poor by tapping into the latter's disgruntlement and marginalization. Populist strategies are especially well-suited to this task. In a region dominated by parties using personalistic linkages that advance vague catch-all messages intended to appeal to everyone, parties reliant on populist strategies function in a manner similar to a niche product by providing a good for which there is much demand among the urban poor but little supply. As such, populist parties offer greater differentiation from the dominant party alternatives in Africa, creating a memorable impression on a voter's mind. Moreover, vis-à-vis both the myriad of personalistic parties and the few programmatic parties in the region, populist strategies consist of a policy message with greater congruence to the issues most relevant to the lives of the urban poor, including jobs, taxes, public services, and state harassment. Congruence is defined as the degree of distance between policies advocated by parties and voters' own preferences (see Dalton 1985; Huber and Powell 1994). Indeed, as Nelson (1979) notes, populist parties are more likely than Marxist or reformist parties to be concerned with the urban poor. In addition, she claims that their appeal to the urban poor is linked to their

promise to engage in radical reforms to address the needs of the under-class and their rejection of established parties that rarely respond to the urban poor's interests.

This though prompts a secondary research question: when and why do opposition parties employ a populist strategy to target the urban poor? Populist appeals can generate electoral costs as well as benefits. For instance, opposition parties may lose other potential voters, such as rural constituents, by placing the urban poor at the forefront of their campaigns. As Nelson (1979: 323) suggests, so few parties systematically exploit the electoral opportunities presented by the urban poor because "Political leaders must also weigh the risks of alienating established supporters by overzealous attempts to mobilize the urban poor."

This study argues that two conditions must be met in order for the benefits to outweigh the costs. First, a country must be relatively highly urbanized in order for the mobilization of the urban poor to be a worthwhile electoral strategy for any party. As demonstrated in Table 1.1, most of the countries in which the opposition has proved dominant, in terms of votes gained in the largest city, are highly urbanized. Secondly, an opposition party will employ a populist strategy with the urban poor only if it has the opportunity to appeal to rural voters along other lines, such as identity. Where ethnicity, language, or religion plays a prominent role in society, opposition parties can segment their appeal to different constituents, using policy in urban areas and identity in rural ones.

Building on Gibson's (1997) concept of "metropolitan" and "peripheral" social coalitions, this type of segmented approach allows the opposition to keep its policy proposals targeted to the urban poor, who are the core of the coalition, while relying on a segment of the rural population for the necessary number of votes to win national office. At the same time, identity appeals help opposition parties conserve scarce resources because ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups tend to be geographically

concentrated. This allows the opposition to engage in more targeted and less extensive campaigning in remote rural areas. Where such cleavages are more muted or when identity appeals are not available to an opposition party, then employing a populist strategy with the urban poor is a less practical approach due to the number of other constituents, either in the urban elite or in the rural sector, whose vote opposition parties may lose as a consequence.

Research Cases and Design

This argument is illustrated through a comparative case study approach that spans countries, cities, communities, and individuals. Specifically, the study focuses on political parties and the urban poor in Senegal and Zambia. Besides offering a comparison across countries, the analysis also examines party linkage strategies over time in each country for the purpose of testing the argument's internal validity.

Senegal and Zambia are two of Africa's more urbanized democracies with relatively old capital cities. Officially established in 1857, Dakar's pace of urbanization accelerated with the development of the first rail line in West Africa in 1885 (Scheld 2002). Lusaka was founded in 1905 during the building of a railroad from Cape Town to the mining areas of today's Democratic Republic of Congo (Hansen 2002). The age of both cities means that contemporary urbanization trends are driven more by urban-to-urban migration and natural population growth rather than rural-to-urban migration (ANSD 2005: 181; CSO 2003a). Almost one-quarter of Senegal's population and 50 percent of its urban population resides in Dakar (ANSD 2007a; UN 2007). Thirty-five percent of Zambia's population is considered urbanized and 32 percent of its urban population lives in Lusaka (UN 2007; World Bank 2009b), with other significant portions living in the country's urbanized Copperbelt region.

Income poverty rates are high but still tend to under-state the level of deprivation because they are measured according to national poverty lines rather than separate urban and rural ones. In Dakar, 42 percent of the population were estimated to live below the national poverty line based on 2002 data (Mesple-Somps 2007) while 43 percent of population in urban Lusaka Province is considered poor (World Bank 2007a). The degree of deprivation in Dakar is further emphasized by the fact that 76 percent of the city's population labors in the informal economy, a sector which accounted for 97 percent of employment growth between 1994-2005 (ANSD 2007b: 48; World Bank 2007b). In Zambia, urban unemployment increased from 13.7 to 26 percent between 1990 and 2000 (CSO 2003a) and today, 56 percent of the country's urban population and 69 percent of Lusaka's works in the non-agricultural informal sector (CSO 2007; World Bank 2007a).

Beyond working conditions, each city's poor live in a sub-standard housing environment. Seventy-six percent of Senegal's urban population lives in slums¹⁴ with most of Dakar's poorest residents living in vast irregular settlements in the city's suburbs of Parcelles Assainies, Pikine, and Guediawaye. A majority of these residents, as well as beggars, lepers, and street-peddlers were viewed by authorities as *encombremments humains*, or "human clutter," and pushed out of Dakar's city center during the 1970s and 1980s (Collignon 1984; Zeleza and Eyoh 2003). Conditions in these neighborhoods are dire:

In Pikine for example, an average of 20 households may share a single water source, and many others have no access to a latrine. The consequences of limited urban planning force suburbanites to shift back and forth between the city center and outer areas in search of housing, hospitals, schools, employment opportunities, and other basic resources necessary for survival (Scheld 2002: 86).

Likewise, as a result of British town planning principles, the dearth of government housing initiatives, and the lack of private sector housing development, more than 70

¹⁴ See UN-Habitat database: <http://www.unhabitat.org/> (accessed June 10, 2009).

percent of Lusaka's residents live in squatter settlements on the periphery of the city center, which are popularly referred to as "shanty compounds" or "high-density areas" (Hansen 2002; Mulenga 2003; UN-Habitat 2007). Most of these compounds lack proper infrastructure and key services such as internal plumbing, which in turn often forces communities to share the same latrines and communal water taps (Taylor 2006). As Hansen (2002: 85) surmises, "The health of the public is seriously at risk in Lusaka at the outset of the 21st century due to the combined effects of overcrowding, declining infrastructure, and insufficient services." The return of cholera in the city during every rainy season and the large number of deaths caused by tuberculosis highlight the urgency of the situation.

Despite facing similar living and working conditions, the urban poor in Zambia turned to the opposition during recent presidential elections while their counterparts in Senegal chose to re-elect the incumbent. Specifically, Zambia's ruling party, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), first entered office with strong support in both the country's urban areas and almost all rural provinces. While corruption and economic mismanagement during the 1990s under President Frederick Chiluba significantly reduced the MMD's popularity, economic circumstances improved considerably under President Levy Mwanawasa's tenure, which began in 2001. In fact, under Mwanawasa's New Deal government, the country's inflation dropped to single digits and economic growth averaged approximately five percent, buoyed by improved copper prices and substantial external debt forgiveness (*Economist* 2006; Larmer and Fraser 2007).

Yet, high unemployment and economic disparities persisted and in the October 2006 presidential elections, Mwanawasa and the MMD lost substantially to the Patriotic Front (PF) in Zambia's major urban areas. In Lusaka district, the PF presidential candidate, Michael Sata, obtained 58 percent of the vote compared with

27 percent for Mwanawasa. In the 2008 presidential by-elections that followed Mwanawasa's death, Sata gained 60 percent of the votes in Lusaka compared with 30 percent for the MMD candidate Rupiah Banda. In both elections, Sata's voting shares were particularly high in urban Lusaka's poorest constituencies, such as Chawama, Kanyama, Mandevu, and Matero. Similar high results in cities within the Copperbelt Province lend credibility to Gould's (2007: 8&9) observation that "Michael Sata has brought real *issues* of concern to the urban poor into the political arena."

In Senegal, the current ruling party, *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS) and its leader, Abdoulaye Wade, retained support from the urban poor during the 2007 presidential elections. This occurred despite the fact that few jobs were created during most of President Wade's first term, prompting thousands of Senegalese men to risk their lives by immigrating to Europe in ramshackle fishing boats (Polgreen 2007). Many of President Wade's projects, such as the multi-lane Corniche highway along the Atlantic coast, were deemed to have favored the city's wealthy few rather than the poor majority, prompting observations that life in Dakar was operating "*à deux vitesses*," at two speeds (Meunier 2008: 38). Yet while Dakar's intellectuals supported opposition candidates, such as Ousmane Tanor Dieng of the *Parti Socialiste* (PS), Moustapha Niasse of the *Alliance des Forces de Progrès* (AFP), or Rewmi's Idrissa Seck, many of Dakar's poor surprisingly still supported the incumbent. Indeed, in both the region of Dakar and at the national level, Wade received 55.9 percent of the votes in the first round of the 2007 elections, exceeding the majority needed to obviate a second round. As Galvan (2009: 5) observes, "Tellingly...angry mobs did not take to the streets to denounce the government's alleged 'theft' of the presidential election." Despite Wade's failure to deliver for the urban poor, the latter did not shift their support to the opposition.

The Senegalese opposition's inability to mobilize the urban poor in those elections contrasts starkly with Wade's own stint in the opposition only seven years previously. In fact, during the second round of Senegal's historic 2000 presidential elections, overwhelming support in Dakar helped Abdoulaye Wade and the PDS defeat the then-incumbent PS candidate, Abdou Diouf. The support of other opposition parties for Wade's *Sopi* coalition catapulted Wade to victory during those second round of elections. Critically though, Wade far exceeded the number of votes obtained by any of his competitors in Dakar during the first round of the elections, indicating that Dakarois at that time did not just want a general of change of political regime but a specific change that involved Wade as leader. In particular, Galvan (2001) argues that Wade inspired hope among Dakar's economically marginal youth.

Table 1.4: Schematic of Party Strategies and Outcomes in the Case Study Countries

	SENEGAL		ZAMBIA	
	2000	2007	2001	2006/2008
Strategy by opposition party or parties	Populist strategy by PDS	Personalistic and programmatic linkages	Personalistic linkages	Populist strategy by PF
Outcome in largest city	Opposition PDS wins more than 50 percent of vote	Incumbent PDS wins more than 50 percent of vote	Vote is split amongst opposition parties and incumbent MMD	Opposition PF wins more than 50 percent of vote

Given the comparable situation of the urban poor in both countries, support for the opposition in Zambia's recent presidential election, but not in Senegal's, proves puzzling. As shown in Table 1.4, this disparity though can be attributed to the manner in which the opposition parties in each country mobilized the urban poor and further substantiated by examining changes in mobilization strategies over time. While the PF used a populist strategy with Zambia's urban poor in the 2006 and 2008

elections, Zambia's opposition parties relied on personalistic linkages in the 2001 elections. By contrast, Senegal's opposition parties used personalistic linkages with the urban poor during that country's 2007 elections while the PDS employed a populist strategy with this sector of society during the 2000 elections.

Specifically, in Zambia's 2001 elections, neither of the two main opposition parties, the Forum for Democratic Development (FDD) and the United Party for National Development (UPND), obtained an overwhelming plurality of votes in Zambia's urban centers, including Lusaka, because of their reliance on personalistic linkages. After these elections, Mwanawasa increasingly steered the MMD to a more programmatic orientation, focused on free-market policies intended to attract foreign investment, particularly in the country's copper sector. At the same time though, he placed even greater restrictions on the urban poor by amending the "Street Vending and Nuisances Act" to include more stringent provisions and launching his "Keep Lusaka Clean Campaign," which blamed informal workers for traffic congestion, littering, cholera outbreaks, and deterring business investment in the city. With the help of his Minister of Local Government and Housing, Sylvia Masebo, those living in informal housing settlements were often threatened with, or actually experienced, demolitions (see Mushinge 2007; Mwape 2007). To fortify the MMD's clientelist linkages in rural areas, he simultaneously began a massive fertilizer and food subsidy program for agricultural smallholders under the Food Reserve Agency.

As a consummate political entrepreneur who previously was a major player in the MMD, Michael Sata took advantage of this disgruntlement and used a populist strategy to achieve victory among the urban poor during both the 2006 and 2008 elections. With showmanship tactics, such as arriving at the High Court in a speedboat to register the Patriotic Front (PF) for the 2008 elections, Sata represents the quintessential charismatic politician. Popularly known as "King Cobra," he also has a

record for getting things done. For example, when he was Lusaka District Governor in the 1980s, he provided affordable housing to many residents and cleaned the rubbish off the streets (Gould 2007). In cities, he appeals to the poor based on their main economic priorities, using a campaign slogan of “lower taxes, more jobs, and more money in your pockets.” He simultaneously has increased his share of national votes in each subsequent election by campaigning heavily in the predominantly rural Northern and Luapula Provinces. There, he appeals to voters on the basis of his Bemba identity and espousing that no true Bemba politician has ever been president. In fact, his campaign symbol of Noah’s Ark, intended to indicate that all Zambians should get aboard the PF to survive economic hardships, was nationally advertised only with the Bemba phrase *Pabwato*, meaning “get on the boat.”

When in the opposition, Wade targeted his appeals in urban areas to the unemployed youth and members of the informal sector, relied on simplistic language and innovative campaign messages, and invented a novel form of campaigning, known as the *marches bleues*. Despite his failure to deliver tangible benefits for Dakar’s urban poor during his first term, no one Senegalese opposition party was able to tap into the frustrations of this constituency in the 2007 elections and duplicate Wade’s previous populist strategy. Instead, a majority of the opposition parties in Senegal are perceived as the preserve of Dakar’s *citadins*, or the traditional urban elite, who express discontent with policies via national conferences rather than street protests. They espouse virtually indistinguishable party platforms and claim they represent all Senegalese rather than one particular constituency base. Many of their plans to improve conditions for the urban poor involve stimulating agricultural growth in the countryside and stemming migration to the city, rather than tackling the conditions of those already residing in Dakar.

The failure of any one Senegalese opposition party to employ a populist strategy with the urban poor was in turn affected by their inability to appeal to rural voters along the country's politically salient identity cleavage, which is membership in one of the country's four Muslim Sufi brotherhoods. The two largest and most influential brotherhoods are the Mourides and Tidianes.¹⁵ Sufi brotherhood leaders, known as *marabouts*, play an especially important role in rural areas. During the colonial period, the French formed a close relationship with the *marabouts* in order for the latter to force rural peasants to cultivate peanuts, the country's main export crop. Peasants who cultivated peanuts on either their own land or that of a *marabout* thereby had a means of paying their dues to their *marabout* and to Allah.¹⁶ In the post-colonial period, Léopold Senghor and other Senegalese elites continued this alliance by providing land, credit, and equipment to *marabouts* in exchange for their compliance with state agricultural and trade policies (Boone 1992; O'Brien 1975). As Senegal democratized, this patronage relationship filtered over into the political sphere such that *marabouts* would issue their rural disciples a *ndigël*, or a prescription to vote for a particular candidate, during elections.

During the 2007 elections, Wade courted leaders of the Mouride brotherhood, obtaining official endorsement from the Mouride *Khalifa Général*, Cheikh Saliou Mbacké, on the eve of the elections. At the same time, he also co-opted the leadership of one sect of the Tidiane brotherhood. This in turn prevented opposition parties from using religious appeals for significant rural votes. Consequently, opposition parties such as the PS, AFP, and *Rewmi* were forced to rely on personalistic linkages with the urban poor so as to avoid losing any potential supporters in the rural areas.

¹⁵ The other two orders are the Qadiriya and the Layène (see Beck 2008).

¹⁶ In the version of Senegalese Islam, *marabouts* possess the power to grant salvation to their disciples, who are in turn required to obey and pay homage to their spiritual leader (Boone 1992: 41).

These cases and the study's main arguments are illustrated in greater detail with four main types of evidence. First, semi-structured interviews were conducted with ruling and opposition political party elites, journalists, civil society members, local academics, and development experts. As recommended by Blee and Taylor (2002), respondents were chosen according to the principles of "completeness" and "dissimilarity" such that they spanned different categories of actors who would also possess diverse views on their country's respective political environment. These actors were asked about differences in the ideologies of their countries' main political parties, who comprise the main constituency base of each party, and whether parties possess any specific policy proposals aimed at the urban poor.

No known surveys exist of the voting decisions of Africa's urban poor. To fill this gap, around 400 total surveys were conducted with informal sector workers in the capital cities of Dakar and Lusaka during September to November 2008 and February to April 2009, respectively. In each city, these surveys occurred in ten different markets, which is where many informal sector workers spend most of their day vending from either stalls or on the side of the street. The ten markets in each city spanned different electoral constituencies and included both centrally-located markets as well as more peripheral ones. The rationale for focusing on markets rather than households was that during weekdays, most of the urban poor and particularly men are not at home unless they have a home-based business. Moreover, the markets attract individuals from across the city, allowing the survey sample to capture a mixture of ages as well as those with different linguistic and educational backgrounds. Also, based on national survey data, a high percentage of those laboring in the informal sector within each country are concentrated in the retail and trade sectors, which is the predominant domain of the markets.

Twenty people were selected in each market, and the survey procedure relied on a random sampling procedure stratified according to gender. Research in other areas of the world highlights that female and male voters can have different preferences for candidates or policy proposals (e.g. Inglehart and Norris 2000). Moreover, in the markets, there tends to be a form of gender segregation such that women dominate vending in the food and fabric sector while men concentrate on selling cheap manufactured goods or work as shoe-shiners, carpenters, and tailors. Stratifying on gender therefore allowed me to ensure that all such occupations were covered.¹⁷ Unlike other variables, such as ethno-linguistic identity or even age, gender is also the easiest marker for stratification without asking respondents questions *ex-ante*. Respondents who were younger than 18 years-old and those who did not have Senegalese or Zambian citizenship were purposely excluded since these individuals are not eligible to vote in either country's elections.

Thirdly, to confirm that the views of the market workers represented those of the broader urban poor, more in-depth surveys were conducted with 30 slum or squatter households across three different neighborhoods within each city. Following Dietz (1998), the housing settlements were chosen in each city according to Przeworski and Teune's (1970) "most similar" and "most different" strategies. While the settlements all contained low-income residents, they varied in that a) they were located in different electoral constituencies of their respective city, b) some have a contentious relationship with the state authorities while others do not, and c) some have been prime targets for non-governmental organization (NGO) and international donor service delivery projects while others were not. More details on the choice of

¹⁷ Research by Macharia (1997) in Nairobi, Kenya revealed that the ruling regime may craft different relationships with different sub-sectors of the informal economy.

markets and neighborhoods and the administration of the surveys are provided in Chapter Four.

Lastly, in order to determine candidates' campaign strategies in rural areas, census data and newspaper reports were used. Drawing on the logic underlying Posner's (2005) work on which identity cleavages become more salient than others, census data from each country reveals the share of the population belonging to various ethnic, linguistic, and religious categories, and whether these identities are geographically concentrated in rural areas. This information is then combined with newspaper reports of candidates' campaign stops during each country's most recent elections, which reveals whether or not they were concentrating their campaigns in rural regions where the population overwhelmingly belongs to one particular ethnic, linguistic, or religious group.

Study Outline and Broader Contribution

The remainder of the study is organized into five chapters. Chapter Two examines theories about the preferences of the urban poor and derives potential hypotheses regarding their voting decisions. In particular, it examines the role of vote-buying, ethnicity, economic voting, and associational life in influencing voting decisions. It then advances this study's central argument, which is that voting decisions by the urban poor depend on the linkage strategies used by political parties to incorporate them into the political arena. A populist strategy in particular is more likely to attract the urban poor than alternative party-voter relationships because it offers greater differentiation and greater congruence. A typology of linkages is introduced that distinguishes clientelistic, personalistic, and programmatic linkages according to a party's constituency base, mode of mobilization, the role of voter participation, and implications for party organization. The similarities and differences

with a populist strategy are then elaborated. The chapter further discusses how the semi-structured interviews and survey materials will be employed to help operationalize party linkages and the concepts of differentiation and congruence.

Chapter Three delves into the contemporary political context of Senegal and Zambia and focuses on the linkage strategies parties have used with the urban poor. Due to the fact that party linkage strategies can change over time, different electoral periods since 2000 are examined in each country. In Senegal, the populist strategy employed by Wade and the PDS in 2000 are compared with those used by other political parties during that election. In turn, the personalistic strategies of the PS, AFP, and *Rewmi* parties are examined within the context of the 2007 elections and highlighted as a reason for Wade's re-election despite his failure to noticeably improve their welfare during his first term. In Zambia, most of the opposition parties relied on personalistic linkages in the 2001 elections and therefore none could garner a sizeable share of votes amongst the urban poor despite widespread disillusionment with the ruling MMD. While the MMD became more programmatically-oriented by the 2006 elections, Michael Sata and the PF relied on a populist strategy with Lusaka's underclass to both defeat Mwanawasa and the other opposition parties competing in those elections. He was able to sustain that strategy and repeat this performance in 2008, when the MMD advanced Rupiah Banda as its presidential candidate.

Chapter Four relies on the survey materials collected from the urban poor in the markets and the slums in order to understand how they view the political landscape in their respective countries. By using a series of binomial logit models, the alternative hypotheses discussed in Chapter Two are tested with respect to Senegal's 2007 as well as Zambia's 2008 elections. In both countries, associational membership among respondents is minimal and retrospective sociotropic and egotropic perceptions of the economy do not predict voting behavior at a statistically significant level.

Likewise, vote-buying fails to explain support for the opposition candidate, Sata, in Zambia and for the incumbent, Wade, in Senegal. Although ethnicity was a statistically significant predictor of support for Sata, with Bemba voters more likely to vote for him than for other parties, he received cross-ethnic support and no respondents claimed that ethnicity alone was the main factor in their voting decisions. Rather, most of Sata's supporters claimed they supported him because of the PF's manifesto and their belief that of all the country's political parties, the PF was most interested in improving living conditions in Lusaka.

By contrast, most respondents in Senegal supported Wade in 2007 not because they appreciated his policies but because he had promised to change them. Ironically, their disappointment manifested in support for the incumbent rather than any of the opposition parties. A majority of respondents further admitted to seeing no distinction among their country's parties, few understood the concept of a party platform, and most believed that no Senegalese party was particularly interested in improving Dakar's living conditions. The comparison of survey results emphasizes that an opposition party reliant on a populist strategy with the urban poor offers greater differentiation and issue congruence than existing alternatives and therefore is more likely to secure the urban poor's votes.

Chapter Five examines the second research question, namely why and when parties choose to target the urban poor through a populist strategy. It is argued that the logic of electoral coalition building primarily explains when parties decide to take advantage of the electoral opportunities presented by the urban poor by specifically targeting them through a populist strategy. For opposition parties, a populist strategy oriented towards the urban poor is most likely to emerge in countries where societal cleavages exist that allow the opposition party to segment its message and thereby

target the urban poor in cities with a populist strategy while appealing to rural dwellers along identity lines.

The argument is then applied to the two case study countries. In Zambia, the PF has complemented its populist strategy with the urban poor with the use of Bemba ethnic appeals to the rural population in order to build a unique social coalition. Otherwise, Sata's dependence on populist appeals alone to the urban poor would prove insufficient for gaining substantial national votes. Yet, this same strategy was unavailable to opposition parties in Senegal during the 2007 presidential elections because the incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade, had already co-opted the religious leaders from two Sufi brotherhoods. As such, Senegalese opposition parties were forced to use more personalistic appeals in urban areas to avoid alienating potential rural supporters, who could not be mobilized through identity appeals.

In order to evaluate the argument against data from outside the initial cases used to generate the theory, Chapter Six applies the study's central arguments to three other African democracies, Botswana, Kenya, and South Africa. These cases confirm that a populist strategy not only is a winning approach for mobilizing the urban poor but also that it almost always is complemented by appeals to a segment of rural voters along identity lines. In addition, the cases show that a populist strategy is not just available to opposition parties but rather can be used by incumbents as well to reinvigorate their party's support among the urban poor. Chapter Six also summarizes the major findings and broader contributions of the entire study while also suggesting areas for further research on political parties and the urban poor.

Taken as a whole, this study on party strategies and voter preferences provides a contribution in at least four domains. First, the study aims to push Africanist scholarship in new directions. While a majority of literature on African politics focuses on voting behavior, electoral outcomes, or party systems alone, this study is

one of the few that examines how parties actually interact with citizens. By recognizing intra-urban disparities and not just rural-urban cleavages, it further emphasizes the value of a sub-national approach for gaining a more nuanced understanding of the variety of electoral constituencies in Africa with which parties interact. At the same time, the study does not simply examine "the opposition" as a monolithic entity but rather differentiates African opposition parties according to how they mobilize the urban poor and other constituents.

A second contribution is to embed Africa in cross-regional discussions about democratic trajectories. In other regions of the world, demographic and socioeconomic dynamics have long represented the impetus for shifts in voters' behavior and their relationships with political parties. For example, rapid urbanization and processes of economic informalization that contributed to contemporary manifestations of populism in Latin America offer a useful lens for understanding the African experience.

Populist strategies, as defined in this dissertation, represent a fusion of personalistic, programmatic, and clientelistic linkages. As such, the third contribution is to highlight how, contrary to Kitschelt's (2000) claims, all three linkages can be simultaneously combined to provide an especially potent means of mobilization. Moreover, the study illustrates how parties can use disparate linkages with different constituents within the same country and over time.

Finally, the study speaks to the importance of opposition parties for generating the level of contestation and citizen participation that characterizes a genuine electoral democracy. In many African countries, opposition parties consistently fail to defeat incumbent parties. Though incumbent advantages explain part of this trend, the lack of credible opposition parties is also an important factor. As will be shown in the following pages, in order to have meaningful multi-party competition, opposition

parties must not just participate in elections but use such occasions to articulate citizens' preferences. By targeting the priorities of the urban poor, opposition parties using populist strategies represent a credible alternative to the status quo for this particular constituency, and their presence in elections can therefore facilitate the turnover of incumbents. Thus, how the growing ranks of the urban poor are incorporated into the political arena will prove significant not only for their own welfare but also for broader party development and democratic consolidation.

CHAPTER TWO

Drivers of Voting Behavior among Africa's Urban Poor: The Appeal of Populist Party Strategies

Introduction

Explanations for the motivations underlying the voting behavior of Africa's urban poor are scarce, and the broader political preferences of this group remain unexplored. Nonetheless, this chapter draws on four strands of literature to derive possible hypotheses for when and why the urban poor support opposition parties. First, from findings in other regions of the developing world, the literature on clientelism postulates that the urban poor support the political party that offers the most selective benefits in exchange for votes, and this often tends to be the incumbent. Secondly, scholarship squarely focused on Africa highlights the salience of ethnic cleavages in voting decisions, predicting that a poor, urban voter will support a co-ethnic candidate. These first two schools of thought imply relative stability in voting alignments over time. The economic voting literature, which constitutes the third school of thought, argues that voters will punish or reward incumbents for the handling of the macroeconomy or for changes in their own personal economic circumstances. Since most of their goods and services are monetized, the urban poor in particular are very sensitive to fluctuations in the macroeconomy and will accordingly withhold votes from an incumbent when inflation rises and incomes tumble. Fourthly, many micro-level studies explore the associational life of Africa's urban poor. This literature portrays either a completely self-sufficient urban underclass, divorced entirely from placing demands on the ruling regime, or a highly politicized sector of society that may even possess direct ties with a political party.

For either empirical or theoretical reasons detailed in the rest of this chapter, each hypothesis is an incomplete explanation of voter motivations on its own. For

example, politicians may still engage in clientelist practices or ethnic appeals, but these practices on their own are not likely to overwhelmingly win over the urban poor. Instead, it is argued here that the urban poor's voting decisions depend on the types of relationships established with them by political parties during election periods. Building on the work of Kitschelt (2000), the chapter proceeds to delineate three types of linkages according to not only their mode of mobilization but also their constituency base. Subsequently, it introduces the idea of populist strategies, which represent an amalgam of these three linkages. The chapter then details the logic underlying the central argument of this study: opposition parties that rely on populist strategies are more likely to obtain votes from Africa's urban poor than parties that rely on any of the other party linkages alone. The reason for this is twofold. First, parties that employ populist strategies provide greater differentiation for voters than personalistic linkages, which tend to represent the norm in Africa. Secondly, the appeals inherent within a populist strategy offer greater congruence with the policy issues most relevant to the working and living conditions of the urban poor. The chapter further describes the conceptualization and operationalization of party linkages and populist strategies as well as the causal mechanisms of differentiation and congruence.

Payments and Promises for Votes?

Clientelism, or the distribution of resources and promises to a select group of constituents in exchange for votes and loyalty, does not sufficiently explain the voting behavior of Africa's urban poor for two reasons. First, incumbents tend to possess more resources than the opposition, meaning that we would rarely observe the opposition winning support in urban centers. Secondly, the opposition tends to concentrate those scarce resources that it does possess in urban rather than rural areas.

As such, the urban poor can presumably accept resources from every party but still vote for the one that they most prefer. In other words, clientelism does not ultimately explain why the urban poor supports an opposition party over an incumbent, or one opposition party over another, if all parties are engaged in the same practice.

Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to first examine why clientelism often is deemed the dominant mode of interaction between political parties and the urban poor. For Walton (1998), clientelism presents the least costly means of redressing grievances that is simultaneously amenable to both the state and the urban poor. Similarly, based on the Argentine experience, Stokes (2005) argues that clientelism is easiest when voters are poor enough to value private goods highly but the party values them very little. According to survey data, she found that the higher an Argentinean's income, the less likely it was that he/she would accept a gift in the hopes that it would influence his/her vote. Dixit and Londregan (1996) and Calvo and Murillo (2004) have also advanced the argument that clientelism appeals most to the poor because income has diminishing marginal utility as someone becomes richer.¹⁸ For Kitschelt (2000), in the absence of a welfare state, clientelism mitigates instability caused by distributional struggles because it appeases the poor without necessarily hurting the affluent and concurrently benefits the established political order. Burnheim (1985) also adheres to such sentiments, noting that people get more out of politics when party patrons are looking for clients rather than just followers.

Two main types of clientelism repeatedly appear in this literature. One type, largely derived from observations in Latin America and South Asia, emphasizes the importance of established vertical ties between parties and the urban poor. By becoming embedded in the neighborhoods and workplaces of the urban poor and

¹⁸ Kitschelt (2000) classifies such explanations as part of the "developmentalist school" on clientelism, which emphasizes that more affluent and educated citizens will both value their votes more as well as demand private goods that are too expensive for parties to provide.

forming long-term relationships with them, local party patrons attempt to foster among constituents a sense of loyalty as well as a fear of losing access to certain goods and services. For example, Auyero (1999) focuses on a pro-Peronist shantytown in Buenos Aires and notes the installation of offices, known as *Unidades Básicas*, in such neighborhoods that operate as brokers for the party: “Peronist brokers function as gatekeepers for the flow of goods and services coming from the executive branch of the municipal power (the mayor) and the flow of support and votes coming from the ‘clients’”(p.303). In Mexico, Magaloni *et al.* (2007) observe that during the 1980s, the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) tried to create clientelist links with new migrants in city slums and informal workers by offering property titles, jobs, subsidized food and housing, and licenses for vending in flea markets. Likewise, Eckstein (2001) highlights how in the wake of an earthquake in the 1980s that destroyed slum dwellers’ housing in Mexico City, the PRI entered into a pact with residents to provide them with affordable housing and even a free tank of gas in exchange for their political support.¹⁹ From research on clientelism in the slums of Karachi, Pakistan, Jan van der Linden (1989) reminds scholars that such relationships should not be deemed irrational for the urban poor or a sign of “false consciousness” but rather a means for obtaining protection and desired goods.

Yet, this mode of clientelism requires intermediaries. In order to disburse benefits for votes or punishments for disloyalty, parties require the ability to monitor the actions of constituents, which in turn requires an efficient means of information gathering. Auyero (1999) stresses that in order for clientelism to be effective, strong, face-to-face relationships are required on an everyday basis, not just around elections.

¹⁹ Also in Mexico, Holzner (2006) examines the PRI’s influence in a squatter community and concludes that clientelism based on strong, vertical linkages can also stifle information flows and prevent the urban poor from learning about alternative party options. In his view, this explains why despite receiving few substantial benefits over the previous twenty years, the members of this community continued to support the PRI.

Furthermore, mass parties that have deteriorated into patronage machines can benefit from more institutionalized structures to engage in such clientelism.²⁰ Based on her research of Argentina's Peronist party, Stokes (2005: 322) finds that parties with a "tentacle-like organization" are most amenable to engaging in clientelist practices. In the same vein, Kitschelt (2000: 849) notes that "the complexity of material resource flows" inherent to this type of clientelism can thrive "through heavy investments in the administrative infrastructure of multilevel political machines that reach from the summits of national politics down to the municipal level."

While examples of this type of institutionalized clientelism do exist in Africa, they primarily exist in rural areas where traditional authorities perform the function of brokers. According to Stokes (2005), the monitoring necessary for this type of clientelism is more feasible in smaller communities, such as villages, where it is easier to gain knowledge about whether someone is inclined to support one party over another. Informal mechanisms of social control through traditional authorities in rural areas can further spread this knowledge. For example, Senegal's *Parti Socialiste* distributed credit, monetary benefits, and agricultural equipment to Mouride *marabouts*, who controlled production of the country's peanut sector, in order to maintain support from the rural population for agricultural policy decisions and to obtain votes during elections (see Villalón 1995).²¹ Baldwin (2008) similarly examines how goods and services by the MMD to rural villages in Zambia are channeled through traditional chiefs, whose legitimacy can in turn deliver votes for the ruling party. While such situations prove advantageous for both the party and the broker,

²⁰ Mass parties originally emerged in 19th and 20th century Europe as a result of mobilization by the working classes. Historically, they relied on trade unions and social movements to engage voters, and they established nationwide networks to expand membership and to espouse the party's ideology (Gunther and Diamond 2001).

²¹ Chapters Three and Five detail how the current president, Abdoulaye Wade, has reverted back to this practice with the Mourides for the purpose of electoral gain.

how much the rural poor benefit from this clientelism remains unclear. Drawing on insights from Bayart (1993) and Rothschild (1985), van de Walle (2007) indeed notes that this first type of clientelism in Africa primarily is oriented to serve the needs of elites and to help them build coalitions that span ethnic, regional, or religious divides.²² He observes that the weakness of African party systems and the centralization of power around individuals rather than established parties explain the dearth of mass-based patronage machines organized around vertical ties with the poor. Table 2.1 draws on public opinion data from Afrobarometer to illustrate that most voters in major metropolitan centers in Africa do not believe that their votes are monitored by political elites.

Table 2.1: Assessment of Vote Monitoring by Parties in African Democracies

Country	Region in which Largest City is Located	How likely do you think it is that powerful people can find out how you voted? (% of Respondents in Region)		
		<i>Not Likely</i>	<i>Likely</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>
Benin	Littoral	86.6	12.5	0.8
Botswana	Gaborone	91	7.7	1.4
Ghana	Greater Accra	81	10.4	8.7
Kenya	Nairobi	90.5	8	1.1
Lesotho	Maseru	51.4	39	9.6
Malawi	South (Blantyre)	82.2	13.1	4.6
Mali	Bamako	48.5	20.3	31.3
Mozambique	Maputo City	64	12.6	23.4
Namibia	Khomas	58.7	32.2	9
Nigeria	Lagos	64.4	35.2	0.5
Senegal	Dakar	62.9	27	9.8
South Africa	Gauteng	59.8	36.1	4.1
Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	57.9	39	3.1
Uganda	Kampala	66	29.8	4.2
Zambia	Lusaka	57.4	30.7	11.4

Source: Calculated from question 48a in Afrobarometer Round 4 Data, accessed at <http://www.afrobarometer.org/>

²² Arriola (2009) confirms this, finding that across 40 African countries, patronage via the expansion of cabinet appointments facilitates the accommodation of elites who are from different ethno-regional groups.

As such, a second type of clientelism, which focuses on the distribution of gifts and promises as part of election campaigns, rather than on the creation of long-term relationships, is the more dominant form of clientelism practiced with Africa's poor. Its manifestations are readily observable in both rural and urban communities. Hats, T-shirts, and bright sarongs covered with candidates' faces and party symbols are standard fare during election campaigns in Africa. In many cases, free bus trips to rallies, money, meals, and even beer are provided as inducements. For Fox (1994: 157&158), such clientelism can actually be termed "semi-clientelism" because individuals cannot be easily punished for disloyalty at the ballot box. Instead of threatening to punish, candidates can only claim that their largesse is a precursor to even greater benefits if they are elected into office. In turn, such claims are "unenforceable deals" for both sides because the candidate cannot be sure the voter will support him/her and the voter cannot be sure of the candidate's future actions. Stokes (2007: 606) distinguishes this second type of clientelism as a sub-type of the first and accordingly labels it "vote buying."

A burgeoning area of survey research has not only measured the vote buying sub-type of clientelism in broadly similar ways across different African countries but also concluded that its presence does not unequivocally determine electoral outcomes. Using an experimental design approach, Wantchekon's (2003) study in Bénin focused on eight electoral districts that were each divided into three sub-groups. In the first sub-group, voters were exposed only to campaign messages that stressed the delivery of public goods and government jobs only to the members of that community. In the second sub-group, voters only heard from politicians "public policy" messages, which focused on national issues. The final sub-group, which was the control group, heard both types of messages. While Wantchekon found that first type of message worked particularly well for regionally-based candidates as well as incumbents, he also

discovers that such clientelist appeals are not uniformly accepted, even amongst the poorest of voters. In Ghana, Lindberg and Morrison (2008) likewise classified clientelism in terms of vote buying, defining it as promises of personal favors, service, patronage, or assistance to a voter or a member of the voter's family. Their econometric analyses reveal that such promises play a minor role in influencing outcomes in Ghanaian elections. Drawing on Afrobarometer survey data for Kenya and Zambia, Young (2009a) operationalizes clientelism in two ways: as a party representative offering a survey respondent food or a gift in return for his/her vote and how often the respondent contacts his/her member of parliament (MP) for help with a problem. Measured in this manner, the results show that clientelism does not increase the likelihood that a voter in either country will support his/her MP again at the polls. Using experimental methods in São Tomé e Príncipe, Vicente (2008) provides more nuance by finding that vote buying is more effective with rural than with urban voters.

With regards to Africa's urban poor, additional theoretical reasons cast doubt on the ability of vote buying to shape voting alignments. As noted above, the poor in general are the most likely to be targeted by parties using vote buying because more affluent voters can afford the goods that parties disburse. At the same time, opposition parties typically possess fewer resources than incumbents and have limited geographical coverage during campaigns (see Salih and Nordlund 2007). In fact, opposition parties typically concentrate their campaigns in dense urban areas to ensure that these resources go as far as possible. These two facts combined imply that the urban poor will be courted by many different parties, all offering material goods and promises. Since these exchanges are "unenforceable deals," the urban poor can accept the generosity of all the parties while still voting for their favorite candidate, or abstaining entirely, on election day. Indeed, based on research conducted in Bénin in 1996, Banégas (1998) found that voters took advantage of political competition,

accepting gifts from every party and then actually voting according to other criteria and interests. Also based on research in Bénin, Wantchekon (2003) discovers that amidst this vote buying, the incumbent candidate is believed to be the most credible because he/she is already in office. Based on their analysis of Nigeria's 2007 elections, Collier and Vicente (2009) likewise find that vote buying practices often favor the incumbent rather than opposition challengers. By extension then, if this type of clientelism is the driving factor for the urban poor's voting behavior, then the opposition would rarely ever win substantial majorities amongst this group, contradicting current voting patterns across the continent. Thirdly, as Magaloni *et al.* (2007) observe, parties cannot rely exclusively on vote buying as a campaign strategy precisely because it can be very expensive and offers few guarantees about the ultimate electoral outcome.

Thus, neither type of clientelism provides a convincing explanation for the voting behavior of Africa's urban poor. Both types are believed to appeal particularly to the poor. Yet, clientelism characterized by institutionalized, long-term relationships with the urban poor is more infrequent in the African context than in other developing regions. The vote buying sub-type of clientelism, which is oriented around campaign gifts and promises, creates uncertainty about the actions of voters and the credibility of candidates' pledges. Since vote buying practiced by incumbent parties is believed to be the most credible, and presumably the most generous, we would rarely observe a majority of the urban poor in some African countries offering their support to relatively young opposition parties if such clientelism represented the primary driving force behind voting decisions. In addition, precisely because vote-buying by both incumbents and the opposition is widespread throughout Africa, this variable fails to provide a useful explanation on its own for when and why the urban poor support the opposition.

Ethnic Voting Alignments

Similarly, recent empirical research on ethnicity in Africa as well as theoretical insights about the diminished salience of ethnic identity in cities cast doubt that ethnicity represents the *sole* feature driving the voting decisions of the urban poor. The motivation for thinking otherwise derives from Rokkan and Lipset's (1967) seminal work on party systems, which emphasized that societies contain a hierarchy of cleavage structures that in turn influence voter alignments. Indeed, a large portion of the literature on Africa stresses the prominence of ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages within the political sphere.

Ethnicity in particular frequently is portrayed as a tool strategically used by skilled political entrepreneurs to capture a share of the electorate. During the era of one-party rule, Zolberg (1966) highlighted how political leaders used a mantra of unity and the fear of ethnic tensions as a means of justifying the banning of opposition parties. Yet, even if political leaders publicly denounced the role of ethnicity in political affairs, many nonetheless manipulated ethnicity as a means to stay in power (Ottaway 1999). For instance, Posner (2004a) demonstrates that Malawi's Hastings Banda assessed the country's electoral geography and in turn decided to exploit cleavages between the Chewa and Tumbuka groups as a means of holding on to political power. With respect to the multi-party era, Ottaway (1999) claims that ethnicity remains a salient feature in electoral politics because the swiftness of democratic transitions gave parties little time to develop their policy programs while the concurrent discrediting of socialism increased the difficulty for parties to define themselves in ideological terms.

Why, however, would ethnic appeals attract voters? According to van de Walle (2007), in the absence of programmatic parties, individuals may resort to ethnic voting in the expectation that they are more likely to receive certain goods and

services from a co-ethnic than from a politician with a different background. Such “cognitive shortcuts” are particularly useful for those with minimal education and few other means to distinguish political parties (Norris and Mattes 2003). Indeed, Kimenyi (2006) claims that ethnic groups are akin to interest groups with high exit and entry barriers, and ethnic diversity precludes a socially-optimal distribution of public goods by increasing the transaction costs of cross-ethnic collective action. By contrast, because collective action problems can be addressed more efficiently within an ethnic group and because ethnic groups tend to be geographically concentrated, intra-ethnic cooperation facilitates the acquisition of local public goods, which can materialize when a co-ethnic is in power.

Empirical research based on survey data provides ambiguous evidence about the impact of ethnicity on voting behavior. For instance, using data from Afrobarometer, Norris and Mattes (2003) examine whether a link exists between ethno-linguistic identification and party identification. While they find that there is a significant relationship between the two variables, they concede that other structural factors as well as government performance also influence party support in most countries. Lindberg and Morrison (2008) administered their own survey to explicitly examine voting behavior, and they find that ethnicity was not an overriding determinant of voting decisions over the course of the 1996 and 2000 national elections in Ghana. Rather, ethnicity is only a factor in supporting certain parties for about 10 percent of respondents. Otherwise, the vast majority of survey respondents chose parties based on their past performance, their future potential, or their policy proposals. Wantchekon’s (2003) field experiment in Benin also revealed that voting decisions are far from determined by a candidate’s ethnic affiliation.

These studies, however, do not distinguish between rural and urban voters but rather aggregate all voters together. In the specific context of urban Africa, the

salience of ethnicity and its implications for the political arena have been contested by anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists. On the one hand, urbanization can foster inter-ethnic competition over scarce resources and opportunities within the city. For Bates (1983: 164-165), the benefits of modernization are limited but also highly visible and desired by many in an urban setting, and ethnic groups therefore rationally compete with each other to obtain them. For him, competition occurs along ethnic lines because ethnic groups constitute a “minimum winning coalition,” meaning they are large enough to gain benefits from the inter-ethnic competition for resources but small enough to maximize the per capita value of these benefits since they are only distributed to members of the group. Based on an analysis of Nigeria, Melson and Wolpe (1970: 1115) likewise argue that urban areas create conditions for zero-sum conflict amongst different ethnic groups:

Nowhere is the reality of ‘modern scarcity’ experienced more intensely than in the cities, wherein the rate of population growth invariably exceeds the rate of economic development and the availability of new jobs. It is here that the various elements of the mobilized population are thrown into direct, and very personal, competition with one another---for positions within governmental agencies and commercial concerns, for the control of local markets, for admission to crowded schools, for induction into the army, and for control of political parties.

In his study of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Young (1965) concurred that urban ethnic tensions could be linked to a strong demand for resources that outstrip supply as well as the tendency for social status to overlap ethnic divisions (pp.256 &263). He further observed that the co-existence of ethnic groups in urban areas contributed to a heightened sense of cultural identity.

Such observations have been echoed by Cohen (1969), who noted the growth of ethnic associations in urban Nigeria intended to assist newly arrived migrants in the search for housing and income, as well as Chege (1981), whose analysis of local politics in Nairobi’s slums illustrated that urban settlement was highly ethnically segmented. Huntington and Nelson (1979) also note that African cities contain a large

number of urban migrants who ultimately intend to retire to the countryside and thereby retain an attachment to rural ethnic ties and village of origin. For the urban poor in particular, Nelson (1979) argues that ethnic ties are the main source of information, employment opportunities, and political participation in Africa. In addition, she believes that the inability of the urban poor to forge cross-ethnic linkages inhibits their ability to act as a unified political class and therefore she concludes that voting, along with other forms of participation, would occur along ethnic rather than socio-economic lines.

On the other hand, theorists argued that urbanization reduces the salience of ethnicity via a variety of mechanisms, including through socioeconomic development, the exacerbation of inequality within ethnic groups, or exposure to greater diversity. Scholars of the modernization school proposed a teleological viewpoint and claimed that urbanization constituted a key element of modernization, accompanying an expansion in literacy, industrialization, and growth and contributing to more progressive and cosmopolitan world views that erode parochial forms of identification (e.g. Lerner 1968; Lipset 1959; Parsons 1975). A few case studies support this perspective in the African context. In Bamako, Meillassoux (1968) found that the Muslim religion and the availability of Bambara as a *lingua franca* contributed to the creation of a new urban identity that transcended rural, ethnic affinities. Crowder (1962: 83) likewise claimed that “tribal” identities were difficult to maintain in Dakar where he noted that a “new community of Dakarais” were emerging. For others, the expansion of education and media that accompanies such socioeconomic and demographic processes tends to increase inequalities within ethnic groups while also creating a basis for shared interests and experiences that foster new solidarities across ethnic groups (e.g. Beteille 1970; Hargrave 1970). Proponents of the “contact hypothesis,” such as Allport (1954), also argued that prolonged interaction with others

reduces barriers to communication and thereby increases mutual awareness of shared characteristics, whereas infrequent contact can reinforce hostile stereotyping. Cities in particular provide more of a forum for such interaction than dispersed rural areas.

Excluding this present study, there are no known contemporary empirical studies of whether ethnicity specifically affects the voting behavior of urbanites and the urban poor in African elections. Without such data, there are additional theoretical reasons for questioning whether ethnicity trumps all other considerations for the urban poor when they go to the polls. First, a constructivist view of ethnicity emphasizes that the urban milieu may cause identities to be constantly re-defined and that ethnic groups are not necessarily cohesive or monolithic. Indeed, rather than ethnicity becoming transplanted to the city or modernization eroding such affinities, Ferguson (1999) found during his study of mineworkers in Zambia's Copperbelt an overlapping duality in urban identities that were both "localist" and "cosmopolitan." Eyoh (2007) echoes this sentiment, noting that cities contribute to the creation of distinct urban identities that are highly heterogeneous and shaped by transnational cultural influences, youth, religion, class, locality, gender, *and* ethnicity. The mutability of ethnicity may be even further enhanced by changing demographic patterns since fewer urbanites today are retiring to their rural villages and since most urbanization is fueled by natural population growth in cities or urban-to-urban, rather than *rural*-to-urban, migration (Freund 2007; Tacoli 2001).²³ Indeed, one would expect that the salience of ethnicity would be most muted in older cities, which are the ones where natural population growth predominantly fuels urbanization and where communal enclaves would have had more time to diversify.

²³ Tacoli (2001) notes that while rural-to-urban migration accounted for over 40 percent of urban growth in the 1960s and 1970s, it only accounted for about 25 percent during the 1980s and 1990s.

Secondly, it is not clear that ethnicity serves the same political function in urban areas as it does in rural ones. For rural dwellers with less access to media and divergent views, a candidate's ethnicity may be interpreted as a sign of a credible commitment to deliver goods and services. However, given the higher population density of urban areas, opposition parties in particular are likely to concentrate a majority of campaign efforts in cities so as to ensure that their limited resources go as far as possible. As a result, urban residents are more likely than their rural counterparts to learn about the various party options available and to make their voting decisions accordingly.

Thirdly, even if ethnic attachments remain strong for urbanites and the urban poor, political parties cannot feasibly take advantage of such affinities in their election campaigns. Indeed, according to Barkan (1995), rural populations tend to lack an occupational or class identity and therefore define their interests based on where they live instead of what they do, thereby explaining the geographic concentration of votes in rural areas during African elections. For political parties, this implies that ethnic appeals are more feasible in a rural setting. In cities however, political parties cannot target their campaign messages as easily along ethnic lines because this would require knowing *ex-ante* whether the urban poor are neatly segregated into ethnically distinct housing townships, who is actually attending political rallies to hear the party message, and who within these townships is actually registered to vote. This degree of knowledge is rarely available to African political parties and even if it were, the possibility of alienating other groups with an ethnic message is quite high in an urban setting. Moreover, according to Eyoh (2007), ethnic residential segregation is less of a reality today than in the past precisely because of the rapid growth of African cities and the attendant expansion of both poor and mixed-income neighborhoods.

Given the prominence of ethnicity in studies on Africa, one cannot outright dismiss the impact of this variable on voting behavior. Yet, its influence may vary across urban and rural areas. Since rural areas have less access to the media, encounter fewer opposition candidates because of the latter's resource constraints, and tend to possess more homogeneous and geographically-concentrated identities, ethnicity may hold greater symbolic power of a candidate's commitments. By contrast, urbanites encounter greater ethnic diversity on a daily basis and more information about alternative political options. While the urban poor in particular may not necessarily possess a clear class consciousness, the urban setting offers more axes for unity, including the need for quality public services and job opportunities, than division.²⁴ Furthermore, both the inconclusive nature of the literature and the lack of voting data on this particular issue cast doubt that ethnicity is the *dominant* means by which the urban poor select a political party.

Economic Voting

While the ethnic voting literature tends to portray voters as intransigently loyal to co-ethnics, the traditional economic voting literature implies more fickle citizens who will switch allegiances if government performance proves unsatisfactory. Increasingly, however, this literature recognizes the importance of intervening factors, such as political institutions, for determining whether and how economic factors influence voting decisions. As will be shown, even when such intervening factors are considered, an analysis of macro-economic data reveals that this school of thought

²⁴ The failure to disaggregate explicitly urban and rural voters in many recent empirical studies of ethnicity and voting behavior may account for why these studies often result in contradictory or ambiguous findings.

does not offer a robust explanation for when Africa's urban poor support the opposition.

By definition, economic voting occurs when economic concerns represent the primary motivation for choosing a candidate or party to support. These concerns may be either sociotropic, meaning that voters react to their country's overall macroeconomic circumstances, or egotropic, meaning that one's personal financial situation affects his/her voting decisions. Most of the early research in this field originated from studies of the United States and Western Europe, which had ample longitudinal data on both elections and economic conditions for statistical analyses. Moreover, this literature espoused a common pattern, namely that voters act retrospectively and therefore punish incumbents at the ballot box if macroeconomic conditions deteriorate in the period immediately preceding an election (e.g. Lewis-Beck 1988; Tufte 1978). While individuals can also be prospective and vote based on assumptions of a ruling government's future behavior, Hibbs (2006) noted that this outlook creates a moral hazard problem because voters have no guarantee that the government will perform better. Yet, they have witnessed the ruling government's past behavior and believe this is a predictable indicator of future trends.

More recently, however, scholars have questioned whether voters can draw a clear chain of accountability between economic performance and incumbent actions. Rather, as Anderson (2007) argues, there are a number of contingencies that can inhibit economic performance from directly influencing voting decisions. Key among these is the nature of party systems and political institutions. Coalition governments or executives with weak mandates increase the difficulty of attributing responsibility to the incumbent. For example, Samuels (2004) finds that presidential systems increase the clarity of partisan responsibility for economic performance compared with

parliamentary ones, and this is particularly true if executive and legislative elections are held concurrently.

The importance of party system and institutional variables has been confirmed through research focused solely on developing countries. Based on an analysis of the 1990s in Latin America, Roberts and Wibbels (1999) uncovered that shifts in GDP exerted a greater influence in causing electoral volatility in the region's legislative elections than in presidential ones. Yet, voters appear to hold presidents more accountable if economic performance is measured by inflation rather than GDP, indicating that they feel an executive has more control over monetary policy than broader economic growth. Focusing on the same region during the 1980s, Remmer (1991) found that the larger the shift in GDP, inflation, and exchange rates in the period preceding elections, the greater the electoral volatility. However, this volatility was more extreme in politically fragmented party systems than in two-party democracies. Aguilar and Pacek (2000) examine a more diverse group of developing countries and find that deteriorating macroeconomic conditions are associated with a higher voter turnout amongst lower socioeconomic groups, in turn leading to greater electoral support for not just any opposition party but specifically those parties with a leftist or lower class orientation.²⁵

At its core, the theoretical tenets of the economic voting literature are highly relevant to the urban poor because this group is considered to be especially susceptible to the effects of the macroeconomy. Shocks to macroeconomic conditions hurt the urban poor more severely than the rural poor because of the former's dependence on cash income to purchase necessary goods and services, including food (Fay 2005; Kessides 2006). In fact, Dietz's (1998) analysis of Peru revealed that due to their

²⁵ Their research directly builds on findings by Pacek and Radcliff (1995), who claim that the stakes of economic adversity are even greater in developing countries than industrialized ones because it can exacerbate existing sociopolitical tensions.

dependence on monetary incomes, Lima's lower classes were much more intimately tied to, and therefore more affected by, inflation, devaluation, and rising costs of living in the 1980s and 1990s than Peruvian peasants, who could rely on self-provision of food. Moreover, in the specific African context, the dominance of strong executives and weak legislatures, as well as the small number of parliamentary systems with coalition governments, would imply that the potential for accountability might be relatively greater.

Nevertheless, evidence of this relationship in Africa is also scarce. For instance, Posner and Simon (2002) offer one of the only known detailed analyses of economic voting in Africa. Focusing on Zambia and relying on sociotropic, egotropic, retrospective, and prospective perceptions of satisfaction with the economy, they find that economic conditions only have a small impact on election outcomes. At the same time though, they find that voters who were dissatisfied with the economy abstained from voting in the country's 1996 presidential elections instead of supporting an opposition party.

Figure 2.1 below further highlights that macroeconomic conditions do not explain the disparities across African democracies regarding support for the opposition by the urban poor. This Figure examines the election year percentage change in real GDP per capita for the 15 electoral democracies in Table 1.1 of Chapter One. This measure not only examines shifts in individual incomes but also is adjusted for inflation changes.²⁶ As shown, the incumbent retained control in countries with a negative or comparatively small percentage change in real GDP per capita, such as Senegal. At the same time, the opposition was dominant in the urban areas of countries where the percentage change in real GDP per capita was quite high,

²⁶ Pacek and Radcliff (1995: 750, footnote 2) further note that this measure is most appropriate for intertemporal comparisons.

including Zambia. If economic voting were at play, then we would expect those countries classified as “opposition party dominant” to have small or negative changes in real GDP per capita previous to their last presidential elections. Instead, the overriding impression is that no clear pattern exists between changes in macroeconomic conditions directly preceding elections and whether the incumbent won a majority of votes in the country’s largest city.




Figure 2.1: Real GDP per capita (%) in Year of Country’s Most Recent Presidential Election²⁷

Moreover, the economic voting thesis fails to elucidate the causal mechanisms linking perceptions of economic performance to voting behavior. As Anderson (2007) discusses, for economic circumstances to influence voting decisions, voters must directly attribute blame to the government for declining standards. In addition to institutional constraints, this chain of causality may be disrupted by a host of other factors that voters consider responsible for both national and personal economic

²⁷ The data in Figure 2.1 are from the Economist Intelligence Unit database (2010). The data are based on real per capita GDP in constant 2005 US dollars. Following Pacek and Radcliff (1995), if an election occurred in the first quarter of a year, then the rate change was based on the prior year.

circumstances, including global economic turmoil, lack of personal initiative, or family sickness (Stokes 2001). Pacek and Radcliff (1995) further suggest that it is not aggregate growth per se but inclusion in the growth process that determines whether constituents vote against the incumbent. Indeed, the urban poor in particular may judge a government more on its failure to abide by promises regarding service delivery, job creation, affordable education, and better healthcare than about only the state of GDP and inflation, which are the most common indicators used in this literature. Finally, the economic voting literature does not recognize the ability of parties to shift the locus of accountability for the macroeconomy: ruling parties may possess the marketing skills to convincingly justify poor performance just as opposition parties' may be able to persuade voters of an incumbent's neglect more than is genuinely warranted.

Associational Life

In comparison with the economic voting literature, scholarship on the political ramifications of the urban poor's associational behavior poses contradictory claims. From the perspective of some observers, associational life amongst the urban poor provides an outlet for self-help activities and thereby reduces this sector of society's dependence on the state. Associational life does have a rich history in Africa, and the withdrawal of the state during the period of economic liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s was expected to provide the necessary political space to further foster its growth (see Bratton 1989). The strains placed on deteriorating municipal infrastructure, coupled with growing urban populations, certainly has provided fertile ground for "heterogeneous institutions involved in a range of activities including community management, provision of social services and infrastructure, finance and credit, and religious and social affairs" (Tostensen *et al.* 2001: 20).

Examples of such associations are numerous. Tripp (1991) focuses on rotating savings associations and neighborhood watch teams in Dar es Salaam during Tanzania's economically tumultuous period of the 1980s. She finds that these types of informal, voluntary associations filled critical gaps when the state was too incompetent to provide trustworthy financial institutions or adequate police security to the urban poor. Robson (2001) observes a similar dynamic in Luanda, Angola where water committees in low-income neighborhoods are responsible for maintaining community water taps and obtaining money from residents for their upkeep. For those facing a family emergency or interested in starting an entrepreneurial venture, credit associations organized along ethnic or religious lines may provide a poor urbanite with a crucial lifeline. For instance, the rotating credit associations, or *tontines*, among the Bamiléké in Douala and Yaoundé are well-known for helping newly arrived rural migrants adjust to urban Cameroon (e.g. Bouman 1995; Burnham 1996; Soen and de Comarmond 1972). In Dakar, Senegal, adherents to the Mouride sect of that country's brand of Sufi Islam can find financial assistance from *dairas*, which play the same role as credit associations (see Guèye 2001).

Instead of self-help organizations reducing claims-making on the state and relying on informal or local support networks for basic goods and services, an alternative view of associational life espouses that members of such organizations may be much more politicized. Participation in civic associations can foster trust and cooperation and encourage citizens to become more engaged in their political communities (e.g. Putnam 1993). A corporatist perspective goes even further to suggest that members of some associations can actually possess explicit ties to specific political parties. Reflecting on developments in countries of Western Europe and Latin America, Schmitter (1974: 93-94) defined the concept of corporatism as "a system of interest representation," dominated by a small number of interest group

organizations that are “recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and support.” In other words, such organizations are notable for their degree of “encompassment,” containing not only a large, concentrated membership base but also a high degree of authority over their members’ actions (Olson 1971). In turn, this provides them with the leverage to engage in a process of concertation with the state in order to design relevant economic and social policies and help with their implementation. By extension, members of such organizations are most likely to support the ruling party in charge of the state apparatus when their interests are taken into account and filtered into the policy process.²⁸

As in other regions of the world, labor and trade unions in Africa have in the past played a relatively politicized role. Unions and their strike activities in the 1940s and 1950s were pivotal to ending colonial rule. Indeed, one of Africa’s most vocal anti-colonial leaders, Guinea’s Sékou Touré, was the leader of the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT), and he gained notoriety by leading a series of strikes against French colonial rule in the early 1950s (Cooper 2002). During the 1990s, labor unions also were key actors in the region’s pro-democratization movements, ranging from Benin, Malawi, Nigeria, and Zambia (see Bratton 1994; Cooper 2002; Decalo 1997; Ihonvbere 1997). In Zambia, the leader of the Zambian Confederation of Trade Unions (ZCTU), Frederick Chiluba, became the country’s first democratically elected leader in 1991. Yet, outside of South Africa, unions rarely have retained a corporatist relationship with political parties after democratic

²⁸ Based on her observations of Niger, Robinson (1991) noted a sub-type of corporatism, which she labeled “neotraditional” corporatism. This refers to a state in which technocrats, military officers, and aid donor bureaucrats obtain broad legitimacy for policy reforms by cultivating ties with traditional forms of authority, such as customary chiefs and Islamic officials.

transitions occurred. For instance, internal divisions over economic reforms caused the ZCTU to splinter, and it was rarely consulted by the government on issues of economic policy (Rakner 2003). The growth of the informal sector and loss of formal jobs also has weakened union membership throughout Africa (Olukoshi 1998), further reducing the power of unions to exert influence over political parties.

Admittedly, some traditional labor unions are broadening their mandate to incorporate informal sector workers. In Ghana, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) has established an informal economy desk that has been assisting informal sector workers for over a decade (Croucher 2007). The example of Senegal's *Union Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels du Sénégal* (UNACOIS), which is an organization of informal sector workers that originally emerged in 1989 to protest the role of state monopolies in the country's economy (Thioub *et al.* 1998), also hints at the potential for informal sector workers to unionize in their own right. In fact, in Southern Africa, there exists the Malawi Union for the Informal Sector (MUFIS) as well as Mozambique's *Associação dos Operadores e Trabalhadores do Sector Informal* (ASSOTSI) (War on Want n.d.). Likewise, Zambia contains a multitude of such organizations, ranging from the Zambian National Marketeers' Association (ZANAMA), the Zambian Traders and Marketeers Association (ZATMA), and the Lusaka Informal Traders Association (LITA) (War on Want 2007).

Similar organizations exist with regards to improving the urban poor's living conditions. One of South Africa's most active organizations is Durban's *Abahlali baseMjondolo* (shackdwellers) movement, which was founded in 2005 during a protest over the dearth of toilets, land, and suitable housing within the city. *Abahlali baseMjondolo* was particularly vocal about not wanting its members to support the ruling ANC in elections until such services materialized (Pithouse 2006). Along with the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign and the Landless People's Movement in

Gauteng, *Abahlali baseMjondolo* remains quite active in contesting that country's anti-slum and squatter legislation (see Tolsi, 2008, 2009). Other comparable organizations include Ghana's Homeless People's Federation and the Shack Dwellers Federation of Namibia.²⁹

Nevertheless, such organizations may not represent the interests of a broad segment of the urban poor. For Nelson (1979), large-scale organization of the urban poor is hampered by both the heterogeneous nature of their interests and their lack of resources. Amis (2004) offers some confirmation of such sentiments by observing that informal traders in Johannesburg and Kumasi were too poorly organized and not sufficiently well-connected to prevent their forcible relocation from markets in their respective cities. Dietz (1998) concurs that the urban poor rarely possess enough money and time to engage in associational activities that may compete with other responsibilities. A study of street vendors in South Africa found that informal sector workers also were loath to join organizations claiming to represent their interests due to a belief that the required membership fees fueled corrupt practices (Lund and Skinner 1999). For precisely all of these reasons, Tostenten *et al.* (2001) question whether associational life includes the poorest elements of Africa's urban population.

Without a sizeable membership base amongst the urban poor, it is therefore doubtful that such organizations possess the qualities of encompassment needed to function in a corporatist mode. In addition to their small size, Widner (1997) adds that such types of associations may be too transient or too numerous to represent a dependable source of votes for a party. According to a report by the International Labor Organization (2002), most informal sector organizations are in fact very short-lived and disband after their objectives are achieved, rarely becoming more

²⁹ See the Shack/Slum Dwellers International website: <http://www.sdinet.co.za/> (accessed June 22, 2009).

institutionalized structures able to pursue long-term development objectives. At least in the case of Zambia, Rakner (2003) further confirms that a large number of economic interest associations precludes any single one from gaining adequate attention by the broader public and weak membership bases reduce the government's incentives to consult with, or consider the concerns of, any single one. In addition, many of these organizations, especially those supported by NGOs, may be loath to form close relationships with parties for fear of co-optation into coalitions that ultimately implement policies antagonistic to the urban poor. Such fears are not without precedent: both the Zambian Confederation of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the South African Confederation of Trade Unions (COSATU) became handmaidens to neoliberal policies directly antithetical to their own interests through their close relationships with the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) and the African National Congress (ANC), respectively. In other words, organizations representing the urban poor may be unable or unwilling to perform the delicate act of balancing autonomy from party forces with influence over party policies.

Associational life in Africa is therefore eclectic and vibrant, at least among a small segment of the urban poor. How membership in such associations affects voting behavior remains nebulous though. In the scholarship on self-help associations, politics appears completely divorced from urban service delivery. Yet, as Hagopian (2007) notes, there is little evidence to suggest that a dense associational life reduces the salience of political parties as citizens' main source of interest representation. Harriss (2005) likewise finds that despite the plethora of organizations for the urban poor in Delhi, India, they most commonly seek to have their demands answered through political parties rather than NGOs or other representatives of civil society. Other scholarship emphasizes the political activism of such associations, and a corporatist perspective would presume that associational involvement would hold

implications for members' party preferences. However, details on existing informal sector or slum dwellers' organizations provide little indication that such interest groups possess the requisite characteristics of size and authority needed both to influence government policies towards the urban poor and to shape their members' voting decisions.

Party Linkages and Populist Strategies

Given the incomplete nature of existing explanations for the voting behavior of Africa's urban poor, this study advances an interactive approach that focuses on the relationships between parties and constituents. In particular, the study examines the linkage strategies, or mode of connection, used by parties with voters. As Barr (2009: 34) specifies, the term "linkages" refers to the manner in which support and influence is exchanged by parties and voters. Differentiating amongst various forms of linkage requires understanding who are the voters targeted by a party, how are they mobilized, and what is the ultimate aim of their participation. In turn, the type of linkages established with voters holds implications for party organization.

Kitschelt (2000) delineates three types of linkages: personalistic, clientelist, and programmatic. Drawing on Max Weber's (Roth and Wittich 1968) notion of charismatic authority, personalistic linkages depend on appealing to constituents almost entirely by showcasing a politician's individual qualities. A party reliant on such linkages is virtually reduced to its leader's agenda rather than representative of a particular ideology or broader mandate. Clientelist linkages revolve around the disbursement of selective benefits, both before and after elections, in exchange for votes. As noted earlier, clientelist linkages with Africa's poor tend to manifest through the distribution of money, gifts, and promises during campaigns. Kitschelt (2000) further classifies appeals made to citizens based on ethnic or other identity

factors as a type of clientelist linkage because such appeals delimit who should receive future benefits in exchange for their votes. When parties offer a set of policies that they would implement if elected into office, they establish programmatic linkages with citizens. In contrast to clientelist linkages, programmatic linkages imply that all constituents experience the impact, both good and bad, of those policies rather than just those who supported the party. From Kitschelt's (2000: 850) perspective, "Political parties offer packages (programs) of policies that they promise to pursue if elected into office. They compensate voters only indirectly, without selective incentives."

Yet, Kitschelt's categorization actually does not define different linkage strategies but rather focuses predominantly on how voters are mobilized, i.e. through charisma, selective benefits, or policy proposals. Table 2.2 provides a more comprehensive analysis of various linkage strategies. As already discussed, poorer voters typically represent the main constituents for clientelist linkages because they are more likely to value the benefits received from parties than better-off voters (e.g. Stokes 2005). The main intention of the linkage is to garner votes rather than for the poor to exercise any influence over policy orientation, contributing to a vertical and asymmetrical relationship between the party and voters. A hierarchical, party structure facilitates this relationship (Gunther and Diamond 2001) and encourages direct ties between a leader and voters.

For personalistic linkages, obtaining votes is also the primary aim of a party. However, any particular sector of society may comprise the constituent base. Since the party leader's charisma is the main mode of mobilization, vertical ties likewise exist between the leader and his/her followers. Party organization is therefore shallow and dependent on the leader (Gunther and Diamond 2001).

Programmatic linkages can also be formed with any socioeconomic group but, crucially, they have participatory aims. Relationships are forged with voters in order for them to help shape the policy agenda and to become incorporated into the political process (Lawson 1980).³⁰ Horizontal ties may be formed with civil society organizations to expand influence. This in turn causes accountability to be more indirect and dispersed amongst different actors and institutions rather than solely attributable to the party leader.

Table 2.2: Typology of Party Linkages

Dimension	Clientelist	Personalistic	Programmatic
Who is the constituent base?	The poor	Any societal group	Any societal group
How are they mobilized?	Particularistic benefits	Charisma	Policies and ideological program
What is the aim of targeting the constituent base?	Votes	Votes	Participation in shaping policy agenda
Mode of interaction with constituents?	Direct, vertical ties between leader and voters	Direct, vertical ties between leader and voters	Indirect, horizontal ties between leader and voters,
Party management?	Top-down	Top-down	Dispersed authority

Parties that employ populist strategies tend to combine aspects of all three of these linkages in order to obtain votes. The concept of populism has proved contentious, and often the term is used so frequently to describe parties, promises, and leaders that it can become substantially vacuous. Changing economic, social, and political structures can also cause populism to adopt different manifestations over

³⁰ Roberts (forthcoming) further distinguishes between participatory and programmatic linkages, usefully noting that they while programmatic linkages tend to encourage participation, participation can also exist in tandem with more eclectic ideologies, as exhibited with Argentina's Peronists. For the sake of parsimony, the current study does not engage in a more disaggregated analysis of party linkages, even if such an undertaking would add greater conceptual accuracy.

time. As such, Latin American scholars often distinguish between the "classic" populism that dominated in that region during the 1930s and 1940s and contemporary variants as represented by the parties led by figures such as Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, Bolivia's Evo Morales, or Ecuador's Rafael Correa. A key distinguishing feature between the two types was that classical populism occurred during the early stages of industrialization in Latin America, when mass participation in politics emerged, and often involved ties to grass-roots organizations, such as labor unions. Neo-populism, however, is less tied to formal organizations and institutions but rather emerges in societies that are fragmented and grappling with economic and political transformations (see Roberts 2006; Roberts 2007). Given the present study's concern with recent political developments in Africa, core aspects of the contemporary conceptualization of populism are more relevant, particularly since the degree of social organization in Africa never has been sufficiently high to lend itself to the classical incarnation of populism and since mass participation in Africa has occurred before, rather than in concert with, large-scale industrialization.

One of the key aspects of this type of "populism" is not just an appeal to "the people" but rather to a certain group of people. Specifically, poorer, subaltern, diverse, and often unorganized groups represent the primary constituency base of parties that use populist strategies (Roberts 1995; Weyland 2001). As such, there is a similarity in constituency base to those parties that rely more exclusively on clientelist linkages. Another aspect is that much like programmatic linkages, mobilization of these constituents relies on a policy discourse. While these policies may not necessarily fall along a traditional left-right ideological continuum, they are focused on a program of social inclusion. Much of the literature stresses that populism is anti-elitist and criticizes established institutions (e.g. Canovan 1999; Ionescu and Gellner 1969). Parties that employ populist strategies offer a package of policies oriented

around providing goods, services, and recognition to those who have been excluded from the economic and political status quo supported by the existing establishment. In the case of the urban poor, these policies do not focus on the provision of valence goods, about which everyone agrees. Rather, they may involve policy decisions about practices deemed legal and illegal, formal and informal. For instance, are shanty homes upgraded or demolished? Are street hawkers harassed or viewed as an asset? Are basic services provided to settlements deemed illegal by the state? To achieve these policies and gain support, populist strategies can also involve some selective benefits to supporters in the form of economic redistribution or material incentives (Roberts 1995), much like the mode of mobilization central to clientelist linkages.

In addition to an anti-elitist policy discourse to rectify exclusion, a charismatic leader is usually a *sine qua non* of a populist strategy (e.g. Canovan 1999; Conniff 1982; Mouzelis 1985). This leader often professes an affinity with the under-class, or a "closeness with the common people" (Weyland 2001:14), which is reinforced by the leader's self-portrayal as an outsider to the political establishment against which s/he protests (e.g. Barr 2009: 38). By relying on "nonmediated rapport between the leader and 'his people'" (Mouzelis 1985, 334), populism is essentially plebiscitarian, "vesting a single individual with the task of representing 'the people'" (Barr 2009: 36). As with clientelistic linkages, populism tends to involve vertical forms of incorporation of the lower classes in developing countries (Mouzelis 1985).

Populist strategies therefore hold implications for a party's internal structure. Specifically, the party will be organized in a top-down manner, with local cadres having little autonomy (Mouzelis 1985). Indeed, the party becomes relegated behind the leader's prerogatives, sometimes leading to authoritarian tendencies (Norris 1999). Both Barr (2009) and Nelson (1979) further emphasize that citizens are not seen as

agents of social reform by populist parties but rather as objects for providing votes and a popular legitimacy for the leader and/or party.

Table 2.3 summarizes these characteristics and stresses that populist strategies fuse together key aspects of the three voter-citizen linkages. They share the same constituency base as clientelist linkages. Moreover, they share the same internal party organization, direct ties with voters, and aims of personalistic and clientelist linkages. However, they also incorporate the modes of mobilization of all three linkages, with policy discourse playing a major role. As such, in contrast to some Latin American scholars such as Weyland (2001), who believe that the essence of populism is its plebiscitarian organization, this study instead emphasizes that in the African case, the programmatic content is critical to populist strategies.

Table 2.3: Characteristics of a Populist Strategy

Dimension	Populist
Who is the constituent base?	The poor
How are they mobilized?	Policies, Charisma, Particularistic benefits
What is the aim of targeting the constituent base?	Votes
Mode of interaction with constituent base?	Direct, vertical ties between leader and voters
Party organization?	Top-down

The Advantage of Populist Strategies with Africa's Urban Poor

Populist strategies exhibit greater appeal to the urban poor than the individual party linkages presented in Table 2.2 on their own. Specifically, as noted earlier, clientelist linkages in the form of vote-buying are a common practice in urban areas by both incumbent and opposition parties alike. As such, there is nothing to prevent urban citizens from accepting material incentives from all parties and then voting according to other preferences.

Moreover, Africanist scholars have oft-noted the dearth of parties with programmatic linkages that advance distinct policy agendas or a clear ideology (e.g. Manning 2005; Ottaway 1999; Randall and Svasand 2002; van de Walle and Butler 1999). Instead of a vehicle for class grievances, many established African political parties emerged as a result of anti-colonial protest and relied on a nationalist discourse that emphasized unity over division. Africa is also similar to many other developing regions in that industrialization occurred after independence, therefore weakening the autonomy of trade unions vis-à-vis the state (Mouzelis 1985) and dampening the impact of class-based interest groups in political debates. Moreover, foreign aid can constitute one-quarter to two-thirds of central government expenditures in many African countries, resulting in a heavy dependence on international donors whose conditionalities limit the degree of freedom for parties to define their own political programs (Manning 2005).³¹

Notwithstanding these observations, Africa is not completely devoid of programmatic parties. The long-ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) is well-recognized as a conservative, free-market-oriented party whose policies have favored the creation of an enabling institutional environment targeted at attracting investment (Molomo 2000). According to Good and Taylor (2008), the fact that the BDP ruling elite emerged from wealthy cattlemen and was never particularly anti-colonialist or African nationalist contributed to its orientation. Under Thabo Mbeki, South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) became decidedly more neo-liberal, particularly through the implementation of the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) plan. GEAR increasingly alienated the ANC's leftist alliance partners because it

³¹ For example, aid as a share of central government expenditures is 24 percent in Kenya, 26 percent in Ghana, 40 percent in Zambia, 58 percent in Benin, and 59 percent in Senegal. These figures are for the most recent years available in the World Development Indicators 2009.

emphasized privatization, tariff reductions, and productivity-linked wage rates (Lodge 2002).

Yet, Africa's few programmatic parties tend not only to represent the ruling party but also to adhere to the right-side of the economic ideological spectrum. Traditional leftist parties adhering to socialist beliefs are uncompetitive in contemporary Africa due to either the discrediting of socialism in other regions of the world (Randall and Svasand 2002) or the absence of a viable constituency base. Indeed, the decline of formal labor union participation that has been observed in Europe (e.g. Rueda 2005) and Latin America (e.g. Roberts 2007) is also reflected in the African experience due to economic liberalization programs implemented during the 1990s. Without adapting their electoral strategies to incorporate Africa's vast non-unionized, informal sector, such leftist parties as Senegal's *Parti de l'Indépendance et du Travail* (PIT), Côte d'Ivoire's *Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs* (PIT), or Ghana's Convention People's Party (CPP) cannot gain much support in urban areas beyond working-class professionals. In turn, attempting to appeal to the heterogeneous and unorganized informal sector requires a more amorphous message and a shift in party organization that may reduce the programmatic nature of a traditionally leftist opposition party.

By contrast, personalistic linkages are the norm in most of Africa, and parties that forge such linkages tend to advance vague platforms and valence goods, offering to improve everything for everyone. Voters in turn cannot clearly articulate what distinguishes the party's agenda from the leader's personality. There are a number of reasons for this. First, many new parties in Africa either emerge as, or transition into, a vehicle for one individual's personal ambitions. Secondly, the financing of most political parties in Africa depends on the personal resources of the party leader rather than contributions from citizens or public funding (Bryan and Baer 2005; Salih and

Nordlund 2007). This reinforces both the control of the party leader over the internal workings of the party, as well as increases the tendency for political leaders and parties to become synonymous in the eyes of the voters. Thirdly, traditional leaders and chiefs retain a prominent role in African societies, ranging from Ghana's Ashanti chieftdom, Uganda's Buganda kingdom, South Africa's Zulu kingdom, or the Lozi kingdom in Zambia's Western province. Even if such monarchies are largely symbolic today, they may contribute to a public tendency, especially among older generations, to equate political office with a person rather than party. Moreover, political institutions in many African countries foster a high degree of centralization around the office of the presidency, resulting in vast powers awarded to the executive (van de Walle 2003). The fusion of the executive office with a person filters over into the electoral sphere, causing campaigns to revolve around a presidential contender's personal qualities rather than his/her policy beliefs. In addition, widespread illiteracy and minimal education hinders many Africans from reading party platforms or comprehending potentially complex policies. Instead, they may use alternative information shortcuts, such as how gregarious or colorful a candidate is on the campaign trail, as an indicator for how well s/he will perform in office.

Given this political landscape, an opposition party that relies on a populist strategy with the urban poor is more likely to achieve the latter's support at the ballot box. The reason for this is twofold. First, since most opposition parties campaign in urban areas to conserve scarce resources, the urban poor are inundated by political contenders. A party that engages in a populist strategy functions in a manner similar to a niche product, in effect choosing an area of specialization for which there is a demand that no other party is addressing. Consequently, populist strategies offer a degree of differentiation for a party operating in a political milieu crowded by purely personalistic linkages.

Greater issue congruence with poor, urban voters represents the second advantage of populist strategies. In much of the literature on party-voter linkage mechanisms in industrialized countries, congruence is defined as the degree of distance between policies advocated by parties and voters' own preferences (see Dalton 1985; Huber and Powell 1994). By definition, populist strategies rely on mobilization through an anti-elitist or anti-establishment discourse, which automatically appeals to poorer and more marginalized groups. Yet, beyond this, a policy discourse by populist parties that addresses the distinct challenges faced by the urban poor, vis-à-vis their rural counterparts and more affluent urbanites, further enhances congruence.

What are some of the distinct challenges faced by the urban poor from which populist parties can derive a policy message? Most critically, prices tend to be higher in urban areas, particularly in large cities where costs are affected by those with higher incomes. In African cities, access to goods and services is highly monetized whereas in rural areas, basic goods such as shelter, fuel, and food, may not be marketed but rather self-provisioned (Bratton 2006; Mitlin 2004; Satterthwaite 2004). Compared with their rural counterparts, the urban poor are more likely to be tenants rather than owners of their homes, increasing their vulnerability to rent increases and evictions by landlords (see Mitlin 2007). Unlike rural areas, the urban poor face daily expenditures on public transport to reach labor markets (Mitlin 2004). At the same time, the urban poor enjoy fewer informal safety nets in the form of kinship and community networks than their rural counterparts, making poor economic circumstances particularly difficult to handle (Maxwell *et al.* 2000). Formal safety nets are also lacking. In fact, while agricultural input subsidy programs are now popular in a number of African countries, such as Malawi and Zambia, equivalent initiatives in the form of urban public works programs or food stamps for the poor are virtually non-existent.

Moreover, research in other regions indicates that the urban poor are more exposed to stimuli from radios, TV, and newspapers as well as the actions of political parties, civil society organizations, and neighbors (e.g. Dietz 1998). This means that they are more likely to be aware of the nature of their economic circumstances and the potential political alternatives to address their situation. All of this suggests that while absolute poverty remains higher in Africa's rural areas, relative poverty may be more acutely felt in urban areas where gleaming shopping malls compete with street vendors for space and where residents tend to be more politically mobilized.

Yet, in addition to their difference with rural dwellers, the urban poor may experience a dissimilar relationship with the state than more affluent urbanites. The urban poor threaten the authority of the state by circumventing property laws and building homes on land for which they lack an official title (e.g. Centeno and Portes 2006). In addition, African states have tended to view the informal activities in which the urban poor engage as a blight on their cities' images (e.g. Potts 2007). As Cooper (1983: 42) observes,

In African cities, people are more likely to be buffered from the harshness of poverty and unemployment by social ties rooted in illegal space and the nonregulated economy, which only emphasize the impotence of the state. This in turn may draw the state into gestures of control that, whether effective or not, show the state's hostility to the poor's efforts at survival.

Despite such attitudes, the urban poor must depend on the state for service delivery much more than other urbanites. For instance, more affluent urbanites can buy generators when electricity provision is erratic or hire private security guards if the police are not adequately tackling crime. Urban professionals, such as doctors, nurses, and teachers, also have more leverage for obtaining concessions to their demands through strike activity than those in the informal sector. Indeed, the degree of competition in the saturated informal sector and the inability to forfeit even a day's wages contributes to the urban poor's incapacity to use such tactics to place pressure

on the state. Simultaneously though, the degree of desperation amongst this group may contribute to shorter time-horizons as their impatience grows for some means to ameliorate their plight.

Thus, the urban poor lack the money or leverage of other urbanites to procure private services or elicit government responsiveness. At the same time, they possess fewer options to engage in self-provision of goods and services in the same manner as rural dwellers. When they do try to build makeshift homes or sell goods in the street as a survival strategy, they often face harassment by the ruling regime during non-electoral periods. Their combination of deprivation, dependence, and neglect by the government makes them particularly ripe for populist opposition parties that espouse radical reforms over a short period of time that are intended to address the existing establishment's non-responsiveness to their demands. As such, through both the content of their messages and their claim to deliver fast rewards, parties engaged in populist strategies provide a close degree of congruence with this group's needs.

Overall then, as highlighted in Figure 2.2, this study argues that populist strategies are more likely to generate support from the urban poor because they offer greater congruence with the issues relevant to the urban under-class and provide differentiation from parties reliant on purely personalistic linkages, which tend to mobilize all types of voters with the same catch-all messages. Yet, they are also superior to parties with programmatic linkages oriented around a left-right ideological spectrum which are, as discussed above, relatively rare. Those that do exist are either oriented towards salaried workers by dwindling leftist opposition parties or towards neo-liberal policies that have not demonstrated much benefit to Africa's urban poor. In other words, traditional programmatic linkages may offer greater differentiation than those of personalistic parties but less congruence than populist strategies that focus on policies relevant to the everyday realities of the urban poor.




Figure 2.2: Outline of Argument's Key Variables

Contributions and Qualifications of the Argument

In order to fully understand the argument, three important qualifications are required. First, as described thus far in this chapter, populist strategies have a specifically urban orientation. The reason for this is that scholarship in other developing regions of the world has noted that populism is predominantly, though not exclusively, an urban phenomenon. For instance, in Latin America, urbanization in the 1930s and 1940s led to classical populism in some countries by contributing to the rise of the working classes who lacked representation (Conniff 1981; Conniff 1982; Drake 1982). In the 1980s and 1990s, the debt crisis and other failed economic policies led to a rise in the urban informal sector, whose members were pivotal supporters to the populist parties that emerged during that period (e.g. Demmers, Fernández and Hogenboom 2001; Weyland 1999).

Admittedly, previous episodes of populism in Africa have sometimes focused on rural areas. The most obvious example occurred in the early 1980s in the wake of a military coup when Burkina Faso's charismatic prime minister, Thomas Sankara, advocated a radical social revolution. He privileged the needs of peasants by reducing rural taxes, establishing farm collectives, and attempting to provide rural social

services (Rothschild and Gyimah-Boadi 1989). At the same time though, he alienated urban labor unions (Nugent 2004) and razed slum dwellings in the center of the capital, Ouagadougou (Rothschild and Gyimah-Boadi 1989). Yet, his efforts appeared to be a "top-down affair" (Sandbrook 1993: 130), prompted by his own grand vision rather than as a response to popular demands on the ground.³²

Today, however, the combination of rapid urbanization, democratization, and economic stagnation in Africa can create the foundations for popular discontent in cities that can in turn be seized on by savvy politicians. As Coppedge 1997 notes, when a particular cleavage is absent from the political sphere, political entrepreneurs face a window of opportunity to form new parties to reflect new social conflicts. Huntington and Nelson (1979: 29) observe that this is particularly true when such entrepreneurs belong to the opposition: "Political elites out of power are more likely to be interested in expanding political participation, changing its bases, and, at times developing new forms of participation. Bringing new actors into the political arena is a classic way of altering the balance of power in that arena." A populist strategy aimed at the urban poor is therefore one means for an opposition party to gain votes.

The second issue concerns the role of class in this analysis. As defined here, populist strategies involve a programmatic element. Programmatic linkages on their own, particularly when forged by mass-based parties, traditionally have depended on socioeconomic cleavages (e.g. Gunther & Diamond 2001). However, the urban poor may not necessarily experience a sense of class consciousness that binds them together

³² Jerry Rawlings is also sometimes portrayed as a populist leader. However, the populism he expressed in the period immediately after his coup in Ghana in 1979 was based on vague notions of rectifying immorality and corruption (Oelbaum 2001), which seemed to provide a convenient justification for the military takeover rather than a response to popular economic and political demands. Though the regime was sympathetic to keeping transport costs and the prices of consumer goods low for urban residents, this often resulted in the destruction of market stalls and the confiscation of traders' merchandise, which was then re-sold to the general public by the government at lower prices (Rothschild and Gyimah-Boadi 1989).

and motivates their choice of party. Rather, the point is that the urban poor collectively face certain challenges as a result of their living and working conditions, and these may constitute the basis for common grievances that are instrumental for parties' electoral fortunes. For instance, Cameron's (1991) study of Peru's expanding informal sector revealed that while this group was neither cohesive nor a unified social force, its collective emergence profoundly influenced that country's party dynamics.

Moreover, because the programmatic element of populist strategies revolves around social inclusion, the implications for other classes will vary according to country context. In certain instances, such a strategy can polarize the electorate along class lines and particularly alienate elites. However, in other cases, the non-poor may identify with certain goals of a populist strategy, even if they personally are not targeted to benefit. Improving conditions for the poor does not always diminish the welfare of the rich, and sometimes may even enhance it by decreasing crime, begging, and other social ills. In addition, while the urban poor may support an opposition party that relies on a populist strategy because of the particular challenges they encounter on a daily basis, the non-poor may vote for the same party primarily for different reasons, such as disappointment with the incumbent's attempts to alter the constitution or curb civil liberties. Indeed, even though populist parties depend heavily on a constituency base among subaltern groups, there are cases in other regions of the world where they have fostered cross-class support (see Cameron 1991; Gibson 1997; Roberts and Arce 1998). Likewise, Table 1.3 in Chapter One illustrated that support for the opposition in some African countries was found amongst both the urban poor and urban non-poor.

Thirdly, parties are dynamic entities, shifting their interaction with voters as a result of both structural factors that change voter preferences and as a means of responding to modifications of other parties' electoral strategies. As Hagopian (2007)

observes, political parties in developing country democracies may mix their electoral strategies with different types of constituents. Consequently, opposition parties may rely on a populist strategy with the urban poor but purely personalistic linkages with rural dwellers. At the same time, ruling parties may craft programmatic linkages with elites that espouse a free-market ideology while resorting to clientelist linkages to maintain the support of the rural poor. Parties can also alter their electoral strategies over time. For instance, in India, Chhibber (1999) observed the erosion of clientelist networks and the increased use of caste, religion, and ethnicity for attracting voters. In Brazil, Hagopian *et al.* (2009) found that politicians are becoming less dependent on clientelism and more supportive of programmatic linkages with voters as a result of economic and administrative reforms in the 1990s, which created new cleavages amongst voters and reduced resources available for patronage.³³

Likewise, opposition parties in Africa that rely on populist strategies with the urban poor may experience transitions over time. Indeed, populism is a particularly transitory mode of mobilization (Weyland 2001) and cannot be sustained for indefinite periods if the urban poor fail to see any tangible improvements in their lives or experience policies that are directly antithetical to their own interests. Therefore, if opposition parties turn into ruling parties, faced with national concerns, tasked with managing the macroeconomy, and responding to investors, a populist strategy may be abandoned. As a result, a party that was voted into national office through majority support from the urban poor may potentially lose this constituency base in the long-run.

³³ This supports Shefter's (1994) claim that parties may resort to programmatic modes of mobilization when they lack adequate resources for clientelism, a view that van de Walle (2007) believes ultimately may hold some relevance in Africa as well.

Operationalizing Key Concepts

To test this study's main argument, the key concepts discussed in this chapter require operationalization. This study provides a dual approach to operationalization by examining these concepts from the standpoints of both parties and voters. In addition to drawing on secondary materials about political parties in Senegal and Zambia, interviews with political party members and local governance experts are complemented by the views of the urban poor regarding the political scene in their respective countries.

From the view of political parties, a comparison of party manifestoes, responses from semi-structured interviews, and party activities documented in local newspapers help characterize the linkages they forge with both the urban poor and other constituencies. Based on these resources, personalistic linkages dominate if opposition parties cannot define the ideological differences that distinguish them from their competitors and instead each espouses a commitment to the same values and goals. Other indicators include a party's claim that it broadly represents all citizens and cannot define a clear constituency base and if the party markets the qualities of its leader during campaigns rather than a set of policy programs. Likewise, if voters define their motivation for supporting a presidential candidate in terms of his/her personal characteristics rather than policies, then personalistic linkages prevail.

As already noted, clientelist linkages can sometimes prove difficult to identify. Yet, for the purposes of this study, clientelist linkages as conceptualized in Table 2.2 involve systematized handouts to a certain constituency base, namely the poor. While such handouts may persist during normal times as part of an effort towards fostering more long-term relationships between a party and the poor, it was argued earlier that vote-buying around elections is the most common manifestation of clientelist linkages in Africa. In such cases, handouts usually involve the disbursement of money,

clothing, food, and/or drinks during election campaigns. They may also involve localized infrastructure and/or development initiatives that are timed right before elections. The nature, degree, and timing of such handouts will be uncovered through the use of interviews with observers of election campaigns, newspaper reports, and the claims of survey respondents.

Of all potential linkages, programmatic ones potentially have attracted the most attention in terms of operationalization. The World Bank's Database of Political Institutions (DPI) classifies a party's programmatic nature according to either its description in two party almanacs, *Political Parties of the World* and *Political Handbook of the World*, or whether a party's name indicates its ideological leaning (Keefer 2005). As part of its secondary materials, this study also relies on the use of the same almanacs as the DPI. However, it does not characterize a party as having a specific ideological orientation simply due to its name because self-proclaimed "socialist" parties in Africa often have engaged in economic liberalization. In other words, party actions do not always correspond to party monikers. This study further draws on some of the suggestions offered by Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 323) and classifies a party as purely programmatic (or confirms that it is not) if the following conditions are (not) met, as evidenced through primary data materials: 1) parties' positions on relevant issues systematically diverge, 2) politicians within the same party demonstrate less variance on key issues than those belonging to different parties, and 3) if politicians can map their party positions on a left-right scale ranging from more to less government intervention, respectively.

A populist strategy can be discerned according to the dimensions presented in Table 2.3. In order to be populist, the party needs to be firmly oriented around a constituency comprising lower-class groups. While electoral support amongst this group is an indicator of a party's popularity, it does not necessarily mean that a party

is populist. Rather, the party needs to center most of its electoral campaigns in the neighborhoods and working areas of the urban poor, potentially even establishing party offices in such areas. At the same time, a charismatic leader is a *sine qua non* of a populist party, and such charisma may manifest through publicity stunts and controversial claims that stir up attention. Unmediated ties between a charismatic leader and the under-class can emerge when the leader attempts to identify himself as a “common man,” using a form of language, a repertoire of campaign tactics, or a selection of personal experiences that resonate with the masses. Most significantly, given that a populist strategy involves a programmatic component focused on social inclusion, parties using this strategy should offer policy promises targeted to the distinct challenges faced by the urban poor and aimed at rectifying their exclusion from the economy. Simultaneously, given that the populist strategy described here is especially focused on the urban poor, a party using this strategy should have a much weaker policy message, based on manifestoes and interviews with party members, towards other constituencies, including rural dwellers and the urban elite.

The two intervening variables central to this study, differentiation and congruence, can be uncovered by focusing more on a voter’s perspective in the manner delineated in Table 2.4. Indeed, survey data collected from market workers and residents of low-income neighborhoods in Dakar and Lusaka provide such viewpoints. Voters were asked if they viewed any distinction among their country’s political parties and, if so, they were asked to identify how that party was different. If they acknowledged distinctions and could articulate what they were, this provided an indicator that parties did not simply merge together in a voter’s mind. A secondary indicator of differentiation relied on how much support opposition parties received as measured by who survey respondents voted for and according to official election results in low-income urban areas. If two or more opposition parties received

equivalent support, this implies that voters did not discern a major difference among them. However, if one opposition party received overwhelming support, then it clearly stood out among its competitors.³⁴ While it is theoretically plausible for more than one party to employ a populist strategy towards the urban poor in the same election cycle, there are no known practical examples of this in either the African context or other regions of the developing world.

Table 2.4: Indicators of Differentiation and Congruence from Surveys of the Urban Poor

Dimension	Degree	
	<i>More</i>	<i>Less</i>
Differentiation	- Respondents report observing a difference among parties along key dimension (e.g. policies)	- Respondents report they cannot see a difference among country's parties
	- One particular opposition party received significantly more support than any other	- No opposition party received significantly more support than any other
Congruence	- Majority of respondents articulated that a specific policy was the main motivation for supporting a particular opposition candidate <i>and</i> that candidate also expressed that particular policy message in his/her campaign	- Majority of respondents voted for incumbent despite registering disappointment with the status quo
	- One opposition party repeatedly identified as interested in improving urban living conditions	- No opposition party identified as interested in improving urban living conditions

Traditional measures of congruence require mapping a median voter's positions on key issues along a left-right scale, estimating the positions of politicians on the same issues, and then measuring the distance between the median citizen and the median legislator according to the width of scale positions (see Huber and Powell 1994; Powell and Vanberg 2000). The smaller the distance is, the greater the

³⁴ The focus on comparing opposition parties is more meaningful because voters would be expected to be more likely to see a difference between the incumbent and the opposition than among opposition parties alone.

congruence. Yet, such techniques are usually applied in studying industrialized countries where the assumption that parties and voters possess views along a left-right scale rarely proves problematic. As noted earlier though, such an assumption is not always valid in the African context.

Nevertheless, certain parties can still offer policy prescriptions that are more aligned with a particular constituency base than others. The policy priorities of the urban poor were uncovered through both the surveys as well as through secondary resources on low-income populations in Dakar and Lusaka. If survey respondents voted for a presidential candidate who promised to address these priorities, which often included the provision of jobs and basic services, *and* the respondent reported that the policies of the candidate rather than his/her personality or campaign handouts were the primary motivation for support, then this is an indication that such a party offered more congruence to the demands of the urban poor than the existing alternatives. In turn, those who voted for another candidate should *not* have identified party policies as the main motivation for support because this would then imply that different segments of the urban poor support various parties due to their respective policies, thereby meaning that no one party provides more congruence with this constituency base than any other. In the same manner, if a majority of respondents repeatedly identified the same party as being most likely to improve living conditions in either Dakar or Lusaka, then that party was deemed to have greater congruence with the urban poor's demands. Lastly, if a respondent reported disappointment with the status quo but nevertheless voted for the incumbent, this highlights that none of the existing opposition parties offered greater congruence to the needs of the urban poor

than the incumbent.³⁵ Table 2.4 delineates how respondents' behavior can reflect a party's degree of differentiation and congruence.

Summary

Even though Africa's urban poor have received little attention by scholars during the multi-party era, this chapter examined four possible explanations for their voting behavior and found each incomplete. The institutional requirements and party discipline for monitoring voter actions renders clientelist, party machines that exist in other developing regions quite rare in Africa's urban context. Moreover, empirical findings in a set of African cases show that a sub-type of clientelism, vote buying, does not entirely influence voters' decisions. From a theoretical standpoint, it is conceivable that the urban poor may accept handouts from all parties but ultimately vote in accordance with their own conscience. The influence of ethno-linguistic identity on political behavior has long occupied a large body of the literature on Africa. However, the evidence is far from conclusive that ethno-linguistic cleavages overwhelmingly determine who a voter supports, and no known contemporary research has examined whether such cleavages apply to those lower-class Africans living in a heterogeneous, metropolitan setting. Economic decline consistently has proved a key motivation for voters to reject an incumbent but, whether this manifests as a vote for the opposition or through abstention remains less clear. Cases where Africa's urban poor support an opposition party even when macroeconomic conditions are improving implies that such factors cannot entirely account for voting behavior. Associations for the urban poor, whether in the form of slum dwellers movements or

³⁵ It would not be surprising if a respondent was not disappointed with the incumbent and therefore voted for the incumbent. Indeed, as described, a populist strategy relies on incorporating those who feel alienated by the status quo. By extension then, a member of the urban poor who does not feel that way would be less likely to support an opposition party espousing such a message.

informal sector work organizations, are growing fast throughout Africa. Yet, how many Africans actually belong to these associations and what influence they actually exert on members' voting preferences or on political parties' policies remain vague.

Due to the limitations of these alternative explanations, this study focuses on the role of political parties and their interactions with constituents. This chapter presented the study's main argument, which is that opposition parties that rely on a populist strategy are more likely to obtain support from this group than parties reliant on personalistic, clientelist, or programmatic linkages alone. A populist strategy fuses key elements of these distinct linkages, including their modes of mobilization. Like programmatic linkages, a populist strategy relies on a policy discourse but one which is focused on social inclusion rather than a left-right ideology. Similar to personalistic linkages, a populist strategy depends on a charismatic leader. In the same manner as clientelist linkages, a populist strategy may also involve the selective disbursement of material incentives and its constituency base is firmly focused on the poor.

The advantage of a populist strategy is twofold. First, its policy message exhibits greater congruence with those issues relevant to the urban poor. Such issues include job creation, reductions in the prices of basic goods, provision of public services, and freedom from state harassment. By contrast, those few parties in the region reliant on purely programmatic linkages often either advance neo-liberal policies that thus far have brought few benefits to Africa's urban poor or promote a leftist ideology that is outdated and/or more relevant to salaried workers than to the urban poor's quest for daily survival. Secondly, a populist strategy increases a party's differentiation from the multitude of competitors in the region that are dependent on purely personalistic linkages with the urban poor. Instead, a populist strategy enables a party to fuse the charisma of its party leader with a specific policy agenda oriented

towards the excluded, thereby creating a memorable impression on the mind of an impoverished urbanite when s/he goes to the polls.

CHAPTER THREE

From *Gorgui* to King Cobra: Party Strategies in Comparative Perspective

Introduction

The previous chapter delineated criteria for identifying the disparate linkages used by political parties with their country's citizens and introduced the concept of populist strategies. This chapter aims to draw on these criteria to classify the strategies employed by Senegalese and Zambian opposition parties with the urban poor during each country's most recent presidential elections. In comparing the two countries, the chapter highlights that a populist strategy is most effective for opposition parties to gain votes from this specific constituency.

For the Patriotic Front's (PF) Michael Sata, nicknamed "King Cobra" because he can prove "venomous" to his political enemies (Mwiinga 1994), a populist strategy helped his party obtain the majority of votes in Zambia's major urban centers in Lusaka and the Copperbelt during both the 2006 and 2008 elections. Sata targeted his campaigns in shanty compounds and mobilized the urban poor not only with his charismatic style but also with a bundle of policy promises that collectively aimed to rectify this constituency's economic exclusion and lack of political voice. His campaign messages were reinforced by the use of tactics intended to portray himself as a "common man" who understood the plight of the marginalized. Such a strategy helped him defeat both the increasingly aloof and rural-oriented ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) as well as the United Party for National Development (UPND) and the Heritage Party (HP), both of which articulated broad-sweeping messages intended to hold national appeal.

By contrast, no single opposition party obtained significant support from the urban poor during Senegal's 2007 elections. Abdoulaye Wade, an octogenarian oft-

referred to as *Gorgui*, meaning the “old one” in Wolof, retained the presidency despite having accomplished very little for the urban poor during his first term. His victory was assisted by Senegal’s so-called “living room opposition,” which consists of a broad range of opposition parties who all share the tendency to discuss the country’s problems in exclusive fora rather than join disgruntled Dakarais in street protests against government policies. Amongst these opposition parties are those reliant on purely personalistic linkages, claiming that they represent “all Senegalese” and espousing vague, indistinguishable platforms. A smaller set of programmatic opposition parties with strong ties to the country’s dwindling labor unions offer more distinct appeals around socialism, workers’ rights, and economic nationalism. However, the comprehension of such messages remains limited to only a small segment of unionized urbanites and salaried professionals rather than the mass of the urban poor.

For purposes of highlighting the argument’s internal consistency and to demonstrate the dynamic nature of party linkage strategies, each country’s preceding electoral period is first examined in brief detail. For example, in Zambia’s 2001 elections, when all the opposition parties relied on personalistic linkages, the urban poor divided their support amongst four political parties rather than overwhelmingly supporting just one. By contrast, in the run-up to Senegal’s historic 2000 elections, Wade relied on a populist strategy to mobilize Dakar’s excluded and disgruntled masses, particularly the youth. He defeated not only the ruling PS but also his other opposition competitors in the first and second rounds of voting. By providing this historical context, the chapter therefore can compare different party strategies both across countries and over time.

Semi-structured interviews with approximately 60 respondents constitute the main source of primary evidence used in this chapter. Those selected for interviews

included party leaders and representatives, past and present government officials, local journalists, civil society organizations, academics, and development experts. Collectively, these interviewees constituted a purposeful sample because they possessed an authoritative level of knowledge about the country's political environment and urban policy challenges. Appendix Three provides a full list of the individuals interviewed in both countries. Party manifestos and newspaper articles collected from each country's national archives further help construct a picture of the various party strategies employed. Overall then, the chapter aims to illustrate how incumbents and the opposition have interacted with the urban poor in Senegal and Zambia over time and emphasizes the success of the populist strategy. The task of uncovering why parties choose a populist strategy over possible alternative approaches is left to Chapter Five.

Zambia

Political Party Landscape

Zambia's peaceful transition to multiparty democracy in 1991 heralded the beginning of greater political liberalization in a number of countries throughout the continent.³⁶ With the slogan "The Hour Has Come," the MMD and its then leader, Frederick Chiluba, ended at the ballot box 27 years of rule by Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP).³⁷ Formed from an eclectic mix of labor union officials, civil society members, and career politicians, the MMD originally

³⁶ Benin, which abolished an 18 year military-authoritarian regime through a national conference in 1990, is often seen as representing an equivalent symbol of democratization, especially for francophone Africa.

³⁷ Previous to the 1991 elections, Zambia had experienced a brief period of multiparty democracy from 1964 to 1972.

emerged in urban areas. However, its victory in 1991 was due to support in both the country's urban and rural provinces.³⁸

Yet, corruption, mismanagement, and electoral maneuvering by the MMD ultimately generated friction within the party, leading to many defections and the creation of new parties, such as the National Party (NP) in 1993 and the Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC) in 1996. Two years later, a Pentecostal pastor, Nevers Mumba founded the National Christian Coalition (NCC). Around the same time, Zambia's managing director at Anglo-American, Anderson Mazoka, resigned as treasurer from one of the MMD's branch offices and formed the UPND. A second round of parties mushroomed in 2001 after Chiluba's failed bid to alter the constitution to secure a third-term as president. Notable amongst these were the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD), the HP, and the PF.

While Christon Tembo and Godfrey Miyanda, leaders of the FDD and HP, respectively, left the MMD because they disagreed with Chiluba's third-term bid (Banks *et al.* 2008), Michael Sata's motivations were quite different.³⁹ Originally a loyal UNIP member, Sata served as the Lusaka District Governor, a Member of Parliament (MP) for Lusaka's Kabwata constituency, and Minister of State for Decentralization. When he foresaw UNIP's waning popularity, he joined the MMD around the time of its founding. Under the latter party, he obtained prominent positions as the Minister of Local Government and Housing, Minister of Labor and Social Security, Minister of Health, Minister without Portfolio, and MMD National Secretary. Believing he would be selected as Chiluba's successor after the third-term

³⁸ The only province the MMD did not win in the 1991 elections was Eastern Province, the stronghold of UNIP (Bratton 1994).

³⁹ Sata had supported the attempt to change the constitution. In fact, during the May 2001 conventions during which MMD party members voted on Chiluba's proposition, Sata pressured fellow party members to wear third-term T-shirts (Malupenga 2001) and claimed that those who opposed Chiluba would not succeed (Mapulenga and Phiri 2001).

bid failed, Sata left the party and formed the PF when Levy Mwanawasa was chosen instead.

Today, there are approximately 28 officially registered political parties in the country (Matlosa 2007), with the most competitive ones presented in Table 3.1. In the 2006 presidential elections, the Electoral Commission of Zambia tried to ensure the participation of only the most serious contenders by stipulating that each party needed to pay 20 million kwacha to participate (Chakwe 2006).⁴⁰ The same fee was also required for the 2008 elections. In general though, Zambia provides no public subsidies for parties, forcing most to rely on their leader's own finances as their primary source of funding (Bryan and Baer 2005).

Table 3.1: Overview of Zambia's Main Political Parties

Party Name	Current Leader	Year Founded	Coalitions joined (year formed)
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD)	Rupiah Banda	1990	---
Patriotic Front (PF)	Michael Sata	2001	---
United Party for National Development (UPND)	Hakainde Hichilema	1998	■ United Democratic Alliance (UDA, 2006)
Heritage Party (HP)	Godfrey Miyanda	2001	---
United Liberal Party (ULP)	Sakwiba Sikota	2006	■ Supported PF (2006) ■ Supported MMD (2008)
United National Independence Party (UNIP)	Tilyenji Kaunda	1958	■ United Democratic Alliance (UDA, 2006) ■ Supported MMD (2008)

Urbanization Challenges

Zambia's proliferation of parties occurred in tandem with an economic liberalization program that impoverished the urban population while simultaneously increasing its ranks. The MMD adopted a free market ideology, and Chiluba's tenure

⁴⁰ The average exchange rate in the fourth quarter of 2006 was 3985 kwacha = 1 US dollar (EIU 2007a).

was characterized by the adoption of vast reforms under the auspices of a structural adjustment program. As has been documented elsewhere (e.g. Tacoli 2001; Myers and Murray 2007), structural adjustment often hurt urban consumers by ending currency controls and price subsidies on staple foods. Simultaneously, greater economic austerity reduced available public spending for urban infrastructure, health, and education while privatization and trade liberalization forced uncompetitive domestic industries to either shed workers or impose wage freezes. As a result of these latter measures, between 30,000 and 50,000 formal sector workers in Zambia lost their jobs between 1992 and 1996 (Rakner 2003). Moreover, poverty in Lusaka increased from 25 to 39 percent in only two years between 1991 and 1993 (UNDP 1998: 59). Consequently, so many Zambians resorted to laboring in the urban informal sector that by the mid-1990s, middle-class Lusakans were complaining about the lack of walking space on city sidewalks due to the predominance of street vendors and the growth of *tuntembas*, which are makeshift market stalls crafted out of wood and plastic (see Chilaizya 1993; Mwiinga 1993).⁴¹ As Hansen (2004: 62) notes, street vending in the capital had reached “anarchic proportions” by Christmas 1998: “Main streets, alleyways, and shop corridors in the city centre, and many other spots besides, had turned into one huge outdoor shopping mall where thousands of street vendors were selling all manner of goods.”

At the same time, Lusaka experienced an increase in population. The city’s population growth rate over the 1990s was 3.3 percent, more than twice the rate for Zambia overall (CSO 2003a). The impetus for this demographic shift was twofold. First, migrants arrived from Zambia’s other main urban area, the Copperbelt province, which is the source of the country’s main export commodity. A prolonged decline in

⁴¹ Translated from Bemba, *tuntamba* literally means “area of operation” and in Hansen’s (2004) view, is a term that captures how vendors and marketers claim public space for their survival activities.

copper prices and production, along with privatization of the mines, caused more than 25,000 workers in the mining sector to lose their jobs over the 1990s (McCulloch *et al.* 2000). Most migrated to Lusaka in the hopes that the city's more diversified industrial base would provide alternative employment opportunities. In fact, the capital city received approximately 133,000 residents from the Copperbelt during the 1990-2000 period (CSO 2003a). Secondly, Lusaka contains a higher concentration of young people than the rest of the country, meaning that the city experienced higher natural population growth than other areas of Zambia (Mulenga 2003).

Such demographic and economic pressures not only placed constraints on formal employment opportunities within Lusaka but also on housing availability. Due to British town planning principles, many African residents of Lusaka lived in housing on the outskirts of the city during colonial times and since permanent settlement was discouraged, housing options for Africans generally were limited (Taylor 2006). With successive waves of migration to the city in the 1990s, coupled with the dearth of government housing initiatives or private sector development, this housing became characterized by vast, unorganized shanty compounds (Hansen 2002; Mulenga 2003). The construction of such housing consists of concrete block walls and corrugated iron or asbestos sheet roofs, and roads in such communities are gravel with no drainage, making many impassable during the rainy season (World Bank 2002a). According to the director and deputy directors of housing and social services for the Lusaka City Council, approximately 35 such compounds exist in Lusaka, seven of which are considered illegal and therefore not eligible to receive more substantial infrastructure investments from the government.⁴² In all, such settlements contain the highest

⁴² Personal interviews with Rose Phiri and Bornwell Matawe, LCC, Lusaka, April 8, 2009. According to Matawe, in legal settlements, people possess title to their land and therefore can access loans and put up homes of their choice. Hickey (2005) echoes that the government is not responsible for investing in basic services within those settlements deemed "illegal."

density of the city's population and are home to 70 percent of Lusaka's residents (UN-Habitat 2007). Tellingly, while the government refuses to recognize illegal shanty compounds because this implies an onus of service provision, it nonetheless has designated some of them as official political wards for the purpose of elections.⁴³

Throughout the 1990s, the MMD not only implemented liberalization policies that worsened living and working conditions, but also actively alienated the urban poor through housing demolitions and crackdowns on vendors. In his role as the MMD's Minister of Local Government and Housing, Michael Sata razed in 1991 the homes of 500 families living in Kanyama's shanty compounds (*Weekly Post* 1992).⁴⁴ Illegal homes in the compounds of John Laing and Misisi were also threatened with demolition in 1992 because these areas had been earmarked for industrial development (Chibuye 1992). One year later, approximately 40 shacks in Kamwala Township were targeted by bulldozers to make way for more modern houses (Chitenje 1993). By the end of the decade, John Laing and Misisi were threatened yet again with demolition (Mumbati 2000; Kabuswe 2000). Also in 2000, the deputy minister of Lusaka Province requested the eviction of squatters in Lusaka's Ibex Hill neighborhood, prompting one affected resident to exclaim, "My husband is a policeman and he gets very little money so where do you want us to go? It seems the ruling MMD is for the rich" (cited in Hampande 2000: 3). Figure 4.1 in Chapter Four illustrates the location of these neighborhoods.

With respect to street vendors, a particularly violent crackdown in 1993 by the Lusaka City Council (LCC) led to riots and prompted Chiluba to intervene on the vendor's behalf (Hansen 2004: 65). Consequently, vending was sarcastically referred to as the "Office of the president" because vendors appeared to be under Chiluba's

⁴³ Personal interview with Rose Phiri, LCC, Lusaka, April 8, 2009.

⁴⁴ Apparently, just a few years later, residents whose homes were destroyed had already re-built on the same site (Nampito and Gina 1995).

protection (Chifuwe 1993). This relationship was formalized in 1996 with the establishment of a Vendors' Desk at State House where Chiluba appointed a deputy minister to be in charge of street and market vendors' affairs (War on Want n.d.). By 1999, however, traders recognized the limits of their protection when the LCC engaged in a massive sweep across Lusaka that resulted in the destruction of hundreds of *tuntembas* in the city center and within the residential townships on the periphery (Hansen 2004: 66). Apparently, Chiluba did not intervene on this occasion because the MMD realized that the vendors were not actually registered voters and therefore did not need to be co-opted in exchange for electoral support (Hansen 2007b: 10).

The 2001 Elections: Personalistic Linkages Fail the Urban Poor

Although this harassment, dire living circumstances, and Chiluba's attempts to change the constitution should have proved a major boon for the opposition's prospects in the 2001 elections, the use of personalistic linkages to mobilize the urban poor failed to deliver electoral majorities in urban areas to any major party. In fact, only 2.5 million of a potential 4.6 million eligible Zambians even registered to vote in 2001 (Venter 2003), implying a significant lack of enthusiasm with the possible candidates. Though the MMD's candidate, Levy Mwanawasa, obtained the presidency through a very slim mandate, with only 29 percent of the national vote, the opposition did not perform much better. In fact, the second-place finisher at the national level, the UPND's Mazoka, only received a quarter of the votes. As seen by the boldfaced numbers in Table 3.2, the UPND and FDD split votes in Lusaka's poorest constituencies, with the UPND more popular in Kanyama and Munali and the FDD prevailing in Chawama and Mandevu. Within the Copperbelt, the Heritage Party received the most votes in the country's second largest city, Kitwe, while the MMD proved victorious in the third largest city of Ndola. Thus, despite a decline in urban

living standards, no one party was able to overwhelmingly capture the imaginations of the urban poor.

Table 3.2: Results from the 2001 Zambian Presidential Elections in Selected Urban Areas (%)

Urban Constituencies	Poverty Rates	Main Candidates (Party)			
		Levy Mwanawasa (MMD)	Andrew Mazoka (UPND)	Christon Tembo (FDD)	Godfrey Miyanda (HP)
Lusaka Province					
Chawama	0.61	21.4	27.3	29.2	3.8
Kabwata	0.25	15.0	34.5	21.8	9.8
Kanyama	0.57	14.5	41.4	19.9	4.5
Lusaka Central	0.26	12.4	34.7	21.9	13.5
Mandevu	0.52	16.5	18.7	30.5	7.4
Matero	0.42	19.4	20.1	25.1	9.2
Munali	0.58	12.5	31.7	24.6	12.9
Copperbelt Province					
Kitwe	0.45	30.0	15.9	4.9	30.1
Ndola Central	0.56	26.1	15.6	12.2	22.1

Sources: Election data from the Electoral Commission of Zambia; Poverty data from Simler (2007) and based on the 2000 Census and the 2002-2003 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey.

Based on some of the criteria discussed in Chapter Two, the fact that the urban vote was split among four parties indicates that the opposition parties exhibited very little differentiation. Indeed, analysts of these elections are in agreement that while the MMD certainly engaged in some techniques to hinder the opposition, the opposition parties themselves were largely to blame for failing to mobilize greater support.⁴⁵ For instance, Rakner (2003: 124) notes that all the parties contesting those elections shared the following traits: emerged from the MMD, were formed behind a strong leader who contributed the majority of the party's finances, lacked any programmatic or ideological leanings, and were mainly based in Lusaka. Momba (2005: 33) observed that "the lack of significant differences in terms of policies due to similar ideologies

⁴⁵ Some of the MMD's tactics involved harassment of the media, physical violence against opposition party members, and scheduling the elections immediately after Christmas, when most people would be away from the constituency in which they registered to vote (Simon 2005).

and general outlooks raises questions about the meaningfulness of alternative choices presented to voters at election time." Burnell (2001) noted that the opposition had failed not only to craft a policy agenda targeted at key issues but also to mobilize grassroots support. He further claimed that the state of the opposition helped qualify Zambia as an example of Mkandawire's (1999) "choiceless democracies."

A closer examination of the opposition parties' promises indicates that no single one advanced a message with a large degree of congruence with the priorities of the urban poor. The FDD focused on the need for institutional reforms, such as curbing executive powers, but economic concerns and food security were more urgent issues for the electorate (Burnell 2002). While the Heritage Party campaigned on a vague message of "national renewal," both UNIP and the UPND offered to introduce free healthcare and education (Burnell 2002). At the same time, however, the UPND also announced that agriculture would receive priority if Mazoka was voted into presidential office, arguing that this sector was "Zambia's number one competitive advantage in Africa" (cited in Chifuwe 2000: 4). All three parties did not offer different economic policies than the MMD but promised to implement them with greater oversight and transparency (Rakner 2003).

The PF only obtained between two to four percent of the vote across Lusaka's urban constituencies. The party certainly was disadvantaged by time constraints, having decided to compete in the elections only 59 days after it had been established. Yet, Sata's poor showing was also due to his close association with Chiluba, and therefore with the rampant corruption and liberal economic policies that typified the MMD's first decade in power (Larmer and Fraser 2007). At the time of the 2001 elections, Sata's populist strategy had yet to take shape.

The “New Deal” Administration Gets Old

Mwanawasa entered office proclaiming a “New Deal” administration, which resulted in greater commitment to economic liberalization and increased harassment of the urban poor. Specifically, by furthering many of the privatizations initiated by Chiluba and courting foreign investors, the MMD retained a pro-capitalist, free-market stance, emphasizing the importance of entrepreneurship.⁴⁶ According to the party’s manifesto, prepared for the 2006 elections, Mwanawasa’s government had pursued during his first term “macroeconomic policies aimed at arresting economic decline, stabilizing the economy and further entrenching a liberal economic environment” (MMD 2006: 6). During his second term, the MMD’s priorities were to “provide incentives that facilitate and enhance greater private sector participation in the mining, agriculture, tourism and manufacturing sectors as well as create a risk free investment destination” (MMD 2006: 6). In addition, the party aimed to promote partnerships with local and foreign investors, create incentives to invest in rural areas and for labor-intensive businesses, promote export-oriented industries, and encourage Zambians’ involvement in high-earning investments (MMD 2006: 7).

Guided by these objectives, Mwanawasa considerably improved Zambia’s economic circumstances and governance environment during his tenure. The country’s inflation dropped to single digits and economic growth averaged approximately five percent, buoyed by improved copper prices and substantial external debt forgiveness (*Economist* 2006; Larmer and Fraser 2007). Progress also occurred with financial sector reform during this period,⁴⁷ and Mwanawasa engaged in a concerted effort to combat corruption, including establishing a corruption taskforce

⁴⁶ Personal interview with Dr. Katele Kalumba, MMD, Lusaka, March 5, 2009. Members of other parties, such as the ULP’s Sakwiba Sikota (interviewed March 31, 2009 in Lusaka) and journalists, such as the BBC’s Musonda Chibamba (interviewed January 28, 2009) agreed with this characterization.

⁴⁷ Personal interview with anonymous DfID governance advisor, Lusaka, March 11, 2009.

and controversially removing Chiluba's immunity from prosecution on corruption charges (Mthembu-Salter 2007). Furthermore, Mwanawasa officially launched the National Constitutional Conference (NCC) in 2007, which is a multi-stakeholder initiative aimed at reviewing weaknesses in the country's constitution, including the rule that a presidential candidate can win with only a simple plurality of votes.⁴⁸ Compared with Chiluba's presidency, Mwanawasa's tenure also coincided with greater tolerance of the independent press, such as *The Post* newspaper, which tends to offer more favorable coverage to the opposition.⁴⁹

Mwanawasa's Policies Towards the Urban Poor

Yet, as highlighted in Figure 2.1 in Chapter Two, macroeconomic growth did not necessarily help the MMD very much in the 2006 elections because life for the urban poor did not necessarily improve under Mwanawasa. Indeed, as noted by Lewis (2008: 97), economic growth in a number of African democracies over the last decade has not been accompanied by improvements in incomes or public welfare. In Zambia, improved copper prices benefitted foreign investors more than local residents, especially since foreign-owned mining companies were only taxed 0.6 percent of their profits (Larmer and Fraser 2007). Other growth came from the country's tourism and construction industries (EIU 2008), neither of which had significant spillover effects. Figure 3.1 shows that despite relatively stable growth during Mwanawasa's first term, there was only a marginal decline in the number of poor people living in Lusaka. Moreover, this figure highlights that there was positive and stable economic growth throughout Mwanawasa's tenure from 2001-2008, even though the opposition prevailed during the 2006 and 2008 elections among Lusaka's urban poor.

⁴⁸ See "About the NCC" at <http://www.ncczambia.org/aboutthenc.php> (accessed October 13, 2009).

⁴⁹ Personal interview with Sheikh Chifuwe, 17-year journalist with *The Post* and General Secretary of the Press Freedom Committee, Lusaka, January 29, 2009.




Figure 3.1: Trends in Urban Poverty and Macroeconomic Growth, Zambia⁵⁰

Other data also attests to the persistence of urban poverty despite economic growth during this period. By 2004, formal sector employment had declined by 24 percent from its 1992 level (Larmer and Fraser 2007). Approximately 56 percent of Zambia's urban population and 69 percent of Lusaka's worked in the non-agricultural informal sector (CSO 2007; World Bank 2007a). Figure 3.2 also highlights that the monthly cost of basic food staples and essential non-food items for a family of six living in Lusaka continued increasing during Mwanawasa's first term. Just two months previous to the October 2006 elections, the cost increased again to 1,421,650 Kwacha, or \$387 at 2006 exchange rates. This exceeded by more than double the

⁵⁰ The number of poor was calculated from poverty data in Simler (2007), who in turn based his data from the Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys for 1993, 1998, and 2004, and from population data from CSO (1995), CSO (2003a), and Republic of Zambia (2006). GDP growth data is from the World Development Indicators, 2009.

average monthly income of 645,326 Kwacha found in most of Lusaka's low-income neighborhoods.⁵¹




Figure 3.2: Trend in the Cost of Monthly Basic Needs in Lusaka⁵²

Moreover, service delivery remained sub-standard and expensive in urban areas. Figure 3.3 illustrates how the average cost of electricity and water for a family of four living in Lusaka steadily increased during Mwanawasa's tenure. The quality of such services was also low. Despite paying very high electricity bills relative to their incomes, residents in Lusaka's townships were also burdened by frequent power outages that could last up to eight hours (Bupe 2006). According to a World Bank (2007a) study on urban settlements in Zambia, pit latrines are a common form of waste disposal in informal settlements. Space constraints in Lusaka mean that there is limited room available to construct new latrines. This problem is exacerbated by the

⁵¹ See the basic needs baskets calculated by the Lusaka-based Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection (JCTR) since 1996 and which can be found at <http://www.jctr.org.zm/bnbasket.html> (accessed July 20, 2009).

⁵² The source for Figure 3.2 is data from the JCTR (2006). The basic needs surveys are conducted on a monthly basis. Only the data from the month of January is shown here.

fact that residents in such settlements often rely on self-made shallow wells for water supply and can rarely afford to chlorinate or boil their drinking water. While it is not uncommon for middle- and upper-class Lusakans to pay for private garbage collection, street lights, and roads,⁵³ poor households could only rely on the government or an NGO to provide equivalent services. Organizations involved in housing policy claim that the government-run National Housing Authority built houses that only Lusakans with affluent jobs could afford while the Low-Cost Housing Development Foundation linked to the Ministry of Local Government concentrated most of its projects on the poor in rural areas.⁵⁴




Figure 3.3: Trend in Average Cost of Utilities in Lusaka⁵⁵

⁵³ Personal interviews with Michael Soko of the United Nations Development Program, Lusaka, March 10, 2009 and Nelson Ncube of the People's Process on Housing and Poverty in Zambia, Lusaka, February 17, 2009.

⁵⁴ Personal interview with Nelson Ncube, People's Process on Housing and Poverty, Lusaka, February 17, 2009.

⁵⁵ The source of the data presented in Figure 3.3 is the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) CityData database.

In addition, the harassment of the urban poor prevalent during the Chiluba era grew even more pronounced under Mwanawasa. Unlike his predecessor, Mwanawasa considered the Vendor's Desk an unnecessary government office and abolished it (War on Want 2007). When a cholera outbreak occurred in February 2004 under the electricity pylons next to Soweto market, Mwanawasa's Minister of Local Government and Housing, Sylvia Masebo, ordered the razing of part of the market and told the displaced vendors they would receive no alternative land to trade on because they had originally opted to trade on illegal land (cited in Hansen 2007a). In June 2008, 400 makeshift stalls in Lusaka's Town Centre Market were razed without warning and without offering traders alternative space (*Times of Zambia* 2008a). The impetus for many of these demolitions was to force marketeers into more modern markets, which offer better working conditions but require the payment of tenants' fees for stalls that few vendors can afford. Indeed, some of the city's newest and most modern markets have wound up in the hands of Asians and Lebanese, who can more easily afford the higher stall charges that the government levied on these markets, effectively preventing many African Zambians from moving into them (Hansen 2004).⁵⁶ Such actions lead Victor Phiri, a representative of an informal sector workers' organization known as Workers Education Alliance of Zambia (WEAZ), to conclude that the government is in effect "stealing from the poor."⁵⁷ Extortion practiced by MMD cadres presents another problem for marketeers. MMD cadres frequently force marketeers to pay extra fees in exchange for their stalls under the promise of receiving better garbage collection and drainage within the markets, which ultimately never materializes.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Hansen (2004: 76) provides some details on this issue, particularly with respect to Kamwala Market.

⁵⁷ Personal interview with Victor Phiri, WEAZ Director, Lusaka, February 25, 2009.

⁵⁸ Personal interview with BBC correspondent Musonda Chibamba, Lusaka, January 28, 2009. See also Hansen (2007a) and War on Want (2007) on MMD cadres' control of the markets.

President Mwanawasa also invested 200 million kwacha into the “Keep Zambia Clean” campaign (*Times of Zambia* 2007a). Designed to improve cleanliness and hygiene around the city, the campaign involved adding more stringent provisions to Zambia’s Street Vending and Nuisances Act, which levies fees on those who are engaged in street vending or who purchase from vendors (*Times of Zambia* 2007a).⁵⁹ Crackdowns on street vendors and illegal marketeers ensued because they supposedly worsened traffic congestion and street littering and contributed to cholera outbreaks. For example, in mid-2007, the four-lane Freedom Way in downtown Lusaka was cleared of street vendors whose activities had made the road virtually impassable.⁶⁰ The Zambian Confederation of Trade Unions (ZCTU), which has initiated a number of programs to assist informal workers, decried this “continued harassment of the informal sector by the state police, the local authorities, the ZRA [Zambian Revenue Authority] and even the ruling party cadres. These look at the informal sector as a nuisance merely tolerated for cheap political propaganda, electioneering and even financial extortion” (ZCTU 2006: 17). For Hansen (2007a: 2) though, such harassment is consistent with the government’s perception of the “free market,” which means attracting foreign investors to a clean city free of vendors and selling market stalls to the highest bidder.

In addition, those living in illegal squatter settlements consistently were threatened with demolitions. In late 2002, a campaign of squatter compound demolitions occurred throughout the city at the height of the rainy season, causing more than 700 families to become homeless and placed in refugee tents where

⁵⁹ The amended Street Vending and Public Nuisances Act can be found on the website of the Lusaka City Council at http://www.lcc.gov.zm/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=82&Itemid=112 (accessed March 20, 2009).

⁶⁰ Personal interview with Father Henriot, Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection, Lusaka, January 30, 2009.

dysentery and cholera ensued (Myers 2005). In March 2007, the Mwanawasa government announced full backing from the President's cabinet to proceed with plans to demolish illegal shanty compounds in Lusaka, some which were in existence for decades. Human rights groups warned that such actions would create a humanitarian emergency since alternative accommodation had not been provided for the displaced (Jere 2007). Nevertheless, under the protection of anti-riot police, the government proceeded to destroy 100 homes in the Kalikiliki compound alone (Mwanangombe 2007).

Such treatment of the urban poor reflected both characteristics of Mwanawasa's personality and the government's general attitude towards urban development. For Mwanawasa, adherence to the rule of law was more important than his popularity.⁶¹ At the same time, the MMD government has not created an urban development program around a coherent policy framework.⁶² Even one of the MMD's founding members and campaign manager, Dr. Mbita Chitala, admits that his party lacks clear programs on housing and job creation.⁶³ His colleague and MMD National Secretary, Dr. Katele Kalumba, further adds that he is unaware of any urban development strategy and notes that instead, the goal of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing tends to be aimed at ridding the cities of excess populations in the markets and residential areas.⁶⁴ Regardless of the motivation for such actions, Dr. Kalumba recognizes that they were detrimental to his party's image among Lusaka's poor:

And I realized that we were really hurting a lot of our people by the approach that we were taking in enforcing the public hygiene measures. It touches upon whether the street or the town is the privilege of a certain group of people. Whose town is it? It appears that if you live in Woodlands, Kabulonga, and so on, you are *the* town

⁶¹ Personal interview with BBC Zambia correspondent, Musonda Chibamba, Lusaka, January 28, 2009.

⁶² Personal interview with anonymous DfID governance advisor, Lusaka, March 11, 2009.

⁶³ Personal interview with Dr. Mbita Chitala, MMD, Lusaka, January 29, 2009.

⁶⁴ Personal interview with Dr. Katele Kalumba, MMD, Lusaka, March 5, 2009.

owners, and if you live in Kaunda Square or Kalingalinga or places like this, you are simply strangers in the city who can be moved and resettled somewhere. Now that's a very significant ideological problem regarding our understanding of the city and its dynamic as a population-space relation. Before, in the colonial times, it was a white man's city, a white man's town. The natives were brought in from outside, they were kept away and at night, after 17 hours, you are not expected to be seen anywhere near the neighborhoods. So, this time, it's just a different configuration, from race to class. The new sort of *nouveaux riches*, the new economic leaders and players think that they have the power to define who occupies what space.⁶⁵

Frustration with these policies was apparent during the 2006 campaign when the Minister of Local Government and Housing, Sylvia Masebo, was almost beaten up when she canvassed for votes at Lusaka's City Market. One vendor shouted, "This station is not for MMD, it is for Sata and we do not want Masebo and her MMD" (cited in Kachali and Kalilele 2006: 6). Mwanawasa faced similar outrage during the same campaign when his presidential motorcade was blocked by PF supporters shouting anti-MMD slogans along Lumumba Road (Chellah and Chilemba 2006), a thoroughfare normally crowded by informal sector workers.

Vote-Buying in the Countryside

In contrast to the MMD's treatment of the urban poor, the party adopted a much more accommodating approach in the rural areas through the use of vote-buying, thereby illustrating how parties employ disparate strategies with different constituents. The party's manifesto for 2007-2011, which was released for the 2006 elections, highlights that the MMD ranked agriculture as its number one priority for the country's economic development agenda (MMD 2006). The party mainly accorded attention to this sector via the Fertilizer Support Program (FSP). Launched in the 2002-2003 farming season, the FSP provides partially subsidized fertilizer to

⁶⁵ Ibid. Woodlands and Kabulonga are affluent neighborhoods in Lusaka while Kaunda Square and Kalingalinga are shanty townships.

households in rural areas. While there is no doubt that rural poverty remains a major concern in Zambia that should be addressed by the government, the FSP did not represent solely a programmatic tool to improve rural livelihoods but rather an instrument for vote-buying.⁶⁶

This becomes obvious by observing that the FSP has been sustained by the government despite the many problems with its economic effectiveness and administration. For instance, if the government was truly interested in improving agricultural development, the FSP would be accompanied with a broad range of investments in the agricultural sector. Instead, the FSP constitutes the single largest expenditure item in the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO) budget (Jayne *et al.* 2006), and comprised almost 40 percent of the government's budget during 2006 (Ariga *et al.* 2006). By contrast, more long-term investments in infrastructure and irrigation constituted only two and three percent of the budget, respectively (Jayne *et al.* 2006), and the dominance of the FSP in the budget has deprived agricultural extension and research services of a large part of their operating budgets, in turn decreasing their effectiveness (Ariga *et al.* 2006). Moreover, richer farmers have benefitted more from the program than poorer small-scale farmers (Morris *et al.* 2007). Similarly, poorer regions, such as Western and Northwestern Province, receive the lowest agricultural public expenditures and benefit the least from the FSP (Govere *et al.* 2009).⁶⁷ In essence, the FSP was not available to all agricultural producers and as seen in Table 3.3, fertilizer was distributed more heavily in provinces that were becoming PF strongholds, presumably in the belief that votes in other provinces were already secure.

⁶⁶ Just because the MMD distributes FSP for political reasons does not mean that this necessarily wins over voters. In fact, Taylor (2008) suggests that the poor administration for the FSP may have actually hurt the MMD politically

⁶⁷ The spatial distribution of fertilizer subsidies is returned to briefly in Chapter 5.

A 2005 study based on extensive fieldwork in rural areas by the Zambia-based NGO Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) concluded that there was “very little impact of the FSP in terms of reducing food shortages, increasing household income and reducing poverty” (CSPR 2005: 23). In addition, the impact of the FSP has been negligible on yield production (Govere *et al.* 2009). According to Taylor's (2008) research on the political economy of agricultural subsidies in Zambia, distribution around elections in 2006 occurred way before the actual planting season. Moreover, his research uncovered that rural MPs often pressured the Ministry of Finance to continue financing the program in the belief that it would provide support among voters. This was confirmed by the MMD's national campaign manager, Mbita Chitala, who admits that his party retains control in rural areas via fertilizer distribution.⁶⁸ Likewise, a World Bank specialist on Zambia's public management notes that given the number of inefficiencies surrounding the FSP, the program should be primarily viewed as a political tool for the MMD.⁶⁹

Table 3.3: Distribution of FSP and Poverty Rates by Province

Province	Poverty Rate, 2004	Kilograms of FSP fertilizer per hectare of maize planted, 2006
Central	76	51
Copperbelt	56	122
Eastern	70	54
Luapula	79	115
Lusaka	48	122
Northern	74	110
Northwestern	76	54
Southern	69	47
Western	83	13

Sources: Poverty data is from Simler (2007) and FSP data is from Govere *et al.* (2009).

When the vice-president, Rupiah Banda, became the MMD's election candidate in the wake of Mwanawasa's death in August 2008, he campaigned on a motto of “continuity” and vowed to proceed with his predecessor's policies (*Africa*

⁶⁸ Personal interview with Dr. Mbita Chitala, Lusaka, January 29, 2009.

⁶⁹ Personal interview with Patricia Palale, Lusaka, February 25, 2009.

Confidential 2008).⁷⁰ The continuation of agricultural handouts represented one of the key ways in which this promise was fulfilled. Banda promised in a campaign rally that he was expanding the FSP from 120,000 to 220,000 families and that the government would increase the share it subsidizes from 60 to 75 percent (Miti 2008). Around the same time, it was announced that the budget for the FSP 2008-2009 year would be 485 billion kwacha (*Times of Zambia* 2008b). The PF's Dr. Guy Scott complained that the MMD again timed its annual fertilizer deliveries just before the 2008 elections.⁷¹ Banda also aroused much controversy when he was photographed distributing bags of sugar and mealie-meal, a maize-based gruel that is a Zambian staple food, to village women in rural areas during his campaign (See Figure A4.1 in Appendix Four).

Election Results in 2006 and 2008

While the MMD concentrated on vote-buying in the rural areas during both the 2006 and 2008 elections, its treatment of the urban poor proved detrimental to its electoral fortunes in Lusaka and the Copperbelt. Overall, the 2006 elections were characterized by much higher voter registration than in the 2001 elections. Four million Zambians registered (Wines 2006a) while the Electoral Commission of Zambia reported that 70 percent of these registered voters actually turned out to vote, indicating less voter apathy at the choice of candidates or outcome.⁷²

At the national level, Mwanawasa received a larger mandate than in 2001, gaining 43 percent of the vote compared with Sata's 29 percent. Not surprisingly, the MMD obtained most of its votes in majority rural areas, such as Eastern, Western,

⁷⁰ The Zambian constitution stipulates that in the case where a president dies in office, a new president needs to be elected within 90 days. The vice-president, Rupiah Banda, became the interim president and endorsed as the MMD's candidate. Ironically, Banda was until only a few years earlier an official member of UNIP.

⁷¹ Personal interview with Dr. Guy Scott, Lusaka, January 21, 2009.

⁷² See "2008 Elections" at <http://www.elections.org.zm/>.

Northwestern, and Central provinces. However, Michael Sata obtained about 58 percent of the vote in Lusaka District compared with 22 percent for Mwanawasa. In the wake of Andrew Mazoka's death, Hakainde Hichilema took over leadership of the UPND and entered into a coalition with UNIP and the FDD, which was called the United Democratic Alliance (UDA), for the 2006 elections. Despite hoping to reverse the 2001 results when these parties split each other's votes by running separately, Hichilema only received 20 percent of the votes in Lusaka. As seen by the boldfaced numbers in Table 3.4, Sata obtained the majority of votes in *all* of Zambia's major urban constituencies. Such an outcome indicated that urbanites did not simply want a change from the MMD but rather chose a specific opposition party that was believed to be most likely to implement the exact change they wanted.

Table 3.4: Results from the 2006 Zambian Presidential Elections in Major Urban Areas (%)

Main Urban Constituencies	Poverty Rates	Presidential Candidates (Party)				
		Levy Mwanawasa (MMD)	Michael Sata (PF)	Hakainde Hichilema (UDA)	Godfrey Miyanda (HP)	Ken Ngondo (APC)
Lusaka Province						
Chawama	0.61	20.7	55.9	22.2	1.0	0.3
Kabwata	0.25	17.2	61.4	19.6	1.6	0.1
Kanyama	0.57	22.9	45.7	29.8	1.2	0.3
Lusaka Central	0.26	20.9	56.4	20.8	1.6	0.1
Mandevu	0.52	23.0	61.4	13.9	1.3	0.3
Matero	0.42	21.7	63.4	13.5	1.2	0.2
Munali	0.58	19.9	58.3	19.9	1.6	0.3
Copperbelt Province						
Kitwe	0.45	19.6	69.5	9.2	1.5	0.2
Ndola Central	0.56	20.4	64.5	12.2	2.5	0.4

Sources: Election data calculated from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (<http://www.elections.org.zm/>). Poverty data from Simler (2007) and based on the 2000 Census and the 2002-2003 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey

The importance of Sata's victory across both Lusaka and cities in the Copperbelt is even more remarkable considering the ethnic composition of the two regions of the country. While the Copperbelt is primarily Bemba-speaking, Lusaka's

population is highly heterogeneous. Though migrants from the Copperbelt and Northern provinces have arrived more recently, most migrants are from Eastern and Southern provinces (Hansen 2002). Nyanja-speakers are in the majority, representing almost 53 percent of the population as of 2000 (CSO 2004). This is important because, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five, ethno-linguistic identity has at times played an important role in Zambian politics (see Posner 2005). Nevertheless, Sata, who is a Bemba-speaker, was still highly popular in a city dominated by Nyanja-speakers.

Table 3.5: Results from the 2008 Zambian Presidential Elections in Major Urban Areas (%)

Main Urban Constituencies	Poverty Rates	Presidential Candidates (Party)			
		<i>Rupiah Banda (MMD)</i>	<i>Michael Sata (PF)</i>	<i>Hakainde Hichilema (UPND)</i>	<i>Godfrey Miyanda (HP)</i>
<i>Lusaka Province</i>					
Chawama	0.61	25.5	60.3	13.9	0.3
Kabwata	0.25	20.2	63.3	15.8	0.7
Kanyama	0.57	26.1	52.2	21.3	0.4
Lusaka Central	0.26	24.7	58.6	15.9	0.8
Mandevu	0.52	28.8	63.2	7.5	0.5
Matero	0.42	25.0	66.5	8.1	0.4
Munali	0.58	27.1	58.5	13.7	0.6
<i>Copperbelt Province</i>					
Kitwe	0.45	18.5	75.2	5.6	0.6
Ndola Central	0.56	30.4	60.8	7.6	1.3

Sources: Election data calculated from the Electoral Commission of Zambia(<http://www.elections.org.zm/>). Poverty data from Simler (2007) and based on the 2000 Census and the 2002-2003 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey

A similar pattern occurred in the October 2008 by-elections that followed Mwanawasa's death. Rupiah Banda beat Sata by only two percentage points at the national level, obtaining 40 percent of the vote compared with his competitor's 38 percent. Simultaneously, Sata's vote shares actually increased in all of Lusaka's constituencies, as well as in key cities on the Copperbelt. By contrast, Hichilema and

his UPND actually lost some ground (see Table 3.5).⁷³ While the exact level of turnout by the urban poor in particular is not possible to determine with the existing election data, the turnout rates in urban Lusaka were higher than the national turnout rates during both elections. Specifically, the national turnout rate was 69 and 45 percent in the 2006 and 2008 elections, respectively. The comparative rates for urban Lusaka were 71 and 58 percent.

The Populist Strategy of “King Cobra”

By employing a populist strategy, rather than the personalistic linkages of his opposition competitors, Sata was able to tap into the frustrations of the urban poor more effectively in the 2006 and 2008 elections than the opposition had done during the 2001 elections. His strategy was three-fold. First, he relied on a careful targeting of his campaign rallies within key areas of Lusaka. Secondly, he mobilized constituents via a combination of charisma and a programmatic message around issues of social inclusion and anti-elitism, with some distribution of selective benefits to potential supporters. Thirdly, he relied on simplistic language and an open-door policy, as well as magnified his own lack of education, in order to foster the image of a paternalistic benefactor who understands the plight of the “common man.” This, in turn, fosters vertical ties between Sata and his constituents and translates into an autocratic and hierarchical management of the PF by him.

⁷³ Both the 2008 and 2006 elections were deemed “free and fair” by local and international observers (see *Africa Confidential* 2008; Larmer and Fraser 2007). However, the UPND believes that the MMD steals some of its votes in rural areas as a way of remaining competitive with the PF, whose urban votes are more difficult to steal (Personal interview with Dr. Choowle Beyani, UPND, Lusaka, February 24, 2009).

Geographically-Targeted Campaigns

Sata spent a majority of his time campaigning amongst street vendors, marketeers, bus and taxi drivers, and the youth, the latter of whom comprise 66 percent of the population in Lusaka Province (CSO 2004).⁷⁴ In the 2008 elections, he launched his campaign from the Matero market, where the PF contains an office (Kalaluka and Noyoo 2008). By contrast, Banda launched his campaign from Lusaka's plush Inter-Continental Hotel (*Times of Zambia* 2008c) and Hichilema began at the Mulungushi Conference Center, a site traditionally reserved for meetings amongst politicians.⁷⁵ In the run-up to the 2006 elections, Sata believed that Mandevu constituency, which is among the poorest in Lusaka, was one of his strongest bases of support⁷⁶ and he therefore held the final rally of his presidential campaign in Mandevu compound (Larmer and Fraser 2007).

Shanty compounds are specifically targeted by the PF during election campaigns because, as mentioned earlier, these neighborhoods have the highest density of residents where potentially many votes can be obtained.⁷⁷ In the aftermath of the 2006 elections, when many urbanites were surprised that Sata did not win the presidency, riots broke out in not only Mandevu and Matero but also in the Garden and Chipata compounds and ultimately spread to the Copperbelt. Residents in these compounds threw stones and burned market stalls and merchandise, overwhelming the police and forcing the Zambian army to intervene (Paipi *et al.* 2006). Only when Sata publicly appealed for calm did the rioting cease (Wines 2006b). As a precautionary measure, riot police were dispatched to some Lusaka shanty compounds in 2008 to deter violence after those elections (*Africa Confidential* 2008).

⁷⁴ This percentage refers to Zambians who are 24 years-old or younger.

⁷⁵ See Hichilema's campaign website: <http://www.hakainde.com/>, accessed October 1, 2009.

⁷⁶ Personal interview with Sakwiba Sikota, President of the United Liberal Party and MP for Livingstone constituency, Lusaka, March 31, 2009.

⁷⁷ Personal interview with Musonda Chibamba, BBC correspondent for Zambia, Lusaka, January 28, 2009.

Mixed Modes of Mobilization

As a consummate political entrepreneur, Sata grabbed the attention of this constituency by crafting a charismatic and controversial image that has helped distance himself from his previous image as Chiluba's right-hand man. For instance, he engages in very theatrical antics during his campaigning to grab attention. In 2006, his campaigns featured broken clocks because the clock is the MMD's symbol (Wines 2006a). The implication was that the MMD's time had expired. The PF's own symbol is Noah's Ark and its rallying cry of *Pabwato* translates as "get on the boat," implying that Zambians should join the party to escape the country's deluge of economic hardships.⁷⁸ Playing on the theme, Sata arrived at the Zambian High Court to register his party for the 2008 elections standing in a speedboat towed by a truck (see Figure A4.2 in Appendix Four).

Importantly, he sustains this image outside of election periods. In 2005, more than a year before the 2006 elections, he addressed a huge rally in Matero township to denounce the MMD's performance and argued that Zambians needed a respite from power outages, high taxes, and the lack of clean water (*The Post* 2005). In January 2007, he organized a mass procession in the streets of Lusaka to protest the privatization of Zambian National Commercial Bank (ZNCB) and the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) suggestion that the government place higher valued-added taxes on food and agricultural products (Larmer and Fraser 2007). Moreover, he takes great effort to remain in the eye of the media and is featured on the front cover of *The Post* newspaper practically every day. The PF's vice-president, Dr. Guy Scott, noted that Sata purposely used to hold press conferences on Sunday, when there is relatively little happening for journalists to report, so that he would be guaranteed to appear in

⁷⁸ The MMD joked that if too many people got on the boat though, it was bound to sink like the Titanic (*Africa Confidential* 2006).

the Monday paper.⁷⁹ He often intentionally creates large crowds by hiring buses to bring people to his rallies, which in turn is intended to convince others that he has legitimacy as the people's representative. In fact, when he went to the High Court in January 2009 to demand a recount of the 2008 election results, 15 busloads of supposed supporters were brought in to cheer in his favor.⁸⁰

Coupled with this charisma is a package of policy promises that resonate with the priorities of the urban poor and aim to rectify their relegation, both figuratively and literally, to a marginal place in Zambian society. Collectively, Sata's promises challenge the MMD's rigid definitions of legality and illegality as well as highlight that support for a free market economy need not require the state to abrogate its responsibilities to provide basic goods and services. In the words of the PF's vice-president, Dr. Guy Scott, "The growth of the elite and elite-led kind of policy-making, or elites serving-their-own policymaking, coupled with dreadful poverty, both urban and rural, it's a serious apartheid kind of problem. I think Michael [Sata] grasps that, verbalized that better than anybody, the inequality."⁸¹ A respected Zambian political analyst, Dr. Neo Simutanyi, concurs:

He [Sata] has been able to package his message in a way that resonates well with the majority of the poor, especially in urban areas. He seems to understand the problems of the poor, the problems of the working people, especially you know those who have lost jobs and so forth. And having worked as Minister of Local Government, he seems to understand the local issues, the issues of water, the issues of services, and these are some of things that he is able to talk about in a language that the local people actually understand.⁸²

He has articulated this message most vocally through the PF's slogan of "lower taxes, more jobs, more money in your pockets." Though vague, it offers more substantive policy commitments than the slogans of the other parties. The MMD

⁷⁹ Personal interview with Dr. Guy Scott, Lusaka, January 22, 2009.

⁸⁰ Personal interview with Dr. Neo Simutanyi, Lusaka, February 3, 2009.

⁸¹ Personal interview with Dr. Guy Scott, PF Vice President, January 21, 2009.

⁸² Personal interview with Dr. Neo Simutanyi, Lusaka, February 3, 2009.

exhorts Zambians to support it “For Growth and Empowerment” (MMD 2006) and the UPND encourages voters to “Realize the dream of a better Zambia through real change” (UPND 2008). Growth, empowerment, and a better Zambia essentially represent valence goods against which no one would argue. By contrast, low wages, high prices, and few job opportunities were cited among residents in Zambia’s informal urban settlements as the top causes of poverty (see World Bank 2007a). Indeed, when asked why informal sector workers belonging to his organization support the PF, Victor Phiri of WEAZ responded that “He [Sata] focuses on unemployment, he can articulate our will.”⁸³ Given Lubinda, the PF’s spokesman and MP for Lusaka’s Kabwata constituency recognizes that the message is particularly effective in urban areas rather than rural ones: “We talk about lower taxes, we talk about jobs for people. Now, that appeals to the people in the urban areas because they’re the ones who are looking for jobs, they’re the ones whose incomes are overtaxed. So, we appeal to them more than to rural dwellers. We haven’t articulated issues of agriculture that strongly.”⁸⁴ Others echoed the same claim, noting that people living in rural areas are less likely to understand the concept of tax while being more inclined to want to hear campaign promises about farming inputs than jobs.⁸⁵

On the surface, promising more jobs and lower taxes may also appear devoid of any programmatic content. However, tax rates are particularly contentious in Zambia, where the MMD government privatized the mines and only requires foreign investors to pay 0.6 percent of royalties on their profits (Lungu 2008). Many low-income Zambians in formal jobs believe that they should not have to pay taxes on their meager incomes when wealthy investors could do so more easily. Informal workers who do not pay income tax are still forced to pay monthly or daily fees for using a

⁸³ Personal interview with Victor Phiri, Lusaka, February 25, 2009.

⁸⁴ Interview with Given Lubinda on January 22, 2009.

⁸⁵ Personal interviews with journalists Brenda Zulu and Sally Chiwama, Lusaka, January 21, 2009.

market stall or for setting up a *tuntemba*.⁸⁶ The urban poor also are more likely to have a higher share of their incomes going to pay VAT taxes on consumer goods.⁸⁷ Arguably, reducing the VAT and other taxes would provide less revenue for the government. However, the PF's Director of Research, Dr. Mulenga, claims that reducing taxes could actually provide more money for public services because fewer people would try to evade taxes, leading to higher compliance, and Zambians would spend more of their money on consumption, thereby expanding industries and ultimately economic growth.⁸⁸ With respect to jobs, the PF argued that creating more employment required diversifying the economy away from copper⁸⁹ and requiring foreign investors, particularly the Chinese, to use local labor rather than importing workers from overseas.⁹⁰ For those who remain unemployed, Sata also advocated the provision of unemployment benefits until a job was found.⁹¹

In addition, improved water, sanitation, electricity, and housing are amongst the top promises offered by the PF during its campaigns. Dr. Mulenga claims that the PF's advantage is the adoption of a "human rights approach" to these issues. When a clean water supply, for example, is portrayed as a basic need, then it becomes inexcusable for a government not to provide it.⁹² This emphasis on a human rights approach is not necessarily uncontroversial when one considers that the MMD will not provide such services to compounds considered "illegal."

A comprehensive housing development program is the main pillar of the PF's party manifesto, which stresses the need to provide low-cost, decent housing to those

⁸⁶ Personal interview with Wilma Nchito, University of Zambia, Lusaka, January 22, 2009.

⁸⁷ Personal interview with Patricia Palale, World Bank public sector management specialist, Lusaka, February 25, 2009.

⁸⁸ Personal interview with Dr. Chileshe Mulenga, PF, Lusaka, February 24, 2009.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Personal interview with Given Lubinda, PF spokesman and MP, Lusaka, January 22, 2009.

⁹¹ Personal interview with Dr. Neo Simutanyi, Lusaka, February 3, 2009.

⁹² Personal interview with Dr. Chileshe Mulenga, PF, Lusaka, February 24, 2009.

individuals currently residing in squatter settlements.⁹³ Upgrading shanty housing by providing the proper infrastructure, rather than demolishing these settlements as the MMD has tended to, was stressed throughout the PF's last two electoral campaigns.⁹⁴ PF MPs, such as Dr. Scott and Lubinda, have been vocal in Parliament about ensuring that shanty compounds receive adequate government assistance during the rainy season when roads become impassable (Zambian Parliament Tenth Assembly 2008). In addition, after the March 2007 housing demolitions, Sata proclaimed that he would sue the state on behalf of the people who lost their homes (Mwape 2007). When asked about the housing situation, Sata personally replied that illegal housing should be upgraded and added, "But, you don't demolish for the sake of demolishing. The people must come first. People must come first. The laws are made for people, laws are made to protect the people. We're going to do that."⁹⁵

Part of the PF's message is also to deride the MMD's harassment of street vendors as both counterproductive and inhumane and instead advocate that more adequate places be found for them to sell. In fact, Sata noted that

The MMD, they don't know anything about how to deal with anything because...when it comes to the vote, they [MMD members] don't run in the streets where they [vendors] vote and they don't provide them [vendors] with employment. They [MMD members] don't provide them with more space. You can't force them [vendors] out of the streets...If you crack down on them [vendors], where are you going to take them? What I'm saying is, if you fail to provide for them, don't bring punitive measures against them.⁹⁶

Such a claim is surprising from someone who, as Minister of Local Government and Housing under Chiluba, engaged in wide-ranging crackdowns on informal sector

⁹³ See "Patriotic Front Manifesto," available at <http://www.pf.com.zm/manifesto.html> (accessed February 3, 2009). The manifesto, however, provides few details about how to actually provide affordable and decent housing.

⁹⁴ Personal interviews with Musonda Chibamba, Lusaka, January 28, 2009 and Father Henriot, Lusaka, January 30, 2009.

⁹⁵ Personal interview with Michael Sata, Lusaka, January 28, 2009.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

workers and was even the architect of the Street Vending and Public Nuisances Act. Yet, for Edward Chisenga of the Street Vendors' Association, Sata's past behavior is forgotten and "King Cobra's" more recent interventions on their behalf are appreciated. In choosing a presidential candidate, Chisenga adds that treatment of street vendors is more important to him than other issues, such as health or education.⁹⁷ PF Vice-President, Guy Scott, further adds that his party, which controls the Lusaka City Council but receives orders from the MMD-controlled Ministry of Local Government, tries to sabotage the crackdowns on street vendors and market workers as much as possible.⁹⁸

Importantly, this package of messages around social inclusion remained constant across the two elections. Yet, some of Sata's more controversial claims disappeared in 2008 without hurting his support among the urban poor. Most notably, Sata had been extremely critical of the predominance of foreign investors or, in his words "infestors," in the Zambian economy. In the Copperbelt, Sata criticized the presence of Chinese and Indian companies, who own many of the region's copper mines in the wake of the MMD's privatization policies. He likewise decried that most of Lusaka's shops were owned by Chinese and South Asians (Wines 2006a) and vowed to deport foreign business owners if elected into office. At his final rally in Mandevu in 2006, he stated, "The markets are for Zambians...if you want to remain poor and if you want all good things to go to foreigners, vote for Mwanawasa" (cited in Chellah and Mwilu 2006).

Yet, in the run-up to the 2008 elections, he noticeably toned down his xenophobic rhetoric.⁹⁹ In fact, in the September 30, 2008 edition of *The Post*

⁹⁷ Personal interview with Edward Chisenga, Lusaka, March 3, 2009.

⁹⁸ Personal interview with Dr. Guy Scott, Lusaka, January 21, 2009.

⁹⁹ Personal interviews with Dr. Neo Simutanyi, Lusaka, February 3, 2009 and Musonda Chibamba, Lusaka, January 28, 2009.

newspaper, the PF sponsored a full-page campaign advertisement with the following message, which was personally signed by Sata:

We started our journey in 2001, we have come a long way. I would like on behalf of the Central Committee, Provincial Committees, District Committees, Constituencies, Wards, Branches, Sections, the General Membership of our Party and indeed on my own behalf pay tribute and *sincerely thank our Asian community for the tremendous support and contribution rendered to the Patriotic Front*. Without it, we would not have reached this far (emphasis added).

He also reversed direction and pledged that if elected into office, he would actually protect all investment deals signed under the MMD administration (EIU 2008). The fact that his vote shares actually were slightly higher in urban areas despite a reduction in xenophobic claims suggests that his message on social inclusion had been the constant factor in attracting the urban poor.¹⁰⁰

While Sata's charisma and programmatic message around social inclusion are his primary mobilizing tactics, he may have relied on selective benefits to a small extent as well. Specifically, there was some speculation that the PF distributed money to bus and taxi drivers before both elections in order to encourage them to generate support for the party among their customers.¹⁰¹ However, few knew whether those who had received such payments actually voted for Sata, or even showed up at the polls at all.¹⁰²

More generally, many believe that vote-buying does not necessarily influence urban voting behavior to the same extent as it might in rural areas. For instance, Cheikh Chifuwe of *The Post* newspaper claims that urban voters who receive handouts still tend to vote according to their consciences: "Urban voters get those things

¹⁰⁰ I further test the appeal of xenophobic rhetoric to the urban poor in Chapter Four when I look at the urban poor's attitudes towards Chinese involvement in the economy and whether any relationship existed between those attitudes and the party they ultimately chose to support.

¹⁰¹ Personal interview with Dr. Neo Simutanyi, Lusaka, February 3, 2009.

¹⁰² Ibid.

[handouts] but, at the end of the day, they make an independent decision, choice. I think over time, there has been greater awareness in the urban areas so it doesn't matter what you really give them.”¹⁰³ As noted in Chapter Two, one reason for this is that due to resource constraints, opposition parties will concentrate campaigns in urban areas and so, they can all offer hand-outs and urbanites can vote in turn as they choose. This contrasts with rural areas, where the incumbent traditionally is dominant and sometimes the only party campaigning.

Vertical Ties and Hierarchical Party Management

The third key element of Sata's populist strategy is the use of language, symbols, and party management tactics that bring him closer to the people. In turn, these actions reinforce his vertical ties and plebiscitarian relationship with the urban poor while emphasizing the lack of autonomous civil society organizations mediating the PF's interaction with this constituency. For instance, Sata speaks in the vernacular during his campaign speeches while Mwanawasa used to give his speeches in English and then have a staff member translate them into local languages (Wines 2006a). Moreover, Sata portrays himself as a common man who understands the travails of low-income urbanites: “He [Sata] talks about people eating a meal in the compound. He talks about what affects a person in the compound and they understand that this man knows what he's talking about.”¹⁰⁴ According to the PF's vice-president, Sata purposely highlights his own lack of education and refinement because it elicits claims from the opposition that one needs to be educated to run a country: “He [Sata] likes the image that he's uneducated. It brings out the worst in the educated elite. They say, ‘Honestly, a man with grade 4 [education], how can he run a

¹⁰³ Personal interview with Cheikh Chifuwe, Lusaka, January 29, 2009.

¹⁰⁴ Personal interview with Wilbur Simuusa, Lusaka, January 21, 2009.

country?’ I mean, 99 percent of the voters are grade 4 [educated]. What’s their problem? What a stupid thing to say.’¹⁰⁵ Likewise, the PF tries to discredit the leader of the UPND by calling him “calculator boy” as a reference to Hichilema’s former background working in the accounting multi-national Grant Thornton. Hichilema, though somewhat insultingly, admits that the PF’s style of leadership is effective given the nature of the urban poor:

It is the circumstances that they [the urban poor] have found themselves in that they are looking for someone who can---well, their perception is that the one who shouts a lot, the one who threatens to beat up everyone else is the one who is macho enough and maybe is the one who should rule the country. And you can’t blame them because they have been denied education. They’ve been denied jobs. So, they tend to be on the riotous side and obviously somebody who is closer to the riotous behavior is someone who they will think is their savior.¹⁰⁶

In the same manner, Dr. Chitala of the MMD candidly acknowledges that his party has less success with the urban poor because his party is perceived as aloof and intellectualistic.¹⁰⁷

Another tactic used by Sata is to show that unlike other politicians, he is directly accessible to the people. In the mid-1990s, when he was Minister of Local Government and Housing, dozens of people regularly queued up to speak with him directly about their problems (Mwiinga 1994). Anyone who has visited the PF headquarters in Farmer’s House off Cairo Road soon realizes that this “open door” policy still continues today, with constituents constantly lined up to meet with him. Furthermore, the PF’s vice-president, Dr. Scott, acknowledges that Sata publicly lambasts the performance of PF councilors and MPs to purposely bring himself closer to the voters.¹⁰⁸ By criticizing his own party members for not effectively responding

¹⁰⁵ Personal interview with Dr. Guy Scott, Lusaka, January 21, 2009.

¹⁰⁶ Personal interview with Hakainde Hichilema, Lusaka, February 17, 2009.

¹⁰⁷ Personal interview with Dr. Mbita Chitala, Lusaka, January 29, 2009.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Guy Scott, PF Vice-President and MP for Lusaka Central constituency, on January 21, 2009.

to the peoples' demands, Sata creates a paternal image that only he cares for the people and can accordingly provide.

On the other hand, the PF does not forge horizontal relationships with civic organizations representing the urban poor, debunking the possibility that a corporatist arrangement between associations of the urban poor and this opposition party have been responsible for the PF's success. According to Dr. Scott, while there are representatives of certain organizations who are members of the PF, the party does not have formal associations with any particular organizations. In his view, it would be unwise for an organization to associate with the PF since this would in turn cause it to be targeted for harassment by the MMD.¹⁰⁹ The largest umbrella organization for informal workers, known as the Alliance for Zambia Informal Economy Associations (AZIEA), has been angry about the targeting of its members by all political parties during election times. In fact, its general secretary, Lameck Kashiwa, complained in the 2008 electoral campaign that "They [politicians] should stop looking at us as campaign tools, we are human beings and want to be respected just like they want to be respected" (cited in Katasefa 2008: 7). One of AZIEA's largest alliance members is the Zambia National Marketeers Association (ZANAMA), which was established in cities on the Copperbelt during the 1990s but has its Lusaka office in the capital's main Soweto market. Its original goal was specifically to protect market workers from pressures by political party cadres, who often try to extort money from them (War on Want n.d.). According to the MMD's Dr. Kalumba, ZANAMA splits its support between the MMD and PF rather than favoring one over the other.¹¹⁰

As noted earlier, the country's main alliance of labor unions, the ZCTU, has become increasingly involved in advocating rights for informal sector workers,

¹⁰⁹ Personal interview with Dr. Guy Scott, Lusaka, January 21, 2009.

¹¹⁰ Personal interview with Dr. Katele Kalumba, Lusaka, March 5, 2009.

especially since its membership of formal sector workers has declined substantially since 1991.¹¹¹ While the ZCTU formerly possessed a corporatist relationship with the MMD during the party's early years under Chiluba, the party's privatization practices alienated much of the labor movement. By the 1996 elections, the ZCTU openly announced that it no longer supported the MMD (Rakner 2003) and since then, the union movement has abstained from endorsing any parties, including the PF (Larmer and Fraser 2007). This lack of horizontal ties resonates with contemporary populist movements in Latin America where leaders have sought to mobilize atomized, unorganized urban masses who are not represented by any organizational intermediaries, such as unions (e.g. Roberts 1995; Roberts and Arce 1998).

Not surprisingly, Sata's reliance on strong, vertical ties with the voters has manifested in a party organization firmly oriented around him. Thus far, Sata has demonstrated little tolerance for internal dissent and tellingly, the PF is the only major Zambian political party not to hold internal party elections to determine who its leader will be (EIU 2008). Consequently, experts on the local political scene and even members of the PF do not believe that the party truly is institutionalized beyond Sata and would therefore lose momentum if he was not at the helm.¹¹² The authoritarian nature of the party was clear when Sata forbade PF MPs from participating in Zambia's National Constitutional Conference (NCC), an initiative aimed at revising the constitution, because he believed that the other invited stakeholders were too partisan.¹¹³ When 27 PF MPs contravened his order and nonetheless participated, he attempted to expel them from the party (*Times of Zambia* 2007b). In turn, they

¹¹¹ Exact ZCTU membership figures are unavailable but, Rakner (2001: 528) claims there were about 350,000 members in 1991 while War on Want (2007: 12) states that there were 274,000 members just four years later.

¹¹² Interviews with Elijah Rubvuta, Executive Director of the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) on February 11, 2009 and Wynter Kabimba, PF Chairman for Local Government on February 5, 2009.

¹¹³ Personal interview with Benoist Bazin, governance advisor for the European Union, Lusaka, March 17, 2009.

threatened to throw their support behind Rupiah Banda in the 2008 elections (EIU 2008).

Cross-Class Support?

While the various components of Sata's populist strategy have endeared him to the urban poor, his appeal to other urbanites appears mixed. Certainly, some of Sata's xenophobic claims in the 2006 elections and his outspoken admiration for Zimbabwe's dictatorial leader, Robert Mugabe, frightened away intellectuals and the middle-classes (Schatz 2007). Larmer and Fraser (2007: 631) claim that civil society leaders are largely distrustful of Sata's "street politics." Big business elites also tend to shy away from the PF and favor the MMD, through votes and/or campaign contributions, specifically because they prefer the certainty that comes from supporting the status quo.¹¹⁴

Nevertheless, the election results in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show that Sata obtained high vote shares in two constituencies, Lusaka Central and Kabwata, that have relatively low poverty rates. Lusaka Central contains the neighborhood of Kabulonga, which is Lusaka's most expensive area where some of Zambia's wealthiest citizens reside. Kabwata is less lavish but contains significant neighborhoods dominated by Zambians of Indian descent (Taylor 2006), who arguably would have been most offended by Sata's anti-South Asian rhetoric. Though difficult to determine the economic standing of those who are voting for Sata within these constituencies, there are at least two reasons why he may not have completely alienated more affluent Lusakans. First, his previous service in government proved that he is serious about policy implementation. In fact, in addition to his "King Cobra" nickname, he is also widely known as a "man of action." For instance, when he was Lusaka District

¹¹⁴ Personal interviews with Dr. Neo Simutanyi, Lusaka, February 3, 2009 and Wynter Kabimba, PF chairman for local government, Lusaka, February 5, 2009.

Governor in the late 1980s, he famously cleaned up piles of accumulated trash on the capital's streets (Gould 2006). As one local journalist noted, "Things work under him. He has been Minister of Local Government, Minister of Health, Minister without Portfolio. He has produced results. So, from that angle, people in the urban areas see him as a person who works."¹¹⁵ Secondly, while the PF has been erratic on the proper role of foreign investors, the PF's director of research, Dr. Mulenga, notes that the party does not eschew a free market orientation.¹¹⁶ Instead of lobbying for nationalization or protectionism, the PF advocates for lower taxes and less bureaucracy in order to provide an enabling environment for private investment by local investors.¹¹⁷ This eclectic stance of wanting more government support for local investors with less government intervention may then prove palatable to some medium- and small-scale business owners.

Nonetheless, Sata's populist strategy towards the urban poor holds greater pay-offs because it is the latter, rather than better-off urbanites, who are most likely to appear at the polls. Hakainde Hichilema, the leader of the UPND, offered the following observation: "First, you must understand who votes in the city. It is the people living in squalor, mainly. The people in these big offices that you see hardly go into the queue to vote, they don't even register."¹¹⁸ Cheikh Chifuwe of *The Post* made the same claim, noting that in urban areas, those with formal jobs will not be able to spare adequate time to stand in long voting queues.¹¹⁹ The Director of Policy and Research for the UPND, Dr. Choolwe Beyani, despaired at these circumstances:

¹¹⁵ Personal interview with Brenda Zulu, Zambia Media Women's Association, Lusaka, January 21, 2009.

¹¹⁶ Personal interview with Chileshe Mulenga, PF, Lusaka, February 24, 2009.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Personal interview with Hakainde Hichilema, UPND President, on February 17, 2009.

¹¹⁹ Personal interview with Cheikh Chifuwe, Lusaka, January 29, 2009.

Unfortunately, the unemployed are the majority of the voters. The so-called middle-class is insignificant. Even the working classes, who have certain levels of education, has become insignificant in voting patterns. So, the half-literate or illiterate urban poor and the rural peasantry have become, especially in this economic crisis, the backbone of the voting patterns.¹²⁰

He proceeded to explain how this in turn reduces the ability of his own party to communicate a sophisticated campaign message.¹²¹

Other Opposition Party Alternatives in Zambia

The importance of a populist strategy in contributing to Sata's success among the urban poor during the 2006 and 2008 elections contrasts markedly with the purely personalistic linkages employed by three other main opposition parties. The UPND is the most viable of the three, given its third-place finish in the 2008 elections. Unlike the PF, whose rallying cry of *Pabwato* conjures an image of radical departure from the status quo under the MMD, the UNDP's motto of *Pa Kuboko Chabe*, meaning "let's shake hands," implies a conciliatory stance and accomplishment through unity. A former UPND vice-president, Sakwiba Sikota, now leads the United Liberal Party (ULP). Though Sikota has never run as a presidential candidate, his party always enters into electoral pacts with other parties. The third main opposition party, the Heritage Party, probably achieved its greatest popularity in the 2001 elections and, as seen in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, has since then failed to gain more than one to two percent of the vote in Zambia's urban constituencies. Its leader, Godfrey Miyanda, struggled to even obtain the necessary 200 signatures to legally register as a presidential candidate in 2008 (Mwanangombe 2008).

The ideologies of each party remain relatively similar, offering a wide-ranging agenda that intends to appeal to all Zambians. The Heritage Party campaigns against

¹²⁰ Personal interview with Dr. Choolwe Beyani of UPND, Lusaka, February 24, 2009.

¹²¹ Ibid.

the corruption of the MMD while failing to articulate why voters should support it.¹²²

Formed in 2006 after Sikota lost the battle to lead the UPND to Hichilema, ULP theoretically is guided by a liberal democratic philosophy. However, its own leader does not appear exactly sure of what that means in practical terms:

Especially in a country like ours, where you have so many disparities between the haves and the have nots, you need to have intervention from the state. But at the same time you can't have a totally leftist leaning [government], otherwise the economy gets bogged down. So, hence that's why we are liberal democrats, which is sort of like a halfway house between the two.¹²³

The ULP's lack of strong ideological orientation is demonstrated by the fact that the party opposed the MMD in the 2006 elections and then entered into an electoral pact with the ruling regime during the 2008 elections.

In 2006, the UPND's leader, Hichilema, led the UDA, which also included UNIP and FDD (Mapulenga 2006). This coalition emerged as a response to Zambians' fatigue with proliferating opposition parties.¹²⁴ As seen in Table 3.4, the UDA failed though to not only defeat the MMD but also to outperform the PF. Larmer and Fraser (2007: 623) observe that the UDA ultimately proved unappealing to the electorate because it failed to offer any substantive policy differences with the MMD. Likewise, in 2008, the UPND proposed running a "mixed economy" that aimed to increase and properly structure "private/public local and foreign investments in sectors such as agriculture, mining, construction, energy, tourism, manufacturing, infrastructure, telecommunications, pensions, insurance, financial and other services, many of which have in the past decades been neglected" (UPND 2008: 1). However, these objectives are not a radical departure from those articulated in the MMD

¹²² Personal interview with Michael Soko, UNDP governance advisor, March 10, 2009.

¹²³ Personal interview with Sakwiba Sikota, Lusaka, March 31, 2009.

¹²⁴ Personal interviews with Winstone Chibwe of the UPND, Lusaka, February 17, 2009 and Sakwiba Sikota, Lusaka, March 31, 2009.

manifesto but rather convey a commitment to improve and intensify investments in a broad range of sectors.

In terms of substantive policy areas, education, health, and agriculture represented the UPND's three main foci. According to the party's research director, Dr. Beyani, the party advocates the introduction of free education, reform of the healthcare system, irrigation, agro-processing, effective agricultural marketing arrangements, and improved road infrastructure.¹²⁵ Yet, as the governance advisor with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) observes, the party is not specific about how they will achieve these improvements, particularly with respect to how they will pay for them.¹²⁶ Moreover, since no Zambian political party opposes more education, better healthcare, and a revived agricultural sector, it is unclear how these goals differentiate the UPND from its competitors.

Both the UPND and the Heritage Party also tend to emphasize rural development as the key to improving urban challenges. For Hichilema, stopping the tide of rural-to-urban migration would help "decongest" the cities: "So, if we made the conditions better for them out there [in rural areas], by making agriculture viable through subsidies and other programs, you will reduce the pressure of influx of street vendors coming in and looking for a better life."¹²⁷ Yet, as noted earlier, the MMD is already engaged in a vast input subsidy program. Likewise, the "Village Concept" lies at the heart of the Heritage Party's manifesto, advocating that Zambia return to the way of life before the country was colonized. Such a life involves ownership of a wealth-generating investment (e.g. land or business), food security, incorruptible leadership, productivity, and a social safety net to protect the destitute (Heritage Party n.d.). According to Wazziah Phiri, the party's spokesman, the "Village Concept"

¹²⁵ Personal interview with Dr. Choolwe Beyani, Lusaka, February 24, 2009.

¹²⁶ Personal interview with Michael Soko, UNDP governance advisor, Lusaka, March 10, 2009.

¹²⁷ Personal interview with Hakainde Hichilema, Lusaka, February 17, 2009.

emphasizes that improving productivity in rural areas will decrease rural-urban drift because Zambians would no longer only find opportunities in the cities.¹²⁸

While certainly not ignorant of the challenges of urban poverty, both UPND members, such as Dr. Beyani, and MMD representatives, including Dr. Kalumba, claim that the UPND's constituency base predominantly spans middle-class, urban intellectuals as well as rural dwellers in Hichilema's stronghold of Southern Province.¹²⁹ This is partly due to the way in which the young, charismatic Hichilema markets himself. He alternately claims "I'm a villager," "I'm a rancher" and "I come from a business background."¹³⁰ His rhetoric though does not seem to be relevant for the urban poor. For instance, he advocated in his 2008 campaign that Zambians should more actively read the Auditor General's reports, which shows how poorly citizens' money has been spent under the MMD (Noyoo 2008). He also widely advertises that his party has written acerbic critiques of the MMD's budget proposals.¹³¹ Yet, given the low education levels of most of the urban poor, delving into such esoteric reading cannot hold the same appeal as attending Michael Sata's raucous rallies.

Zambia's other main opposition parties do though share with the PF a party organization that centers on their leaders. This problem is especially acute for the Heritage Party, which has no members in parliament (Mwanangombe 2008) and therefore fails to convey that the party is more widely representative beyond Miyanda. Not surprisingly then, Heritage's spokesman, Phiri, admits that his party is not institutionalized beyond its leader and would most likely crumble in Miyanda's absence: "If you look at the political system in our country, it is basically centered

¹²⁸ Personal interview with Wazziah Phiri, Lusaka, February 28, 2009.

¹²⁹ Personal interviews with Dr. Choolwe Beyani, Lusaka, February 24, 2009 and Dr. Katele Kalumba, Lusaka, March 5, 2009.

¹³⁰ Personal interview with Hakainde Hichilema, Lusaka, February 17, 2009.

¹³¹ Ibid.

around individuals, unfortunately or fortunately... So, I wouldn't cheat you and tell you that we're institutionalized enough to reach a point whereby maybe if this man [Miyanda] moves out, we [the Heritage Party] could still stand.”¹³²

In the same manner, the UPND revolves around Hichilema, as it previously did around his predecessor, Mazoka. Transition of leadership from Mazoka to Hichilema did occur on the basis of intra-party elections but, Hichilema was widely perceived as Mazoka's protégé (Banks *et al.* 2008). The main controversy during those elections was the perceived impression that Mazoka's successor needed to be from the Tonga ethnic group, just as Mazoka had been. When Sakota lost the party elections to Hichilema, allegedly because the former is Lozi while the latter is Tonga, Hichilema hastily created a broader party leadership structure. This though was intended not necessarily to improve party governance but primarily to prevent defections to the ULP and to mitigate the impression that the UPND is for Tongas alone (Chellah and Chipenzi 2006). Since then, it is unclear whether future elections for the UPND leadership will occur during Hichilema's tenure, and they seem unlikely given that he has already intimated that he will be his party's candidate in the 2011 elections.¹³³

Thus, while Zambia's other opposition parties share a party organization largely centered on their party leaders, they deviate from the PF in a number of other key respects. First, they advance messages that are oriented around goods that all Zambians would prefer, such as improved health and education, rather than specific issues that are priorities for the urban poor. Secondly, their tactics for addressing urban poverty often focus on nebulous promises to invest in rural areas so as to prevent overcrowding in the cities rather than new solutions for helping those already settled in the cities. Thirdly, for the UPND in particular, the tactic of emphasizing

¹³² Personal interview with Wazziah Phiri, Lusaka, February 28, 2009.

¹³³ Personal interview with Hakainde Hichilema, Lusaka, February 17, 2009.

agricultural production while advocating a thorough analysis of auditor's reports may appeal to a vast constituency of rural dwellers and well-educated urbanites but creates little resonance with the urban under-classes. Such characteristics explain why in both the 2006 and 2008 elections, the PF defeated not only the MMD amongst constituencies largely comprised of the urban poor but also other opposition parties. The urban poor's support for the PF therefore should be viewed as a consequence of the party's ability to craft a populist strategy to address exclusion and harassment by the MMD and thereby become more distinguishable than the rest of the opposition, which predominantly relied on personalistic linkages with this constituency.

Senegal

Political Party Landscape

By comparing the PF with not only other Zambian opposition parties but also those in Senegal, the importance of a populist strategy in attracting the urban poor over personalistic, clientelistic, or programmatic linkages alone becomes even clearer. Like Zambia, Senegal did not experience substantive political liberalization until the early 1990s. From 1966 to 1976, the country was a single-party system under Léopold Sédar Senghor's *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise* (UPS), which espoused a form of democratic African socialism (Nohlen *et al.* 1999). In 1976, Senghor amended the constitution and introduced the "law of three trends," which legalized three political parties as long as they adhered to an acceptable ideological position: liberal democracy, social democracy, and communism/Marxism. At the same time, the UPS changed its name to the *Parti Socialiste* (PS) and staked claims on the centrist, social democratic position (Diaw and Diouf 1998). The liberal democratic orientation was foisted upon the *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS). Founded in 1974, the PDS was led by Abdoulaye Wade, who was trained as an economist, mathematician, and

lawyer. The *Parti Africain de l'Indépendance* (PAI) accepted the Marxist designation.¹³⁴

After Senghor resigned from the PS in 1980, he was replaced by his prime minister, Abdou Diouf. In 1991, the PDS joined the PS government during a period of co-habitation which ended with the 1993 elections. In 1995, Diouf provided Wade a cabinet post. These periods of co-habitation helped create the foundation for a more competitive political environment. The PS began consulting with the opposition about the creation of a new electoral code, a guaranteed secret ballot, lowering the voting age from 21 to 18, allowing expanded voter registration, and permitting foreign election monitors (Creevey *et al.* 2005; Kanté 1994). During the following presidential elections in 2000, an opposition coalition was formed known as *Alternance 2000*. Along with the PDS, this coalition included a number of leftist parties, such as the *Ligue-Démocratique-Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail* (LD-MPT), *And-Jëf/Parti Africain pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme* (AJ/PADS), and the *Parti de l'Indépendance et du Travail* (PIT) (Banks *et al.* 2008).

Between 2000 and 2007, the number of officially registered political parties in Senegal increased from 57 to 77 (Camara 2000; Adejumobi 2007). Table 3.6 presents only the country's most competitive parties. Just as in Zambia, in order to ensure that only the most serious parties participate, the Ministry of the Interior and Local Collectivities imposed a fee of 6 million CFA on parties competing in the 2000

¹³⁴ In 1978, a fourth position, conservatism, was legalized with the recognition of the *Mouvement Républicain Sénégalais* (MRS). Other existing parties were granted the status of "associations" rather than parties because the officially-designated ideological space was already occupied (Vengroff and Creevey 1997).

presidential elections.¹³⁵ Despite relatively low inflation, the fee rose to 25 million CFA for the 2007 presidential elections (Dione 2006).¹³⁶

Table 3.6: Overview of Main Senegalese Political Parties

Party Name	Leader	Year Founded	Coalitions joined (year formed)
<i>Parti Démocratique du Sénégal</i> (Democratic Party of Senegal, PDS)	Abdoulaye Wade	1974	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ <i>Front pour l'Alternance</i> (FAL, 2000) ■ <i>Sopi</i> Coalition (2001) ■ <i>Convergence des Actions autour du Président en Perspective du 21^{ème} Siècle</i> (CAP21, 2002) ■ <i>Sopi</i> 2007 Coalition (2007)
<i>Parti Socialiste</i> (Socialist Party, PS)	Ousmane Tanor Dieng	1959	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ <i>Cadre Permanent de Concertation</i> (CPC, 2001) ■ <i>Coalition populaire pour l'alternance</i> (CPA, 2006)
<i>Alliance des Forces de Progrès</i> (Alliance of Forces for Progress, AFP)	Moustapha Niasse	1999	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ FAL (2000) ■ CPC (2001) ■ CPA (2006)
<i>Rewmi</i> (The Nation)	Idrissa Seck	2006	----
<i>Ligue Démocratique-Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail</i> (Democratic League-Labor Party Movement)	Abdoulaye Bathily	1981	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ FAL (2000) ■ <i>Sopi</i> coalition (2001) ■ CAP 21 (2002) ■ CPA (2006)
<i>Parti de l'Indépendance et du Travail</i> (Party of Independence and Work, PIT)	Amath Dansokho	1981	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ FAL (2000) ■ CPC (2001) ■ CPA (2006)
<i>And-Jëf-Parti Africaine pour la Démocratie et la Socialisme</i> (Act Together –African Party for Democracy and Socialism, AJ-PADS)	Landing Savané	1991	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ FAL (2000) ■ <i>And Defaar Sénégal</i> (2007)
<i>Démocratie-Solidarité</i> (Democracy-Solidarity)	Robert Sagna	2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ <i>Takku Defaraat Sénégal</i>(2007)

¹³⁵ In the first quarter of 2000, the exchange rate was 682 CFA = 1 US dollar (EIU 2000). In the first quarter of 2007, it was 492.5 = 1 US dollar (EIU 2007b).

¹³⁶ If a candidate receives less than five percent of the vote in the election, the fee is returned within 15 days of the official proclamation of the results (C.E.N.A. 2006).

Resource constraints remain a major issue for most opposition parties. Since there is no public funding for parties, approximately 53 percent of funding must come from a candidate's personal resources (Bryan and Baer 2005). Although the Ministry of the Interior will provide every registered candidate with the same number of posters and media attention, a party with more funding can print additional campaign materials and buy more radio and television time.¹³⁷ Campaign travel in particular constitutes the greatest expense for Senegalese parties (Bryan and Baer 2005).

Urbanization Challenges

Due to this lack of resources, urban areas and particularly Dakar represent especially contested areas during elections. At independence in 1960, Dakar was already becoming West Africa's most urbanized city with 14 percent of Senegal's population living in the capital (DPS 1993). This increased to 18.8 percent in 1976 and reached 21.6 percent by 1988 (DPS 1993). By 2002, almost one-quarter of the population lived in the city of Dakar and its main suburbs of Pikine and Guédiawaye (ANSD 2006), meaning that this agglomeration contains a potentially large source of votes. At the same time, Dakar's massive population presents major challenges, prompting it to be described as a place "invaded by poverty, offering today the face of a city knocked to pieces, anarchic and polluted. An urban monster" (Ghorbal 2001).

At least three factors have contributed to the city's growth and impoverishment during the post-independence period. First, the agricultural sector collapsed in the early 1980s. Drought in the peanut basin and the adoption of a structural adjustment agreement that involved reducing fertilizer subsidies stimulated a massive rural exodus to Dakar (Mbow 1993; Pison *et al.* 1995).¹³⁸ The increase in rural-to-urban

¹³⁷ Personal interview with Macoumba Coumé, Ministry of the Interior, Dakar, Oct. 2, 2008.

¹³⁸ By the mid-1990s, fertilizer use was one-third the level it had been in 1980 (Pison *et al.* 1995).

migration to Dakar was especially high during this period, averaging 5 percent during 1983-1988 (DPS 1993), compared with 2.1 percent between 1988 and 2002 (ANSD 2006). Secondly, structural adjustment also required implementing austerity measures that led to extensive job retrenchments and to fewer civil service positions for university students upon graduation (Graham 1994). Both trends resulted in a city increasingly crowded with job seekers at a time when the state could not afford to create more employment opportunities. At the start of the 1990s, open unemployment in Dakar was estimated at 24 percent with underemployment much higher (Graham 1994). During the preceding decade, purchasing power in the city had also declined by 35 percent (Faye and Thioub 2003), an indicator that would be even further exacerbated with the devaluation of the CFA in 1994.¹³⁹

More recently, however, the city has grappled with a third trend, which is that the country's birth rate peaked in the 1980s, meaning that a surfeit of young people is now on the job market (*Oxford Analytica* 2007). For the youth, the rule of the day has become *débrouille*, meaning to cope or manage to get by, which usually involves accepting a low-paid apprenticeship, attempting to emigrate overseas, or most likely entering the already saturated informal sector (Diop 2002). In fact, 76 percent of Dakar's population labors in the informal economy, a sector which accounted for 97 percent of employment growth between 1994 and 2005 (ANSD 2007b: 48; World Bank 2007b). The median monthly salary in the informal sector is approximately the equivalent of 45 dollars in current prices (ANSD 2007b: 51).

As in Lusaka, Dakar's most densely populated areas also tend to be its poorest and, as seen in Figure 4.2 of Chapter Four, predominantly are located outside of the

¹³⁹ The CFA was pegged to the French franc until 2000, when it was then pegged to the Euro. In January 1994, France decided to devalue the CFA by 50 percent, which meant that both the value of Senegalese exports was halved at the same time that the cost of international imports doubled. The resulting inflation sparked violent riots in Dakar in February 1994, which the ruling PS promptly blamed on the opposition (Vengroff and Creevey 1997).

city center. These include the Médina neighborhood, which emerged during the colonial era when African inhabitants were expelled from the central Plateau quarter, which is the center of government administration and expensive homes (Mehretu and Mutambirwa 2003; Scheld 2002). Likewise, the vast, irregular settlements of Parcelles-Assainies, Pikine, and Guédiawaye originated from *déguerpissements*, or forced removals, of slum dwellers from the city center between the 1970s and 1980s because they were perceived as *encombrenments humains* (human clutter) who tarnished the city's image (Collignon 1984; Vernière 1977; Zeleza and Eyoh 2003).¹⁴⁰ A majority of the *bidonvilles*, or shantytowns, in these neighborhoods on the city periphery were built on marshlands during an extended period of drought. Yet, ever since the rainy seasons re-commenced, these neighborhoods become flood zones during part of the year, causing stagnant water to accumulate in homes (Fall *et al.* 2005) and thereby creating breeding grounds for malarial mosquitoes and cholera.¹⁴¹

The Triumph of a Populist Strategy in 2000

Although Dakar's poor were ignored and even physically marginalized in the past during the country's period of more circumscribed political competition, their growth and density now means they are actively courted by politicians during elections, particularly by opposition parties trying to economize on scarce resources. As such, a journalist with the independent newspaper *Sud Quotidien* claims that "If a party wins Parcelles, Pikine, and Guédiawaye, then it wins Dakar."¹⁴² During his time in opposition, Wade recognized the importance of this electoral rule better than any of

¹⁴⁰ These forced removals and what they revealed about the state's attitude towards some of its poorest citizens became the inspiration for some of Senegal's best-known literature, including Aminata Sow Fall's *La grève des bàttu* and Ousmane Sèmbane's *Xala*.

¹⁴¹ In fact, at least 200,000 Dakarois were affected by the flooding during the 2009 rainy season (Thompson 2009).

¹⁴² Personal interview with Ibrahima Faye, *Sud Quotidien* newspaper, Dakar, Aug. 29, 2008.

his other political competitors. Wade relied on a populist strategy specifically targeted at Dakar's youth and consisted of a mixture of unrivalled charisma and programmatic appeals aimed at giving hope to the excluded. The manner in which he delivered his messages signified an important deviation from the traditionally elitist nature of Senegalese politics and conveyed a sense of the direct, vertical ties between him and the broader populace. Describing Wade's use of a populist strategy in the 2000 elections further highlights the contrast with the opposition parties competing in the 2007 elections.

Vertical Ties, Youth, and Informality

Wade's campaign for the 2000 elections was influenced by the growth of a new urban identity that privileged individual initiative in the face of an unresponsive state. Two trends contributed to this identity. First, the disappointed urban youth became more vocal about their living and working conditions. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, unemployed youth and students engaged in a series of riots, strikes, and demonstrations targeted against symbols of power in the affluent Plateau area of Dakar (Diouf 1996). Shortly thereafter, the *Set Setal* movement was launched. Inspired by a song written by the Senegalese musician Youssou Ndour, *Set Setal* is a Wolof phrase for "clean up" and referred both to improving poor sanitation on the city's rubbish-strewn streets and to reducing the country's corruption and bad governance under the PS (Scheld 2002; Diaw and Diouf 1998). Participating youth responded to the state's incompetence by organizing volunteer neighborhood groups to clean streets, dispose of litter, and paint wall murals. For Diouf (1996), the movement was an assault on the non-responsive ruling class and an attempt to reclaim public space for the entrepreneurial activities associated with *la débrouille*. McLaughlin (2001) further argues that *Set Setal* essentially signified the emergence of

an eclectic new urban identity, exemplified by not just wall murals, music, and neighborhood solidarity but also the spread of urban Wolof, which is a Creole language of French and Wolof.

Secondly, this period coincided with the emergence of a class of individuals called *moodu-moodu*. This term refers to predominantly uneducated and male, Wolof rural migrants to the city who depend on the informal sector and transnational opportunities to accumulate wealth. Assisted through their contacts via Sufi religious affiliations, the existence of the *moodu-moodu* contradicted the belief of middle-class families that Western education was the route to success (Scheld 2002). In the view of Senegalese sociologist Malick Ndiaye (1996), the *moodu-moodu* further popularized the notion amongst the urban masses that the informal sector, not white collar jobs, represented the easiest means to acquire social mobility and affluence.

In the run-up to the 2000 presidential elections, Wade's method of campaigning accorded priority to this new urban identity around youth and informality, thereby generating a sense of direct responsiveness between *Gorgui* and the alienated masses.¹⁴³ Specifically, he invented an entirely new formula of political campaigning in Senegal known as the *marches bleues*, or blue marches. Traditionally, parties relied on elaborate, stationary performances set up around tents and chairs and complete with dancers and praise-singers, who would espouse the virtues of local or national party candidates. The gathered audience would receive a meal as well as T-shirts and hats with party slogans and pictures of candidates' faces. Critically, these traditional meetings would involve the leader speaking in French to his audience, with a translator interpreting the meaning into local languages. Moreover, candidates often

¹⁴³ Such an advantage became even greater precisely because Diouf had lowered the voting age from 21 to 18 in 1993. Moreover, popular radio stations in the city, such as *Oxy-Jeunes* in Pikine, were encouraging their young listeners to register to vote for the 2000 elections (Gellar 2005).

devoted their time to talking with small groups of older attendees while the youth were often sent away to separate mass rallies (Foucher 2007).

While the PS continued in this vein for the 2000 elections, the PDS could not afford this mode of campaigning. Rather, Wade chose a cheaper but more dynamic mode of campaigning. Specifically, PDS representatives toured city streets in their own cars, waving flags and banners colored blue, which is the color of the PDS. Instead of the suits favored by Diouf, Wade donned the typical Senegalese *boubou*. His security guards wore blue denim, a symbol of American values that favor the personal initiative of the *débrouillard* or the migrant returning from overseas rather than the ideals of a French civil servant (Foucher 2007). Large amplifiers would blast the Senegalese pop music and Ivorian reggae favored by the young. When the music was interrupted for Wade's speeches, he used urban Wolof rather than French to directly communicate to voters. By effectively marching through Dakar, Wade was using a form of mobilization familiar to the youth, who always used marches as a means of protesting against the state (Foucher 2007). At the same time, this mode of campaigning resonated with the notion of informality. As Ibrahima Thioub, a Senegalese history professor at the University of Cheikh Anta Diop, observed,

The PS has static meetings while the PDS marches, like the street peddlers and hawkers. The PDS carries an indigenous discourse that is very understandable for the rural migrants who arrive in the city. I believe that the group that has the most difficulty with the PDS is the descendants of the *citadins* of the 19th century. For them, the texts of laws and rules are very important but such things aren't for those in the informal sector. So, for them, laws don't make much sense and the PDS wants to push this logic.¹⁴⁴

As a sign of where he saw his constituency base was located, Wade launched the start of his 2000 campaign and his *marches bleues* in the main thoroughfares of Dakar where informal workers typically peddle their goods. He moved from the

¹⁴⁴ Personal interview with Ibrahima Thioub, UCAD, Dakar, Sept.10, 2008. *Citadins* is a term for city dwellers.

Médina to the markets of Guele Tapée and Soumbédioune and down the main thoroughfares of Cheikh Anta Diop and Avenue Blaise Diagne (Ba 2000, cited in Foucher 2007). By contrast, the PS launched its campaign in the rural Tambacounda region in the south-east of the country while Moustapha Niasse of the AFP began in the troubled region of Casamance (Panafrican News Agency 2000). Such an approach helped Wade convey that he was a leader who differed from his two predecessors: “This populism gave the appearance that he remained an ordinary man. A leader who listened to his people. A leader who consulted them and was devoted to them” (Coulibaly 2003: 128). Indeed, despite his high level of education, he proved capable of portraying himself as a man of the people.

A “Political Animal” with a Popular Message

Beyond his *marches bleues*, Wade’s populist strategy involved a combination of charisma with a relevant policy message. Léopold Senghor had long ago characterized Wade as an *ndiombor*, or hare, which symbolized a remarkable and shrewd political animal in a poem written by the first president (Breuillac 2000). For Diop *et al.* (2002: 176), one of Wade’s major advantages was a talented oratory and deep knowledge of the Senegalese people. His facility with words tapped into the disillusionment of the times. Most critically, he brought the term *Sopi*, meaning “change” in Wolof, into the political sphere during the 1980s long before this now commonplace rallying cry became a feature of political campaigns in Africa (Breuillac 2000). He would also draw on well-known fables to make parallels between literary villains and the incompetence of the PS (Breuillac 2000). Like Michael Sata, Wade also ensured that, he always remained in the public eye through deft use of the burgeoning private media. In fact, he would often hold several press conferences a day

while Diouf would only agree to interviews during the week preceding the 2000 elections (McKenzie 2000).

Even Wade's own party cadres admit that *Gorgui's* charisma was the main allure of the PDS. When asked what attracted him to the PDS over all of Senegal's other political parties, Babacar Gaye, the PDS spokesman and Director of the Cabinet of Political Affairs, responded:

I was fascinated by the man [Wade]. It wasn't his party [that attracted me] at the time because I wasn't looking for his doctrine, philosophy, method, organization. No, that didn't interest me. What interested me was that I was convinced that Abdoulaye Wade could change this country, that's all... So, I joined the PDS more for Wade than for the philosophy or ideology of the party. Maybe if he was a fascist, I would support him. If he was a communist, I would support him. Even if he was someone who believed in savage liberalism, I would support him.¹⁴⁵

Beyond charisma, Wade mobilized the urban poor with promises on those issues most relevant to their everyday lives. Notably, these promises were focused on social inclusion but combined aspects of both liberal and leftist appeals, consistent with Sata's promises and with observations that contemporary variants of populism adhere to an eclectic ideology (see Roberts 1995). Jobs were at the forefront of Wade's agenda, with a critique of Diouf's poor performance in this respect topping off his campaign on February 8, 2000: "Seven years ago he [Diouf] had promised 20,000 jobs. Actually he lost 100,000" (cited in Panafrican News Agency 2000). He made a ritual of asking at campaign rallies who had a job, anticipating only a few individuals to respond. A sea of hands always rose up into the air when he would subsequently question who was unemployed (Breuillac 2000). The technique was effective in reinforcing the PS' lackluster record on employment. Drawing on his party's characterization as a liberal party, Wade promised to provide jobs via the diversification of the economy away from peanut production and attracting foreign investment (Sixtine 2003). Beyond jobs, he also focused on the need to improve the

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

water supply in urban areas and provide relief for victims of flooding in the country (EIU 2000), which would include those in the poor suburbs of Dakar. In addition, he vowed to end the *déguerpissements* practiced under the PS regime.¹⁴⁶ Instead of demolishing unsuitable or illegal housing, the new logic was either to relocate people into better housing or compensate them if the state required them to move elsewhere.¹⁴⁷

Given the primary emphasis on unemployment, it was the economically, marginal youth concentrated in urban slums who had staked the most hope on Wade's promises (Galvan 2001). More generally though, Diaw and Diouf (1998: 134) characterize the PDS as a "populist party which the population could believe in." Above all, Graham (1994: 126) claims that Wade's optimism was an important antidote to growing complacency with the status quo: "Usually the only way this 'culture of poverty' can be reversed is by severe economic shock or by some kind of external influence. The *Sopi* movement, which broke with years of uninterrupted political stability, may have temporarily provided such an influence."

The 2000 Elections

The 2000 election results highlighted the success of Wade's populist strategy. In the first round of the February 27, 2000 elections, Wade competed against six other opposition candidates as well as the PS. Election results from the first round of voting revealed that his populist strategy paid off. Based on data provided by the Ministry of the Interior, Wade obtained 48 and 50 percent of the vote in the departments of Dakar and Pikine, respectively.¹⁴⁸ At the national level, Wade secured a total of

¹⁴⁶ Personal interview with Ibrahima Thioub, UCAD, Dakar, Sept. 10, 2008.

¹⁴⁷ Personal interviews with Cheikh Guèye, ENDA-Tiers Monde, Dakar, Nov. 19, 2008 and Mohammadou Abdoul, ENDA-Tiers Monde, Dakar, Oct. 3, 2008.

¹⁴⁸ At the time, Pikine and Guédiawaye were part of the same department. Since 2000, they became separate administrative entities. Data for the first and second round of the 2000 elections was graciously provided by Macoumba Coumé at the Ministry of the Interior on Oct. 2, 2008.

approximately 31 percent of the vote compared with Diouf's 41 percent. Moustapha Niasse of the *Alliance des Forces du Progrès* (AFP) came in third with 17 percent of the votes, illustrating that it was not just a contest between the PS and the opposition but rather between the PS and the PDS. Having received enough votes to advance to a second round of elections, Wade needed to convince the unsuccessful opposition candidates to rally around him. Promising that he would install a coalition government if he won, Wade was able to convince the AFP, along with other smaller parties, to join his original *Alternance* coalition, which was in turn re-named the *Front pour l'Alternance* (FAL) (Banks *et al.* 2008).

Recognizing that winning over Dakar was critical to a national victory in the second round of the 2000 elections, the PS hurriedly launched a “charm offensive” in the city and its suburbs (Diop *et al.* 2002: 173). Yet, this tactic failed to have the desired outcome for the PS, which ultimately lost the second round to the PDS. In Dakar especially, the PDS garnered 76 percent of the votes compared with 23 for the PS.¹⁴⁹ According to one of the spokespeople for the PS, its major failure was ignoring both the plight and the electoral potential of Senegal's urban poor: “This is why the PS lost in 2000, because it lost its electorate, which had shifted and became poorer and more urban and conditions of life very difficult. And these people sanctioned us in 2000.”¹⁵⁰

Sopi becomes Nopi¹⁵¹

After Wade's electoral victory, his populist strategy dissipated and more purely personalistic linkages began to characterize his relationship with the urban poor, illustrating how party strategies shift over time. Yet, the change was a gradual

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Personal interview with Aissata Tall Sall, PS, Dakar, Sept. 15, 2008.

¹⁵¹ *Nopi* means “to fall silent” in Wolof. I borrowed this phrase from Havard (2004).

one. Hoping to consolidate his rule by gaining a parliamentary majority, he continued to rely on his *marches bleues* for the campaign leading up to the 2001 legislative elections (Thomas 2001). While inaugurating a commercial center in 2002 in Dakar's largest downtown market, known as Sandaga, Wade praised the ingenuity and entrepreneurial efforts of informal sector workers. Famously, he declared at this gathering that he was the country's first "informal" president (Coulibaly 2003: 123), referring to his own initiative and innovation in the political sphere.

In general though, the PDS retreated from a populist strategy with the urban poor and relied more on a vague platform around valence issues as well as large-scale projects that proved most beneficial for Dakar's more affluent citizens. The seven years preceding the 2007 elections were characterized by a series of high-profile construction projects, which Wade labeled as his *Très Grands Projets* (Very large projects, TGP) and administered by the *Agence pour la promotion de l'investissement et les grands travaux* (Agency for the promotion of investment and large works, APIX). These projects included luxury ocean-front hotels and shopping centers, such as "Dakar City" in the posh Les Almadies neighborhood and which contained a high-end American retailer and a store selling imported European perfumes. He further promised to build a new 400 million dollar international airport and a new capital (*Oxford Analytica* 2007). One of the more controversial projects was a new, gleaming highway along Dakar's *Corniche*, hugging the road parallel to the Atlantic Ocean. For the hundreds of thousands of poor Dakarois who cannot afford a car and who instead depend on dangerous, communal vehicles known as *Ndiaga Ndiayes* for transport, according priority to building the highway seemed misplaced. Serigne Mansour Tall, the program director for UN-Habitat in Senegal, observed the following about the highway: "The relationship between the amount of money that was invested and the impact on the population is relatively weak because the *Corniche* only benefits a few

of the privileged in Dakar and encompasses the rich neighborhoods and those who have their own cars, which is a very small percentage of the population.”¹⁵² According to a former minister of urbanization, Seydou Sy Sall, this general emphasis on large-scale infrastructure has occurred to the detriment of basic infrastructure in Dakar’s peri-urban zones.¹⁵³ Many began agreeing with the claim of PS spokesman Abdoulaye Vilane that the acronym of TGP stood for nothing else than a *Très Grand Piège*, or a very large trap, rather than the grand projects originally promised (Thiobane 2008). The cartoon illustrated in Figure A4.3 of Appendix Four satirizes the degree of disappointment with these projects.

In the meantime, life for the urban poor became increasingly intolerable. As seen in Figure 3.4, growth was somewhat erratic during Wade’s first term, and the number of poor living in Dakar increased by almost 90,000 between 1994 and 2002. Moreover, Wade’s 2000 campaign promises to tackle youth unemployment remained largely unfulfilled.¹⁵⁴ In fact, approximately 50 percent of Dakar’s population is 20 years-old or younger (ANSD 2007b) and 22 percent of this age group are unemployed, compared with 11 percent in rural areas (ANSD 2007a). A survey conducted by the national statistical agency in 2006 found that most Dakarois, like their counterparts in Lusaka, viewed youth unemployment as their community’s greatest development challenge, followed by the lack of potable water and suitable sanitation facilities (ANSD 2007a).

¹⁵² Personal interview with Serigne Mansour Tall, UN-Habitat, Dakar, Oct. 29, 2008.

¹⁵³ Personal interview with Seydou Sy Sall, former, Minister of Urbanization and LD-MPT member, Dakar, Sept. 23, 2008.

¹⁵⁴ Economic growth began to slump in the year before the elections due to high fuel prices (Polgreen 2007).




Figure 3.4: Trends in Urban Poverty and Macroeconomic Growth, Senegal¹⁵⁵

In addition, only 32 percent of Dakarois own their homes compared with 62 percent for the country overall (COHRE 2004). The urban poor's role as tenants only increases their vulnerability since they are susceptible to increases in rent payments and evictions by landlords. Early on in his first term, Wade rescinded on his earlier promised not to demolish slum housing and instead his government engaged in forced evictions in, among other places, Dakar's Baraka and Capatage slums, claiming that residents were illegally occupying State-controlled land (COHRE 2004).

Furthermore, while the PDS regime began improving rural electrification, urban electrification did not receive the same degree of investment.¹⁵⁶ Due to the government's failure to finance sufficient fuel to run its electricity generators, unrelenting black-outs began to plague Dakar in March 2006 (*Oxford Analytica* 2007). Electricity cuts lasting up to twelve hours a day could be particularly aggravating for

¹⁵⁵ The number of poor in Dakar was calculated from poverty data from the ESAM-I and ESAM-II surveys for Dakar and based on population data from Minivielle *et al.* (2005) and ANSD (2006). GDP growth data is from the World Development Indicators 2009 database.

¹⁵⁶ Personal interview with Seydou Sy Sall, former Minister of Urbanization, Dakar, Sept. 23, 2008.

poor households that had allocated scarce resources to pay their monthly bills and could not afford the private generators on which affluent Dakarais began to depend. Similar to Zambia, Figure 3.5 highlights that the average monthly cost of both electricity and water in Dakar for a family of four people increased during Wade's first term as president.




Figure 3.5: Trends in the Average Cost of Utilities in Dakar¹⁵⁷

The desperation of the urban poor was most clearly manifested by the large-scale emigration of Senegalese men to Europe during Wade's first term. In fact, Senegalese nationals comprised a majority of the 30,000 illegal migrants who arrived in Spain's Canary Islands during 2006 alone. The trip in fragile, open wooden canoes results in usually one in six migrants perishing in the high seas (Ba 2007). Yet, desperation made many Senegalese fatalistic, leading to the popular slogan of "*Barça ou Barsakh*," meaning that one either makes it to Barcelona or goes on to the next life.

¹⁵⁷ The source of the data in Figure 3.5 is from the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) CityData database.

Given the risks involved and the fact that overseas remittances can contribute 30 to 80 percent of household budgets in Senegal (Faubert 2008), many poor migrants blamed Wade directly for a massive deportation campaign led by Spain and France in late 2006. Wade's main response to this outpouring of anger only a few months before the 2007 elections was to launch a new program to address urban unemployment, which was called *Retour vers l'Agriculture* (Return to Agriculture, REVA) and intended to grant would-be migrants plots for farming. Playing on the title of this program, many concluded that REVA was invented by *rêveurs*, or dreamers, who unrealistically believe that city dwellers will be enticed to move back to the countryside.¹⁵⁸

REVA represented just one example of the PDS' growing focus on agricultural programs. Another effort was the *Loi d'Orientation Agro-Sylvo-Pastorale* (LOASP), which Wade announced soon after entering office, arguing that Senegal needed a grand vision for its agricultural sector. In all, the PDS spokesman Babacar Gaye claims that between 2006-2008, 1000 tractors were delivered to rural areas to help with the modernization of agriculture and that both seeds and fertilizer were heavily subsidized.¹⁵⁹ By contrast, a number of development experts and former bureaucrats claim that the regime lacks any type of coherent government strategy for urban development.¹⁶⁰ Notwithstanding the urgent need to spur agricultural growth, these developments during Wade's first term illustrate that he shifted his focus away from the urban poor and that his strategy for addressing their concerns relied on stemming the wave of urban migration rather than improving housing, services, and employment opportunities in Dakar.

¹⁵⁸ Personal interview with Cheikh Guèye, ENDA-Tiers Monde, Dakar, Nov. 19, 2008.

¹⁵⁹ Personal interview with Babacar Gaye, PDS, Dakar, Sept. 30, 2008. In the wake of food riots in 2008, Wade then announced yet another agricultural initiative, known as the Great Agricultural Offensive for Food and Abundance (GOANA).

¹⁶⁰ This claim was made during interviews with Mohammadou Abdoul of ENDA-Tiers Monde (Dakar, Oct. 3, 2008), Serigne Mansour Tall of UN-HABITAT (Dakar, Oct. 29, 2008), the former Minister of Planning Ibrahima Sall (Dakar, Nov. 11 2008), and an anonymous representative of the French aid agency, *Agence Française de Développement* (Dakar, Nov. 6, 2008).

Creating Clienteles?

Some opposition parties have argued that though Wade failed to deliver jobs and prioritized construction projects for affluent Dakarais, he won over the urban poor through clientelistic linkages.¹⁶¹ They point to the one main project targeted at the urban poor that has received a great deal of media attention: *Plan Jaxaay*. This project was intended to assist the victims of yearly flooding in Pikine and Guédiawaye by moving affected households to higher land nearby.¹⁶² In 2005, Wade proposed to allocate approximately 84 million dollars (50 billion CFA) towards building modern housing for those living in water-logged shantytowns. The PDS-dominated National Assembly further adopted Wade's proposition that a portion of the money for such a program would come from postponing the 2005 legislative elections so that they would coincide with the 2007 presidential ones (Agence France Presse 2005b).

Yet, the mismanagement and poor planning of *Plan Jaxaay* was not likely to create a loyal clientele for Wade. Only a few months before the 2007 elections, most of the affected families were still homeless and living in tents on the outskirts of Dakar, having endured yet another rainy season in even more crowded and unsanitary conditions. Furthermore, flood victims were still being required to pay 35 percent of the cost of the new housing once they were finally re-settled (UN-IRIN 2006). In the view of Serigne Mansour Tall from UN-Habitat, "The Plan Jaxaay is not a very bad thing but it was a plan that was chosen without much consideration of its feasibility... it's dominated by disorder."¹⁶³

By contrast, the PDS did embark on more organized efforts to establish clientelistic linkages with religious leaders. Indeed, although ethnic identity is not a salient feature of Senegalese politics (see Diouf 1994), religion has played an

¹⁶¹ Personal interview, Hélène Tine, AFP, Dakar, September 16, 2008.

¹⁶² "*Jaxaay*" means "eagle" in Wolof.

¹⁶³ Personal interview, Serigne Mansour Tall, UN-Habitat, Dakar, Oct. 28, 2008.

important political role in the country's history. In particular, Senegal has four main Islamic Sufi brotherhoods. While the Tijaniyya brotherhood remains larger in membership, the Mouridiyya is more centralized because it is not split into independent branches (Ross 2008). As a Mouride himself, Wade engaged in frequent visits during his first term to Touba, which is the holy town of this brotherhood. In fact, his trips became so regular that he became mocked for only engaging in 3Ts: *tukki, télé, Touba*, meaning “traveling overseas, going on television, and visiting Touba” (Dahou and Foucher 2004). Among other patronage promises, Wade oversaw the construction of a new road from Touba to Mbacké, which is where the leader of the Mouridiyya, Cheikh Saliou Mbacké, resides (Le Vine 2004). Furthermore, prominent Mourides received special favors, such as being issued diplomatic passports that are usually only reserved for public officials (Mbow 2008). Tellingly, unlike in the 2000 elections when Wade focused his campaign in Dakar, he launched his 2007 one in Touba (Schwartz 2007). On the eve of elections, Cheikh Saliou appeared on television to lobby for Wade's re-election, arguing that the President would then be able to complete the modernization of Touba's infrastructure (Mbow 2008).

Yet, such tactics could not explain Wade's popularity with Dakar's poor for two reasons. First, a majority of Dakarois belong to the Tidiane sect, not the Mourides (DPS 1993). Secondly, while Chapter Five discusses how Wade co-opted leaders of some Tidiane sects in rural areas in the same way he did with Mouride leaders, there is increasing evidence that urban voters, much more than rural ones, follow Sufi leaders only in matters of religion rather than politics (Beck 2008; Gellar 2005).

Le PDS, c'est Wade

Wade's overt displays of religious devotion to the Mourides in an officially secular state were symptomatic of a broader tendency to engage in excessive displays

of executive power and a highly hierarchical management of the PDS. As a result, he created a rift between urban intellectuals and the PDS, contributing to the impression that the many intellectuals who rallied around Wade's cause in 2000 no longer support him.¹⁶⁴

Specifically, Wade further sullied his reputation early on in his first term when he began purging representatives from other opposition parties who had backed him in the FAL coalition in 2000. In December 2000, he dismissed his Minister of Urbanization, Amath Dansokho, who is the leader of PIT. Moustapha Niasse of the AFP lost his job as prime minister in March 2001, and two cabinet members from the LD-MPT were fired in March 2005. For Ismael Fall, a political analyst at the University of Cheikh Anta Diop, such tactics reflected Wade's attempt "to forge a new political identity, based first on himself and secondly on his party, ahead of the [2007] elections" (Agence France Presse 2005a). Furthermore, after an initial referendum in 2001 which eliminated the upper-legislative chamber, the *Sénat*, for financial reasons, the National Assembly approved the re-establishment of this body in January 2007 and stipulated that 65 of its 100 members would be appointed by the President (Englebert 2008).¹⁶⁵

Within the PDS, Wade ultimately controls the career track of his party members. The clearest evidence of this occurred when Idrissa Seck, the prime minister from 2002 until 2004, was fired from this post under allegations of corruption. A long-time protégé of Wade and the director of the PDS' presidential campaign in the historic 2000 elections, Seck was widely perceived to harbor presidential ambitions. He was expelled from the party and spent seven months in

¹⁶⁴ Personal interview with Ibrahima Faye, *Sud Quotidien*, Dakar, Aug. 29, 2008.

¹⁶⁵ Moreover, in January 2001, the National Assembly voted to reduce the presidential term in office from seven to five years. However, in July 2008, this decision was reversed by the same body, extending the presidential term from five to seven years with effect from the next election in 2012 (Englebert 2008).

prison under the charge that, as mayor of the town of Thiès, he had misappropriated funds intended for road construction projects (see Diop 2006).¹⁶⁶ Many mayors who were PDS members but considered close to Seck were also removed from their posts and replaced with Wade loyalists.¹⁶⁷ Once freed from jail, Seck formed his own political party, called *Rewmi*, which means “the nation” in Wolof.

The hierarchical nature of the PDS’ management was only reinforced by the party’s lack of horizontal relationships with civic organizations, including those representing members of the urban poor. One such organization is the *Union Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels du Sénégal* (UNACOIS), which was established in 1990 to fight against government monopolies. UNACOIS consists of a variety of informal sector workers, ranging from small-scale traders and service providers to large-scale importer-exporters. Defending the interests of informal sector workers and protecting them from tax levies constitute the main goals of the organization (Thioub *et al.* 1998). According to UNACOIS’ Secretary General, Mame Bou Diop, the organization contains about 50,000 members in Dakar and 150,000 nation-wide.¹⁶⁸ Headquartered in Dakar’s Sandaga market, the members are linked to UNACOIS’ leaders through a series of hierarchical business, credit, family, and religious relations (Thioub *et al.* 1998), giving UNACOIS a degree of encompassment that theoretically would be conducive to a corporatist arrangement with the PDS. Yet, in reality, it retains an independent political base. Mame Bou Diop claims that while a UNACOIS member can be a member of any political party, the organization does not

¹⁶⁶ A similar fate befell Seck’s successor and director of the 2007 presidential election campaign, Macky Sall. As the mayor of the town of Fatick, Sall was likewise deemed a credible successor to Wade because he possessed his own powerbase within the PDS. When he called Karim Wade, Abdoulaye’s son, to a hearing at the National Assembly concerning the handling of finances for constructions sites intended for the 2007 Organization of the Islamic Conference, he was perceived as trying to counter the President’s authority and dismissed from his post soon thereafter.

¹⁶⁷ Personal interview with Waly Fall, *Rewmi*, Dakar, Nov. 25, 2008.

¹⁶⁸ Personal interview with Mame Bou Diop, UNACOIS, Dakar, Sept. 17, 2008.

subscribe to any formal political affiliations,¹⁶⁹ and its political autonomy was confirmed by a number of other outside observers.¹⁷⁰ In fact, though many presidential candidates came to discuss their programs with the UNACOIS leadership before the 2007 elections, the PDS was notably absent. Despite Wade claiming an affinity with the informal sector, Bou Diop notes that Wade lacks a policy for improving conditions for informal workers and that the government's interest in taxing such workers necessarily creates antagonistic relations with UNACOIS.¹⁷¹

The 2007 Election

Despite the lack of ties to organizations representing the urban poor, the focus on large-scale construction projects that benefitted the affluent rather than the lower-classes, and the exhibition of excessive executive powers, Wade nonetheless proved victorious in the 2007 presidential elections. Wade campaigned on a message of “*Le meilleur reste à venir*,” or “The best is yet to come,” which implied that his large-scale construction projects were just a small sample of the larger plans he intended (see campaign photo in Figure A4.4 in Appendix Four). At the national level, Wade secured 55 percent of the vote, meaning that a second round of elections proved unnecessary.¹⁷² As seen in Table 3.7, he also obtained more than 50 percent of the vote in the four *départements* of the Dakar region, including the poorer suburbs of Pikine and Guédiawaye. Moreover, his closest competitor, Seck, was between 30 to 40 percentage points behind. Thus, even if these opposition parties had entered into a coalition, as Wade himself did in 2000, they would not have defeated him in Dakar.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Personal interviews with Abdou Salam Fall, UCAD, Aug. 28, 2008 and Ibrahima Thioub, UCAD, Dakar, Sept. 10, 2008. Both individuals have conducted research on UNACOIS.

¹⁷¹ Personal interview with Mame Bou Diop, UNACOIS, Dakar, Sept. 17, 2008.

¹⁷² See *Le texte integral de la decision du Conseil constitutionnel*, available at http://www.accpuf.org/images/pdf/cm/senegal/051-jc-decision_4E5E2007.pdf (accessed on November 5, 2008).

As in Zambia, the turnout rates in Dakar, which was 72 percent, slightly exceeded the rate for the country as whole, which was 70 percent.

Table 3.7: Vote Shares in the Region of Dakar in 2007 Presidential Elections (%) (First Round)

Main candidates (Party)	Départements in the Region of Dakar			
	<i>Dakar</i>	<i>Pikine</i>	<i>Guédiawaye</i>	<i>Rufisque</i>
Abdoulaye Wade (PDS)	52.5	60.4	61.0	52.0
Idrissa Seck (<i>Rewmi</i>)	17.7	20.0	17.8	23.0
Ousmane Tanor Dieng (PS)	16.3	10.4	11.6	17.3
Moustapha Niasse (AFP)	5.3	3.2	3.7	2.4
Abdoulaye Bathily (LD-MPT)	1.7	1.0	1.5	1.0
Robert Sagna (Démocratie-Solidarité)	1.9	1.1	0.9	0.4
Landing Savané (AJ-PADS)	1.2	1.3	1.0	1.4

Sources: *Sud Quotidien* (2007) ; Also, www.Senelections.org (accessed November 2007)

Notes: This table includes only the top seven performing candidates of the total 15 who competed in this election. Unlike the other three *départements*, Rufisque is predominantly rural. The results are for the first round of elections. A second round was unnecessary because of Wade's ability to obtain more than 50 percent of the votes.

Most opposition parties largely decried such a victory as fraudulent and therefore boycotted the June 2007 legislative elections, which only served to exclude them even further from having any influence in the political arena. However, 60 independent observers from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) declared that the election had been “sufficiently free and transparent” and noted that while some discrepancies had occurred, they were not enough to cast doubt on the results (EIU 2007c). Moreover, the popular classes appeared to accept the vote's legitimacy since no mobs of angry, unemployed youth emptied onto the streets to denounce the results in the same manner that they did during the 1980s and 1990s (Galvan 2009). RADDHO, which is a Dakar-based NGO dedicated to promoting human rights in Africa and which helped monitor the 2007 elections, declared that

they occurred in a general atmosphere of peace and tranquility (RADDHO 2007). In addition to obtaining the highest share of votes in the poorest areas, the anti-PDS leader of UNACOIS confirmed that he knew of many informal sector workers who did indeed vote for the PDS.¹⁷³

“The Living Room Opposition”

Instead of massive fraud on behalf of the PDS, the lackluster performance of Senegal’s main opposition parties predominantly explains Wade’s ability to win a majority of votes in Dakar during the 2007 elections. As Galvan (2009: 5) observes, “Divided and demoralized, the opposition has no real platform from which to criticize President Wade and his party.” In fact, since March 2000, no opposition candidate has demonstrated the same ability to mobilize the electorate to the same degree as Wade did (Diop 2006). Although Wade achieved very little for the urban poor and invested more in large-scale infrastructure and rural development, no one opposition party was able to generate the necessary level of momentum required to transform widespread urban disgruntlement with the status quo into an electoral advantage. Instead of the populist strategy employed by Wade in 2000, personalistic linkages characterized the PS, AFP, and *Rewmi* and thereby caused a split in votes amongst these parties, which except for their leaders, all appeared relatively similar to the electorate. The programmatic linkages used by the traditional leftist parties, such as LD-MPT, PIT, and AJ-PADS, relied on an outdated socialist message that never has been really understood by the urban poor and exhibits a low level of congruence with their everyday priorities.

Three main qualities characterize all of the opposition parties and reduce their appeal to the urban poor. First and foremost, they remain virtually indistinguishable

¹⁷³ Personal interview with Mame Bou Diop, Dakar, Sept. 17, 2008.

from one another. Coming from the same elite social class as Wade, they possess the same fundamental interests and fears.¹⁷⁴ While they may consistently criticize Wade's performance, they offer no indication of what distinct policy alternatives they would offer if voted into office. In the view of Ebrima Sall at the research institute CODESRIA, "Personalities of the leaders have come to crystallize the whole identities of these parties...It's been a serious indictment of the political class to say that the politicians are all the same."¹⁷⁵

A second trait, which only serves to reinforce the first, is that Senegal's opposition parties rely on civilized discourse as the main means of attacking the failings of the PDS. Mamador Thior, editor-in-chief at *Radio-Télévision Sénégalaise* (RTS), therefore labels this as the tendency to be an *opposition de salon*, or a "living room opposition."¹⁷⁶ Instead of descending into the streets with other angry Dakarois when the cost of living increases or blackouts become intolerable, the opposition frequently chooses to meet, discuss, and issue joint statements decrying Wade's policies. For example, in 2002 the opposition formed the *Assises politiques de l'Alternance* to critique the direction Wade was taking the country after only two years in office (Sow 2002). Three years later, political parties joined civil society groups, journalists, and concerned academics in the *Pacte Républicain*, intended to mitigate political tensions around the conduct of the forthcoming elections and to demonstrate commitment to the democratic principles of the Republic and social peace.¹⁷⁷ In the wake of the 2007 elections, about 100 organizations, including the opposition parties and civil society organizations, came together again into a massive, long-term

¹⁷⁴ Personal interview with Ibrahima Thioub, UCAD, Dakar, Sept. 10, 2008.

¹⁷⁵ Personal interview with Ebrima Sall, CODESRIA, Dakar, Sept. 9, 2008.

¹⁷⁶ Personal interview with Mamadou Thior, *Radio-Télévision Sénégalaise*, Dakar, Nov. 6, 2008.

¹⁷⁷ See "Rapport conférence à Saly," available at http://www.raddho.africa-web.org/nouveau_site/sites_actualites/pacte.html (accessed September 30, 2009).

initiative known as the *Assises Nationales*.¹⁷⁸ This initiative highlights that Senegal is facing a crisis period, and it revolves around a series of committees that issue reports on the economic and social challenges in the country. Notably, the PDS refused to participate,¹⁷⁹ raising questions about the ultimate impact of the *Assises Nationales* on the policy sphere.

While worthwhile, the overall impression of such activities is that the opposition rarely makes genuine sacrifices when poor Senegalese are marching in the streets. An editorial published in the traditionally pro-opposition newspaper, *Le Quotidien*, decried the opposition's lack of imagination: "The opposition is content with issuing incendiary communiqués to the police office, noisily intervening on the radio, and diplomatic visits" (Aziz Tall 2008: 9). By remaining the reserve of educated elites, such undertakings fail to incorporate the broader urban population, who may be too illiterate or too busy laboring in the informal sector to even know that the opposition is involved in such efforts.¹⁸⁰ At the same time, precisely because so many opposition parties are involved in the same initiatives, it becomes difficult to uncover which one is the most vocal in denouncing the PDS' performance.

Thirdly, despite the fact that three opposition leaders formerly were ministers of urbanization, most of the opposition parties accord very little priority to addressing urban poverty.¹⁸¹ During another opposition discussion roundtable in March 2003, a number of opposition parties, including the PS, AFP, and PIT, published a declaration on their perspective of the national situation. Among a long list of grievances, the declaration concluded that the poor performance of agriculture constituted the PDS'

¹⁷⁸ Personal interview with Abdou Salam Fall, UCAD, Dakar, Aug. 28, 2008.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Survey results presented in Chapter Four confirm that a majority of the urban poor had never even heard about the *Assises Nationales*.

¹⁸¹ Moustapha Niasse (AFP) and Robert Sagna (DS) were urbanization ministers under the PS. Amath Dansokho (PIT) was urbanization minister once under the PS and again briefly in the early period of co-habitation with the PDS in 2000.

greatest failure (*Le Soleil* 2003). In the run-up to the 2007 elections, a number of opposition parties joined in a coalition known as the *Coalition populaire pour l'alternance* (CPA). Along with civil society organizations, members of the CPA primarily were lobbying for greater attention to rural poverty.¹⁸² According to Serigne Mansour Tall of UN-Habitat, no opposition party addressed urban poverty and urban development during the 2007 campaigns:

During the [2007] electoral campaign, some journalists asked the different parties what were their policies for addressing urban poverty. They [the opposition parties] spoke a lot about rural poverty but not about urban poverty. But, urban poverty is much more pernicious because it's a poverty that can lead to violence, which is not the case with rural poverty...I have never seen an [opposition] candidate that has elaborated in a clear manner the need to address urban poverty. They talk more about national issues, especially for presidential elections.¹⁸³

The following two sub-sections further illustrate these three characteristics by first focusing on the three opposition parties that obtained the highest results in Dakar during the 2007 elections, the PS, AFP, and *Rewmi*. In order to emphasize that these opposition parties rely on personalistic linkages, they are compared with respect to their espoused ideology, how they distinguish their ideologies vis-à-vis their competitors, who represents their main constituency base, and their views on urban poverty and the poor. Then, the specific challenges for programmatic parties of appealing to the contemporary urban poor are examined with respect to three of Senegal's most established leftist parties, AJ-PADS, LD-MPT, and PIT. Both types of opposition parties largely confirm Antoine Tine's (2005: 129) observation that Senegalese political parties "are within the hands of political elites who are most often accused of being incapable of thinking about the social realities of the most deprived classes and of proposing adequate social projects."

¹⁸² Personal interview with Ibrahima Faye, *Sud Quotidien*, Dakar, Aug. 29, 2008.

¹⁸³ Personal interview with Serigne Mansour Tall, UN-Habitat, Dakar, Oct. 29, 2008.

The Heavyweight Contenders: PS, AFP, and Rewmi

Internal party rivalries led to the emergence of many of Senegal's current opposition parties. For instance, in 1996, during a period of intense intra-party violence, Abdou Diouf appointed Ousmane Tanor Dieng as the PS secretary general. Moustapha Niasse, who was a long-time PS stalwart and served as foreign minister under both the Diouf and Senghor regimes, opposed this decision and defected in 1999 (Banks *et al.* 2008).¹⁸⁴ During the same year, he formed the AFP. As noted above, Idrissa Seck followed a similar trajectory, having staunchly supported the PDS for his entire career and then establishing *Rewmi* in 2006 after he was released from jail. Consequently, both AFP and *Rewmi* represent vehicles for the personal ambitions of their leaders rather than institutions established to address genuine societal grievances.

The personal nature of these political parties is reflected in their lack of a programmatic orientation. Hélène Tine, the official representative for the AFP, notes that social democracy characterizes her party, which campaigned on a nebulous motto of "faith, patriotism, and solidarity."¹⁸⁵ Accordingly, she explained this means that one requires a spiritual basis on which to build a political program, be a patriot to engage in politics, and express solidarity with the least-favored individuals in society.¹⁸⁶ In declaring his candidacy in 2007 for the presidency, Moustapha Niasse made ten, all-encompassing promises to Senegalese citizens: 1) restoring the credibility of the state, 2) employment creation, 3) lowering the price of staple goods, 4) reinvigorating agricultural production, 5) improving the country's road system, 6) a more judicious allocation of resources to health, education, research, culture, and sport, 7) creating integrated management and development zones to improve service delivery in every

¹⁸⁴ Djibo Ka, a former interior minister, was another key PS figure who left the party due to disappointment with the outcome of this succession battle. He went on to form the *Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique* (URD) and contested the 2000 elections. Both Ka's and Niasse's defections are believed to have contributed to Diouf's defeat by Wade (Banks *et al.* 2008).

¹⁸⁵ Personal interview Hélène Tine, AFP, Dakar, Sept. 16, 2008.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

region of the country, 8) restoring peace in Casamance, 9) re-establishing security on both Senegal's borders and within its urban areas, and 10) employing diplomacy to improve development, security, peace, and good relations with its neighbors (Niasse 2007). These goals are not particularly different from those of *Rewmi*, which according to the party's representative, Omar Sarr, promotes education, training, health, and agriculture.¹⁸⁷ His colleague Waly Fall, who is one of the few *Rewmi* mayors in Dakar not purged by Wade, adds that a party ideology is not particularly necessary:

Thus, *Rewmi* is not a leftist party, it's not a liberal party. The only ideology that is viable here and in all countries in the world is how to improve the lives of the population. What are the efforts that the state should engage in? What are the sacrifices that the population should engage in? And a system of management that is fair and equitable and which allows a majority of the population to get out of their current living conditions.¹⁸⁸

Although the PS possessed much stronger historical and ideological foundations, its party platform became even further muddled in the aftermath of the 2000 elections. In fact, when the PDS originally entered office in 2000, a number of PS cadres defected to it, in a process known as *transhumance*, which refers to the predictable movement of goats to better grazing lands (Galvan 2009). If ideological affinities were more pronounced, such a shifting of party affiliations presumably would be less feasible.

According to Abdoulaye Vilane, the PS spokesman, the party follows the AFP in professing a social democratic nature. Yet, what this means in terms of practicalities remains vague. For him, the PS platform is "socialist in the terms of humanity, justice, democracy, and progress and liberty in the fullest sense."¹⁸⁹ When asked the

¹⁸⁷ Personal interview with Omar Sarr, *Rewmi*, Dakar, Nov.11, 2008.

¹⁸⁸ Personal interview with Waly Fall, *Rewmi*, Dakar, Nov.25, 2008.

¹⁸⁹ Personal interview with Abdoulaye Vilane, PS, Dakar, Sept.11, 2008.

policy goals of the PS, Vilane explained, “We want law and order to prevail, for democracy to prevail, the separation of powers to prevail, justice to prevail, legality to prevail, solidarity to prevail, transparency to prevail, and good governance to prevail.”¹⁹⁰ For Ibrahima Sall, a former Minister of Planning under Diouf and a counselor for the PS, the party is distinguished by being the most organized and committed to fighting against Wade. However, what exactly the PS is fighting for remains unclear: “It [the PS] fights for justice, equality, *things like that*. But, it doesn’t have a precise, specific program.”¹⁹¹

Given these generalities, differentiating among the parties’ philosophies clearly proves difficult, which is a fact openly acknowledged by all of the parties’ representatives. Aissata Tall Sall, who is the chargé of communication for the PS, admits that since they are all committed to social democracy, there is no true philosophical difference between her party and the rest of the opposition.¹⁹² Rather the leadership of Dieng and the party’s past experience in office represent the major advantages possessed by the PS over its competitors. Yet, she also recognizes that the party’s challenge remains distinguishing its policy projects from those of the PDS and communicating this difference more clearly to the Senegalese people.¹⁹³ The AFP’s Tine concurs that there is no substantial ideological difference among the opposition parties since they all more or less are “social democratic.”¹⁹⁴ Abdou Latif Coulibaly, a well-known journalist, political analyst, and fierce critic of Wade, clarifies that “It’s necessary for you to know that the AFP is made up of people who left the PS. At their base, they have the same ideology and approach, theory and doctrine. The area of

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Personal interview with Ibrahima Sall, PS member and former Minister of Planning under Diouf, Dakar, Nov.11, 2008. Emphasis in italics added.

¹⁹² Personal interview with Aissata Tall Sall, PS, Dakar, Sept.15, 2008.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Personal interview with H  l  ne Tine, AFP, Dakar, Sept. 16, 2008.

difference that distinguishes one from the other is the experience of the people who lead the parties.”¹⁹⁵

Moreover, each party professes its desire to broaden its constituency base to include all Senegalese but has achieved this with varying success. The AFP’s performance in this regard is most disappointing. Having come in third place in the 2000 elections, Niasse only garnered five percent of the vote in the department of Dakar during the 2007 elections and even less in Pikine and Guédiawaye (see Table 3.7). Formed by elites who previously worked in civil society organizations, the party’s main constituency base consisted of intellectuals and university professors.¹⁹⁶ According to Coulibaly, “Moustapha Niasse is the best of all of them but the people said ‘no.’ But, he’s also responsible for that. He is a great man but he’s detached from the reality of the true Senegalese. He spent a lot of his time overseas.”¹⁹⁷ In fact, in the year preceding the 2007 elections, Niasse was a member of the United Nations team negotiating peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region, spending much of his time outside of the country (Diongue *et al.* 2007). This certainly did not help his party become better known to the Senegalese in general and the urban poor in particular.

At its founding, the PS was targeted at the rural population, particularly peasants, pastoralists, and fishermen.¹⁹⁸ However, since its defeat in 2000, the PS recognizes that a majority of the population is no longer rural.¹⁹⁹ As such, the PS’ spokesman, Abdoulaye Vilane, claims that the PS’ discourse now “addresses all the Senegalese,” including the youth, women, and the middle-classes because “if you

¹⁹⁵ Personal interview with Abdou Latif Coulibaly, Dakar, Oct.10, 2008.

¹⁹⁶ Personal interview with Hélène Tine, AFP, Dakar Sept.16, 2008.

¹⁹⁷ Personal interview with Abdou Latif Coulibaly, Dakar, Oct. 10, 2008.

¹⁹⁸ Personal interview with Aissata Tall Sall, PS, Dakar, Sept.15, 2008.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

want to advance a country, you can't just address the poorest.”²⁰⁰ As for the poor in Dakar's suburbs, Vilane adopts a more disparaging tone, noting that “there are a lot of people there but people live as though they are in a village. Their mentality, their treatment of the environment, etc., it's always anarchic.”²⁰¹ Similarly, the former PS Minister of Planning, Ibrahima Sall, claims that Dakar's urban poor are simply rural migrants with an “anti-citizen” and “anti-democratic” mentality.²⁰² Both sentiments hint at the old PS elitism that Wade steered to his advantage in 2000 when he rallied the urban poor with a populist strategy. Even though the PS previously failed to adequately target urban areas, the party launched its 2007 campaign in the province of Louga rather than in Dakar.²⁰³

Only a few years old, *Rewmi* has yet to establish a clear constituency base. Idrissa Seck is particularly popular in Thiès, where he is the mayor and where *Rewmi* launched its 2007 campaign. In fact, Thiès was the one region won by his party in 2007, achieving 55 percent of the votes.²⁰⁴ In general though, Sarr states that “Senegal as a whole” represents *Rewmi*'s constituency base.”²⁰⁵ His colleague, Waly Fall, concurs: “*Rewmi* has a panoramic ambition. We traverse issues that appeal to all. Today, the Senegalese don't fit into categories such as the middle-class, the working class, peasants. We are all Senegalese.”²⁰⁶

In addition to expressing a collective desire to appeal to “all Senegalese,” these three parties also share a similar outlook as Zambia's personalistic parties regarding the best way to help the urban poor: improve rural areas. For instance, the PS emphasizes that to prevent people from coming to the cities, the conditions for success

²⁰⁰ Personal interview with Abdoulaye Vilane, PS, Dakar, Sept.11, 2008.

²⁰¹ Personal interview with Abdoulaye Vilane, PS, Dakar, Sept.11, 2008.

²⁰² Personal interview with Ibrahima Sall, PS member and former Minister of Planning, Dakar, Nov.11, 2008.

²⁰³ Personal interview with Ibrahima Faye, *Sud Quotidien*, Dakar, Aug. 29, 2008.

²⁰⁴ See www.Senelections.org (accessed March 13, 2008).

²⁰⁵ Personal interview with Omar Sarr, *Rewmi*, Dakar, Nov. 11, 2008.

²⁰⁶ Personal interview with Waly Fall, *Rewmi*, Dakar, Nov.25, 2008.

need to be established in the countryside.²⁰⁷ Sarr is even blunter about *Rewmi*'s approach:

You know, urban poverty is due to extreme poverty in the rural areas so I think we should attack the problem at its roots, going to the rural areas and finding solutions for the rural populations so that they can have local solutions to their development problems. If you proceed that way, you may prevent them from coming in large numbers to join the urban population, which is the reason for the growing urban poverty.²⁰⁸

The AFP's Tine likewise claims that greater investment is needed in individuals' home localities so that they are not convinced to migrate to the city.²⁰⁹

All three parties' perspectives tend to contradict the contemporary realities about Senegal's urbanization process. While the country's rate of urbanization has increased, this is no longer primarily due to rural-to-urban migration but more to natural population growth. In fact, migrants to Dakar from other regions of the country accounted for only 25 percent of those living in the city as of 2002 (ANSD 2005). Furthermore, augmenting the attractiveness of rural areas in the hopes of discouraging urban migration is no different than many of Wade's own policies in this domain, including REVA. As such, these opposition parties not only fail to provide concrete details for combating existing urban poverty but also advocate the same emphasis on rural development as the incumbent they all oppose.

Finally, the personalistic nature of all these parties manifests through a party organization centered on its leaders. In the view of Mbow (2008: 167), "Parties never turn out their own leaderships, and that needs to change. Most of those who currently run Senegal's parties are incapable of practicing democracy." Indeed, the inability of cadres to advance within their own party structure contributes to the country's proliferation of parties. For instance, Robert Sagna, who is the mayor of the southern

²⁰⁷ Personal interview with Abdoulaye Vilane, PS, Dakar, Sept.11, 2008.

²⁰⁸ Personal, interview with Omar Sarr, *Rewmi*, Dakar, Nov.11, 2008.

²⁰⁹ Personal interview with H  l  ne Tine, AFP, Dakar, Sept.16, 2008.

city of Zinguinchor, left the PS and formed the party *Démocratie et solidarité* in order to compete as a presidential candidate in 2007 because it was not possible to challenge Dieng within the party for this opportunity. In general Diop (2006) notes that Dieng is deft at resisting attacks by adversaries trying to reduce his power, and he firmly controls which candidates run on the PS ticket. A similar pattern hampers the AFP in which individuals such as Massokhna Kane, Cheikh Mouhamadou, and Mamoune Niasse all quit to create their own parties or to join the PDS.²¹⁰ The old rivalry between Dieng and Niasse, which drove Niasse to form the AFP in the first place, also means that they will not support each other in any coalition agreement.²¹¹

Thus, the three main opposition parties in Senegal possess relatively vague platforms and ideologies, with few ideas for addressing urban poverty. Moreover, they tend to target relatively similar constituency bases, though with varying degrees of success. The urban poor in particular were not specified as a constituency base and all three parties launched their 2007 campaigns outside of Dakar. Consequently, the main distinction among these parties is the personalities of their leaders, who in turn exercise a firm grip on their parties' internal power structures.

Le Pôle de Gauche

The parties of the *pôle de gauche*, or the traditional left, include AJ-PADS, LD-MPT, and PIT, and none have ever gained much support outside of Dakar. Led by Landing Savané, the AJ/PADS emerged in 1991 from a merger of socialist and Maoist groups. PIT was formed by dissidents of PAI in 1981 and recognized by the Soviet Union as Senegal's official Communist party. Recognized in the same year but actually established in 1974, the LD-MPT originally was a self-proclaimed Marxist-

²¹⁰ Personal interview with Alioune Badara Diop, University of Gaston Berger, St. Louis, Dec. 1, 2008.

²¹¹ Personal interview with Ibrahima Faye, *Sud Quotidien*, Dakar, Aug. 29, 2008.

Leninist group whose leader, Abdoulaye Bathily, vehemently opposed Senegal's interaction with the World Bank and IMF during the height of structural adjustment in the 1980s (Banks *et al.* 2008).

As more programmatic parties, leaders play a more muted role than they do in the PS, AFP, or *Rewmi*. For example, when Savané accepted a series of ministerial roles in Wade's government after the 2000 elections, the party began splintering because many party stalwarts argued that he was betraying the party's ideology by allying with an avowedly liberal party.²¹² Importantly, defectors left not because they could not obtain adequate power within the party but because of their commitment to its ideology. PIT did not present its leader, Amath Dansokho, as a candidate in the last presidential elections but rather participated in the CPA coalition. Ibrahima Sène, a long-time PIT member and the representative in charge of PIT's social and economic affairs, emphasizes that this was done to emphasize that the party does not exist to serve its leader but rather a larger purpose, which is to enhance "the consciousness of salaried workers."²¹³

In addition, the leftist parties historically possessed strong ties to the country's unions, and this in turn holds implications for their contemporary constituency base. The LD-MPT, for instance, retains links with Senegal's main teachers' union and, according to the party's spokeswoman, originated as an elitist party vested in organizing teachers and students.²¹⁴ AJ/PADS largely consists of the same social base, including left-of-center academics, students, and professionals (Galvan 2009). Sène claims that 80 percent of PIT's members are "salaried workers," who labor in the formal sector and predominantly belong to unions. From his perspective, salaried workers are more involved in a "modern" system of production and communication,

²¹² Interview with Alioune Badara Diop, University of Gaston-Berger, St. Louis, Dec. 1, 2008.

²¹³ Interview on Sept. 25, 2008.

²¹⁴ Interview with Aiwa Wade, spokeswoman for the LD-MPT, on Sept. 21, 2008.

understand and fight for their rights and obligations in the workplace, and experience a sense of solidarity that manifests through organization in unions. In turn, union participation helps raise their social and political consciousness.²¹⁵ Such views largely confirm Graham's (1994: 127) observation that "Most of the [Senegalese] Marxist parties, which in theory should represent the interests of the poor... are not particularly attuned to needs of the poor, whom they consider the *lumpenproletariat*."

At a general level, most of the poor have not attended school and therefore do not understand what "socialism" means and how it differs from "liberalism."²¹⁶ Thus, the abstract nature of the messages espoused by these leftist parties precludes their comprehension by the urban poor. For example, during its previous incarnation as PAI, PIT's goals included achieving political independence from France and transforming Senegal into a Communist society.²¹⁷ Today, PIT lobbies for regional integration and economic nationalism within West Africa as a means of achieving Senegal's economic independence.²¹⁸ Furthermore, the party aims for a fair legal system that protects the rights of workers since, according to Sène, the conditions for achieving socialism can only be attained if the rights of workers are respected.²¹⁹ However, such sentiments can hold little relevance to informal workers who vend in makeshift stalls, near open sewage ditches and with little protection from heavy rains or the scorching sun but who would not seek to redress their situation via the legal system.

The PDS largely discounts these parties as real challengers, highlighted by the PDS deputy proclaiming that while *Rewmi*'s Idrissa Seck is a threat, "the ideology of

²¹⁵ Personal interview with Ibrahima Sène, PIT, Dakar, Sept.25, 2008.

²¹⁶ Personal interview with Mamadou Thior, *Radio Télévision Sénégalaise*, Dakar, Nov.6, 2008.

²¹⁷ Personal interview with Ibrahima Sène, PIT, Dakar, Sept.25, 2008.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

Bathily doesn't work.”²²⁰ Successive presidential election results support this observation. In Dakar, which is the core base of these parties, neither Bathily nor Savané obtained more than two percent of the vote in the 2007 presidential elections (see Table 3.7). According to Galvan's (2009: 3) analysis of those elections, “Neither [Bathily nor Savané] represented serious challengers to Wade; both hoped to be the ‘dark horse’ whose meticulously articulated and *largely irrelevant ideological message* would finally, somehow, catch fire with the voters” (emphasis added).

The future of these leftist parties remains unclear. On the one hand, Aiwa Wade of the LD-MPT admits that “the population does not really understand the message of the left and its meaning for them” and therefore hopes her party can “find a message to convince the masses.”²²¹ She further recognizes that while the LD-MPT formerly was well-situated in Dakar because that was where the intelligentsia concentrated, the changing “physiognomy” of the city, including the growth of the informal sector, means that the party can no longer simply focus on intellectuals and hope to win votes.²²² On the other hand, if these traditional leftist parties, with shrinking union membership bases and an outdated message, try to amend their approach, it remains unclear how they would remain distinct from their better performing but less ideologically-oriented counterparts.

Conclusion

This chapter examined whether and how various political parties in Senegal and Zambia have mobilized the urban poor for votes. Since the commencement of genuine multiparty democracy, the two countries have shared a proliferation in opposition parties, which are deprived of public funding and traditionally financed by

²²⁰ Personal interview with Babacar Gaye, PDS, Dakar, Sept.30, 2008.

²²¹ Personal interview with Aiwa Wade, LD-MPT, Dakar, Sept.21, 2008.

²²² Ibid.

party leaders. Most of these leaders in turn established their parties in the wake of intra-party disputes and as a means of advancing their own ambitions. They all face the challenge of reaching out to large numbers of urban dwellers who have been economically marginalized and often crowded into substandard housing on the peripheries of Dakar and Lusaka.

Given these similar circumstances, two key points emerged by comparing parties across countries and over time. First, even when an incumbent fails to provide jobs, decent housing, and basic public services, the opposition may still prove unable to capture the imagination of the urban poor if it does not employ a populist strategy with this constituency. Indeed, both Zambia's 2001 and Senegal's 2007 elections illustrated that even when the incumbent regime theoretically should be at a disadvantage, no opposition party may definitively win over the urban poor.

Secondly, a populist strategy prevails with the urban poor not only due to the failed promises of the incumbent but also because other opposition parties are relying on personalistic or programmatic linkages that reduce their degree of differentiation and level of congruence with the policy priorities of the urban poor. Well-educated and potentially technocratic leaders, such as the UPND's Hichilema and the AFP's Niasse, remain disadvantaged by an intellectualism that creates distance with the urban poor as well as by advancing broad messages intended to capture the votes of both urbanites and rural dwellers. By contrast, the success of *Gorgui* over the AFP and the *pôle de gauche* in the first round of Senegal's 2000 elections parallels that of "King Cobra" vis-à-vis the UPND and the Heritage Party in Zambia's 2006 and 2008 elections. These trends are summarized in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8: Summarizing Interactions of Opposition Parties with the Urban Poor

ZAMBIA	Incumbent Party (Leader)	Opposition Party (Leader)	Interaction by Opposition Party	Outcome
2001	MMD (Mwanawasa)	UPND (<i>Mazoka</i>), FDD (<i>Tembo</i>), Heritage (<i>Miyanda</i>)	Personalistic linkages	Vote is split among UPND, FDD, Heritage, and MMD in Lusaka, Kitwe, and Ndola
		PF (<i>Sata</i>)	Personalistic linkages	
2006 & 2008	MMD (Mwanawasa)	UPND (<i>Hichilema</i>), Heritage (<i>Miyanda</i>)	Personalistic linkages	The PF obtains an overwhelming majority of support in Lusaka, Kitwe, and Ndola
		PF (<i>Sata</i>)	Populist strategy	
SENEGAL	Incumbent Party (Leader)	Opposition Party (Leader)	Interaction	Outcome
2000	PS (<i>Diouf</i>)	PDS (<i>Wade</i>)	Populist strategy	The PDS wins overwhelmingly in Dakar in both 1 st and 2 nd rounds of elections
		AFP (<i>Niasse</i>)	Personalistic linkages	
		LD-MPT (<i>Bathily</i>), PIT (<i>Dansokho</i>), And-Jëf (<i>Savané</i>)	Programmatic linkages	
2007	PDS (<i>Wade</i>)	AFP (<i>Niasse</i>), PS (<i>Dieng</i>), <i>Rewmi</i> (<i>Seck</i>)	Personalistic linkages	The PDS wins over 50 percent of the vote in the Dakar metropolitan areas; no 2 nd round of elections is needed
		LD-MPT (<i>Bathily</i>), PIT (<i>Dansokho</i>), And-Jëf (<i>Savané</i>)	Programmatic linkages	

Importantly, this chapter has illustrated that the length of a party's tenure in office is not a driving feature of support for Sata in Zambia and for Wade in Senegal. Admittedly, the incumbent MMD in Zambia has been in office for 19 years, while the PDS was only in office for seven years at the time of the 2007 elections. However, Zambia's 2006 elections were as much a referendum on Mwanawasa's first term in office as Senegal's 2007 elections were for Wade. Indeed, if disgruntlement for the

MMD's lengthy tenure was the main reason for the urban poor's support for Sata, then support for Mwanawasa should have continued to decrease between the 2001 and 2006 elections. However, Mwanawasa's support rose from 29 to 43 percent of the national vote between those two elections. Moreover, Sata was not an unknown politician whose performance in office was untested. Rather, he held numerous high-profile positions within the government for the last thirty years, including in both the MMD and UNIP regimes.

Instead of length of party tenure or party loyalty, the means by which each country's opposition parties interacted with the urban poor over time explains why this constituency supported the PF in Zambia and the PDS in Senegal during each country's most recent presidential elections. Despite the fact that Wade was trained as a lawyer and economist while Sata's schooling only extended to grade four, both individuals relied on a similar populist strategy aimed at incorporating low-income urbanites, especially youth, into the political arena. This was done through the use of campaigns targeted in deprived regions of Dakar and Lusaka, which revealed that poor residents represented the PDS and PF's constituency base. Moreover, Wade in 2000 and Sata in 2006 and 2008 relied on a policy message of social inclusion that manifested through promises to provide jobs, end harassment of informal workers, and improve housing and service delivery. Their policies often involved an eclectic mixture of liberal and leftist norms that privileged both individual prerogative and government intervention. Similar to contemporary Latin America's neo-populists, they relied on direct, vertical ties with the urban poor rather than mobilizing them through a corporatist relationship with institutions such as AZIEA or ZCTU in Zambia and UNACOIS in Senegal. Through the use of indigenous languages and theatrical antics during campaign rallies, they signaled a disconnect with what they portrayed as largely elitist existing political establishments. Even though Sata was a long-time

MMD loyalist and Wade had served in co-habitation governments with the PS, these charismatic leaders both re-invented themselves as outsiders and “men of the people.” This gamble paid off with those individuals who historically were treated as a blight on their cities’ landscapes instead of citizens who posed a genuine electoral advantage.

CHAPTER FOUR

The View from Below: How the Urban Poor Respond to Party Linkage Strategies

Introduction

The previous chapter relied on interviews with political elites and other key informants to illustrate the relationships between political parties and the urban poor in Senegal and Zambia. However, the perspective of the urban poor was largely missing from this narrative. As such, this chapter utilizes a novel set of primary data collected from a total of 400 market workers in the cities of Dakar and Lusaka to illustrate how the urban poor view their respective country's political parties and to understand why they voted for a particular candidate in the last elections. The surveys are supplemented with more in-depth interviews with a total of 60 individuals in slum and squatter settlements whose responses are used to provide some qualitative details on each country's party landscape. These two forms of primary data were collected in Dakar from August to December 2008 and in Lusaka between January and April 2009. In Dakar, surveys were conducted in French, Wolof, and Pulaar and in Lusaka, they occurred in English, Bemba, and Nyanja.

The benefits of the survey findings from the market workers are twofold. First, the four models of voting behavior presented in Chapter Two, which were vote-buying, ethnic alignments, retrospective economic voting, and associational membership, are tested on the available survey data. If vote-buying drives the voting decisions of the urban poor, then those parties which offer handouts in the form of money and/or gifts around elections should obtain more votes than those parties that did not, and whether a respondent received handouts should represent a statistically significant influence on his/her choice of candidate. If ethnic alignments are important, then a voter who has a co-ethnic running for president should be

significantly more likely to support that candidate over those who are from other ethnic groups. Similarly, if a candidate is not a co-ethnic, then a voter should be less likely to vote for him/her. If retrospective, sociotropic economic voting plays a role, and the accountability of the government is clear, then voters should support the opposition when they believe that their country's economy is doing poorly and the incumbent when it is doing well. Likewise, they will support the opposition if their personal economic circumstances deteriorate. Finally, if membership in a particular association influences support for a particular candidate, then there should be a statistically significant difference in the candidates who are supported by those who are members compared with those who are not members of any association.

Instead of these four different models of voting behavior, this study has argued thus far that the type of relationships forged between parties and citizens influences when and why the urban poor support the opposition. Specifically, the study has claimed that populist strategies are more likely to attract the votes of the urban poor than clientelistic, personalistic, or programmatic linkages alone. This is because populist strategies offer greater differentiation from the multitude of parties reliant solely on personalistic linkages and provide greater congruence with the priorities of the urban poor than either personalistic or programmatic linkages.

As such, there is a second advantage of the survey findings: they can provide evidence of these two causal mechanisms which are believed to facilitate the appeal of populist strategies. As specified in Chapter Two, congruence refers to the distance between a party's campaign messages and the issues most important to voters. Since typical means of measuring congruence (see Powell 2009) are not available in the African context, this study measures congruence in a number of ways. Greater congruence occurs when a particular party repeatedly is identified by voters as being concerned with improving living conditions for the urban poor, and lower congruence

exists when that party is not believed to be particularly concerned with this issue. Moreover, congruence exists when a majority of respondents claim they supported a specific candidate first and foremost because of his/her policy proposals. If, however, a respondent voted for a candidate due to influences by family members and friends, or because of the candidate's personality and/or region of origin, this implies that less congruence existed between that party and the voter. Chapter Three also described the campaign messages that various political parties in both Senegal and Zambia espoused to the urban poor. If those variables that most influenced a voter's choice of candidate correspond at a statistically significant level with the campaign promises offered by a particular party, then this represents another indication of congruence.

Differentiation refers to substantive policy distinctions among political parties. Again, there are two ways to measure differentiation. If one opposition party receives considerably more votes than any other, then that indicates that one party significantly stands out in the minds of the urban poor. However, if the parties split votes among respondents, then that reveals that no particular party stood out for the urban poor. In addition, if survey respondents directly report observing variation across parties with respect to policy, rather than simply with respect to the personal backgrounds of party leaders, then greater differentiation exists. Importantly, both conditions must be present for a populist strategy to work. Indeed, a party reliant solely on programmatic linkages may exhibit differentiation but not necessarily congruence.

If the argument central to this study is correct, then survey respondents in Zambia would not overwhelmingly just support the opposition but specifically support the PF, which has relied on a populist strategy, in large majorities. In other words, the urban poor would not simply be attracted to any opposition party but to the opposition party which espoused a message focused on their priorities. The PF would be identified as a party interested in improving living conditions for the urban poor as

well as one which is distinguished by its social and economic policies. Those variables that are significantly correlated with support for Sata will encapsulate issues, such as service delivery and employment, which the urban poor themselves have identified as areas of concern and which Sata in turn focused on during his campaign. At the same time, in Senegal, where a populist opposition party did not exist in the 2007 elections, no opposition party should receive a substantial share of votes. Even though services and jobs are equally as important for the urban poor in Dakar, they will not be issues that significantly influence support for the opposition because these are not issues on which the Senegalese opposition parties exclusively focused during their electoral campaigns. Little differentiation will exist among the opposition parties and no one party will be viewed as extensively interested in improving living conditions for the poor. The incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade, will not be chosen because of his policy achievements on behalf of the urban poor but because of the lack of alternative options.

The results confirm that Lusaka's urban poor overwhelmingly voted for Sata, and a majority did so because of the PF's policy manifesto. At the same time, Dakar's urban poor acknowledge that Senegal's opposition parties, which relied on either personalistic or programmatic linkages, were relatively indistinguishable. Few voted for the opposition and those who did spread their votes across a number of different candidates. Of the four models on voting behavior, only ethnic alignments appear to exercise a significant influence on voting behavior, and this was only true for Zambia. Yet, even in Zambia, ethno-linguistic background alone is not responsible for a respondent's decision to support a particular candidate. Indeed, age, household access to water and electricity, and perspectives on job creation are also found to exhibit an impact on voting decisions. Importantly, the evidence on the effects of differentiation and congruence remain significant even when accounting for these alternative models

of voting behavior. The rest of the chapter describes how the surveys were conducted and then delves into the specific findings in each city.

Survey Methodology

The surveys used for this chapter relied on an emic-etic approach whereby a common set of questions were asked in both countries and supplemented by country-specific questions (Harkness *et al.* 2003). In general, the surveys asked about respondents' demographic and educational backgrounds, working and living conditions, perspectives on the ruling party's performance, whether they voted in the most recent presidential elections, who they supported and why, whether and how candidates campaigned in their neighborhoods, and how they perceived their country's opposition parties. A full copy of the questionnaire used in each city can be found in Appendix Five.

Traditionally, cross-national surveys can pose certain difficulties. Cultural norms can dictate that questions which are appropriate in some countries are not in others (Johnson and van de Vijver 2003). Interpretation of the features which constitute abstract concepts, such as "democracy" or "freedom" may vary significantly across countries (King *et al.* 2004). Ordinal response categories, such as those common with Likert scales, can be biased across countries when some groups have higher standards about what constitutes, for example, the definition of "strongly agree" or "strongly disagree" (King and Wand 2007).

While some of these challenges emerged in the present study, they were either confronted directly or do not prove to significantly hinder the overall findings. For instance, direct inquiries about voting decisions can sometimes engender suspicions by survey respondents. However, the relatively democratic environment in both countries, and the fact that such questions were posed *after* rather than *before* the

elections, meant that there were very few refusals to answer questions about this topic. The only abstract concept used in the surveys was “party manifesto” in Zambia and “party platform” in Senegal.²²³ In both cases, respondents were asked to describe their understanding of these concepts in an open-ended fashion so that differences in interpretation could be readily uncovered. While Likert scales were employed, the responses to such questions are applied to understand voting behavior in separate statistical analyses for each country rather than in a cross-country statistical analysis. In other words, the analyses capture the behavior of Dakarois according to their own culturally-specific understandings, and likewise for Lusakans.

Why Market Workers?

While this study is generalizing to the urban poor, Chapter One noted some of the difficulties in determining who actually constitute this category. Many African countries do not use urban-specific poverty lines. Consequently, when measured by a nationally-determined poverty line, the extent of urban poverty is overshadowed by the fact that rural dwellers are often worse off in absolute terms. Moreover, household level poverty data disaggregated by neighborhoods is not available for many African cities, thereby making it difficult to identify *ex-ante* a sampling frame of poor households to survey. Practical challenges compound these methodological ones since a majority of those who constitute the urban poor spend most of their days, including weekends, away from home in order to earn a living. Focusing on households can therefore lead to an oversampling of those who are too old or too sick to work, women taking care of children and housework, and those who are unemployed but not seeking jobs.

²²³ “Manifesto” is more a common term in Zambia while “platform” is more often found in the political discourse in Senegal.

Therefore, the sampling frame for this study included individuals who were eligible to vote based on age and citizenship and who labored as informal sector workers in the markets of Lusaka and Dakar. As already noted, these two capital cities are the largest agglomerations in their respective countries, meaning that a sample selected within them, rather than in secondary towns and cities, should be broadly representative of the general urban poor. Moreover, the informal sector comprises a large share of employment in these two cities. In Lusaka province, 69 percent of the population depends on the non-agricultural informal sector, which is higher than any other province in the country (CSO 2007: 46). According to the Senegalese statistical agency, the informal sector is by far the largest employer in Dakar, with 76 percent of the city's population dependent upon it (ANSD 2007b: 48).²²⁴ As already noted, incomes in this sector are meager. In Dakar, the median monthly income in the informal sector is approximately 20,000 CFA, or about 45 dollars in current prices (ANSD 2007b: 51). While equivalent figures for Lusaka are unavailable, at the national level, the average monthly income is 107,124 Kwacha, or 23 dollars in current prices (CSO 2007: p.53).

Markets represent an appropriate location for sampling informal workers because they are almost entirely comprised of such individuals. The prime occupation of those in the markets is vending, including retail goods such as clothing and house wares, agricultural products, and self-made foods and beverages. In Zambia in particular, a huge proportion of retail trade occurs in *salaula*, which means to “pick from a pile” (Taylor 2006: 90) and refers to secondhand clothing. However, one can

²²⁴ Both countries share a similar definition of this sector. In Zambia, it refers to employed persons who “were not entitled to paid leave, pension, gratuity and social security, and worked in an establishment employing 5 persons or less” (CSO 2006: 18). In Senegal, the basic definition refers to those who lack written accounts and are not registered as a business. Additional characteristics include precarious working conditions that lack water, electricity, or a telephone, lack of social security, and businesses that employ on average 1.5 people (DPS 2003: 1, 3, 8-10).

also find within the markets tailors, carpenters, butchers, hairdressers, shoe shiners, and those providing non-traditional services, such as charging mobile phones. In addition, within this diverse setting are sometimes students assisting a family member's business, unregistered taxi drivers visiting friends or eating a meal, and a few unemployed idling away the day.

Working conditions in these markets can vary according to occupation. Vendors can be particularly disadvantaged because a majority labor in either makeshift stalls, constructed out of wood and plastic, simply sit on the ground, or engage in perambulatory vending on the edge of the markets. Not only do such conditions provide vendors with little protection from inclement weather but also expose merchandise to rain, mud, and heat, all of which may deter customers. Moreover, vendors can be especially vulnerable to petty theft of money and merchandise.

Survey Sampling Technique

This working population was surveyed according to a two-stage clustered sampling procedure. In the first stage, ten markets were selected throughout each city and therefore markets constituted the primary sampling unit. Cluster sampling is an appropriate technique when the working population is so large that it would be prohibitively costly and time-intensive to randomly survey all of it (Rea and Parker 2005), and sub-sampling through multiple stages is a common approach under circumstances where a list of the population is completely lacking (Groves *et al.* 2004). Due to the limited size of the survey samples, clusters (i.e. markets) were deliberately rather than randomly chosen in each setting. Lindberg and Morrison (2008) also adopt this approach, arguing that when working with relatively small

sample sizes, deliberately selecting clusters can ensure a representative level of coverage that cannot be guaranteed through random selection.

In order to make generalizations about the working population, the chosen clusters traditionally should be “probability proportional to size,” meaning that the probability they are selected into the sample should be proportional to some known variable (Groves *et al.* 2004). For instance, if the population of certain geographic locations is larger than others, then those clusters should have a greater chance of being selected into the sample than more sparsely populated ones. However, the market setting in the African context is very different from traditional survey environments in that their total populations are both unknown and vary on a daily basis. During rainy days, those laboring in more makeshift structures may decide to stay at home. Likewise, near special holidays, such as *Korité* and *Tabaski* in Senegal or Christmas in Zambia the number of marketeers may increase as they try to earn some extra money.²²⁵ As such, the objective in both countries was to ensure that the chosen clusters reflected diversity not in terms of population size but rather in terms of geographical coverage and market type.

For Zambia, a report by the European Development Fund (1996) categorized markets in Lusaka according to territorial size. In particular, “urban” markets are equivalent to central city markets in that they span a huge catchment area and attract vendors from all corners of the city. “Inter-area” markets cover the district in which they are located as well as one or more neighboring areas. “District” markets may actually have a greater number of vendors than the previous category but they are just limited to their specific district. Finally, “sub-district” markets are essentially those located in residential areas, meaning that they are both smaller in size and attract only

²²⁵ *Korité* marks the end of Ramadan and *Tabaski* is the biggest feast day of the year for Senegal’s Muslims.

local residents. According to the EDF (1996) report, a majority of these markets fall into the latter two categories and thus, for the purposes of this study, most of the selected markets fell into this classification as well. However, it was also important that the final ten markets spanned different electoral constituencies. In the past, Rupiah Banda was an MP for Munali constituency while Michael Sata served Kabwata constituency. Depending on their perceived records in office, such factors may influence how vendors viewed these candidates in the 2008 elections. By ensuring that markets were sampled across different electoral constituencies, this study aimed to control for that potential bias. Figure 4.1 illustrates that the markets selected were located in all four corners of the city. The concentration of survey sites on the periphery of the city is due to the fact that most of Lusaka's markets are located in unplanned, high-density, and low-income areas rather than in the more affluent neighborhoods of Kabulonga, Woodlands, Roma, or Rhodes Park (Nchito 2006).




Figure 4.1: Map of Survey Locations in Lusaka

Although an equivalent study of the markets was unavailable in Senegal, a similar logic motivated the selection of markets in Dakar. Specifically, those in the sample included more remote markets in the poorer suburb of Pikine, more residential markets in key neighborhoods, and a few major markets in the center of the city. Moreover, Dakar contains a number of specialized markets in which a majority of vendors focus on selling a certain type of merchandise. For instance, Kermel is an artisan's market in Dakar's Plateau neighborhood, HLM predominantly focuses on fabric, and Tilène is known as a food market. These were purposely included since studies elsewhere in Africa (e.g. Macharia 1997) have demonstrated that different sub-sectors of the informal economy can both attract particular ethno-linguistic groups and engender disparate responses by the state. The remaining markets were more typical in terms of selling all manner of goods and services. Figure 4.2 highlights which markets were chosen in the city center and Pikine.




Figure 4.2: Map of Survey Locations in Dakar

Table 4.1: Summary of Selected Markets in Each City

Dakar, Senegal			
<i>Market</i>	<i>Arrondissement</i>	<i>Market Specialty</i>	<i>Share of market's workers who live in the same arrondissement (%)^b</i>
Grand Yoff	Parcelles Assainies	Multiple products	50
Gueule Tapée	Parcelles Assainies	Multiple products	90
HLM	Grand Dakar	Fabric	35
Kermel	Plateau	Artwork	30
Marche Zinc	Pikine Dagoudane	Multiple products	85
Ouakam	Almadies	Multiple products	90
Sandaga	Plateau	Multiple products	10
Syndicat	Pikine Dagoudane	Fruits and nuts	70
Thiaroye	Thiaroye	Multiple products	35
Tilène	Plateau	Food products	45
Lusaka, Zambia			
<i>Market</i>	<i>Constituency</i>	<i>Market Type^a</i>	<i>Share of market's workers who live in the same constituency (%)^b</i>
Chawama	Chawama	District	90
Chelstone	Munali	Sub-district	100
Chilenje	Kabwata	District	90
Chipata	Mandevu	Sub-district	95
Kabwata	Kabwata	Inter-area	60
Kanyama	Kanyama	District	95
Kaunda Square	Munali	District	90
Mandevu	Mandevu	District	85
Matero	Matero	District	100
Soweto	Kanyama	Urban	35

Notes: ^aThese market types are derived from the European Development Fund (1996)

^bThese shares are derived from the author's survey results.

Table 4.1 lists the ten markets sampled in each city and highlights the proportion of those sampled in the survey who lived in the same administrative region where the market is located. Not surprisingly, very central markets, such as Sandaga in Dakar and Soweto in Lusaka tend to have most of their occupants migrating into the city center each day from other neighborhoods. By contrast, neighborhood markets, such as Ouakam and Chelstone, are almost entirely dominated by local residents. Thus, these markets exhibit other characteristics that can be leveraged to ensure that

the sample is probability proportional to size. Appendix Six provides a more detailed overview of each selected market.

Cluster sampling can be problematic in that those within a cluster may be more homogeneous, and therefore less statistically independent, than those across clusters. This “design effect” can decrease the size of the standard errors for regression coefficients, thereby leading to a greater tendency to reject the null hypothesis. Unlike traditional household surveys, however, there are reasons to believe that such problems are less severe in the case of market workers precisely because they do not live in the market. In other words, such respondents are exposed to influences both in their workplace and in their own neighborhoods, which might be in a very different part of town than where the market is located, and therefore the degree of homogeneity in political views or demographic characteristics should be less problematic. Nevertheless, one way to mitigate any possible “design effect” variance between clusters is to only sample a small but fixed number of respondents over a wider number of clusters (Groves *et al.* 2004). As such, 20 respondents were surveyed across the ten markets.

During the second stage of sampling, the 20 respondents in each market were chosen according to a random sampling technique stratified by gender.²²⁶ Early studies on voting behavior in the United States and Western Europe suggested a “gender gap” whereby women tended to support more conservative parties than men and typically voted less often (e.g. Inglehart 1977; Butler and Stokes 1974; Campbell et al. 1960). More recent studies (e.g. Inglehart and Norris 2000) have shown that in post-industrial societies, this gap has been narrowing due to women’s greater participation in the labor force, better access to higher education, less emphasis on

²²⁶ According to Levy and Lemeshow (1999), stratified sampling both incorporates the simplicity of random sampling and greater precision by reducing standard errors in estimation.

child-bearing, and declines in religiosity. However, most African societies are not considered post-industrial, and traditional expectations of women still prevail. Stratifying on gender allows the surveys to probe whether a voting gap exists in Senegal and Zambia with respect to both political participation and candidate support. More specific details on the surveying procedures can be found in Appendix Six.

Caveats of Sampling Market Workers

The sampling strategy discussed above presented some caveats and challenges. Most significantly, surveying market workers leads to “coverage error” by excluding other groups who also should be considered the urban poor but do not work in the markets. This can potentially create a major bias if those excluded are significantly different from market workers in a way that affects their voting behavior (Braun 2003). As mentioned earlier, surveying households would have led to a potential oversampling of women with children, the elderly, the unemployed, as well as low-income formal workers, such as security guards, police officers, teachers, and nurses. However, these views are now potentially under-sampled by focusing on markets.

Consequently, three slums or squatter settlements were selected for in-depth interviews in each city to help detect and adjust for potential bias. The responses from individuals in these settlements are not included in this chapter’s statistical analyses but, they provide illuminating qualitative evidence of residents’ political beliefs and voting behavior. Table 4.2 below provides a brief description of the selected settlements.

Table 4.2: Summary of Selected Informal Settlements in Each City

Dakar, Senegal	
Cité Bissap	Located in the Biscuiterie commune, most of Cité Bissap's residents are illegally squatting on land. In March of 2008, 24 homes in Cité Bissap were destroyed by a fire, leaving 325 people homeless. The mayor of Biscuiterie claims that he does not have the resources to improve the housing and attempts to solicit resources from the mayor of Dakar have not amounted to anything (Faye 2008).
HLM Montagne	Located in the HLM commune, HLM Montagne's housing consists of cinder block walls with roofs of cardboard and corrugated steel. The housing is very irregular with public walkways and private backyards ceaselessly blurring together. Montagne has received some support from the NGO ENDA- <i>Tiers Monde</i> .
Baraka	Baraka is situated just behind rather affluent housing in Liberté 6 extension of the Liberté <i>commune d'arrondissement</i> . The residents were evicted from their former location, which is not far from their current one, in February 2001 (COHRE 2004). The community has benefitted from assistance from the NGO, ENDA- <i>Tiers Monde</i> , which is apparent from the community's well-built mosque and community center, as well as the availability of a communal water tap. Many of the residents are from the Casamance region of Senegal (COHRE 2004).
Lusaka, Zambia	
Chaisa	Chaisa compound is located in the Northwestern part of the city in the constituency of Mandevu. In 1987, the Ministry of Local Government and Housing declared Chaisa as an Improvement Area, which allowed occupancy licenses to be given as security of tenure to some of the households (Nordin 2004). The quality of housing varies immensely, with some having doors with padlocks and others just having curtains to indicate an entrance. In recent years, the Japanese donor agency (JICA) has helped install communal water taps in the compound.
Misisi	Misisi is an illegal, informal settlement located in Chawama constituency and has been consistently threatened with demolition by the Government. Misisi has been identified as one of the five worst slums in sub-Saharan Africa. The field surrounding the compound is littered with trash and stagnant, dirty water, which accounts for the compound's high levels of cholera. Most residents' homes are under ZESCO's high tension electricity wires, which have in the past caused some residents to be electrocuted during storms.
Kalikiliki	Kalikiliki is an informal settlement located in Munali constituency, in the Eastern part of the city and next to the Kalikiliki Dam. Kalikiliki means "rush" or "hustle and bustle" in the local language of Nyanja, referring to the original land owner's insistence that the Dam be constructed as quickly as possible (Nchito 2007). In 2002, the Lusaka City Council tried demolishing a number of illegal homes within this compound. Residents torched the bulldozer intended to raze the settlements and in the ensuing clash with police, two teenagers were shot dead (Myers 2005).

Following Dietz's (1998) study of the urban poor in Lima, Peru, the housing settlements were chosen in each city according to Przeworski and Teune's (1970)

“most similar” and “most different” strategies. While the settlements all contained low-income residents, they varied in that a) they were located in different electoral constituencies of their respective city, b) some have a contentious relationship with the state authorities and while others do not, and c) some have been prime targets for non-governmental organization (NGO) and international donor service delivery projects while others have not. The latter two criteria could potentially influence residents’ perceptions of the ruling party’s performance.

Ten respondents in each settlement were asked similar questions to those of the market workers, for a total of 30 respondents in each city and 60 for the overall study. Such a small sample precludes reliable statistical analyses. Yet, a majority of residents in these neighborhoods also engage in small-scale commerce as their major form of livelihood, increasing confidence that the market workers surveyed are not especially different from these residents. Where available, descriptions of their responses are included to provide at least illustrative evidence that coverage error did not pose a major problem in the survey with market workers. Furthermore, these interviews were more in-depth and open-ended than those with market workers, offering a qualitative understanding of decision-making processes with respect to political decisions.

Slum dwellers in each country typically were dismissive of government attention to their plight, although this varied slightly according to the nature of the settlement. For instance, in Dakar, “*rien du tout*,” or “nothing at all,” was the most common response from residents about what improvements the PDS government had made in their neighborhoods in recent years. However, in Baraka, residents offered a slightly more sanguine perspective because of the presence of the urban service-delivery NGO called *ENDA-Tiers Monde*. In Cité Bissap, a few respondents noted that the government provided residents mattresses, rice, and clothes in the aftermath of that settlement’s March 2008 fire but has offered nothing more significant outside of

that particular incident. In Lusaka, residents of Chaisa compound, where the Japanese donor JICA has been active, remained the most positive. In fact, seven out of ten Chaisa respondents were able to cite improvements there, such as the arrival of communal water taps, paved roads, and health clinics. Yet, in both Misisi and Kalikiliki, “nothing” remained the most frequent response to questions about the MMD’s improvements within the neighborhood. This illustrates that outside of areas of heavy donor or NGO involvement, there was little sense that the ruling regime in either country had done much for the urban poor, generating even greater puzzlement over why the PDS was victorious amongst this group in Senegal’s most recent presidential elections while the MMD was not in Zambia’s.

Lusaka: The Power of Pabwato

With the above context and methodological details in mind, this section examines the data from the Lusaka survey to confirm that the PF appealed more to Lusaka’s urban poor than either the MMD or alternative opposition parties and to uncover why this was so. The left column of Table 4.3 presents an overview of the key characteristics captured in the survey sample while the right column presents the distribution of these characteristics in the broader population of self-employed vendors within Lusaka according to data calculated from the 2000 Census. Vendors certainly are not representative of all the types of workers found within the markets. However, since 61 percent of those in Lusaka’s informal sector concentrate on trade (CSO 2006), vendors do tend to represent the dominant occupation of those within this sector. Thus, the Census was disaggregated into self-employed vendors and sales

assistants who live in the district of Lusaka and who are both Zambian citizens and 18 years of age or older.²²⁷

Table 4.3: Summary of Survey Respondents in Lusaka Markets

Descriptive Variable	Sample Percentage	Population Percentage from 2000 Census
<i>Gender</i>		
Female	48	45.5
Male	52	54.5
<i>Age</i>		
18-24 years	17.5	22.9
25-30 years	23.5	33.2
31-35 years	20	14.7
36-40 years	17	12.5
More than 40 years	22	16.8
<i>Language Group</i>		
Barotse	4	1.4
Bemba	37.5	24.3
English	0.5	3.3
Mambwe	6.5	1.5
Northwestern	5	1.1
Nyanja	32	63.3
Tonga	8.5	3.8
Tumbuka	5	1.0
Other	1	0.2
<i>Education</i>		
No schooling	2	13
Primary uncompleted	8	15.3
Primary completed	16	24
Secondary uncompleted	41	33
Secondary completed	26	11.1
Post-secondary vocational	7	3.7
<i>Born in Lusaka?</i>		
Yes	40.5	35.4
No	59.5	64.6
<i>Belong to a Work Association?</i>		
Yes	5.5	---
No	94.5	---

²²⁷ More specifically, the base data for the calculations are the 2000 Census data for Lusaka Province (Province 5). Observations for eligible voters in Lusaka District were isolated and the proportions calculated correspond to individuals who are self-employed in occupations classified as “Salesmen, shop assistants and demonstrators,” “Street vendors, canvassers, and newsvendors,” and “Sales workers not elsewhere classified.” These are occupation codes 451, 452, and 490, respectively, in the Census.

Given that the respondents were stratified according to gender, it is not surprising that the survey sample captured approximately the same proportion of males and females that would be found in the broader populace of Lusaka's informal sector. On the other hand, the language groups, which are those determined by Zambia's Central Statistical Office (CSO), are less representative. While Bemba and Nyanja are the two most prevalent language groups in the capital (CSO 2004), the survey over-sampled those whose first language falls into the Bemba group and under-sampled those in the Nyanja group. Similarly, with respect to education, it appears that those who completed primary schooling, meaning that they left school after Grade 7, along with those who failed to complete primary schooling or never attended at all, were also under-sampled. In order to correct for these two design errors, proportional weights are applied in the regressions presented later in this section.

A key observation about Table 4.3 concerns the extremely small share of respondents who belong to any type of work associations, such as ZANAMA, LITA, or the Street Vendor's Association. The primary reason offered for lack of membership was that the respondent was unaware that any organizations existed for market workers, even though Lusaka contains numerous marketeers and vendors associations. Additional reasons were that the benefits of membership remained unclear, respondents were too busy to join, and a perception that such organizations were corrupt and riddled with in-fighting. A few additional respondents, however, were involved in micro-credit associations, such as FINCA, which provides small loans to female entrepreneurs. These findings mirrored the responses of those in the shanty compounds. Though a very few claimed that they belonged to religious community groups or microfinance organizations, an overwhelming majority claimed they were uninvolved in work associations. All of this suggests that associational affiliation cannot be a major driving force behind respondents' voting decisions and

confirms the observation of Nelson (1979) that the majority of the urban poor tend to be unorganized in any formal manner.

Table 4.4: Number of Migrants to Lusaka by Province and Years of Residence

Province where born	Number of Years Ago Respondent Moved to Lusaka				
	<i>One year or less</i>	<i>Between 1 & 5 years</i>	<i>Between 5 & 10 years</i>	<i>More than 10 years</i>	<i>Total from Province</i>
Central	1	2	3	8	14
Copperbelt	0	8	4	23	35
Eastern	0	2	3	16	21
Luapula	0	0	1	4	5
Northern	0	3	5	13	21
Northwest	0	1	1	3	5
Southern	0	5	1	3	9
Western	0	0	0	6	6
Other ^a	0	0	0	3	3
<i>Total</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>79</i>	<i>119</i>

Notes: ^a“Other” refers to those who were born outside of Zambia but have since become citizens.

The sample also indicates that a majority of respondents migrated to Lusaka from other areas of the country, and this does not markedly differ from the estimates for the broader population. Indeed, Table 4.4 above highlights that most of the respondents moved from the Copperbelt Province, followed by the Eastern, Northern, and Central Provinces, and this largely coincides with the findings from CSO (2003a) regarding migration flows to the capital. Importantly, most of these migrants arrived in Lusaka more than ten years ago, meaning that they are increasingly likely to view themselves as Lusakans. Joining a family member and lack of employment in one’s home province constituted the two main reasons why respondents decided to move to Lusaka.

Despite objective indicators showing that Zambia’s GDP growth and real GDP per capita growth were relatively strong and stable in the 12 months previous to the survey, approximating 6 percent and 3 percent respectively (WDI 2009), most respondents possessed negative views on the prevailing economic conditions for the

country as a whole.²²⁸ As seen in Table 4.5 above, more than fifty percent stated that they believed economic conditions within the country had worsened within the year prior to the survey. Of those who expressed that opinion, 52 percent blamed the policies of the Zambian government for worsening circumstances while a quarter felt that the global economic downturn was responsible. The Cramér's V indicates a strong relationship between the perspectives on the economy and the factor attributed with responsibility for changes in economic circumstances. The Pearson chi-square (χ^2) reveals that there is a significant association between these two variables.²²⁹ This is particularly important given that based on the literature reviewed in Chapter Two, retrospective economic voting is more likely to occur when voters can actually attribute accountability to the government for economic performance. As shown here, the voters did believe the government was responsible.

Table 4.5: Assessment of Economic Conditions over the Previous 12 Months
(% of All Respondents)

Factor responsible for this change in economic conditions	How would you compare economic conditions in Zambia today to those of the same time last year?			
	<i>Better</i>	<i>No change</i>	<i>Worse</i>	<i>Total</i>
Policies of the Zambian government	4	0	51.5	55.5
Global economy	0	0	25	25
Weather	0	0	3	3
Don't know	0	0	2.5	2.5
Not applicable	0	14	0	14
<i>Total</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>82</i>	<i>100</i>

Cramér's V = 0.717 ; χ^2 = 205.362; p = 0.000; N=200

²²⁸ Since the surveys were conducted in the first quarter of 2009, these macroeconomic indicators are based on the World Development Indicators data for 2008.

²²⁹ The Cramér's V measures the strength of the relationship between two or more categorical variables on a scale of 0 (no relationship) to 1 (perfect relationship).

According to Table 4.6, voting appears to be this group's main form of political participation, and a majority of respondents voted in the last two presidential elections. In fact, the turnout rates reported by these respondents for both elections exceeded the rates reported by the Electoral Commission of Zambia for Lusaka District as a whole.²³⁰ Of those who did not vote, procedural issues rather than the dearth of appealing candidates represented the self-reported reason for abstention. The main procedural problem was that respondents lacked the requisite identification documents to vote, including a National Registration Card (NRC) and a voter's card. A Zambian is supposed to receive a National Registration Card at the age of 16, which is in turn necessary to obtain a voter's card at the age of 18. This was particularly problematic in the 2008 elections because the Electoral Commission of Zambia claimed that it was logistically impossible to re-open the electoral register, and therefore those who were not registered in the 2006 elections effectively were disenfranchised in the 2008 ones (Chibamba 2009). Moreover, those who had lost their voting cards in the interim were given only five days to replace them (ECZ 2008). The second reason cited by respondents for not voting was lack of time due to either the fact that they were working or that they were out of town and could not return in time to cast their vote in Lusaka, where they were registered.

Of those who did vote, Sata was overwhelmingly the favorite in both elections amongst this sample, reflecting the general results for Lusaka as a whole. While Sata's share of votes increased between elections, those of the MMD declined. Nevertheless, in 2008, the MMD still outperformed the UPND by more than threefold. This, along with electoral data presented in Chapter Three, suggests that support for the PF is not simply motivated by an anti-incumbent bias amongst the urban poor.

²³⁰ As noted in Chapter Three, the turnout rates for Lusaka District in the 2006 and 2008 elections were 71 and 58 percent, respectively.

Rather, it is spurred by this constituency's particular attraction to Sata and his party's message.²³¹

Table 4.6: Summary of Voting Behavior in 2006 and 2008 Presidential Elections

Did you vote in the presidential elections?	Percentage of <i>all</i> respondents (2006)	Percentage of <i>all</i> respondents (2008)
Yes	74	62.5
No	26	37.5
Primary reason for not voting	Percentage of <i>non-voters</i> (2006)	Percentage of <i>non-voters</i> (2008)
No appealing candidates	0.0	1.3
Lack of time	13.5	22.7
Elections wouldn't be fair	3.8	6.7
Favorite candidate wouldn't win	0.0	2.7
No matter who wins, nothing will change	7.7	6.7
Lacked NRC, voter's card, or both	44.2	48.0
Too young	13.5	0.0
Jehovah's Witness ^a	7.7	5.3
Other ^b	9.6	6.7
Party supported^c	Percentage who voted (2006)	Percentage who voted (2008)
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD)	40.3	30.9
Patriotic Front (PF)	54.9	61.8
United Party for National Development (UPND)	4.9	7.3
Heritage Party (HP)	0	0

Notes: ^a Jehovah's Witnesses in Zambia are forbidden to vote.

^b "Other" usually referred to those who were sick, pregnant, or hospitalized at the time of the elections.

^c The same candidates ran for the PF, UPND, and HP in both elections. However, Rupiah Banda was running to replace the deceased Levy Mwanawasa on the MMD ticket in the 2008 elections.

Respondents were further asked why they believed the MMD ultimately won the 2008 elections at the national level. Since the 2008 elections are more recent, respondents' recall abilities are therefore likely to be more reliable than they are regarding the 2006 elections. Figure 4.3 illustrates that overwhelmingly, respondents believed that the MMD's victory was due to electoral malpractice. By contrast, only about nine percent of respondents claimed that the ruling party's good policies

²³¹ Unfortunately, the small number of respondents who voted for the UPND, which was nine in total, precludes a rigorous statistical analysis of who supported this particular opposition party and why.

explained the final outcome. When pressed, these respondents cited the MMD's removal of primary school fees, which occurred in 2002, the distribution of fertilizers to rural areas, and the fact that the kwacha had been relatively strong under Mwanawasa's tenure. Very few marketeers believed that campaign handouts in the form of gifts and money by the MMD explained that party's national success. Only ten percent of respondents saw the lack of a competitive opposition as a determining factor in the election results.




Figure 4.3: Primary Reason for MMD Victory in 2008

Regression Results and Interpretation

In order to analyze voter motivations, a series of binomial logit regressions were conducted. The purpose of these regressions is twofold. First, they can test the various schools of thought on voting behavior presented in Chapter Two. From the descriptive statistics above, it is clear that associational membership is not an

important determinant of voting behavior for Zambia's urban poor. However, the regressions can test whether ethnicity, vote-buying, and perspectives on the macroeconomy influenced a respondent's voting decisions. Secondly, the regressions emphasize the importance of a populist strategy for a political party attempting to mobilize the urban poor by highlighting the degree of congruence between party messages on the one hand and variables that influence the urban poor's voting decisions on the other hand.

The regressions were conducted on voting decisions in the October 2008 elections. The dependent variable is the probability of voting for Sata in those elections since the primary research question is to understand why King Cobra attracted so much support among the urban poor. However, Table A7.1 in Appendix Seven presents the findings for the same models when the dependent variable is the probability of voting for the MMD's Rupiah Banda.²³² All of these regressions were only conducted on those who voted rather than the entire sample, which reduced the sample size from 200 to 123 respondents.

To determine the best predictors of support for the PF's Michael Sata, a series of independent variables are sequentially introduced to reflect three types of influences that both reflect the schools of thought on voting behavior introduced in Chapter Two and control for confounding variables. The first model examines demographic and educational factors. Specifically, it focuses on the importance of ethnic identity while also controlling for other variables specific to a respondent's background and upbringing that might influence his/her choice of presidential candidate. If the ethnic voting literature is correct, then a respondent who shares Sata's ethno-linguistic background, which is Bemba, should be more likely to vote for Sata at a statistically

²³² The two sets of regressions that alternatively use Sata and Banda as dependent variables are not exactly mirror images of each other because some respondents voted for Hichilema.

significant level even when additional confounding variables are taken into account. At the same time, other ethno-linguistic groups would be significantly less likely to support Sata when they also have co-ethnics in the elections.

This demographic and educational model can be summarized as examining the probability that respondent i supported Sata in the 2008 elections according to the following specification:

$$(1) \Pr (\text{Sata} = 1 | x) = F(\beta_0 + \beta_{\text{fem}_i} + \beta_{\text{young}_i} + \beta_{\text{medium}_i} + \beta_{\text{lowschool}_i} + \beta_{\text{medschool}_i} + \beta_{\text{bemba}_i} + \beta_{\text{nyanja}_i})$$

where $\text{fem} = 1$ if respondent i is a woman, young captures respondents in the 18-30 age category while medium represents those i respondents in the 31-40 age group.²³³

Therefore, those who were older than 40 years of age constituted the excluded dummy variable category. $\text{Lowschool} = 1$ if respondent i did not attend school or did not complete schooling at the primary level while $\text{medschool} = 1$ for a respondent who completed primary schooling or obtained some secondary schooling. Those who had completed secondary school or had some post-secondary education represented the excluded category.²³⁴ Finally, $\text{bemba} = 1$ if a respondent's first language is within the Bemba language group, and $\text{nyanja} = 1$ if a respondent's first language is within the Nyanja language group.²³⁵ Including whether someone whose first language is Bemba chose to support a Bemba candidate, Sata, helps evaluate the strength of the ethnic

²³³ Originally, 18-24 and 25-30 year-olds were in two different groups. However, due to the Electoral Commission's restrictions on allowing new voters to register for the 2008 elections, the former category consisted of very few voters and was therefore collapsed with the next higher age group. This is a recommended procedure for binomial and multinomial models since categories with few respondents can increase the potential for unstable coefficients.

²³⁴ In other words, low schooling represents those with 0 to 6 years of school, medium schooling includes those from 7 to 11 years of school, and high schooling includes those with 12 or more years of school.

²³⁵ The languages within the Bemba language group are Bemba, Lunda, Lala, Bisa, Ushi, Chishinga, Ngumbo, Lamba, Kabende, Tabwa, Swaka, Mukulu, Ambo, Lima, Shila, Unga, Bwile, and Luano. Languages within the Nyanja language group include Nyanja, Chewa, Nsenga, Ngoni, Kunda, and Chikunda (CSO 2000).

voting argument amongst the urban poor. A similar rationale motivated the inclusion of the Nyanja variable since Banda was formerly a member of UNIP, which was highly popular in the Nyanja-speaking Eastern Province.

As seen in Table 4.7, column 1, two variables are statistically significant at conventional levels. A respondent who was between 18 to 30 years of age was more likely to support Sata than someone in an older age category. Moreover, if someone's first language belongs to the Bemba language family, s/he was more likely to vote for Sata. Education level does not significantly impact a respondent's decision to support Sata. Likewise, gender and being a Nyanja-speaker do not appear to have had an impact on the decision to support Sata. As such, this first regression suggests some support for the ethnic voting argument because Bemba-speakers were significantly more likely to support Sata. However, Nyanja-speakers were not necessarily less likely to support the PF leader, suggesting that he did not deter the support of members from this ethno-linguistic group in Lusaka.²³⁶

²³⁶ Importantly, column 1 of Table A7.1 in Appendix Seven also reveals that Nyanja-speakers were not significantly more likely to support the Nyanja candidate, Banda.

Table 4.7: Binomial Logit Analysis of Probability of Voting for Michael Sata

Independent Variables	Demographic & Education (1)	Campaign Conduct (2)	Economy & Service Delivery (3)	Full Model (4)	Weighted Full Model (5)
Female	-0.550 (0.429)	---	---	---	---
Age: 18-30 years ^a	1.221** (0.564)	---	---	2.180*** (0.702)	1.672** (0.786)
Age: 31-40 years	0.641 (0.495)	---	---	---	---
Low education ^b	-0.381 (0.673)	---	---	---	---
Medium education	0.454 (0.495)				
Bemba language group	1.501*** (0.509)	---	---	1.735*** (0.571)	1.316* (0.698)
Nyanja language group	0.580 (0.504)			---	---
MMD handouts	---	0.198 (0.663)	---	---	---
Opposition handouts	---	0.539 (0.516)	---	---	---
Household access to water	---	---	-1.903*** (0.596)	-2.216*** (0.720)	-2.980*** (0.590)
Household access to electricity	---	---	1.423** (0.596)	1.350** (0.672)	1.946*** (0.629)
Poor performance by MMD in creating jobs	---	---	1.579 (1.046)	2.789** (1.169)	3.436** (1.626)
Poor performance by MMD in improving conditions for the poor	---	---	1.495*** (0.560)	1.679*** (0.644)	2.453*** (0.875)
Poor performance by MMD in improving transport	---	---	0.631 (0.485)	1.169** (0.563)	1.156 (0.839)
Worsened economic conditions over previous 12 months	---	---	1.031* (0.605)	0.939 (0.674)	-0.039 (1.033)
Worsened personal economic conditions over previous 12 months	---	---	0.010 (0.462)	0.681 (0.557)	0.964 (0.619)
Constant	-0.818	-0.114 (0.548)	-3.375*** (1.213)	-6.349*** (1.649)	-6.304*** (2.094)
Number of obs.	123	123	123	123	123
Pseudo R-squared	0.116	0.012	0.215	0.337	0.459
Prob >chi2	0.009	0.400	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors are in the parentheses.

^aThose who were older than 40 years of age constituted the excluded reference category for the age dummy variables. ^b The reference category excluded for the education dummy variables was those who had 12 or more years of education.

The second model, labeled the “campaign conduct” model, draws on the vote-buying literature and tests whether a respondent’s voting behavior is influenced by whether a party offered gifts and/or money in his/her neighborhood during the 2008 campaign. Gifts usually occur in the form of T-shirts or *chitenges*, which are brightly-colored fabric women wrap around their waists into long skirts. All opposition parties are grouped together, but this does not necessarily prevent examining the specific effect of the PF’s handouts. No one mentioned that the Heritage Party offered money or gifts, if it even campaigned at all in a respondent’s neighborhood, and this is consistent with popular views that the HP presidential candidate, Godfrey Miyanda, eschews giving the perception that he’s buying peoples’ votes.²³⁷ By contrast, the PF was the most frequently mentioned opposition party involved in handouts. If the UPND was also cited, then this party was also deemed to have offered handouts in addition to, not instead of, the PF. The model can be specified as follows:

$$(2) \Pr (Sata = 1 | x) = F(\beta_0 + \beta_{mmdhandouts_i} + \beta_{opphandouts_i})$$

where *mmdhandouts* is coded as 1 if respondent *i* claims that the MMD offered money and/or gifts in his/her neighborhood, and 0 otherwise. The same coding procedure is used for *opphandouts*, which refers to whether any opposition parties provided gifts and money.

If vote-buying played an important role, then we would expect a positive and significant correlation between the presence of opposition handouts and support for Sata. While column 2 of Table 4.7 demonstrates a positive relationship between these two variables after controlling for the MMD’s campaign handouts, this relationship is not significant. As such, whether a party offered gifts and money do not appear to have had an influence on respondents’ decision to support Sata. This is potentially

²³⁷ Interviews with HP spokesman, Wazziah Phiri on February 28, 2009 and UNDP governance advisor on March 10, 2009.

because, as seen in Table 4.8, both the MMD and the opposition offered these handouts in relatively high proportions, meaning that ultimately they did not provide any one party with a particular electoral advantage.

Table 4.8: Handouts (Gifts and/or Money) by Zambian Political Parties before 2008 Elections, as Reported by Respondents

Party	Yes		No/Don't Know	
	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
MMD handouts?	88%	110	15%	12
Opposition (PF & UPND) handouts?	78.4%	98	21.6%	27

Notes: These statistics are just for those who actually voted in the 2008 elections rather than for the entire sample. For the entire sample, 87% claimed the MMD offered handouts and 77% claimed the opposition parties did so.

The third model tests two hypotheses. The first is the economic voting argument and therefore includes independent variables that capture retrospective sociotropic and retrospective egotropic perspectives on economic conditions. The second hypothesis refers to the importance of the PF's message and its degree of congruence with voters. In particular, since the PF focused on service delivery, employment, and improving conditions for the poor in its campaign messages, the model tests whether those who lacked key services or disapproved of the MMD's performance in these areas were significantly more likely to vote for Sata.

This third model, labeled "economic conditions and service delivery," is specified as follows:

$$(3) \Pr (\text{Sata} = 1 | x) = F(\beta_0 + \beta_{\text{water}}_i + \beta_{\text{elec}}_i + \beta_{\text{jobs}}_i + \beta_{\text{poor}}_i + \beta_{\text{trans}}_i + \beta_{\text{worse}}_i + \beta_{\text{worseper}}_i)$$

If a respondent possessed tap water and electricity within his/her household, *water* and *elec* were coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. If a respondent claimed that the MMD performed poorly in terms of creating employment, improving conditions for the poor, and improving transport, such as the availability of affordable minibuses and taxis,

then *jobs*, *poor*, and *trans* were all coded 1. Likewise, if the respondent claimed that Zambia's economic conditions worsened over the previous twelve months, *worse* was coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. A similar coding procedure occurred for those who had observed a deterioration in their own personal economic conditions. These last two variables are specifically aimed at testing the economic voting thesis.

As seen in the results, the most substantively significant variable in this model is whether a respondent possessed access to tap water within his/her household. Those who did have such access were *less* likely to vote for Sata. Indeed, the World Bank (2007a) notes that within Lusaka's informal settlements, residents rely on self-made shallow wells for water supply and on pit latrines, posing serious health challenges. Out of 314 communal pipes installed in the city, 142 have been vandalized and are unusable and many more suffer from leaks (World Bank 2007a: 86-87). Potable water within households is a scarce commodity for Lusaka's urban poor and as seen in Table 4.9 below, only 46 percent of survey respondents in the markets claimed they possessed a water tap within their homes.

Table 4.9: Distribution and Perceived Affordability of Utilities among Survey Respondents, Zambia

Utility	Possess utility within household		Utility has become more affordable	
	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
Water	45.6%	54.4%	26.6%	73.4%
Electricity	65%	35%	33%	67%

Notes: These statistics are just for those who actually voted in the 2008 elections rather than for the entire sample. However, they are almost exactly the same for the entire sample.

Moreover, only two of the thirty shanty compound residents interviewed possessed a household tap. In Misisi, one woman complained that she would like more water in the compound "because most of the personal taps in the yards are closed because people were not paying. For the communal taps, it's 200 kwacha per 20 liters." Another woman in Chaisa explained that "the communal taps are timed and

open in sessions, from 7-10 in the morning and 4 to 6 in the afternoon.” She would prefer to have the taps open throughout the day. Others complained about the poor quality of water from these taps.

As seen above, electricity is more widely available within households. Yet, power cuts are frequent and electricity bills are high, causing many to default on bill payments and have their service suspended. As shown in Table 4.9, only 33 percent of respondents believe that electricity has become more affordable. Moreover, unlike water, which requires substantial investments in infrastructure within homes, electricity can be obtained illegally. Respondents were only asked whether they could obtain electricity within their households, not about how they obtained it or how consistently it was provided. These confounding circumstances may explain why even those who do have electricity were also more likely to vote for Sata.

In addition, if the MMD was deemed to have done little or nothing to improve conditions for the poor, then respondents were significantly more likely to support Sata.²³⁸ Retrospective sociotropic perspectives of the macroeconomy also seem to exert a significant impact on support for Sata in this model.

To preserve degrees of freedom, a full model is then constructed by introducing those independent variables that were statistically significant in previous models into the service delivery model. Even those variables within the service delivery model that were not statistically significant are nonetheless retained for both theoretical and statistical reasons.²³⁹ Theoretically, variables not significant in the service delivery model may nonetheless prove significant when omitted demographic

²³⁸ In order to determine whether respondents considered themselves poor, they were asked which neighborhood they resided in and then which ones they believed to be the poorest in Lusaka. Most respondents lived in one of the neighborhoods that they personally considered to be among the city’s poorest.

²³⁹ This full model proved relatively robust given that the Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) test was $p = 0.122$, meaning that the number of those who actually voted for Sata are not statistically different from those predicted by the model.

variables are included whose absence may have been suppressing the influence of some variables in the service delivery model. Statistically, a likelihood ratio test revealed that those variables which were insignificant in the service delivery model had a non-zero impact on a respondent's decision to vote for Sata and therefore should be included in the full model.²⁴⁰ Furthermore, Table A7.2 in Appendix Seven reveals that there was not any multi-collinearity among these independent variables that may bias the results. Similarly, even though a number of subjective indicators are included in this full model, Table A7.3 in Appendix Seven demonstrates that based on a test using Chronbach's Alpha, these indicators are not capturing the same underlying variable dimension.²⁴¹

This full model, presented in column 4 of Table 4.7, once again emphasizes that younger voters and those whose first language is Bemba were significantly more likely to vote for Sata. In addition, the service delivery variables retain the same relationship and degree of significance. The fact that the MMD's poor performance on job delivery becomes statistically significant in this model suggests that age not only affects who supported Sata but also perspectives on service delivery. This is logical given that younger individuals may be more inclined to be mobilized by a charismatic leader who promises rewards over a short period of time. Given that the Central Statistical Office (2004) found that the majority of urban Lusaka's unemployed are in the 15-29 age category, younger voters may be particularly disillusioned by the lack of available jobs and more attracted to a leader who prioritized this issue.

²⁴⁰ In particular, the likelihood ratio test which excluded from the full model perspectives on the MMD's performance on employment and transport as well as retrospective egotrophic perceptions of the economy resulted in a probability $> \chi^2 = 0.0068$.

²⁴¹ Chronbach's Alpha is a statistical indicator which determines whether separate variables are essentially measuring the same underlying concept.

Importantly however, neither retrospective sociotropic nor retrospective egotropic perceptions of the macro-economy proved to be a significant predictor of support for Sata in this full model. However, the MMD's lackluster performance in improving conditions for the poor was a very significant factor. Three reasons may explain this outcome. First, the MMD's performance with improving conditions for the poor is a level variable rather than a change one. Residents may be more inclined to blame the government for more long-term suffering than short-term fluctuations, especially since the MMD has been in office for 19 years.²⁴² Secondly, many respondents did not perceive a change in their personal economic conditions and if they did, often saw their own initiative or family circumstances as contributing to this change, not necessarily the government. Third, if voters were simply disappointed with their economic conditions, they could have abstained entirely or supported alternative opposition parties, including not just the PF but also the UPND and HP. Instead, Lusaka's urban poor needed to be mobilized by a candidate who not only pointed out what the MMD did poorly but also convinced them he would offer improvements in specific domains most relevant to their livelihoods, including water, electricity, and jobs.

As a further test of the model's robustness, weights are introduced into the model to account for the over-sampling of Bemba and the under-sampling of poorly-educated respondents within the survey. This was done by determining from the 2000 Census what share of the informal sector population in Lusaka jointly belong to each of the three education categories used (i.e. low schooling, medium schooling, and high schooling) and each ethno-linguistic category. These population shares were then

²⁴² This claim contradicts the findings of Posner and Simon (2002), who argue that change variables are more likely to influence voting behavior than level ones. However, their measures were based on objective poverty data, while this study's relies on more subjective perceptions, and they focused on opinions of the MMD with respect to the elections in 1996, when the party had yet to establish a substantial record in office.

divided by the sample shares of respondents who fell into each of these schooling-linguistic categories (i.e. Bemba speakers with low schooling, Bemba speakers with medium schooling, etc.).²⁴³ In this way, the views of those individuals who were under-sampled, such as less-educated Nyanja-speakers, are given more weight than those who were over-sampled. However, as seen in column 5 of Table 4.7, this alteration does not significantly change any of the results from the full model.²⁴⁴

Coefficients in logit analyses are well-known for being difficult to interpret, particularly when the independent variables are all dummy variables. As such, Table 4.10 draws on the statistically significant variables in the weighted full model and presents predicted probabilities of voting for Sata for key selected variables, holding the remaining statistically significant variables at their modal values. This not only facilitates interpretation but also highlights that while a Bemba-speaker was significantly more likely to vote for Sata than someone of another ethno-linguistic group, service delivery and performance variables exert a more substantive impact on the urban poor's choice of Sata. For instance, a young, Bemba-speaker who has access to water within his/her household and believes that the MMD performed well regarding job creation was only 36 percent likely to vote for Sata in the 2008 elections. By contrast, a young, non-Bemba speaker who lacks access to water within his/her household and believes the MMD performed poorly regarding job creation is 99 percent likely to vote for Sata. In other words, while demographic variables are

²⁴³ Though one might doubt the accuracy of these weights given that they are based on the 2000 Census rather than a more recent year, reports on language in CSO (2004) show that the shares of these language groups in Lusaka hardly changed between 1990 and 2000, which was a major period of internal migration. This increases confidence that using language weights calculated from the 2000 Census are not especially problematic.

²⁴⁴ The weighted model also provides a slightly better fit based on the pseudo-R square. Long and Freese (2006) note how essentially, a pseudo-R square alone cannot reveal much information about the fit of a model unless it is compared with other specifications of the same model. In other words, a small pseudo-R square is not necessarily an indicator of poor fit alone unless it is lower than the equivalent for a different specification of the same model.

important, issues which Sata emphasized in his campaign appear to have a greater impact on a respondent's decision to support him for president.

Table 4.10: Predicted Probabilities of Voting for Sata in 2008

Selected Variables		MMD performed well regarding job creation		MMD performed poorly regarding job creation	
		<i>Non-Bemba speaker</i>	<i>Bemba speaker</i>	<i>Non-Bemba speaker</i>	<i>Bemba speaker</i>
Does <u>not</u> have access to water within household	<i>Older (above 30 years)</i>	0.35	0.67	0.94	0.98
	<i>Young (18-30 years)</i>	0.74	0.92	0.99	0.99
Has access to water within household	<i>Older (above 30 years)</i>	0.03	0.09	0.46	0.76
	<i>Young (18-30 years)</i>	0.13	0.36	0.82	0.94

All of this suggests that while ethno-linguistic identity cannot be dismissed as a factor shaping the voting preferences of the urban poor, it operates in conjunction with other considerations. Indeed, Bemba speakers were more likely to support a Bemba co-ethnic at the ballot box. This is also highlighted in Table 4.11. Among Bemba-speakers, almost 77 percent of them were supporters of Sata. This was significantly higher than the percentage of Bembas attracted to the two other main candidates. Yet, a higher percentage of Nyanja speakers also tended to support Sata as opposed to either Banda or Hichilema, with almost 58 percent of Nyanja-speakers casting their ballot for King Cobra.

Moreover, when respondents were asked directly why they supported a particular candidate in both elections, no one identified a candidate's ethnicity or region of origin as a primary reason for his/her voting behavior. This was likewise the case within all three shanty compounds, where respondents spanned a wide range of ethno-linguistic groups. For instance, in Misisi compound, a 70-year-old Tumbuka woman who supported Sata asks rhetorically, "Why pick a fellow tribemate if he can't deliver?" Even if one accepts that respondents may edit their survey answers to

present the most socially desirable responses (e.g. Johnson and van de Vijver 2003), the logit results demonstrate the importance of service delivery issues even after ethno-linguistic identity is taken into account.

Table 4.11: Support for Candidate in 2008 Elections by Primary Language Group

Primary Language Group	Candidate Supported by % of Language Group (Frequency)			Total % of Language Group (Frequency)
	<i>Rupiah Banda (MMD)</i>	<i>Michael Sata (PF)</i>	<i>Hakainde Hichilema (UPND)</i>	
Barotse	50 (3)	16.7 (1)	33.3 (2)	100 (6)
Bemba	21.6 (11)	76.5 (39)	2 (2)	100 (51)
English	0 (0)	100 (1)	0 (0)	100 (1)
Mambwe	14.3 (1)	85.7 (6)	0 (0)	100 (7)
Northwestern	28.6 (2)	57.1 (4)	14.3 (1)	100 (7)
Nyanja	36.8 (14)	57.9 (22)	5.3 (2)	100 (38)
Tonga	37.5 (3)	25 (2)	37.5 (3)	100 (8)
Tumbuka	75 (3)	25 (1)	0 (0)	100 (4)
Other	100 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	100 (1)
<i>Total candidate share</i>	<i>30.9 (38)</i>	<i>61.8 (76)</i>	<i>7.3 (9)</i>	<i>100 (123)</i>

Cramér's V: 0.376; $\chi^2 = 34.854$, $p=0.004$; N= 123 voters

Table 4.12 further reveals that Sata was the favored candidate among those who labeled a candidate's party manifesto, not ethnicity, as the primary factor driving voting decisions, followed by whether the candidate promised a change. This highlights that the policy proposals offered by the PF tended to mobilize market workers. By contrast, of the total voters in the survey, those who cited "Other" as the main reason driving their voting decisions overwhelmingly supported Banda. When

this category is examined more closely, it predominantly includes those who felt that the MMD should be allowed to complete its term given that Mwanawasa was re-elected in 2006 and would have served until 2011 if not for his untimely death.

Table 4.12: Primary Reason for Supporting Candidate in 2008 Elections

Primary Reason for Supporting a Candidate	Candidate Supported (% of All Voters)			Total (% of All Voters)
	<i>Rupiah Banda (MMD)</i>	<i>Michael Sata (PF)</i>	<i>Hakainde Hichilema (UPND)</i>	
Candidate's manifesto	1.6	27.6	4.9	34.1
Personal change in living conditions	2.4	2.4	0.0	4.9
Candidate promised a change	4.1	26.8	0.8	31.7
Candidate's experience	0.0	2.4	0.0	2.4
Candidate's personality	1.6	0.0	1.6	3.3
Candidate's ethnicity/region of origin	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other reason	21.1	2.4	0.0	23.6
<i>Total candidate share</i>	<i>30.9</i>	<i>61.8</i>	<i>7.3</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Cramér's V: 0.592; $\chi^2 = 86.180$, $p=0.000$; $N=123$ voters

Again, these findings generally were consistent with results obtained through the shanty compound interviews. For instance, a 22-year-old Nyanja-speaking housewife in Chaisa compound supported Sata because of his policies: "Sata has good policies on living and working conditions. If they were implemented, they would improve the conditions of Zambia. Under Mwanawasa, working conditions were bad and a few people were enriching themselves." In Kalikiliki, a 44 year-old, uneducated Chewa-speaking man who works as a gardener at a lodge, claimed that his decision to support the PF in 2008 was "Because of his [Sata's] promise to improve working conditions for informal workers and to have salaries start from 500,000 kwacha a month." In Misisi, a 70 year-old Tumbuka-speaking woman who brews and sells beer within the compound voted for Sata because she liked the PF's policies and added, "I thought Sata would provide roads, better houses, and would legalize Misisi."

However, explanations for why shanty residents voted for Banda are less consistent and tended to fall into three categories. The first was proxy voting. For

instance, a 59 year-old Tonga-speaking woman in Chaisa who sells fish in front of her home and a 24 year-old Bemba woman in Kalikiliki who vends vegetables by the side of the road both admitted voting for Banda simply because they were told to do so by a family member or friend. The second explanation was that Banda was believed to be more likely to foster political stability than Sata. A 42 year-old Nyanja woman in Chaisa who sells groceries in the compound market represented an extreme example of this view, claiming that she had a dream that civil war would occur if Sata became president. Third, people wanted continuity with previous MMD policies. According to a 44 yr-old, Tumbuka, man in Misisi who works as a security guard, “He [Banda] promised to give fertilizer in rural areas.” Only two shanty compound residents supported Hichilema in 2008, one noting that she had no particular reason for voting for him while another claimed that she approved of his views on education and agriculture.

Sata’s policy message therefore played a critical role in the PF’s ability to attract large segments of the urban poor while other candidate’s appealed to voters according to much more ambiguous criteria. However, as mentioned in Chapter Three, part of Sata’s rhetoric included xenophobic overtones, especially towards the Chinese community. While this died down between elections, most of his 2008 supporters were also faithful PF voters in 2006. As such, it is conceivable that market workers, many of whom have lost stalls to foreigners and who compete to sell their goods at the lowest price, may be particularly supportive of Sata because of his previously controversial anti-Chinese stance. To explore this possibility, respondents were asked their opinions of the Chinese influence on the Zambian economy and whether their presence was uniformly beneficial, harmful, or brought advantages and disadvantages. As seen in Table 4.13, out of the total number of voters, a majority believed that the increasing Chinese presence brought both benefits and disadvantages.

Many criticized what they viewed as exploitative labor practices by Chinese companies and the import of cheap products, but they also praised the Chinese for providing communal water taps and construction jobs. Twenty-seven percent of those who adhered to this mixed category also voted for Sata while 20 percent of those who saw the Chinese as uniformly harmful supported “King Cobra.” In any case, the bivariate relationship between candidate support and Chinese influence is weak and not significant. As such, Sata’s previously outspoken opinions on this topic cannot plausibly be the driving factor for voting behavior amongst this constituency.

Table 4.13: Relationship between Opinion of Chinese Involvement and Candidate Support in 2008

Opinion of Chinese Influence in Economy	Candidate Supported (% of All Voters)			Total (% of All Voters)
	<i>Rupiah Banda (MMD)</i>	<i>Michael Sata (PF)</i>	<i>Hakainde Hichilema (UPND)</i>	
Beneficial	11.3	14.8	0.9	27.0
Mixed	13.0	27.8	4.3	45.2
Harmful	6.1	20.0	1.7	27.8
<i>Total candidate share</i>	30.4	62.6	7.0	100.0

Cramér’s V: 0.1332; $\chi^2=4.078$, $p=0.395$; N=115 voters due to the fact that 8 voters had no opinion on this topic.

Further Analysis of Opposition Party Alternatives

The logit regressions show a correlation between lack of services and negative opinions of the MMD’s delivery record on the one hand, and support for Sata on the other. Yet, these regressions are largely an assessment of why a respondent chose Sata over the incumbent, rather than vis-à-vis other opposition parties. Since only nine respondents voted for Hichilema, it is not possible to isolate through regression why Sata was chosen over the UPND leader. The information in Table 4.14 is therefore intended to focus explicitly on survey respondents’ views of the opposition parties. They were asked to identify which opposition party was most interested in improving living conditions in Lusaka as a proxy for determining which party they

believed was most committed to addressing the city’s development challenges. Their responses are compared to their opinions on the primary characteristic that distinguishes parties in Zambia.

Table 4.14: Assessment of Opposition Parties

Main distinction amongst parties in Zambia	Opposition Parties interested in Improving Living Conditions in Lusaka (% of All Respondents)						Total (% of All Respondents)
	<i>PF</i>	<i>UPND</i>	<i>HP</i>	<i>UNIP</i>	<i>FDD</i>	<i>None</i>	
Personality of party leaders	22.95	8.20	0.55	0	0.55	1.64	33.88
Positions on social and economic issues	32.79	11.48	0	0	0	3.28	47.54
Parties' links with a region of Zambia	2.73	0.55	0	0	0	0.55	3.83
No difference	2.73	1.09	0	0.55	0	7.65	12.02
Other	0.55	0	0	0	0	0	0.55
Don't know	1.09	0.55	0	0	0	0.55	2.19
<i>Total share for party</i>	62.84	21.86	0.55	0.55	0.55	13.66	100

Cramér's V = 0.2719 ; $\chi^2 = 67.6221$ $p = 0.000$, N=183 due to the fact that the remaining respondents could not decide among one particular opposition party.

A key observation from this table is that a majority of respondents, approximately 48 percent, identified “positions on social and economic issues” as the main distinction among Zambian parties, followed by the “personality of party leaders,” and then “no difference.” Overall, the PF was by far the opposition party believed to be most interested in improving living conditions in Lusaka, obtaining this distinction from 63 percent of respondents. The same merit was accorded to the UPND by only 22 percent of respondents. Likewise, a majority of those who identified the PF as the most interested in improving living conditions in Lusaka also claimed that social and economic issues distinguished parties, reflecting Sata’s outspoken message on jobs and services. Due to Sata’s charisma, it is not particularly surprising that 23 percent of respondents who supported the PF identified the

personality of party leaders as the defining quality. Indeed, this table suggests that by using a populist strategy that combined charisma with a message that exhibited congruence with the lives of the urban poor, the PF provided greater differentiation from its counterparts. Furthermore, these results reinforce that parties such as Heritage, UNIP, and FDD, which were credible competitors in the 2001 elections, are no longer viable for the urban poor.

Finally, respondents were asked what the term “party manifesto” meant to them. The aim of this question was to uncover whether the urban poor were aware of basic tools of political campaigning that are used by a party to express their policy messages. Of those who claimed they knew, common responses by the market workers were: “It’s the plans of a particular party which they intend to do for the people,” “Things that the party promises to do, such as building schools, lowering prices for basic needs,” and “Programs on how a party will work, attract investors, manage the economic and living conditions of the people.” Otherwise, the individual admitted that s/he did not know. Approximately 70 percent of those who were Sata supporters offered a definition of a party manifesto that closely corresponds with its actual meaning while 37 percent was the equivalent rate for Banda supporters. Since the regression analyses revealed that education did not significantly influence party choice, these findings suggest that how parties campaign and target their messages may play an important role in helping people in young democracies recognize what constitutes a manifesto. This indeed offers some support for Nelson’s (1979) claim that sustained competition for the votes of the urban poor may ultimately educate the latter about their political options and help them to draw links between complex policies and their own long-term interests.

Dakar: The Opposition that Fails to Resonate

While Sata's populist strategy mobilized Lusaka's urban poor, Senegal's lackluster opposition parties convinced many of Dakar's lower-class residents to remain loyal to an under-performing incumbent. The failure of the opposition to capitalize on the PDS' mistakes, to campaign on issues relevant to the urban poor, and even to enter many deprived neighborhoods during the campaign convinced poor Dakarais to stake their fortunes on the better-known incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade. This becomes clear by examining the opinions and voting rationale that motivated Dakar's urban poor in the 2007 presidential elections. At the same time, this section again tests the four alternative hypotheses regarding vote-buying, ethnic voting, macro-economic voting, and the importance of associational ties.

Unlike in Zambia, the raw census data from Senegal's 2002 Population and Housing Census was unavailable. Instead, data from the 2001 Senegalese Household Survey (*Enquête Sénégalaise auprès des Ménages-ESAM II*) was used to provide a relative idea of how the small sample of marketeers compares to the broader population of informal sector workers in Dakar. The ESAM-II relied on a multi-stage stratified random sampling procedure that included 6624 households and 64,679 individuals. The sampling was designed to allow for population estimates for regions and according to rural/urban distinctions.²⁴⁵ The right-hand column of Table 4.15 therefore provides characteristics on those Senegalese citizens who are at least 18 years-old, live in the urban region of Dakar, and classified themselves as independently employed or family help and working for an individual or a household.²⁴⁶ This is how the Senegalese Ministry of the Economy and Finance

²⁴⁵ For more details on the ESAM-II survey, see the Central Survey Catalog at <http://www.surveynetwork.org/home>.

²⁴⁶ Specifically, the calculations are based on the individual-level data for observations within the urban region of Dakar for those who 18 years and older and are actively working (acthb= 1), independently employ or family help (sitprofp=2 or sitprofp=5), and work for an individual or a household (sectactp=1).

defined members of the informal sector based on findings from the ESAM-II (see DPS 2004: 40 & 94).

Table 4.15: Overviews of Survey Respondents

Variable	Sample Percentage	ESAM-II Percentage
<i>Gender</i>		
Female	47.8	46
Male	52.2	54
<i>Age</i>		
18-24 years	21	21
25-30 years	20	12.7
31-35 years	10.5	13.7
36-40 years	16	12.7
More than 40 years	32.5	40
<i>Language Group</i>		
Jola/Diola	0.5	4
Mandinka	2.5	4
Pulaar	14.9	18.7
Serer	9.0	10.9
Soninke	0.5	1.5
Wolof	70.7	54.9
Other	1.99	6.1
<i>Education</i>		
No schooling	43.5	57.1
Koranic/Language School	18	---
Primary	23.5	26.7
Secondary	13	12.1
Post-secondary vocational	2	3.2
<i>Born in Dakar?</i>		
Yes	36.8	---
No	63.2	---
<i>Belong to Work Association (e.g. UNACOIS, etc.) ?</i>		
Yes	15.4	---
No	84.6	---

As seen by comparing Tables 4.3 and 4.15, the overall background of the Senegalese survey sample reveals both key similarities and differences from the Zambian sample. First, a much higher share of Dakar's marketeers lack any type of

education, with about 44 percent of the sample never having attended school.²⁴⁷ Since a majority of the Senegalese population is Muslim, a share of the survey sample attended Koranic or language schools, which are informal modes of education. Students may begin Koranic school as young as the age of three, with the aim of learning to read and write Koranic verses by rote as well as to internalize the values of obedience, respect, and submission (André and Demonsnat 2009). A majority of those who attended language schools did so to learn Arabic. Since these informal schools teach a minimum degree of literacy but no numeracy, they offer less education than a formal primary school. Students sometimes attend Koranic or language schools in parallel with their formal education. If a respondent fell into this latter category, then his/her education was coded according to the formal education level. If, however, s/he only attended Koranic or language school, then this was the type of education level assigned to the respondent. Primary school typically includes students who range from around age 7 to 13 while secondary school includes those aged 14 to 18.

Secondly, the marketplace tends to be concentrated among the young and those over 40 years of age, reflecting that the markets tend to be predominantly occupied by young men vending retail goods and older women selling foodstuffs. Thirdly, the Dakar respondents have a slightly higher rate of participation in work associations than their counterparts in Lusaka. A majority of those involved in work associations belonged to UNACOIS, an organization whose history and objectives were discussed in Chapter Three. Yet, as in Lusaka, most respondents claimed they were not involved in work associations but rather community-based, rotating micro-credit groups, known

²⁴⁷ There are two possible explanations for the comparatively low levels of education in Senegal. André and Demonsnat (2009) argue that the widespread availability of informal Koranic schooling deters parents from sending their children to more formal venues. Another explanation was discussed in Chapter Three in reference to Scheld's (2002) claim that the success of the *moodu-moodu* deters parents from viewing Western education as the key to social mobility. Yet, the Senegalese government has engaged in education reforms in recent years, waiving primary school fees in 2001 (ILAB 2006: 436) and expanding the supply of schools as well as providing free lunches in some establishments (World Bank 2006). As such, education outcomes may improve in the near future.

as *tontines*, or belonged to micro-finance organizations such as PAMECAS or Credit Mutuel.

Only about a third of the sample was born in Dakar. Similar to Lusaka's marketeers, a majority of these migrants arrived in the city over ten years ago. Table 4.16 highlights that Diourbel, Kaolack, Kolda, and Thiès are the main regions of origin for these migrants. Seventy-two percent of these migrants claimed that lack of employment in their home regions motivated their decision to come to Dakar.

Table 4.16: Number of Migrants to Dakar by Region and Years of Residence

Region where born	Number of Years Ago Respondent Moved to Dakar				
	<i>One year or less</i>	<i>Between 1 & 5 years</i>	<i>Between 5 & 10 years</i>	<i>More than 10 years</i>	<i>Total from Region</i>
Casamance	0	1	1	2	4
Diourbel	1	3	7	19	30
Fatick	0	1	4	4	9
Kaolack	1	5	5	15	26
Kolda	1	1	0	1	3
Louga	0	2	2	18	22
Matam	2	3	0	2	7
St. Louis	0	0	2	2	4
Thiès	0	2	9	10	21
Other ^a	0	0	1	0	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>73</i>	<i>127</i>

Notes: ^a "Other" refers to those who were born outside of Senegal but have since become citizens.

Another similarity between the two survey samples is the predominance of negative assessments of economic conditions at the time the survey was conducted. Ninety-three percent of respondents believed that the country's economic conditions had deteriorated in the year prior to the survey and, as in Zambia, more than half of all respondents blamed the government's policies for such changes rather than other potential factors.

**Table 4.17: Assessment of Economic Conditions over the previous 12 months
(% of All Respondents)**

Factor responsible for this change in economic conditions	How would you compare economic conditions in Senegal today to those of the same time last year?			
	<i>Better</i>	<i>No change</i>	<i>Worse</i>	<i>Total</i>
Policies of the Senegalese government	1.5	0	50.8	52.4
Global economy	1	0	29.4	30.4
Weather	1	0	2	3
Other reason	1.5	0	2	3.5
More than one of the above reasons	0	0	6	6
Don't know	0	0	3	3
Not applicable	0	2	0	2
<i>Total</i>	5	2	93	100

Cramér's V = 0.764; $\chi^2 = 234.796$; $p = 0.000$; $N = 200$

The calculations indicate the survey sample of marketeers is relatively representative of Dakar's informal sector. However, there was an oversampling of a particular ethno-linguistic group, the Wolof. Even though the Wolof are the majority in both Dakar and in Senegal overall, they may have been over-sampled to the detriment of other ethno-linguistic groups. Again, a language weight is used to compensate for this in the regressions presented later in this chapter.

Voting Patterns

Contrary to the protests of many opposition parties, who claimed that the election results must have been manipulated, the voting patterns of these respondents largely emphasize that the urban poor were indeed enthusiastic supporters of Wade. In fact, an overwhelming 78 percent of respondents claim to have turned up at the polls. This even exceeds the 72 percent turnout rate for Dakar reported by the official

election data. However, though the problem was not as severe as in Zambia, the young were less likely to vote. Procedural issues again proved to be the most cited reason for abstaining from the polls with 36 percent of respondents claiming that they did not have the necessary documentation. Importantly, while only 1.3 percent of respondents in Zambia noted that they were deterred by the lack of appealing candidates, the equivalent figure in Senegal is almost 14 percent.

Table 4.18: Voting Behavior in the 2007 Elections

Did you vote in the presidential elections?	Percentage of <i>all</i> respondents
Yes	78.1
No	21.9
Primary reason for not voting	Percentage of <i>non-voters</i>
No appealing candidates	13.6
Lack of time	15.9
Elections wouldn't be fair	0
Favorite candidate wouldn't win	2.3
No matter who wins, nothing will change	4.6
Lacked identity piece, voter's card, or both	36.4
Too young	9.1
Other ^a	18.2
Party supported^b	Percentage of those who voted^c
<i>Parti Démocratique Sénégalais</i> (PDS)	79.9
<i>Rewmi</i>	11.4
<i>Alliance des Forces des Progrès</i> (AFP)	4
<i>Parti Socialiste</i> (PS)	2.7
<i>And-Jëf-Parti Africaine pour la Démocratie et la Socialisme</i> (AJ-PADS)	0.7
<i>Front pour la Socialisme et la Démocratie</i> (FSD)	0.7
<i>War Wi</i>	0.7
<i>Ligue Démocratique Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail</i> (LD-MPT)	0

Notes: ^a "Other" usually referred to those who were sick or not interested in politics

^b Fifteen parties competed in the 2007 presidential elections. For purposes of saving space, only those major parties and those selected by respondents are provided here.

^c Eight respondents claimed they voted but refused to admit who they supported. As such, they are excluded from these calculations.

For those who did vote, almost 80 percent were PDS supporters, exceeding the 55 percent who voted for *Gorgui* in Dakar as a whole (see Chapter Three). This indicates that Wade was particularly popular amongst this low-income group, and his shares at the city level may have been dampened by the preference of more affluent Dakarais for opposition candidates. Idrissa Seck's *Rewmi* was the second-most popular choice among the market workers, largely reflecting the broader order of party preferences in both Dakar and the rest of Senegal. Other "heavy contender" parties, such as the AFP and the PS, fared less well. Parties belonging to the *pôle de gauche*, such as Landing Savané's AJ-PADS and Abdoulaye Bathily's LD-MPT, received negligible support, once again confirming that their leftist discourse holds little appeal for sub-altern groups. These findings were largely mirrored in the slums where 21 out of 30 interviewees admitted voting and all but one of them supported Wade.²⁴⁸

Surprisingly though, Figure 4.4 indicates that most people could not identify why exactly Wade had won in 2007, and this corresponds with elites' confusion over the PDS victory. Twenty-six percent of respondents thought that the PDS' success at the national level could be attributed to its policy initiatives. Specifically, many assumed that Wade's high-profile construction and road projects indicated a nascent commitment to improving living conditions for the broader populace. At the same time, however, only 12 percent of respondents believed that the election was not fair while only around six percent thought that vote-buying was responsible. Critically, Figure 4.4 also indicates that a higher share of survey participants in Dakar than in Lusaka believed that the lack of a competitive opposition contributed to incumbent victory.

²⁴⁸ One resident in the slum of HLM-Montagne claimed to have voted for Louis Jacques Senghor of the *Mouvement pour la Liberation du Peuple Sénégalais* (MPLS).




Figure 4.4: Primary Reason for PDS Victory in 2007²⁴⁹

A more thorough investigation into respondents' personal motivations for supporting a particular candidate further confirms the degree to which the opposition failed to mobilize the urban poor. A significant indication of this is that a majority preferred Wade because he promised a change (see Table 4.19). This is unusual since, as an incumbent, Wade represented the least likely of all candidates to want to alter his own policies. Apparently however, the incumbent who had done little for the urban poor represented a more credible agent of change than any of the opposition parties. Instead, most opposition parties obtained their votes because supporters simply recognized the name of a particular party from campaign materials. Seck in particular was well-known given that his ouster from the PDS had been highly publicized in the media in the months preceding the elections. In stark contrast to Lusaka where almost 28 percent of Sata's supporters identified his party manifesto as their main reason for

²⁴⁹ "Other" often referred to respondents' claims that incumbents always win, people just like Wade, or that it had been the "will of God."

supporting him, almost no respondents in Dakar claimed to have picked an opposition candidate based on the candidate's platform.

Table 4.19: Primary Reason for Supporting Candidate in 2007 Elections

Primary Reason for Supporting a Candidate	Candidate Supported (% of All Voters)					Total (% of All Voters)
	<i>Abdoulaye Wade</i> (PDS)	<i>Idrissa Seck</i> (Rewmi)	<i>Ousmane Tanor Dieng</i> (PS)	<i>Moustapha Niasse</i> (AFP)	Other Party	
Candidate's platform	3.4	0.7	0	0.7	0	4.7
Recognized candidate's name	16.1	4	0.7	1.3	0.7	22.8
Personal change in living conditions	4	0	0.7	0	0	4.7
Candidate promised a change	46.3	3.4	0	1.3	0.7	51.7
Candidate's experience	0.7	0	0	0	0	0.7
Candidate's personality	0	1.3	0.7	0.7	0	2.7
Candidate's ethnicity/region of origin	0	0	0	0	0	0
Influenced by family member/friend	5.4	0	0.7	0	0.7	6.7
Other reason	4	2	0	0	0	6
<i>Total candidate share</i>	<i>79.9</i>	<i>11.4</i>	<i>2.7</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>100</i>

Cramér's V: 0.279; $\chi^2 = 46.218$, $p=0.017$; N=149 voters because 6 people who voted refused to admit the candidate he/she supported.

A selection of more detailed views from opposition supporters in the survey further reveals the rationale driving their voting decisions. Seck supporters elaborated that the *Rewmi* leader “did not talk too much” and “seemed competent” while a third supporter claimed that he just wanted a change in regime. A male store vendor in Grand Yoff market noted that he supported Ousmane Tanor Dieng because he was “serious” while a women selling in the streets of Guele Tapée claimed that her life was better under the PS. The lone Landing Savané supporter admitted that she voted for

him because that was what her husband had done, not because of his leftist orientation. In general then, opposition supporters attributed their voting behavior to candidates' personal characteristics or other idiosyncratic factors rather than candidates' positions on policy issues.

Table 4.20: Support for Candidate in 2007 Presidential Elections by Primary Language Group

Primary Language Group	Candidate Supported, (% of those in Language Group)					Total % of those in Language Group (Frequency)
	<i>Abdoulaye Wade</i> (PDS)	<i>Idrissa Seck</i> (Rewmi)	Ousmane Tanor Dieng (PS)	<i>Moustapha Niasse</i> (AFP)	Other Party	
Jola/Diola	100	0	0	0	0	100 (1)
Mandinka	100	0	0	0	0	100 (4)
Pulaar	76.2	9.5	9.5	4.8	0	100 (21)
Serer	81.8	9.1	9.1	0	0	100 (11)
Soninke	0	100	0	0	0	100 (1)
Wolof	80.6	11.1	0.9	4.6	2.8	100 (108)
Other	66.7	33.3	0	0	0	100 (3)
<i>Total candidate share</i>	<i>79.9</i>	<i>11.4</i>	<i>2.7</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>100</i>

Cramér's V: 0.178; $\chi^2 = 18.900$, $p=0.757$; N= 149 voters

Similar to Zambia, no respondent indicated that a candidate's ethnicity or region of origin influenced his/her voting decision. Table 4.20 lends even greater credibility to the low salience of ethnicity than it did in Zambia. For instance, Wade received support across all language groups, including the Serer, which is Dieng's primary ethno-linguistic group. At the same time, the Wolof supported other candidates besides Wade. Moreover, the bivariate relationship between primary

ethno-linguistic group and the candidate supported is not significant at conventional levels.²⁵⁰ The degree of ethnic voting, or the lack thereof, distinguishes Senegal from Zambia.

Further Assessment of Opposition Alternatives

The opposition clearly did not attract many supporters, and those it did were not particularly interested in the opposition's policy positions. The low appeal of the opposition stems from a lack of differentiation among parties as well as the minimal degree of congruence between party platforms and the priorities of the urban poor. Indeed, Table 4.21 examines whether respondents, including both voters and non-voters, felt that any opposition parties were interested in improving living conditions in Dakar and what they believed constituted the main mode of differentiation among existing opposition parties. Approximately 53 percent of respondents claimed that they perceived no difference among parties while around 33 stated that the personality of party leaders represented the main mode of distinction. Only two percent of respondents claimed that positions on social and economic issues distinguished parties. This presents a stark contrast with those surveyed in Lusaka where most claimed that positions on social and economic issues represented the key axis of differentiation.

Moreover, almost 66 percent of respondents believed that no party was genuinely interested in improving living conditions within Dakar. Again, this is a dramatic difference from Lusaka where only about 14 percent of those surveyed stated that no party was interested in addressing that city's problems. Of those who did identify a party, *Rewmi* stood out the most while neither of the other "heavy

²⁵⁰ Religious identities are also important in Senegal, and Chapter Five will explore in more detail the dynamics between different Muslim brotherhoods and support for particular candidates.

contenders” nor the leftist LD-MPT was perceived as especially dedicated to improving conditions for Dakarois. As indicated by the chi-2, the bivariate relationship between perspectives of opposition parties and their main mode of differentiation is significant at less than one percent.

Table 4.21: Assessment of Opposition Parties

Main distinction amongst parties in Senegal	Opposition Parties interested in Improving Living Conditions in Dakar (% of All Respondents)						Total (% of All Respondents)
	<i>Rewmi</i>	<i>PS</i>	<i>AFP</i>	<i>LD-MPT</i>	<i>Other Party</i>	<i>None</i>	
Personality of party leaders	12.1	1.5	3.5	0.5	5.1	10.1	32.8
Positions on social and economic issues	1	0	0	0	0	0.5	1.5
Parties' links with a region of Senegal	1.5	0	0	0	0	0.5	2
No difference	2	1	0.5	0	1.5	48	53
Other	1.5	1	0	0	0	1.5	4
Don't know	1.5	0	0	0	0	5.1	6.6
<i>Total share</i>	<i>19.7</i>	<i>3.5</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>0.5</i>	<i>6.6</i>	<i>65.7</i>	<i>100</i>

Cramér's V = 0.311 ; $\chi^2 = 95.598$; p = 0.000; N=198 due to the exclusion of two respondents who couldn't identify just one party as interested in improving living conditions in Dakar.

The detailed comments of the marketeers further illustrate their disillusionment. In Kermel, a male artisan over 40 years of age emphatically stated, “They [party leaders] are all liars.” A female vendor in her late thirties at Guele Tapée sighed that “It’s always the same thing” with the politicians in her country. Slum dwellers in Dakar echoed similar sentiments. When asked whether any opposition parties appealed to them, 21 out of the 30 could not identify any particular opposition party. A 25 year-old, Serer-speaking laundress in HLM-Montagne captured the prevailing attitude by responding, “None. They are all the same.”

Regression Analysis of Voting Behavior

In order to both test alternative hypotheses on voting behavior and to emphasize the absence of populist strategies by Senegal's opposition parties, a series of binomial logit regressions were again conducted on the survey responses collected in the markets of Dakar. To ensure as much comparability with the Lusaka analysis, these regression models also aimed to test the respective influence of demographic and schooling variables, campaign conduct, and socioeconomic conditions. Since many more voters supported the incumbent than the opposition, the dependent variable measured the probability of supporting Abdoulaye Wade.

The demographic and education model is again intended to test the influence of ethno-linguistic background on the choice of candidate, taking into account additional control variables such as gender of respondent, education level, and age. Specifically, this model is specified as the following:

$$(1) \Pr (\text{Wade} = 1 | x) = F(\beta_0 + \beta_{\text{fem}_i} + \beta_{\text{young}_i} + \beta_{\text{medium}_i} + \beta_{\text{kor}_i} + \beta_{\text{lang}_i} + \beta_{\text{primary}_i} + \beta_{\text{secondaryabove}_i} + \beta_{\text{wolof}_i} + \beta_{\text{pulaar}_i})$$

As in Zambia, the age categories were collapsed into three groups, 18-30 year-olds, 31-40 year-olds, and above 40 years-old. Again, *young* = 1 if respondent *i* belonged to the 18-30 group and *medium* = 1 if s/he belonged to the 31-40 category. Those who are older than 40 years-old constituted the excluded category. Regarding education, the model examines the various levels of schooling that a respondent pursued, ranging from only Koranic or language schooling to secondary and post-secondary training.²⁵¹ Those without any type of schooling constitute the excluded category. To assess the effects of ethno-linguistic background, dummy variables are included to capture whether a respondent's first language was Wolof or Pulaar, which are two most widely-spoken languages.

²⁵¹ Since only four respondents attended post-secondary school, they were combined with those respondents who attended secondary school.

**Table 4.22: Binomial Logit Analysis of Probability of Voting for
Abdoulaye Wade**

Independent variables	Demographic & Education	Campaign Conduct	Socioeconomic Conditions & Associational Activities	Full Model	Weighted Full Model
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Female	0.643 (0.492)	---	---	---	---
Age: 18-30 years ^a	0.928 (0.609)	---	---	---	---
Age: 31-40 years	0.528 (0.589)	---	---	---	----
Koranic education ^b	-2.254 *** (0.816)	---	---	-2.847 *** (0.831)	-3.351 *** (0.882)
Language education	-1.500* (0.772)	---	---	-1.585 ** (0.751)	-1.597 ** (0.740)
Primary education	-1.263* (0.656)	---	---	-1.356** (0.594)	-1.721 *** (0.637)
Secondary & above education	-1.448 ** (0.673)	---	---	-1.441** (0.646)	-1.806*** (0.681)
Wolof language group	-0.111 (0.663)	---	---	---	---
Pulaar language group	-0.191 (0.817)	---	---	---	---
Handouts by PDS	---	-0.255 (0.503)	---	---	---
Handouts by opposition	---	-0.178 (0.480)	---	---	---
Household access to water	---	---	-1.041 (1.073)	---	----
Spend 3000 CFA or less per day ^c	---	---	0.881* (0.512)	1.311 ** (0.522)	1.756*** (0.541)
Spend between 3000 and 5000 CFA per day	---	---	0.116 (0.501)	---	----
Belong to a work association	---	---	-0.001 (0.574)	---	----
Constant	1.681 ** (0.757)	1.612*** (0.353)	1.999* (1.094)	1.913 *** (0.409)	1.953*** (0.424)
Number of observations	148	148	148	148	148
Pseudo R-squared	0.109	0.006	0.033	0.133	0.180
Prob >chi2	0.063	0.664	0.289	0.001	0.000

Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors are in the parentheses.

Notes: ^aThose who were older than 40 years of age constituted the excluded reference category for the age dummy variables.

^b The reference category excluded for the education dummy variables was those who had no schooling at all.

^c The reference category excluded for the spending levels included those who spend above 5000 CFA a day.

As seen in column 1 of Table 4.22, age did not prove a significant predictor of support for President Wade, nor did the respondent's gender. In contrast to Zambia, ethno-linguistic affiliation also was not a statistically significant predictor of support for Wade. Those whose primary ethno-linguistic group is Wolof were not more likely to support Wade than those of any other ethno-linguistic background, confirming the analysis in Table 4.20 above.²⁵²

Instead, however, education appears extremely important for determining a respondent's voting decisions. Those with just even a little bit of schooling, such as Koranic or language training, were significantly *less likely* to support Wade than those with no schooling at all. The same pattern prevails for those with some formal primary, secondary, or post-secondary education.

The second model on campaign conduct is intended to test the impact of vote-buying on survey respondents' choice of presidential candidate. The campaign conduct model is specified as:

$$(2) \Pr (\text{Wade} = 1 | x) = F(\beta_0 + \beta_{pd} \text{shandouts}_i + \beta_{opp} \text{phandouts}_i)$$

Table 4.23 highlights that as in Zambia, the incumbent party in Senegal was reported by respondents to have distributed more handouts prior to elections than the opposition parties. Nevertheless, the campaign conduct model in Column 2 of Table 4.22 demonstrates that vote-buying through the distribution of money and/or gifts during campaign rallies in a respondent's neighborhood does not influence a respondent's decision to support the incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade, at a statistically significant level.

²⁵² This holds true even when the same model is run with language weights to account for the over-sampling of Wolof speakers.

Table 4.23: Handouts (Gifts and/or Money) by Senegalese Political Parties before 2007 Elections

Party	Yes		No/Don't Know	
	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Frequency</i>
PDS handouts?	59.2%	93	40.8%	64
Opposition (Rewmi, AFP, PS, LD-MPT, And-Jëf) handouts?	43.3%	68	56.7%	89

Notes: These statistics are just for those who actually voted in the 2007 elections rather than for the entire sample. For the entire sample, 54% claimed the PDS offered handouts and 42% claimed the opposition parties did so.

Notably though, far fewer respondents in Dakar than in Lusaka claimed that they even received visits from any political party. For instance, 65 percent of respondents noted that the PDS came to their neighborhood in the run-up to the 2007 elections while only about 50 percent stated that the PS, AFP, or *Rewmi* arrived and only about 44 percent that any of the leftist parties campaigned. By contrast, the MMD was identified by 94 percent of Lusaka's marketeers as campaigning in their respective neighborhoods while the equivalent figure for the PF was 89 percent. This indicates that the Zambian opposition was much more active than its Senegalese counterparts in visiting the neighborhoods of the urban poor, even though vote-buying practices did not prove significant there either.

The model presented in column 3 aims to test hypotheses regarding economic voting, associational ties, and the importance of service delivery. However, this model deviates from the analysis conducted in Zambia in three key respects. First, whether a respondent's household possesses electricity could not be included as an independent variable because all of those who did have this service voted for Wade. Due to a lack of variation on the dependent variable, the regression model therefore could not derive estimates for the impact of this independent variable.²⁵³ Secondly, since more respondents admitted to belonging to a work association in Senegal than in Zambia, there were adequate observations to include this variable into the model to

²⁵³ According to Long and Freese (2006), maximum likelihood estimation is not possible when a dependent variable does not vary within one of the categories of an independent variable.

allow for a more thorough investigation of whether associational membership affects voting behavior. Thirdly, respondents' opinions on the PDS' performance regarding service delivery and jobs could not be used as predictors. In both countries, respondents were asked to assess such performance in the twelve months prior to the day the survey was conducted. Due to the timing of the survey, such questions captured opinions more than a year after the Senegalese elections, meaning that they could not be considered *ex-ante* influences on voting decisions.²⁵⁴

As such, model 3 incorporates a variable on a respondent's daily spending as a proxy for socioeconomic status. Data was gathered on spending rather than earnings because the latter proved a particularly sensitive issue, especially since respondents' friends and colleagues in the market place were within listening distance. Three spending categories were derived: those who spend 3000 CFA or less, those who spend between 3000 and 5000 CFA, and those who spend more than 5000 CFA. Based on an exchange rate of 500 CFA per one US dollar, 3000 CFA per day may appear relatively high at first. Yet, when one considers that 88 percent of survey respondents live with more than six people, most of whom are children, it quickly becomes apparent that 3000 CFA a day, or six dollars, is not much money at all when spread out across an entire household.²⁵⁵ Approximately 41 percent of those who voted in the 2007 elections fell within this lower spending category.²⁵⁶

With these details in mind, the third model is specified as:

²⁵⁴ This was not a problem in Zambia since the survey there was conducted only two months after the elections. Table A7.4 in Appendix Seven presents the regression results when these subjective performance indicators are included and reveals that none of them are statistically significant predictors of whether a respondent voted for Wade for Senegalese president.

²⁵⁵ We can have greater confidence in these findings since a series of studies on poverty in Dakar by the *Agence du Fonds de Développement Social* (2004) found that in some of the city's poorest neighborhoods, such as the arrondissement of Yeumbeul Sud in Pikine, household heads spend on average 2625 CFA a day.

²⁵⁶ Approximately 28 percent of those who voted spent between 3000-5000 CFA per day and 14 percent of those who voted spend more than 5000 CFA per day. The remaining respondents could not quantify how much they spent on a daily basis.

$$(3) \Pr (\text{Wade} = 1 | x) = F(\beta_0 + \beta_{\text{water}}_i + \beta_{\text{spendlow}}_i + \beta_{\text{spendmed}}_i + \beta_{\text{wrkassoc}}_i)$$

The variable *water*=1 if the respondent had a water tap within his/her household. The variable *spendlow*=1 if respondent *i* spends 3000 CFA or less a day and *spendmed*=1 if s/he expends between 3000 and 5000 CFA a day. Those who spent more than 5000 CFA per day represented the excluded category. If a respondent belonged to a work association, then *wrkassoc*=1.

The findings from this third model reveal that work associations are not a useful predictor of support for Wade. This again casts doubt on the hypothesis that associational participation may shape voting decisions and largely reinforces the claims of the UNACOIS Secretary General, Mame Bou Diop, that his own organization is apolitical.²⁵⁷ In the same manner, whether a respondent's household possessed water is not a significant predictor, even though the dearth of water is a major problem in many low-income neighborhoods of Dakar. For instance, only two of the thirty slum residents reported having access to water within their homes. More than half stated that the main improvement they wanted for their neighborhood was *robinets*, or water taps. This indeed highlights that despite the desire for significant improvements in the realm of service delivery, the opposition was not able to capitalize on these issues for electoral gain in the same manner that the PF did in Zambia. Moreover, those who spent 3000 CFA a day or less were actually significantly more likely to support Wade than those with greater spending capacity. Thus, with existing opposition parties failing to espouse policy messages targeted at the priorities of the urban poor, those with the lowest spending abilities decided that Wade was their best alternative.

The full model aims to preserve degrees of freedom by incorporating into the socioeconomic model all those independent variables that were significant in each

²⁵⁷ Personal interview with Mame Bou Diop, Dakar, Senegal, on September 17, 2008.

prior model. A likelihood ratio test revealed that excluding from this full model those non-significant variables from the previous models would not compromise the results.²⁵⁸ While the fit of this full model is much better than in any previous model, both the direction of the coefficients and the statistical significance remains unchanged on the education and spending variables.²⁵⁹ Table A7.5 in Appendix Seven also reveals that multi-collinearity amongst the independent variables in this full model was not problematic.

The final model tests for robustness by including language weights calculated from the ESAM-II to account for the over-sampling of those whose primary language was Wolof. Even though ethno-linguistic affiliation was not a significant variable, reducing the weight of those responses from Wolof-language participants and increasing those of other language groups reduces any potential bias that this sampling error may exert on the other variables.²⁶⁰ As seen in column 5, introducing the language weights also does not alter the results from the full model while nonetheless providing an even better model fit.

Predicted probabilities again can facilitate interpretation of the coefficients from the logit regressions. For example, Table 4.24 focuses on one of the education levels in combination with the low spending level. A respondent with a secondary or post-secondary education who spends more than 3000 CFA per day is only 35 percent likely to have voted for Wade in the 2007 presidential elections. By contrast, someone

²⁵⁸ In particular, the likelihood ratio test which excluded from the full model gender, age, ethno-linguistic background, water, medium spending level, and whether a respondent belonged to a work association resulted in a probability $> \chi^2 = 0.536$. Previous iterations revealed that incorporating the campaign conduct variables into the full model did not alter their substantive or statistical significance, although this did cause a reduction in the degrees of freedom.

²⁵⁹ The Hosmer-Lemeshow test was $p = 0.388$, meaning that the number of those who actually voted for Wade was not statistically different from those predicted by this model.

²⁶⁰ In order to derive the language weights, the population share of a language grouping indicated by the ESAM-II was divided by the sample share provided in Table 4.15 of this Chapter.

with a lower education level who spends 3000 CFA per day or less is 95 percent likely to have voted for *Gorgui* in 2007.

Table 4.24: Predicted Probabilities of Voting for Wade in 2007

Selected Variables	Spending Level	
	<i>High</i> (Above 3000 CFA/day)	<i>Low</i> (Below 3000 CFA/day)
Below secondary education	0.77	0.95
Secondary education and above	0.35	0.76

The Importance of Educational Background for Voting Behavior

The predicted probabilities and regression results emphasize the importance of education in shaping voting behavior among Dakar’s urban poor. Notwithstanding qualms about potential disparities in education quality, those who had some schooling generally were less likely to support Wade and more likely to support the opposition than those with no schooling. This echoes survey findings by Vengroff and Mangala (2001: 18) who examined voting behavior in the 2000 elections and discovered that those Senegalese with higher education demonstrated a greater propensity to support the opposition.

The importance of education in Senegal, but not Zambia, is potentially due to two key factors. First, many more survey respondents in Senegal had no schooling compared with their counterparts in Zambia and this is especially true for older respondents. Even based on the population shares from the 2000 Zambian Census and the ESAM-II, 13 percent of informal sector workers in Lusaka had no schooling compared with 57 percent in Dakar. Secondly, as the discussion in Chapter Three illustrated, the Senegalese *opposition de salon* is perceived as elitist and intellectualistic. This means that without actively campaigning in low-income neighborhoods and the workplaces of the urban poor, the activities of the opposition will remain largely unknown by, or unattractive to, this group. Indeed, when slum

dwellers were asked which newspaper they consulted and how many times a week they read it, all but three claimed that they could not read. As such, the better-educated will be more exposed to the policy ideas or incendiary statements of the opposition in the printed press, which has more outlets for independent expression in Senegal than television or radio. In addition, better-educated citizens may be less inclined to believe Wade's promises to change after having witnessed his inability to deliver on his initial populist claims during his first seven years in office.

Table 4.25: Awareness of the *Assises Nationales* by Education Level

Level of Education	Do you know what the <i>Assises Nationales</i> is? (% of Education Level)	
	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
No schooling	7.7	92.3
Koranic/Language	22.6	77.4
Primary	27.3	72.7
Secondary	43.5	56.5
Post-secondary	100	0
<i>Total</i>	21.2	78.8

Cramér's V = 0.392 ; $\chi^2 = 27.482$; p = 0.000; N=179

Education once again proved significant when analyzing whether survey respondents were aware of the *Assises Nationales* which, as noted in Chapter Three, represents the opposition's grand project for addressing the challenges facing the country and for critiquing Wade's governance. From Table 4.25 above, it is clear that a majority of respondents did not even know that such a vast opposition initiative was taking place. Moreover, there is a significant relationship between level of education and awareness of the *Assises Nationales*, with only 7 percent of those without schooling knowing about this initiative compared with almost 44 percent of those with some secondary schooling. Likewise, in the slums, only two people knew about the *Assises Nationales*, and they were the two with the highest levels of education, one with a Master's degree and the other with five years of secondary education. Both were the only slum residents who read the newspaper, choosing the independent

L'Observateur as their preferred source. In general, this highlights that the opposition either is not properly marketing its activities or that its activities are not viewed by the urban poor as the most effective means for improving their immediate living and working conditions.

Conclusions

By probing the views of market workers and residents of slum and squatter settlements, this chapter provided an assessment of voting motivations among the urban poor of Dakar and Lusaka during each country's most recent presidential elections. The chapter aimed to accomplish two objectives. First, the four hypotheses introduced in Chapter Two regarding the voting behavior of the urban poor were tested. Vote-buying in the form of money and/or gifts during the election period was not found to be a major explanation for disparate voting patterns in either Lusaka or Dakar. When asked directly, the urban poor of neither Lusaka nor Dakar believed that handouts accounted for the incumbent party's overall national victory (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4). In addition, the logit results demonstrated that whether the incumbent or opposition offered handouts to survey respondents did not significantly affect which candidate they supported. This is not to say that parties did not try to engage in vote-buying; in fact, as shown in Tables 4.8 and 4.23, political parties did distribute gifts and/or money in respondents' neighborhoods. Rather, it demonstrates that such practices on their own do not shape the voting decisions of the urban poor because if almost every party is engaging in this practice, then parties need some additional means of distinguishing themselves to the urban poor. Moreover, in these cities, opposition parties in particular have few resources to monitor voting behavior and therefore cannot punish voters if they accept handouts but then vote or abstain according to their conscience. This echoes Young's (2009a) findings from Kenya and

Zambia that African voters who are offered gifts by politicians are not necessarily likely to support these politicians at the ballot box.

Likewise, the influence of associational ties on voting behavior was not confirmed. Very few marketeers actually belonged to work associations, confirming that the urban poor, particularly workers in the informal sector, remain unorganized. Moreover, in the Senegalese case, where about 15 percent of respondents belonged to work associations, the logit analysis demonstrated that this was not a statistically significant determinant of support for a presidential candidate. Associational life is by no means absent, especially since many are involved in credit associations. Yet, contrary to the role played by formal trade unions in African history, involvement in work associations for marketeers and street vendors appears devoid of any serious political implications.

The existing evidence also questions the impact on support for the opposition caused by voters' retrospective sociotropic and egotropic perspectives of the economy in the past year. This chapter illustrated that from a subjective perspective, both Zambians and Senegalese possessed negative sociotropic views of their country's recent economic conditions. Nevertheless, the regression analysis for Zambia demonstrated that neither negative sociotropic nor egotropic views ultimately determined support for Sata. For those in Senegal, those with lower incomes, as measured by spending ability, were actually less likely to vote for an opposition party and more likely to support Wade.

While the other three hypotheses on voting behavior were not supported in the results here, the ethnic voting hypothesis did demonstrate some traction. When asked directly, respondents in both countries overwhelmingly rejected that a candidate's ethnic background or region of origin influenced their voting decisions. However, the statistical analyses revealed that while ethno-linguistic affiliation proved insignificant

in explaining the voting behavior of Dakar's urban poor, it was correlated at a statistically significant level with higher shares of votes for Sata among Lusaka's urban poor. At the same time though, Nyanja-speakers were not significantly less likely to vote for Sata, and he attracted support from other ethno-linguistic groups as well. Even after controlling for ethno-linguistic background as well as other demographic variables, the importance of services and jobs remained statistically and substantively important determinants of a respondent's decision to support Sata. As such, voters may be attracted to a candidate for a number of reasons, including that s/he is a co-ethnic, but this does not necessarily mean that non-co-ethnics will avoid voting for the same candidate.

The chapter's second objective was to uncover some key relationships between the type of party strategy and the share of votes a candidate received. An opposition party that employs a populist strategy, such as the PF, appeals most to the urban poor by offering both greater congruence and greater differentiation than alternative party linkage approaches. In Lusaka, Sata was the overwhelming favorite among market workers, a majority of whom pointed to policy promises on jobs and services as their primary motivation for supporting him. In addition, the PF was pinpointed by both voters and non-voters as the main opposition party interested in improving living conditions in Lusaka, and most PF supporters identified positions on social and economic issues as the main distinction among Zambia's political parties. As noted earlier, the logit analyses also highlighted that many of the issues Sata emphasized in his campaign were significantly associated with his electoral success within Lusaka. Specifically, those who were most disillusioned with the MMD's performance with respect to job creation and ameliorating conditions for the poor, as well as those without access to water, were most likely to vote for Sata. Therefore, by providing a message targeted at the urban poor, which was focused on ameliorating inequalities

through the creation of jobs and the improvement of basic services, Sata offered greater congruence with the policy priorities of this constituency. This in turn helped distinguish him from his other opposition competitors, specifically the UPND and Heritage Party, which eschewed the populist strategy in favor of alternative linkage approaches.

The appeal of an opposition party relying on a populist strategy becomes even more apparent when compared with perceptions of the Senegalese party scene. In Dakar, the urban poor directly claimed that they voted for Wade not because they approved of his past performance in office but more because he promised to change his policies. By relying on either personalistic or programmatic linkages, the opposition was unable to capitalize on disillusionment with Wade's first seven years in office. Programmatic, leftist parties were the least successful in obtaining any votes while those who supported *Rewmi*, AFP, or PS predominantly did so because of the party leader's personality. Compared with Zambia, more of the Senegalese respondents believed that the incumbent's victory could be attributed to the lack of a competitive opposition. This was further confirmed by more than half of respondents claiming that they could discern little difference among the existing opposition parties and almost two-thirds stating that none of the parties was interested in improving conditions for Dakarais. With less than 50 percent of respondents claiming that an opposition party even visited his/her neighborhood during the 2007 campaign, these parties clearly demonstrated that the urban poor were not their key constituency base in the same way that they were for Zambia's PF. Furthermore, widespread ignorance among the urban poor of the opposition's main forum for critiquing Abdoulaye Wade, the *Assises Nationales*, proved that this initiative was largely divorced from the realities of the everyday lives of most Senegalese, and this is especially true for those who are the least educated.

Beyond illustrating the mechanisms of congruence and differentiation via which a populist strategy can win over the urban poor, one of the major contributions of this chapter is the introduction of a novel set of primary data. Surveys on informal sector workers in developing countries frequently focus on their economic activities and organizational structure (see Maloney 2004) rather than their political views and voting behavior. Moreover, a comparative survey of informal sector workers across countries is especially rare in the African context. Recent work on class voting, such as Cheeseman and Hinfelaar (2010), has tended to rely on disaggregating election data by neighborhood. While useful for gaining a perspective on voting trends, such a technique on its own fails to uncover *why* certain socioeconomic groups favor one particular candidate over another. Public opinion data from Afrobarometer can shed more light on these motivational issues, but this database does not focus exclusively on the urban poor and thus far has not included questions about actual voting decisions but rather prospective ones.

Through statistical analyses of this novel dataset, a populist strategy was revealed as the superior approach for opposition parties to attract the votes of the urban poor. Why then do not more parties in African electoral democracies employ it? The next chapter examines this question in greater detail.

CHAPTER FIVE

Electoral Coalition Building in Urbanized Democracies

Introduction

This study thus far has shown that Africa's urban poor are most likely to support an opposition party when they are mobilized by a populist strategy rather than personalistic, clientelistic, or programmatic linkages alone. The previous chapter illustrated that a populist strategy attracts the urban poor by providing greater differentiation and greater congruence than alternative party options. Yet, if a populist strategy represents an optimal approach for attracting the support of the urban poor, then presumably more African political parties would adopt it. This chapter therefore probes two questions that emerge from the previous chapters' comparison of party strategies and voter responses in Senegal and Zambia. First, why do opposition parties in some African countries choose a populist strategy while those in other countries decide otherwise? Secondly, why does one opposition party choose a populist strategy while its competitors within the same country do not?

In addressing these two questions, the study only focuses on an opposition party competing in national elections for president rather than for a local office or for a position as MP in a specific constituency. Indeed, as noted in Chapter One, politicians who are interested in a sub-national or legislative office face different constraints and opportunities for party strategizing than those competing to win a national presidential election. Moreover, the study assumes that a politician actually is interested in winning the election rather than simply participating solely to gain legitimacy as a representative for certain interest groups or to gain leverage in negotiating for future political appointments.²⁶¹ This latter assumption is increasingly realistic since, as in

²⁶¹ Some have argued that this type of rationale does often explain why parties participate in elections. For instance, van de Walle (2003: 314) observes that "[African] parties gain respect and power within

Senegal and Zambia, many African countries now require candidates to pay large fees to enter presidential contests, therefore limiting participation in electoral races to only those who are seriously interested in winning office.

With these qualifications in mind, this chapter argues that not all parties can employ a populist strategy to win national presidential elections. Even though such a strategy is advantageous for mobilizing the urban poor, it can impose at least two costs. First, it will not help a party win a national election if only a small share of the national population lives in urban areas. As such, a country needs to have a sufficiently large urbanized population in order for a presidential candidate to even have an incentive to mobilize the urban poor and for a populist message to resonate. In countries that remain predominantly rural, politicians may decide that targeting the urban poor offers little reward at the ballot box. Secondly, the policy appeals inherent in a populist strategy that is oriented towards the urban poor can alienate other voters, such as rural dwellers, whose support is still necessary to obtain national electoral majorities in most African countries. Thus, an opposition party will not choose to employ a populist strategy with the urban poor if no other options are available by which to appeal to rural voters. However, a populist strategy becomes more feasible if a share of rural dwellers can be mobilized through clientelistic linkages based on appeals to a salient identity cleavage, such as ethnicity, religion, language, or race. Given their resource limits, opposition parties ideally would target only enough rural voters who, in tandem with the urban poor, would help them win national office without requiring extensive campaigning in remote rural areas.

In such circumstances, a party can forge a minimum winning coalition that consists of “metropolitan” elements centered on the urban poor and “peripheral”

the party system when they can make a credible claim to represent a certain ethnic, regional or linguistic segment of the population.” However, as noted, parties and their leaders who possess these type of motivations alone are not the focus of the present study.

constituents represented by a certain segment of rural dwellers. This framework of “metropolitan” and “peripheral” coalition members originally was conceptualized by Gibson (1997) in his comparative scholarship on Mexico and Argentina. He argued that the ruling parties in both countries were able to implement policy reforms during the 1990s that primarily benefited urban constituents, who represented the “metropolitan” component, but still retained national office by engaging in clientelist practices with rural voters, or the “peripheral” component.

In the present study, the opposition PF in Zambia was able to orient its populist strategy around the policy priorities of the urban poor while mobilizing a certain level of rural support to win national office. Since the potentially salient identity cleavage in Zambia is ethno-linguistic group, the PF’s Michael Sata combined his populist strategy towards the urban poor with clientelistic linkages with his co-ethnic Bembas in the rural provinces of Northern and Luapula. Yet, a similar strategy remained unavailable for his main opposition competitor, Hakainde Hichilema, who belongs to the numerically inferior Tonga ethno-linguistic group. In Senegal, the potentially salient identity cleavage is Sufi brotherhood. With Abdoulaye Wade co-opting leaders of the Mouride brotherhood and one sect of the Tidiane brotherhood, opposition parties lacked the ability to use religious appeals for significant rural votes. As a consequence, the AFP, PS, and *Rewmi* were forced to rely on personalistic linkages with the urban poor so as to avoid losing any potential supporters in the rural areas. Smaller parties reliant on programmatic linkages, such as the LD-MPT, primarily concentrated their campaigns in Dakar and therefore forfeited the chance to obtain rural votes.

The rest of the chapter further elaborates on the circumstances that reduce the costs of employing a populist strategy geared towards the urban poor. The following section discusses why an urbanized populace represents an essential scope condition

for a populist strategy. However, even under such conditions, a populist strategy can still prove alienating. As such, the chapter subsequently details how an opposition party interested in using a populist strategy with the urban poor needs to simultaneously mobilize a segment of rural voters through clientelist linkages oriented around identity appeals. Assumptions about electoral institutions and politician motivations that undergird this argument are also discussed. Then, existing research on politically relevant cleavages in Senegal and Zambia is combined with available census data to determine politically salient identities in both countries. By drawing on elite interviews, local newspapers, and campaign data, the chapter proceeds to illustrate whether and how parties mobilized such identities in rural areas. Finally, nationally-disaggregated election data reveals the success of the PF in creating “metropolitan” and “peripheral” coalitions in 2008 as well as emphasizes the Senegalese opposition’s inability to do the same in the 2007 elections.

An Urbanized Populace as a Scope Condition

Key demographic and socioeconomic circumstances are required for a political party to recognize the benefits of mobilizing the urban poor. Specifically, a country needs to be sufficiently urbanized for a party to possess an incentive to target this constituency.²⁶² In other areas of the world, such as Latin America, populism has been a predominantly urban phenomenon (Conniff 1982; Weyland 2001). Moreover, as seen in Table 5.1, those countries which are more urbanized demonstrate a higher share of the urban poor accounting for a country’s total share of poor citizens. While

²⁶² The level of urbanization is examined here rather than potential alternative measures, such as the age of the city, for at least two reasons. First, it is much harder to determine exactly the age of a city given that urban centers may have been important for pre-colonial African kingdoms long before they were officially “settled” by colonialists. Secondly, the share of the population that is urbanized is an indicator that is available on a comparable basis across most countries, therefore facilitating the testing of this study’s arguments beyond the case studies of Senegal and Zambia.

no definitive threshold exists for determining when a country is sufficiently urbanized to ensure that parties direct their attention to the urban poor, it is reasonable to assume that an opposition party in Burkina Faso or Malawi would be less likely to stake an election outcome on a populist strategy than one in Nigeria or Kenya.

Table 5.1: Urbanization and Urban Poverty in Selected Electoral Democracies

Country	Urban Population as Share of Total Population (%) ^a	Urban Poverty as Share of Total Poverty (%) ^b
Benin	44.5	35.3
Burkina Faso	17.6	7.4
Ghana	37.1	21.8
Kenya	36.3	33.5
Madagascar	31.4	23.2
Malawi	15.9	13.1
Nigeria	46.6	41.3
Senegal	49.6	38.2
Tanzania	35.4	28.4
Zambia	40.3	31.1

Source: Kessides (2006).

Notes: ^aThese are 2003 figures.

^bThese figures are based on the most recent survey year for the corresponding country.

When the urban poor comprise a larger share of the total poor population, a greater share of the urban population generally is poor and in turn, intra-urban inequality often increases. Kaufmann and Stallings (1991) believe that there is probably a link between inequality and populist policies since inequality creates circumstances that are conducive to generating redistributive demands by citizens. While inequality does not automatically result in populist parties, it does certainly increase the appeal of the anti-elitist discourse that is inherent to the populist strategy. Both Senegal and Zambia have national income Gini coefficients that exceed 0.4, which is the level that UN-HABITAT (2009) classified as the “international alert line-inequality threshold,” beyond which conditions are ripe for potential social and political strife. Moreover, within Dakar, the Gini coefficient is estimated at 0.46 (Latreille 2005) while calculations from Zambia’s 2004 Living Conditions Monitoring

Survey (LCMS) reveal that urban Lusaka's Gini coefficient is 0.48. As Larmer and Fraser (2007: 618) observe, "Popular resentment regarding liberalization has been strengthened by visible signs of rising inequality... Liberalization's winners ostentatiously display their wealth in Lusaka's new shopping centres, their car parks full of luxury vehicles."

Thus, having a sizeable share of the population living in a country's major urban centers is a prerequisite for a party to use a populist strategy to capture the votes of the urban poor. African countries with higher shares of their populations residing in urban centers tend to have more individuals living in deprived urban conditions, creating more of a gap between the rich and the poor that is conducive to a discourse aimed at rectifying the exclusion of sub-altern groups. Both Senegal and Zambia fit these conditions and yet only one opposition party in Zambia took advantage of them for electoral gain. To understand why, it's necessary to unpack the nature of populist strategies and the need for parties to establish a minimum winning coalition.

The Nature of Populist Strategies and Political Campaigns

Even in countries with relatively large urban populations, a populist strategy can prove risky. Middle- and upper-class voters, who are often needed to finance the campaigns of resource-deprived opposition parties, may fear that populist promises to ameliorate living conditions for the urban poor could result in excessive taxation or other redistributive measures. Rural voters may find a focus on urban priorities superfluous or even antithetical to their own needs. Moreover, in order to be a credible representative of the urban poor, an opposition party reliant on a populist strategy will by necessity campaign less in rural areas and therefore will be less well-known there than parties that adopt an alternative approach. At the same time, parties

in most African countries still cannot win national elections without at least some rural support.

A populist strategy can therefore create huge trade-offs. On the one hand, it may provide a party with the best chances of mobilizing an increasingly growing constituency, i.e. the urban poor. On the other hand, it may result in the loss of critical financing or rural votes, which are essential if a party wants to create a base beyond the city. As Nelson (1979: 323) observes, this dilemma becomes more pronounced as a party becomes more established:

Political leaders must also weigh the risks of alienating established supporters by overzealous attempts to mobilize the urban poor. Parties or movements likely to turn to the urban poor probably have earlier established bases of support among the lower middle class, organized labor, or more rarely peasants. While the interests of these groups may coincide with those of the urban poor on certain issues, particularly inflation and to some extent housing and related services, they are often antagonistic to the urban poor in other respects.

In order to reconcile these trade-offs, a party can first consider the requirements for achieving a minimum winning coalition. The concept, as introduced by Riker (1962), refers to the inclination of participants in an *n-person*, zero-sum game to create coalitions that are just large enough to ensure winning but no larger. In his view, this is rational given that a party needs to offer a side-payment to entice each additional coalition member to join. Parties will naturally want to conserve on resources while still desiring victory and thus, they will only form the smallest coalition possible that contributes to this goal.

How many groups are required for a minimum winning coalition will depend on the type of electoral institutions that are required to elect a country's national executive. In first-past-the-post (FPTP) elections, politicians can win with a smaller share of the votes than in two-round systems (TRS), which typically require a candidate to win 50 percent of the vote in the first round to avoid the second round.

As such, from a theoretical standpoint, candidates in FPTP systems could form smaller minimum coalitions than those in TRS and still obtain national office. Levy Mwanawasa's ascendancy to the presidency in 2001 with only 29 percent of Zambia's national vote represents a good example of this possibility.

Practically, however, politicians in FPTP do not know *ex-ante* how many votes that either they or their competitors will obtain and therefore they do not know how many votes will constitute the winning plurality. This is especially true as the number of parties competing for national office changes with each election. In other words, even if there are instances where the minimum winning coalition turns out to be quite small, candidates will not know that this will be the outcome when they are campaigning. As such, even though a candidate in a FPTP system can win with less than 50 percent of the vote, s/he is assured of victory if s/he gains 50 percent or more of the vote, and knowing this fact *ex-ante* will shape his/her campaign strategy. This means that the size of the minimum winning coalition that a candidate will try to create in an FPTP system will not dramatically vary from that in a TRS.²⁶³

In the African context, an opposition party participating in an election for national office can employ a populist strategy with the urban poor as long as it can find an alternative means of gaining the minimum number of rural votes necessary to achieve a national majority. Yet, there are some challenges for opposition parties attempting to lure rural voters. Most significantly, rural voters in Africa overwhelmingly tend to support the incumbent in elections (e.g. Bawumia 1998;

²⁶³ Proportional representation (PR) elections in parliamentary systems stipulate a much lower threshold of votes that parties must obtain in order to be represented in the national government. However, if a party wants its leader to be elected as the country's executive, this usually requires having a larger share of the votes and representation than any of the other parties. While a 50 percent goal may not be targeted, depending on the number of other competitors, the party will try to form a larger winning coalition than that required for it to obtain only a few seats within the government. In fact, Chapter Six details how in a PR, parliamentary system such as South Africa, a populist strategy with the urban poor and clientelist linkages with a particular ethnic group in rural areas helped the African National Congress (ANC) and its leader, Jacob Zuma, to win the April 2009 elections.

Conroy-Krutz n.d; Villalón 1994). The reasons for this are numerous. As noted in Chapter Two, resources tend to be scarcer for opposition parties and therefore they cannot make significant inroads in remote and less densely populated rural areas. When compared with the resource advantage enjoyed by incumbents, more rural dwellers will be familiar with the incumbent candidate than those of the opposition. For the opposition, this disadvantage is compounded by fewer independent media outlets in rural areas and lower literacy levels, both of which will diminish the ability to create a presence among rural voters outside of campaign periods. Moreover, having committed in 2003 to spend ten percent of their budgets on the agricultural sector as part of the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP), most ruling governments currently are involved in investment, input subsidy, and/or social safety net programs in rural areas (*The Economist* 2009).²⁶⁴ Rural dwellers may fear that a change in government could threaten the continuation of these programs, and the opposition lacks the credibility to ensure voters that these programs will proceed unhindered. As noted by Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (2003), the inability of an opposition figure to guarantee potential supporters that they will benefit directly from his/her tenure in office represents a significant advantage for the incumbent leader.

Clientelist Linkages Based on Ascriptive Identities

Given these circumstances, how can opposition parties make inroads with the rural populace while still employing a populist strategy with the urban poor? By mobilizing a politically salient identity among a certain segment of the rural population, an opposition party can gain the necessary leverage to obtain a minimum winning coalition. This study follows Chandra and Metz (2002: 10) in referring to

²⁶⁴ For instance, fertilizer subsidy and voucher programs currently exist in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia (see Dorward 2009 and Minot and Benson 2009).

identity as an ascriptive feature that is inherited by birth (e.g. religion, ethnicity, first language, race, gender) rather than acquired over an individual's lifetime (e.g. occupation, subsequent languages, place of residence).²⁶⁵ Appeals to ascriptive identity ties represents a sub-type of clientelistic linkages between parties and voters (Kitschelt 2000; Roniger 1994). As discussed in Chapter Two, clientelist linkages involve the selective distribution of benefits and promises in exchange for votes, and they are typically targeted towards the poor. An ascriptive identity, such as ethnicity or religion, can be one means of further disaggregating to whom such selective benefits should be distributed (e.g. Hardin 1995). For opposition parties, which possess fewer resources and less leverage to guarantee benefits than incumbents, such clientelistic linkages to specific ethnic, religious, linguistic, or racial groups are based on future promises to that particular group during campaigns. At the same time, voters will choose a candidate with a similar ascriptive identity in the belief that they and their community will receive selective benefits if that party enters office (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005).

Posner (2005) further argues that mobilizing constituents according to a salient identity allows a party to obtain a sufficient number of votes to win elections while simultaneously reducing the number of benefits that the party needs to distribute *ex-post*. Instead, I argue that clientelistic linkages based on identity help parties maximize the investment of campaign resources in rural areas *ex-ante*, which is especially important for the opposition. Unlike in cities, certain identities are geographically-concentrated in rural areas, and therefore campaigns based on identity do not require extensive travel throughout a country to garner sufficient support. By conserving resources, an opposition candidate can spend more time in a small number

²⁶⁵ In the remainder of this chapter, the term “identity” only refers to ascriptive identities.

of rural areas and thereby convince residents that they stand to benefit more if s/he enters office than if a competitor does.

The identity appeals on which this type of clientelist linkage is based can be either exclusive or inclusive. In other words, parties can specifically espouse a discourse of exclusion that aims to prevent other groups in society from enjoying certain benefits if that party comes into office. The use of the discourse of *Ivoirité* by Henri Bédié in Côte d'Ivoire during the 1990s approximates this first approach because it actively advocated excluding those with Muslim or Northern backgrounds from the political and economic spheres (see Crook 1997). This approach can be quite alienating and difficult to combine with a populist strategy with the urban poor who may be offended by the identity-specific claims a politician is making in rural areas.

Alternatively, parties can imply that their tenure in office will coincide with selective benefits to those of similar backgrounds without actually claiming that other groups will not receive other advantages. The second approach is more amenable to the use of other modes of mobilization with diverse societal groups. For instance, Madrid (2008: 481) argues that parties that successfully combine ethnic and populist appeals, which he labels "ethnopolitist," are precisely able to do so because they rely on an inclusive discourse:

...ethnopolitist parties, like traditional ethnic parties, make ethnic appeals. They often portray themselves as the legitimate representative of a particular ethnic group, they frequently prioritize the demands of that group, and they typically use cultural and political symbols associated with it. However, unlike ethnic parties, ethnopolitist parties are inclusive. Whereas ethnic parties use exclusionary rhetoric and platforms to mobilize members of a single ethnic group, ethnopolitist parties have sought to appeal to a variety of different ethnic groups.

Overall then, an opposition party can only rely on a populist strategy to capture the votes of the urban poor if a politically salient identity is available by which to mobilize a segment of the rural population that is sizeable enough to contribute to

electoral majorities. In other words, the collective contribution of votes from the urban poor and the segment of the rural population should prove adequate for national victory but not so vast as to require extensive campaigning. Moreover, the use of clientelist linkages to mobilize certain rural groups according to identity must involve an inclusive rather than exclusive discourse. Without being able to combine these two appeals, candidates will be forced to utilize alternative forms of mobilization, such as personalistic linkages, to gain the votes of the urban poor without alienating other potential supporters. Such parties, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, often espouse vague proposals to improve both urban and rural areas and fail to gain the level of differentiation and congruence necessary to win votes from the urban poor.

“Metropolitan” and “Peripheral” Coalitions

Candidates that use populist strategies to mobilize the urban poor often rely on multiple coalitions to reconcile seemingly contradictory goals. Low-income, city residents constitute the “metropolitan” component of this coalition because rectification of their economic exclusion constitutes the main policy goal of the party. A portion of the rural populace represents the “peripheral” coalition, which is necessary for electoral victory.

This segmentation of party approaches between urban and rural areas is not atypical and has been observed in other regions of the world. Indeed, Gibson (1997) popularized the notion of metropolitan and peripheral coalitions in his study of Mexico’s *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) and Argentina’s Peronists. He argues that both parties historically represented sub-coalitions of urban labor unions and the working classes, who were central to upholding policies of state-led development, and rural peasants and rural elites who were co-opted through clientelistic practices to deliver the electoral majorities that kept both parties in office.

When both the PRI and the Personists embarked on free-market policies in the mid-1990s, they retained their traditional peripheral coalition while creating a new metropolitan one that consisted of wealthy business entrepreneurs, the urban poor, and the self-employed. Though consisting of different urban constituents than their historical antecedents, the use of metropolitan and peripheral coalitions allowed both parties to pursue the twin goals of economic policy reform and re-election.

This framework has been slightly altered in other scholarship to highlight how parties can combine policy objectives targeted to urban areas with identity appeals to rural dwellers. For instance, Moore (1997) used Gibson's framework to understand the ability of Sri Lanka's People's Alliance (PA) to engage in economic reforms during the 1990s. The main party within the PA, known as the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), was able to appeal to a peripheral coalition consisting of rural Sinhalese, Buddhists who belonged to the high-ranking *Goigama* caste, which account for a third of the national population. At the same time, other parties within the PA consisted of non-*Goigama* Sinhalese, urban technocrats who were able to steer the country towards greater economic liberalization. For Gisselquist (2005) and Madrid (2008), Bolivia's economic crisis in the 1980s led to a discrediting of traditional leftist parties, thereby leaving new urban migrants and the urban poor voiceless. Consequently, Evo Morales' *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) party filled an important gap by appealing to voters with both pro-poor policy goals and a rhetoric that empowered indigenous communities, which comprise approximately half of the population. In the country's 2009 elections, these dual coalitions allowed the populist leader to achieve a high share of the votes in the capital of La Paz along with substantial majorities in rural areas of the Western portion of the country.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁶ See the *Corte Nacional Electoral* at <http://www.cne.org.bo/> (accessed December 15, 2009).

Similarly, the present study also draws on Gibson's (1997) framework. However, instead of the “metropolitan” coalition consisting of a diverse range of socio-economic actors, it predominantly consists of the urban poor. Likewise, the “peripheral” coalition includes only a segment of the rural population who are mobilized by clientelist linkages that specifically rely on appeals to ascriptive identity cleavages. Moreover, the present study examines the advantage of metropolitan and peripheral coalitions only for the purposes of winning national elections rather than for the dual goals of implementing economic reforms and being re-elected.

Importantly, this coalition can exist not because rural voters are ignorant of a party’s message to the urban poor or because the urban poor are unaware of identity appeals to specific rural communities. Instead, it is feasible precisely because the identity appeals are not explicitly exclusive and therefore poor urbanites who are not members of a particular cultural community will not necessarily be offended by such overtures to specific rural groups. Moreover, as noted in Chapter Two, one key element of a populist strategy with the urban poor is the concentration of campaign efforts within poor urban communities. As such, the urban poor will also recognize that most of a populist party’s campaigns are targeted at them. At the same time, rural residents may recognize that a message aimed at improving conditions for the urban poor is not necessarily antithetical to a party’s espoused commitment to a particular cultural community. All of this confirms Hagopian’s (2007) assertion that parties and individual candidates can mix their strategies in order to mobilize different constituents.

Determining Politically Salient Identities

In heterogeneous countries, which identities are most politically salient and can therefore be seized upon by parties interested in forming a peripheral coalition? Individuals of course adhere to multiple, non-exclusive identities spanning race,

ethnicity, language, and religion. Unfortunately, finding a uniform and easily applicable approach for uncovering potentially salient identity cleavages has thus far eluded scholars on identity politics. Determining whether an identity is “salient” depends on context (Abdelal *et al.* 2006). This fact compounds the challenge for a politician searching for the identity that will not only have the greatest mobilizing power but also secure an electoral advantage. Torcal and Mainwaring’s (2003) research on Chile as well as Chhibber and Torcal’s work (1997) on Spain provide one method for uncovering politically salient cleavages. In both studies, econometric analysis unveils which variable, such as class or religious background, played the most significant role in an individual’s decision to support a party. However, this approach is predominantly *ex-post* in that it explains which cleavages influenced voting behavior but not necessarily if those were the ones that politicians purposely mobilized during a campaign.²⁶⁷ Based on his work on India, Wilkinson (2000) has sampled media sources to record all those identities that appear important within a particular community but which may not necessarily be captured in standard census data. While this method provides a better *ex-ante* analysis of the potential menu of cleavages a politician can choose, it still does not explain why a politician may choose one identity for electoral purposes over another.

Instead of these other approaches, this study draws on the rationale underlying Posner’s (2005) identity matrices, combined with existing scholarship on cleavages in Senegal and Zambia. Based on the logic of numbers and the assumption that certain identities are geographically concentrated, Posner’s approach offers a uniform method that can be applied across multiple countries. This approach involves creating a round-robin of identity dyads, such as religion and language, with each category

²⁶⁷ As Chandra (2009: 253) explains, those identities that motivate voters and those that drive party strategy should in principle be similar but the concepts are analytically distinct and can sometimes diverge.

constituting 100 percent of the population.²⁶⁸ Those individuals who belong to the largest group of each dyad category constitute what Posner labels as the “pivot,” meaning that they will belong to the winning coalition regardless of which category of the dyad, e.g. religion or language, is chosen for mobilization. Out of the two options, the pivot members choose to adhere to the one which encompasses the smaller share of the population.

This in turn ensures that they are placed in the minimum winning coalition and can therefore share economic and political benefits among a smaller group. The politically salient cleavage therefore depends on which of the two identities the pivot group chooses. For example, if the linguistic group has a smaller population share than the religious group, then politics will revolve around mobilizing voters according to their language rather than their religion.

The present study applies the logic of this approach to understand which identity a politician will choose as a salient cleavage. Specifically, a politician will determine whether it is instrumental to mobilize rural constituents along a politically salient cleavage if that provides him/her with a minimum winning coalition that also encompasses the urban poor. Full identity matrices cannot be constructed here because they require raw census data in order to calculate cross-tabulations of the various identity dyads.²⁶⁹ Instead, based on the idea of minimum winning coalitions that encompass “metropolitan” and “peripheral” components, I first examine the share of the rural population in Senegal and Zambia across three ascriptive categories, which are ethnicity, language group, and religion. Based on the size of the urban population,

²⁶⁸ One of Posner’s (2005) main insights was that an individual’s salient identity can vary according to institutional constraints, differing in one-party, constituency elections compared with multi-party national elections. Since multi-party, presidential elections are the focus in the present study, the populations of both Senegal and Zambia can be explored under the assumption that they face the same basic institutional constraints, and social cleavages are examined at the national level rather than at the district or constituency level.

²⁶⁹ The raw census data is available for Zambia but not for Senegal.

an opposition politician will presumably choose to mobilize rural dwellers along a cleavage that results in constituencies which can deliver an electoral majority but whose size and geographical dispersion does not require extensive campaigning throughout the entire country. If a candidate cannot mobilize rural voters via an identity cleavage, then s/he must choose an alternative mode of capturing the votes of the urban poor and rural dwellers, such as through personalistic linkages.

Since this approach is predicated on numbers, it is dynamic and amenable to demographic shifts. For instance, as the share of the urban population increases, an opposition candidate can still achieve a minimum winning coalition with a smaller share of the rural population, meaning that smaller ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups become viable targets to construct peripheral coalitions. At the same time, however, whether an opposition candidate can mobilize voters with a particular identity requires the candidate to share that identity with them. Candidates from a minority group that cannot deliver electoral majorities on its own will certainly require a different form of mobilization that encompasses a diverse share of rural constituents. In addition, whether an opposition candidate can capture the support of a certain segment of rural voters depends on the incumbent's actions, which may involve longstanding clientelistic relations with certain communities.

Uncovering Politically Salient Identity Cleavages in Rural Senegal and Zambia

The population of Zambia's major urban centers, which are Lusaka and the two major cities on the Copperbelt, Kitwe and Ndola, collectively constituted 21.6 percent of the total population in 2000 when the last census was conducted.²⁷⁰ Since not everyone within that 21.6 will be poor, the number of votes from the urban poor

²⁷⁰ Presumably, all three cities have grown in the interim and their share in Zambia's total population will be even higher. However, the 2010 census results for these cities were not published at the time this study was written.

that a politician can obtain will realistically be less than this. Nevertheless, recognizing that the poor are the majority of the urban population, and without knowing exactly how many urbanites are objectively poor or how many believe they have been excluded from the benefits of economic growth, a candidate will consider this 21.6 percent as the maximum potential share of votes that s/he could gain in Zambia's key urban areas. By extension then, any cleavage that includes *at least* 28 percent (50 - 21.6) of the rural population can be mobilized into a minimum winning coalition.²⁷¹ As mentioned earlier, in a FPTP system such as Zambia's, a 50 percent threshold is not required to win. Yet, without knowing how many votes other candidates will win *ex-ante* and therefore how much of a plurality is needed, a politician benefits by campaigning with the goal of obtaining this 50 percent threshold.

Table 5.2 below illustrates only two groups that meet this threshold, which are Christians and those belonging to the Bemba language group.²⁷² However, with 87 percent of the rural population claiming allegiance to Christianity, religion is not necessarily a cleavage that politicians can mobilize while still consolidating campaign resources. By contrast, a candidate could target a much smaller segment of the population, namely those within the Bemba language group and, combined with votes in major metropolitan centers, would be able to win a national majority. As such, ethno-linguistic affinity represents a cleavage for political competition. If one candidate targets Bemba-speakers, another could form a multi-lingual coalition to try and defeat his/her competitor.

²⁷¹ If the share of the poor in the urban population declines, then the cleavage needs to encompass an even larger share of the rural population.

²⁷² The language groups encompass a number of different dialects. However, these dialects are mutually intelligible among ethnic groups within each language group. For example, the Chewa, Ngoni, and Nsenga tribes all speak a language that falls within the broader Nyanja language group.

Table 5.2: Distribution of Ascriptive Identities in Rural Zambia

<i>First Language</i>	<i>Share of Rural Population (%)</i>
Bemba	31.7
Tonga	18.9
Nyanja	17.4
NW	10.1
Barotse	8.6
Tumbuka	4.4
<i>Ethnicity (Tribe)</i>	<i>Share of Rural Population (%)</i>
Tonga	15.5
Bemba	13.1
Chewa	7.7
Lozi	5.7
Nsenga	4.8
Tumbuka	3.8
<i>Religious Affiliation</i>	<i>Share of Rural Population (%)</i>
Christian	87.0
Other	6.56
None	6.11
Muslim	0.26
Hindu	0.01

Sources: Calculated from the 2000 Zambian Census.


Ethno-linguistic identity has long played an important role in Zambian politics. Posner (2005) illustrates in great detail that in multi-party national elections, the salient political cleavage in Zambia is ethno-linguistic identity among the four main language groups: Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, and Lozi. As seen in Table 5.3, these language groups tend to be geographically concentrated in most rural provinces. For instance, the Bemba-speaking groups are predominantly located in Luapula and Northern Provinces. Under Chiluba, the MMD became perceived as a Bemba party, which only fuelled the desire of Tongas and Lozis for greater political representation in the central government (Burnell 2001).²⁷³ According to Burnell (2005: 122), “Zambia’s politicians continue to factor ethnic and provincial considerations into their strategies for mobilizing support at local levels.”

²⁷³ Under British colonial rule, the proximity of Bemba-speaking groups to the Copperbelt meant that they supplied much of the labor to the copper-mining operations, which placed them in a more advantageous position vis-à-vis other groups at the time of independence (Taylor 2006).

Table 5.3: Distribution of Zambian Ethno-Linguistic Groups by Province

<i>Province</i>	<i>Predominant First Language Group</i>	<i>Share of Provincial Population Speaking Language (%)</i>
Central	Bemba	47.7
Copperbelt	Bemba	79.5
Eastern	Nyanja	67.9
Luapula	Bemba	88.5
Lusaka	Nyanja	55.9
Northern	Bemba	64.2
Northwestern	Northwestern	81.9
Southern	Tonga	72.8
Western	Barotse/Lozi	70.0

Source: Calculations based on the 2000 Zambian Census

**Figure 5.1 Map of Zambia's Provinces**

Importantly though, overt ethnic appeals are rare (Posner 2005: 181) and there are no ethnic parties in the manner defined by Chandra (2004: 3) “as a champion of the cause of one particular ethnic category or a set of categories *to the exclusion of others*” [emphasis added]. Rather, ethnic appeals follow a pattern of implicit mobilization, meaning that they are coded in a manner that targets specific constituents without necessarily naming a particular ethnic identity (Chandra 2009).

Based on interviews conducted in 2000, Scarritt (2006) found most politicians admitting that ethnopolitical mobilization occurred during campaigns but not in an exclusionary manner that threatened national unity.

In Senegal, approximately 25 percent of the national population resides in Dakar (ANSD 2007a). As such, a candidate needs *at least* 25 percent of the vote in rural areas if s/he is to win at the national level. Again, this is based on the assumption that all Dakarois are poor and all will vote, which realistically is not the case. However, without knowing exactly how many are poor at the time of elections and how many Dakarois will show up at the polls, the 25 percent represents a politician's best estimate of how many potential votes s/he can obtain from the urban poor.

Moreover, based on Senegal's two-round system (TRS), a candidate technically can win without obtaining more than 50 percent of the vote if s/he can be among the top two finalists in the first round of elections and forges a coalition with enough opposition parties in the second round. Again though, *ex-ante*, a candidate does not know who will be among the top two parties and whether a coalition will be formed in the aftermath. Yet, if a candidate gains more than 50 percent of the vote in the first round, s/he can avoid competing in the second round, which is what Abdoulaye Wade achieved in 2007. As such, while a candidate plausibly can win without mobilizing at least half of the population, the chances of guaranteed victory increase if s/he does attempt to do this.

Given these conditions, Table 5.4 illustrates that a politician would not pursue a religious cleavage along Muslim/Christian lines since the rural population is overwhelmingly Muslim. Ethnicity or linguistic background theoretically could be mobilized for political gain. However, Sufi brotherhood affiliation represents the most plausible identity cleavage that a politician could target, not only because ties with

either the Mouride or the Tidiane would ensure a minimum winning coalition but also because extensive scholarship on Senegal has revealed that neither ethnic nor linguistic background plays a substantial role in politics.

Table 5.4: Distribution of Ascriptive Identities in Rural Senegal

<i>First Language</i>	<i>Share of Rural Population (%)</i>
Wolof	44.6
Pulaar	24.7
Serer	14.1
Mandike	5.6
Dioula	5.3
Soninke	2.0
<i>Ethnicity (Tribe)</i>	<i>Share of Rural Population (%)</i>
Wolof	40.7
Pulaar	25.6
Serer	15.5
Dioula	5.3
Mandinke	5.0
Others	7.9
<i>Religious Affiliation</i>	<i>Share of Rural Population (%)</i>
Muslim	94.9
Christian	3.8
Other	1.3
<i>Muslim Brotherhood</i>	<i>Share of Rural Population (%)</i>
Tidiane	48.9
Mouride	33.6
Khadriya	12.8
Layène	0.7

Sources: Division de la Prévision et de la Statistique. 1993. *Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat de 1988*. Dakar, Sénégal : Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et du Plan.

Indeed, there are a number of indicators attesting to the low salience of ethnicity in Senegal. For example, Posner (2004b) constructed a Politically Relevant Ethnic Group (PREG) index which aims not to account for how many ethnic groups exist in a particular country but rather to determine how many actually have been engaged in political competition.²⁷⁴ According to the PREG index, Senegal received

²⁷⁴ More specifically, Posner (2004b) draws on an exhaustive review of secondary literature. Where the literature discussed voting patterns, party-building, or electoral campaigns, he determined which and how many ethnic groups were involved. Then, with this knowledge, he amended the traditional

a score of only 0.14 out of a possible 1, indicating that ethnicity plays a negligible factor in competition over policy in the country. This supports Maktar Diouf's (1994: 44-45) claim that ethnic cleavages have never been a part of the Senegalese landscape. In fact, the former president, Abdou Diouf, who belongs to the Wolof ethnic group, received some of the highest votes from the Pulaar-speaking Toucouleur while his predecessor from the Serer ethnic group, Leopold Senghor, obtained high levels of support in regions containing non-Serers (Beck 2008). Moreover, based on the Round 4 of the Afrobarometer survey, most Senegalese in rural areas do not view themselves in ethnic terms while almost 62 percent of their counterparts in Zambia attach equal importance to their ethnicity and nationality (see Table 5.5).

One reason for the low salience of ethnic identity is because, like other West African societies, many ethnic groups in Senegal are structured by caste. For example, the Wolof, Serer, and the Pulaar-speaking Toucouleur are all caste societies (Diop 1964; Markovitz 1970).²⁷⁵ Members of the same caste across different ethnic groups may have more in common than they do with their co-ethnics. Traditionally, marriage practices encouraged endogamy within castes rather than within ethnic groups (Ross 2008). In addition, Wolof is almost equivalent to a *lingua franca* in that approximately 70 to 80 percent of Senegalese speak it as either their first or second language (Ross 2008).

measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, which is calculated using a Herfindahl index and is based on data compiled by Soviet ethnographers in the 1960s.

²⁷⁵ Historically, for instance, the Wolof caste structure included the nobility, commoners (*Badolo*), artisans and *griots* (*Gnegno*) and slaves (Markovitz 1970). Within each caste stratum, there were even further sub-divisions.

Table 5.5: Comparison of Importance of Ethnicity in Rural Senegal and Zambia

Opinion	Senegalese Rural Population (%)	Zambian Rural Population (%)
I feel only [ethnic group]	5.8	6.6
I feel more [ethnic group] than Senegalese/ Zambian	16	7.7
I feel equally Senegalese/Zambian and [ethnic group]	23.8	61.2
I feel more Senegalese/ Zambian than [ethnic group]	9.6	4.4
I feel only Senegalese/ Zambian	43.4	18.1
Don't know	0.4	0.3
<i>Total^a</i>	<i>99</i>	<i>100</i>

Source: Round 4 Afrobarometer. The exact question was “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Senegalese/Zambian and being a member of [respondent’s ethnic group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?”

Notes: ^aThe total for Senegal does not exactly equal 100 due to rounding and missing data.

By contrast, Senegal’s brotherhoods (*confrèries*, *tariqa*) represent a much stronger marker of identity, playing a central role in the lives of most of this country’s Muslims.²⁷⁶ All of the brotherhoods are hierarchically structured with authority filtering downwards from the *Khalifa Général*, or leader of the brotherhood, to multiple religious leaders known as *marabouts*, to *talibés*, or disciples (O’Brien 1971). In the Tidiane brotherhood, which originated in Morocco, disciples view their *marabouts* as religious guides with mystical powers. However, in the Mouride brotherhood, which was established in Senegal during the early 1900s by Cheikh Amadou Bamba, the *marabout’s* intercession on behalf of his *talibé* is necessary for the latter’s redemption (Beck 2008). The Mouridiyya is very centralized, recognizes only one *Khalifa Général*, and is centered on the town of Touba in the region of Diourbel. Due to internal rivalries and family disputes, the Tijaniyya are more fragmented. The Malikiyya branch established by Al-Hajj Malik Sy is located in Tivaouane in the region of Thiès while the Niassène sect, which was founded by Al-

²⁷⁶ In fact, 95 percent of Senegalese reported that religion was very important to them in the Round 4 Afrobarometer survey.

Hajj Abdoulaye Niass, is headquartered in the region of Kaolack (Ross 2008; Loimeier 2007).²⁷⁷

Table 5.6: Distribution of Senegalese Sufi Brotherhoods by Region

<i>Region</i>	<i>Predominant Sufi Brotherhood</i>	<i>Share of Region's Population Adhering to Brotherhood (%)</i>
Dakar	Tidiane	47.7
Diourbel	Mouride	84.4
Fatick	Tidiane	36.4
Kaolack	Tidiane	64.3
Kolda	Tidiane	49.2
Louga	Mouride	45.7
St. Louis	Tidiane	79.2
Tambacounda	Tidiane	52
Thiès	Mouride	42.2
Ziguinchor ^a	Khadriya	24.1

Sources: Calculations based on Division de la Prévision et de la Statistique. 1993.

Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat de 1988. Dakar, Sénégal : Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et du Plan.

Notes : ^aZiguinchor is predominantly Catholic, which is why the share of Sufi affiliation is so low.

As Table 5.6 above illustrates, one brotherhood is more predominant than another in some rural regions while in others, such as Thiès, Louga, and Fatick, they have relatively equal followings. Figure 5.2 highlights where these different regions are located.

²⁷⁷ The Qadiriyya (Khadriya) order emerged in Baghdad and attracts many of Senegal's minority ethnic groups, such as Mauritians living in the country, migrant Bambara from Mali, and the Mandika of Casamance. The Layène was established in a suburb of Dakar and its membership is generally limited to the Cap Vert peninsula (Ross 2008).



Figure 5.2: Map of Senegalese Regions

The prominence of the brotherhoods in the political sphere is well-documented. The Mourides in particular have motivated a broad range of scholarship examining their role as what Beck (2008) terms “influential brokers” who encourage their disciples to support specific candidates depending on the economic benefits they receive from the ruling regime (e.g. Coulon 1981; O’Brien 1971). Their ability to bestow politicians with legitimacy remains strong in rural areas, prompting Boone (2003: 91) to observe the following:

So it is that even after the groundnut era the regime has continued to invest in sustaining the material bases of the Mouride order, and thus to provide the economic linkages by which religious prestige and legitimacy were transformed into worldly political clout. Senegal’s opposition politicians in the 1990s courted the marabouts almost as assiduously as Lamine Guèye and Léopold Senghor did in the 1950s.

Yet, Loimeier (2007) argues that the Mourides were forced to engage in explicit demands for political concessions precisely because most government offices traditionally have been held by Tidjanis. By contrast, the Mourides were conspicuously missing from the upper echelons of politics: “Murids have thus had to ask for ‘their goods’ rather ‘loudly’...Tidjanis were not forced to resort to ‘Murid’

strategies as long as they were ‘in power’ or close to it” (Loimeier 2007: 71).

Declining patronage resources due to structural adjustment certainly contributed to the Mouride *marabouts*’ decision not to issue a *ndigel* instructing disciples to vote for the Tidiane candidate, Abdou Diouf, in the 2000 elections (Diop *et al.* 2002). Yet, their support for a Mouride candidate instead, Abdoulaye Wade, also reflected a sense of disappointment with their longstanding exclusion from the structures of state bureaucracy and authority (Loimeier 2007). By contrast, one of the heads of the Tidiane brotherhood in Tivaoune, Chiekh Tidiane Sy, publicly instructed his followers to support Diouf in the same elections (Villalón 2004). Jostling between brotherhoods for influence therefore remains a defining feature of the Senegalese political landscape.²⁷⁸

Therefore, in Zambia, opposition politicians can forge a metropolitan coalition with the urban poor if they can simultaneously mobilize a segment of rural residents according to a specific ethno-linguistic identity (or identities), which collectively provides a majority of votes. Likewise, in Senegal, an opposition politician can employ a populist strategy with the urban poor if s/he can simultaneously appeal to a certain share of rural residents based on Sufi brotherhood affiliation. If, however, these strategies are not available in rural areas, either due to the politician’s own identity or the actions of the incumbent, then an alternative means of mobilization is required. For instance, a candidate could simply rely on personalistic linkages with both the urban poor and rural dwellers, which invoke vague messages oriented around both constituencies’ concerns but provide very little differentiation from other parties. Alternatively, a candidate could explicitly focus on programmatic linkages oriented around agricultural and rural development policies, but this will exhibit very little

²⁷⁸ Koter (2009) also argues that the lack of ethnic voting in Senegal, as well as Mali, is due to the role of hierarchically-structured religious orders whose leaders act as intermediaries between voters and the state.

congruence with the priorities of the urban poor. In both of the latter cases, the candidate will forfeit a populist strategy with the urban poor in order to avoid alienating rural voters.

Sata's Peripheral Coalition in the Bemba Heartland

In the 2008 presidential campaign, Zambia's opposition parties were first and foremost limited by the clientelistic linkages forged with rural voters by the ruling MMD. In addition to the Fertilizer Support Program (FSP), which distributed subsidized fertilizer to rural dwellers just prior to the elections, the MMD also relied on the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) to mobilize supporters. The FRA aims to facilitate markets, manage storage facilities, and ensure the country has a strategic reserve of food by buying smallholder maize and cassava and therefore guaranteeing farmers a market for their output.²⁷⁹ Right before the inception of the campaign, the government announced that the FRA would increase the cost it paid farmers for their maize from 45,000 Kwacha to 55,000 Kwacha. In response, the PF unsuccessfully filed for a court injunction to force the FRA either to wait until after the elections before paying the new price or to compensate farmers who had already sold their maize at the cheaper price (*Times of Zambia* 2008d).

By virtue of already being in power, the MMD also possessed two other advantages. First, the MMD naturally had greater campaign resources to reach most areas of the country. According to the BBC correspondent in Zambia, "What tends to happen, the ruling party, MMD, they tend to use state money, government public funds; that is indisputable. They use that, they use public money, they use Zambia air force planes to cover and get to every part of the country. They use government cars,

²⁷⁹ See http://www.fra.org.zm/about_the_fra.php, accessed October 16, 2009.

they have free access to the media, they don't pay for their adverts.”²⁸⁰ The PF's vice-president, Dr. Guy Scott, concurs that this is a major challenge for his party: “I think the PF is disadvantaged in the rural areas because A, only the government has got the resources to actually campaign in the rural areas in a country that is as sparse and is as poorly provided with telecommunications and so on and so forth as this one.”²⁸¹

Secondly, the MMD claimed that by virtue of already occupying office, it could more credibly implement projects and fulfill campaign promises than any of the opposition candidates. This was the common message during Rupiah Banda's campaign tour across the country's nine provinces. For example, in Southern Province, he promised to continue promoting agricultural growth through the Fertilizer Support Program and warned residents “against being hoodwinked by other presidential candidates whom he [Banda] said could not deliver on their promises because they were out of the system while he was in Government” (Moonga 2008: 1). In Eastern Province, Banda emphasized that only he possessed enough members in Parliament to form a strong Government (Ntanda and Lungu 2008: 1).

Given these advantages for the MMD in rural areas, Michael Sata relied on ethno-linguistic appeals in order to build a peripheral coalition with a segment of rural voters, namely those belonging to the Bemba linguistic group. In 2001, Sata's bid for president occurred shortly after the PF was formed and as noted in Chapter Three, relied on personalistic linkages and was almost entirely targeted in urban areas due to limited resources. Five years later, Sata had not only switched to using a populist strategy with Zambia's urban poor but also began more actively campaigning in rural areas, with a specific focus on Bemba-speaking areas. As a result, between the 2001

²⁸⁰ Personal interview with Musonda Chibamba, BBC, Lusaka, January 28, 2009.

²⁸¹ Personal interview with Dr. Guy Scott, PF, Lusaka, January 21, 2009.

and 2006 elections, Sata increased his share of the presidential vote from 3 to 61 percent in Luapula Province and from 8 to 43 percent in Northern Provinces.²⁸² The same strategy was repeated again in 2008, with even greater vigor. As Zambian political analyst Dr. Neo Simutanyi explains,

You know, Sata's political strategy has been very simple. It's based on demographics... the strategy has been that if the Bemba group is consolidated and it votes as a bloc and then gets sympathy, in other words gets support from non-Bembas who are in the group of the working class and the poor and so forth, then it should be possible for this bloc vote to help him win the presidency.²⁸³

The clearest evidence of this strategy emerges by observing where Sata spent most of his time campaigning in 2008. Table 5.7 illustrates the share of rallies that each candidate held within provinces outside of Lusaka. These figures were derived from counting the number of separate rallies held by each presidential candidate and reported in the newspaper *Times of Zambia* during the official campaign period, which started on September 26 and ended on October 29, 2008.²⁸⁴ Admittedly, this approach can be problematic for at least two reasons. First, the number of rallies will inevitably be under-reported since newspaper space cannot be solely devoted to reports on candidates' campaign activities. Godfrey Miyanda in particular argued that the lack of media coverage of his rallies conveyed to the public that he did not engage in much campaigning in rural areas (*Times of Zambia Reporter* 2008e). However, this bias is more likely to exclude smaller rallies and therefore will only serve to further emphasize which constituencies a candidate accorded the most attention. Secondly, rallies which were held by parties, but not attended by the actual presidential candidate, are excluded. Yet, one would assume that those constituencies which are

²⁸² During the same period, the number of MPs elected in Luapula increased from zero to 9 out of a total of 14 constituencies. In Northern Province, the number of MPs elected between 2001 and 2006 increased from zero to 9 out of a total of 21 constituencies.

²⁸³ Personal interview with Dr. Neo Simutanyi, Lusaka, February 3, 2009.

²⁸⁴ September 26, 2008 marked the day when presidential candidates needed to submit their official nomination forms to the Zambian High Court.

deemed most important by the party are those most likely to receive a visit from the actual presidential contender. Notwithstanding these caveats, newspaper reports offer a useful approximation of candidates' geographic focus given that more extensive data regarding political campaigns remains unavailable.

Table 5.7: Share of Campaign Rallies by Province

Province	Candidate			
	Rupiah Banda (MMD)	Michael Sata (PF)	Hakainde Hichilema (UPND)	Godfrey Miyanda (Heritage Party)
Central	4.9	14.8	0.0	50.0
Copperbelt	12.2	7.4	5.0	0.0
Eastern	14.6	0.0	30.0	0.0
Luapula	12.2	14.8	10.0	0.0
Northern	14.6	44.4	10.0	25.0
Northwestern	9.8	3.7	10.0	25.0
Southern	14.6	3.7	30.0	0.0
Western	17.1	11.1	5.0	0.0
<i>Total</i>	100 (N=41)	100(N=27)	100 (N=20)	100 (N=4)

Source: Calculated from news reports in *The Times of Zambia* newspaper between the 2008 presidential campaign period of Sept. 26-Oct.29.

Due to the MMD's access to campaign resources, Banda conducted more rallies than any of the other candidates. Notably, Banda distributed his rallies relatively evenly amongst the provinces, spending marginally more time in Western Province which, as will be discussed later in this section, was designed to deprive Lozi votes from the UPND. By contrast, Sata concentrated 44 percent of his 27 total, non-Lusaka campaign rallies in the Bemba-speaking Northern Province alone. Luapula and Central Provinces, which are also Bemba-speaking, followed with each accounting for approximately 15 percent of Sata's rallies. Eastern Province, which is Banda's stronghold, received no visits from Sata who presumably felt that it was a

waste of resources to campaign in the incumbent's main area of influence.²⁸⁵ Both the Tonga-speaking Southern Province and those in Northwestern Province also obtained minimal attention from Sata.

Sata mobilized fellow Bemba speakers through implicit, rather than explicit, appeals which were centered on their shared identity. In other words, he did not present the PF as an exclusionary party only interested in representing Bemba speakers. Thus, during one of his visits to the Lozi-speaking Western Province, he stated in a radio interview that the PF was a national party and not just for Bembas (*Times of Zambia* 2008f). Rather, he implied that other groups have, and would continue to, exclude the Bemba from political influence. For instance, the late President Mwanawasa's deliberate actions to reduce the dominance of Bemba representation among government appointments encouraged Sata to claim, in turn, that the MMD was purposely marginalizing the Bemba.²⁸⁶ In the same vein, the Tonga-speaking UPND leader, Hakainde Hichilema, believes Sata purposely discouraged Bemba-speakers from supporting him because of his ethno-linguistic background: "I went to campaign in Luapula Province. And Sata told the people there not to vote for me because I was Tonga and they are Bemba. How can you campaign like that? I never go to Southern Province and say, 'Don't vote for Sata because he's Bemba.' No."²⁸⁷

Language provided the key means of implicit mobilization. The PF's slogan of *Pabwato*, which is Bemba, was never translated into any other indigenous languages in campaign materials. This presumably reinforced for rural voters, who were less

²⁸⁵ Banda's popularity in Eastern Province can be traced to at least two factors. First, his father was Chewa and his mother was Ngoni, both of which are members of the Nyanja language group that is dominant in Eastern Province. Secondly, Banda formerly was a key figure in UNIP which, due to Kenneth Kaunda's background, retained support in Eastern Province even after the MMD came to power in 1991.

²⁸⁶ Personal interview with Dr. Neo Simutanyi, Lusaka, February 3, 2009.

²⁸⁷ Personal interview with Hakainde Hichilema, UPND President, Lusaka, February 17, 2009.

likely to relate to a message of “Lower taxes, more jobs and more money in your pockets,” that Sata was a Bemba candidate. Moreover, King Cobra relied on Bemba to address his rallies in Northern and Luapula provinces. Rallies from these provinces were nationally broadcast on independent radio stations, such as QFM Radio and Hot FM Radio (see *Times of Zambia* 2008g; *Times of Zambia* 2008h), which again may have given the impression more widely among Zambians that he was a Bemba politician. Even during his closing rally in Lusaka, where he exhorted supporters not to engage in violence if the election outcome did not favor the PF, he resorted to Bemba, stating “*Kabiyeni, mwilalwa kabili mwila tukana*” [“Go, but do not fight and insult.”] (*Times of Zambia* 2008i).




Figure 5.3: Map of 2008 Zambian Presidential Results²⁸⁸

²⁸⁸ Map adapted by author from data provided by the Electoral Commission of Zambia.

Figure 5.3 illustrates how Sata's campaign strategy affected voting outcomes. Specifically, the PF's base of support, highlighted in black dots, centers on Zambia's most urban and cosmopolitan areas in Lusaka and the Copperbelt, as well as the Bemba-speaking Luapula and Northern Provinces. In these two provinces, Sata obtained 66 and 65 percent of the vote in 2008, respectively. By contrast, the UPND's support base is shaded with the cross-hatch and predominantly concentrated in the Tonga-speaking Southern Province. The MMD's results emphasize that this ruling party, which originally emerged in urban areas, has now become predominantly rural.

The success of Sata in Bemba-speaking provinces is difficult to attribute to other factors besides ethno-linguistic appeals. Due to his focus on his metropolitan coalition of the urban poor, he had not spoken much about agriculture during the campaign. Indeed, one disgruntled Zambian wrote that "His [Sata's] political vision is in town alone, talking about making flyover bridges, sweeping the markets, etc. Coming to issues that affect the rural multitudes, he has nothing to offer or talk about. Ask him about agricultural policies and you will get nothing from him" (Daka 2008: 5). In fact, Cheeseman and Hinfelaar (2010: 23&24) point out that some of Sata's promises to the urban poor, such as reducing food prices, were directly antithetical to the interests of rural producers. They further observe that Sata insulted rural producers during the 2008 campaign by claiming that their farm practices were from the "stone age." Research by Govereh *et al.* (2009) also shows that Northern and Luapula provinces were disproportionately favored by fertilizer distribution through the FSP, as well as by crop purchases through the FRA.²⁸⁹ As such, support for Sata in these provinces could not necessarily be traced to farmers' disappointment with the MMD's

²⁸⁹These provinces specialize in cassava production, and the Govereh *et al.* (2009) study shows that they were favored by the FSP and the FRA over other cassava producing regions, such as Northwestern and Western provinces.

agricultural policies. Notably, within Northern Province, the MMD only won in non-Bemba speaking areas (Simutanyi 2009).

Interestingly, Sata's campaign strategy is also reflected in the other party representatives who have been elected to office on the PF ticket. In urban centers, PF MPs are more likely to be non-Bembas. This is true for Dr. Guy Scott (MP for Lusaka Central), Given Lubinda (MP for Kabwata constituency), and Wilbur Simuusa (MP for Chingola constituency in the Copperbelt). However, in the Northern and Luapula provinces, the PF's MPs tend to be predominantly Bemba.

Sata's dualistic mode of coalition-building probably explains why such disparate views exist over how best to characterize the PF. Not surprisingly, other parties attempt to portray the PF as a distinctly Bemba party. The MMD's campaign manager in 2008, Dr. Mbita Chitala, claims, "He [Sata] is basically a very tribal gentleman, if you look at his party, the whole leadership is Bemba, the Northern people, the Bemba."²⁹⁰ Likewise, the research director for the UPND, Dr. Choolwe Beyani believes that "There are ethnic considerations to voting patterns. There is what you may call a Bemba voting bloc that has voted PF, which has been seen as a Bemba party... You see, if there's any party that is ethnically associated, it's PF."²⁹¹ Yet, for PF members, the accusations of tribal affiliation appear unfounded. The PF's director of research, Dr. Chileshe Mulenga, states, "In cities which are metropolitan, where you have mixed populations, people from different parts of the country living side by side, we have a lot of support."²⁹² He echoes the PF spokesman and MP for Lusaka's Kabwata constituency, Given Lubinda, who observes, "Now, we have been criticized as a tribal party but you will see that the areas where we win votes are the most

²⁹⁰ Personal interview with Dr. Mbita Chitala, MMD, Lusaka, January 29, 2009.

²⁹¹ Personal interview with Dr. Choolwe Beyani, UPND, Lusaka, February 24, 2009.

²⁹² Personal interview with Dr. Chileshe Mulenga, PF, Lusaka, February 24, 2009.

cosmopolitan.”²⁹³ Other independent observers point to the PF’s victories in a multi-lingual city such as Lusaka as a counter to the party’s categorization as a Bemba entity.²⁹⁴ Scholars of the Zambian political scene, such as Gould (2007: 8) and Larmer and Fraser (2007: 632), also dismiss the PF as an ethnic party precisely because of its populist appeal in key cities. These conflicting perspectives most likely reflect Sata’s success in using mixed strategies to create a minimum winning coalition that consisted of the urban poor as well as rural dwellers in Bemba-speaking provinces.

Hichilema’s Dilemma

Sata’s ability to use a populist strategy with the urban poor by capturing the votes of Bemba-speaking groups in rural areas is only reinforced by Hichilema’s inability to follow a similar strategy. Since both Hichilema and his predecessor, the late Andrew Mazoka, are from the Tonga ethno-linguistic group, the UPND is largely perceived as a “Tonga party.” Yet, as shown in Table 5.2, first-language Tonga speakers are only approximately 19 percent of the rural population. Moreover, Table 5.3 highlighted that they are only the majority group in Southern Province which, according to the Central Statistical Office (2003b), only contains 12 percent of the national population. As such, Hichilema would not have been able to forge a minimum winning coalition between Tonga-speakers in Southern Province and the urban poor.

In the past, the UPND has been able to create multi-ethnic coalitions, particularly with the Lozis of Western Province. In fact, in 2001, Mazoka obtained 49 percent of the vote there, compared with Mwanawasa’s 27 percent. However, in the

²⁹³ Personal interview with Given Lubinda, PF, Lusaka, January 22, 2009.

²⁹⁴ Personal interviews with Sheikh Chifuwe, *The Post Newspaper*, Lusaka, January 29, 2009 and Musonda Chibamba, BBC, Lusaka, January 28, 2009.

aftermath of the succession struggle within the UPND after Mazoka's death, described briefly in Chapter Three, the party's vice-president at the time, Sakwiba Sikota, left after Hichilema was chosen as party leader. A Lozi-speaker, Sikota threw his weight behind the MMD in 2008 and campaigned vigorously with Banda across the country, including Western Province. In any case, Lozi speakers only comprise 8 percent of the rural population (see Table 5.3) and residents in Western Province are only 8 percent of the national population. As such, even if a Lozi-Tonga coalition could be formed in tandem with the urban poor, this combination would still not be adequate to provide the UPND with a national majority.

Given these circumstances, Hichilema attempted to portray the UPND as a national rather than Tonga party in order to obtain votes from other rural voters in 2008. This was apparent in two key respects. First, in contrast to the PF, the UPND's slogan was printed on the party's campaign materials in seven indigenous languages, including Nyanja, Bemba, Tonga, Lozi, and a language of the Northwestern linguistic group (see UPND 2008). During campaign rallies, Hichilema also attempted to speak local languages, rather than English, when addressing the audience. For instance, at his rally in Chipata, the capital of Eastern Province, he spoke entirely in Nyanja (*Times of Zambia* 2008j). He also affirmed the role of traditional chiefs from all ethno-linguistic groups, pledging on the campaign trail to renovate chiefs' palaces, provide them with better allowances, and offer them new cars if he were elected president (Lungu 2008). Overall, Hichilema spent more time campaigning in Eastern Province and the PF's strongholds than Sata spent in the UPND's strongholds or Eastern Province (see Table 5.8). This indicates that Hichilema recognized a peripheral coalition could not be secured by focusing on Southern Province alone in the same manner that Sata could concentrate on Bemba-speaking provinces.

Secondly, outside of Tonga-speaking areas, Hichilema engaged in a concerted effort to appeal to rural voters by addressing agricultural concerns. For example, at his October 7, 2008 rally in Katete, Eastern Province, Hichilema stressed the importance of revitalizing the agricultural sector and pledged to provide farmers with free inputs during the first three years of his tenure (*Times of Zambia* 2008j). In the town of Isoka, Northern Province, Hichilema promised that as president, he would cancel the Presidential Emoluments Bill and the Constitutional Office Holders' Bill, both of which aimed to increase salaries for the president, vice-president, speaker of Parliament, ministers and deputy ministers. Instead, the money for such salary increases would be re-allocated to buy fertilizers and other agricultural inputs that would be distributed to farmers free of charge (Mulowa 2008). However, such promises were not necessarily different from what the MMD was already offering through the FSP and FRA and unfortunately, as seen in Figure 5.3, Hichilema did not obtain substantial electoral majorities outside of Southern Province.

Thus, Hichilema could not adopt a populist strategy with the urban poor because a peripheral coalition with rural Tonga-speakers alone would not provide him with a national majority. Instead, he needed to mobilize a larger segment of rural voters beyond Southern Province. A populist strategy with the urban poor, which inherently focuses on urban priorities, would have failed in capturing the broader rural constituency base that he needed to win the presidency. Consequently, Hichilema relied on personalistic linkages with the urban poor, which focused on his youth, education, charisma, and vague messages of both urban and rural development, in order to avoid alienating any voters.

Opposition and Religion in the Senegalese Countryside

The pattern of mobilization employed by Sata in 2008 was likewise used by Abdoulaye Wade during his days as an opposition leader. Previous to the 2000 elections, Wade consistently gained most of his support in urban areas. Yet, as Beck (2001) points out, he would have never won national office without receiving both urban *and* rural support. Wade appeared to realize this in the years preceding the 2000 elections, when he began to emphasize his religious background. According to the Tidiane religious leader Serigne Moustapha Sy, “In 1993, no one knew that Wade was a Mouride. We [Tidiane marabouts] helped him and protected him” (cited in Diouf 2007). Yet, by 2000, Wade seized upon the Mouride leadership’s disappointment with Diouf’s policies and reinforced the notion that he would be “their” president (Loimeier 2007: 72). Such promises gained even greater credibility when Wade immediately traveled to Touba on the day he won in 2000 to be photographed kneeling before the Mouride *Khalifa Général* (Villalón 2004). Hundreds of copies of the photograph subsequently were distributed widely throughout the country (Villalón 2004). Thus, while Wade invoked a populist strategy in Dakar to capture the disgruntled masses in 2000, he chose to mobilize a segment of rural supporters through public overtures demonstrating his religious devotion.

By the 2007 presidential elections though, Senegal’s opposition parties competed in circumstances akin to those experienced by Hichilema. Theoretically, they could have followed Wade’s example by forming a minimum winning coalition with poor *Dakarois* and a segment of rural voters by appealing to one of the two major Sufi brotherhoods, either the Tidianes or the Mourides. Although most urban dwellers are devout Muslims, a number of observers have emphasized that religious brotherhoods take on different manifestations in rural than in urban areas (e.g. Dahou and Foucher 2004). In urban areas, the *marabouts* tend to play a prominent role in

facilitating social and business networks (Beck 2001: 605).²⁹⁵ Yet, they have less influence over secular matters, such as politics (Gellar 2005: 111). Notably, a well-known urban *marabout*, Cheikh Modou Kara, was booed during a rally in Dakar in 2000 when he announced to an audience filled with disgruntled youth that they should vote for the then-incumbent *Parti Socialiste* (PS) in the forthcoming elections (Audrain 2004: 100). In rural areas, however, loyalty to religious leaders historically has been much higher than in urban centers (Beck 2008). Moreover, Senegal's relatively high level of administrative decentralization accords religious leaders, particularly in regions where the seat of the brotherhoods are based, a substantial level of authority over local development and therefore makes them important intermediaries for the central government (see Beck 2001). Recognizing that local development depends on a community leader's assessment of continued government beneficence can play a powerful role for voting-age residents:

When you go into rural areas, if you have in your party the leader of the village who serves the community, etc. you are sure to win there because he dominates the region economically, etc. When the leader says "vote" for something, then it's of course necessary for the people to vote for that person... But, in large cities, the people can position themselves more as they personally wish; they are less conditioned psychologically by the *marabouts*.²⁹⁶

Engaging in appeals to local religious leaders in rural areas and the *Khalifa* of the brotherhoods therefore could have assisted opposition leaders in gaining the following of co-religionists.

Practically, however, this was not possible in the 2007 elections for a variety of reasons. First, as briefly detailed in Chapter Three, Abdoulaye Wade was already crafting clientelistic relationships with the Mouride leadership through "implicit

²⁹⁵ For instance, *diaras*, or religious solidarity associations, first emerged in urban areas to assist migrants financially with their adjustment to city life, and they often are controlled by a particular *marabout* (Beck 2001; Guèye 2001).

²⁹⁶ Personal interview with Alioune Badara Diop, political scientist at the University of Gaston-Berger, St. Louis, December 1, 2008.

patronage promises and overt gestures” (Galvan 2009: 4). In addition to building a new road from the holy city of Touba to the *Khalifa*’s residence at Mbacké (Le Vine 2004), he promised to build an airport there to facilitate religious pilgrimages (Gervasoni and Guèye 2005). Unlike previous presidents who have possessed a retreat in a beach community south of Dakar, Wade decided to build his own vacation home at Touba (Vengroff and Magala 2001:150). Shockingly, he also claimed during his first term that he would not engage in any project within the country without first consulting with his personal *marabout*, who happens to be the *Khalifa Général* of the Mourides (Gervasoni and Guèye 2005: 633). Such actions provoked a great deal of tension among the brotherhoods and created especially difficult relations between the Tidjani branch at Tivaoune and Wade’s government during his first term in office (Villalón 2004).

Nevertheless, Wade remained committed to his Mouride co-religionists. When he launched his 2007 presidential campaign in Mbacké, Wade announced to the assembled crowd, “I have constructed mosques and churches. I have helped all religions. But, I will say clearly that I am a Muslim and a Mouride” (cited in Faye 2007a: 4). According to the journalist who accompanied Wade on the campaign trail, the President gave out 50 million CFA and a 4 X 4 car to all of the most important families within the Mouride brotherhood (Faye 2007b). Such efforts ultimately proved fruitful for Wade since the *Khalifa Général* of the Mourides, Cheikh Saliou Mbacké, issued a declaration for his disciples to support Wade and appeared on television to lobby on behalf of the incumbent on the eve of the elections (Mbow 2008). For Aiwa Wade, the representative for the LD-MPT, these clientelistic relations were a critical factor in explaining the PDS’ support in rural areas: “The PDS is supported by the *marabout* bourgeoisie, who are compradors, and you know that in Senegal, there are the *marabouts* who say to their supporters ‘vote for this person’ and

then their supporters will vote for that person.”²⁹⁷ Indeed, interviews conducted with Mouride followers in the region of Diourbel revealed that though many preferred Idrissa Seck of *Rewmi*, they supported Wade because they did not want to disobey Cheikh Mbacké (see Faye 2007b). Wade also forged close ties with another influential Mouride *marabout*, Cheikh Bethio Thioune, whose disciples violently attacked members of Idrissa Seck’s campaign team (Mane 2007b).

Secondly, Wade also attempted to co-opt portions of the Tidiane leadership. This was particularly problematic for the main opposition parties. Indeed, given Abdou Diouf’s Tidiane background, the PS remains associated with the Tidiane brotherhood. According to the former Minister of Planning for the PS, Ibrahima Sall, the PS’ main constituency is “The middle-class, *the Tidiane*, and the Lébous” [emphasis added].²⁹⁸

Specifically, Wade tried to split the Tidianes by favoring one segment of the brotherhood, the Niassène branch at Kaolack, over the traditionally more influential one, which is the Malikiyya branch headquartered in Tivaoune (Mbow 2008). Wade did so by inviting a high-ranking Niassène *marabout*, Serigne Mamoune Niasse, to the Presidential Palace in the months immediately preceding the 2007 campaign and offered him 1.5 million Euros in cash in exchange for his support (Diop 2007). In November 2006, Wade also promoted Serigne Niasse, who is illiterate in French, to the position of Minister of State without Portfolio and appointed him as a national senator not long after the elections. In addition, Wade appointed Ahmed Khalifa Niasse, who is one of the sons of the Niassène *Khalifa Général*, as his Minister in Charge of a New Capital, which is a newly created ministry intended to oversee the

²⁹⁷ Personal interview with Aiwa Wade, LD-MPT, Dakar, September 21, 2008.

²⁹⁸ Personal interview with Ibrahima Sall, PS, Dakar, November 11, 2008. The Lébou are a subgroup of the Wolof people and are predominantly concentrated in the Cape Vert Peninsula where Dakar is located (Ross 2008).

construction of a new Senegalese capital between Dakar and St.Louis (Kane and Anne 2007). Such actions were strategic in thwarting the opposition candidate Moustapha Niasse. Not only was Serigne Mamoune Niasse formerly was an organizer for the AFP in the regions of Kaolack, Fatick, and Diourbel, but also Moustapha Niasse belongs to the Niassène branch of the Tidiane brotherhood, and Kaolack is his home region and historically an important AFP stronghold.

Beyond reducing candidate Niasse's prospects, Wade's actions continued to provoke anger among the Tivaoune branch of the Tidiane co-fraternity. A sub-sect of this branch, known as the Moustarchidine, threw their support behind Idrissa Seck, who is both a Moustarchidine adherent and mayor of Thiès, which is the *département* in which the sub-sect is based.²⁹⁹ Although the Mouride leader encouraged Seck not to compete against Wade in the 2007 elections, Cheikh Tidiane Sy of the Moustarchidine suggested otherwise and affirmed his close ties with the *Rewmi* leader by stating that he had baptized Seck when the latter was an infant (Sow 2006). Ultimately, the influential son of Cheikh Sy, named Cheikh Moustapha Sy, issued a *ndigel* for all Moustarchidine adherents to vote for Seck in the 2007 elections (Mbaye 2007).³⁰⁰ In the immediate aftermath of the elections, Cheikh Moustapha Sy gave a speech that denounced Wade's division of the brotherhoods and the President's involvement in various financial scandals (Thurston 2007).

²⁹⁹ According to Villalón (1999), the Moustarchidine is a movement that was founded in 1980 and was actually spurred by a succession crisis within the Tivaouane Tijaniyya order. When Cheikh Ababacar Sy died in 1957, his successor as caliphate was fought over by his son, Cheikh Tidiane Sy and his brother, Cheikh Abdoul Aziz. The latter ultimately obtained a majority of family support and Tidiane Sy established the Moustarchidine as a parallel power base. The movement stresses the importance of genealogy as the source of legitimacy for its leadership, and has been active in hosting political activities aimed at targeting disillusioned youth. In the early 1990s, the Moustarchidine gave support to the opposition and publicly broke with the PS and then-president Abdou Diouf.

³⁰⁰ Mbaye (2007) speculates that this *ndigel* created the impression among Mourides that Seck was a distinctly Tidiane candidate and therefore, it actually spurred more Mourides to vote for Wade.

Broad Campaigning for the Opposition

Due to Wade's maneuvering as well as overlapping religious affinities among some of the main opposition candidates, no opposition leader could rely on targeting a minimum number of rural residents with religious appeals. Rather, they needed to campaign more broadly in the countryside. To demonstrate this, campaign data was collected from the newspaper *Sud Quotidien* between the official presidential campaign period of February 4-23, 2007. This newspaper is one of the most important independent newspapers in Senegal, and it dedicated a specific section of the paper to following the campaign trail for every day of the campaign period.

Importantly, the mode of campaigning is different in Senegal than in Zambia. Perhaps influenced by Wade's once-novel *marches blues* (see Chapter Three), candidates tend to travel through towns and stop occasionally to visit religious leaders or tour a neighborhood. The most obvious illustration of this was Seck's orange caravan, which consisted of Seck traveling in a Hummer that was escorted by ten other 4 x 4 cars, motorcycles, scooters, and the music of Youssou N'dour (Mane 2007a). While rallies do occur, especially at the launch and ending of a campaign, they are not the overriding method of campaigning in the same manner as they are in Zambia. As such, the number of villages and towns visited by each of the main candidates were recorded. Then, the village names were matched with the 2002 census, which indicates the administrative region where each locality can be found. Subsequently, the share of places visited within each region was calculated as the share of total places visited.

Table 5.8 reveals that like Zambia, the incumbent was the only candidate to have visited all regions outside of Dakar, and this included the most remote regions, such as Matam. In St. Louis, where President Wade concentrated many of his visits, these mostly occurred in the remote *département* of Podor, along the northern border

with Mauritania. The region is mostly Pulaar and Tidiane and none of the main presidential candidates were from there so, Wade may have viewed it as an important swing region. Given the LD-MPT's more programmatic orientation around socialist goals, Bathily overwhelmingly concentrated his campaign activities in Dakar, where a more educated populace was more likely to understand his message. In rural areas, he was most active in Tambacounda, which is the region of his birth. Dieng and Seck likewise spent most of their time in Dakar. Yet, unlike the PF in Zambia, these opposition politicians spread out their rural campaign activities more broadly. In contrast to Sata's concentration in those rural areas with large numbers of co-ethnics, Niasse allocated only 13 percent of his time in Kaolack, which is where he has the greatest affinity with the populace along religious lines. He concentrated rather more of his visits in Louga, which has a Mouride majority, and in Thiès, where the other Tidiane sect is located.

Table 5.8: Share of Locales Visited in each Région

<i>Région</i>	<i>Selected Candidates (Party)</i>					
	Wade (PDS)	Seck (Rewmi)	Niasse (AFP)	Dieng (PS)	Bathily (LD-MPT)	Sagna (DS)
Dakar	9.5	29.3	6.5	25.0	40.7	14.3
Diourbel	4.8	7.3	3.2	12.5	0.0	0.0
Fatick	9.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.7	0.0
Kaolack	4.8	9.8	12.9	8.3	7.4	0.0
Kolda	2.4	7.3	3.2	4.2	3.7	28.6
Louga	4.8	7.3	16.1	8.3	7.4	0.0
Matam	7.1	2.4	0.0	4.2	0.0	0.0
St. Louis	31.0	12.2	9.7	4.2	3.7	0.0
Tamba- counda	4.8	4.9	9.7	12.5	14.8	14.3
Thies	9.5	14.6	25.8	16.7	11.1	28.6
Ziguinchor	11.9	4.9	12.9	4.2	7.4	14.3
<i>Total</i>	100 (N=42)	100 (N=41)	100 (N=31)	100 (N=24)	100 (N=27)	100 (N=7)

Source: Calculated from news reports in *Sud Quotidien* newspaper between February 4-23, 2007.

Interestingly, regardless of where the opposition candidates campaigned, they all received their greatest electoral support in their home regions, as seen by the boldfaced numbers in Table 5.9. Wade's most formidable challenge came in the region of Thiès where Seck was certainly assisted by both his mayoral position there and his support from the Moustarchidine. Dieng, who was born in the *département* of Mbour within Thiès, also obtained the highest share of his votes in this region. Sagna, who was the only Christian candidate in the race, was the favorite opposition candidate in the predominantly Catholic region of Ziguinchor. Bathily received very few votes across all regions but his highest share of votes came from Tambacounda.

Table 5.9: Regional Distribution of Voting Shares in 2007 Senegalese Presidential Elections

<i>Région</i>	<i>Selected Candidates</i>					
	Wade (PDS)	Seck (Rewmi)	Niasse (AFP)	Dieng (PS)	Bathily (LD-MPT)	Sagna (DS)
Dakar	55.9	19.1	4.0	14.0	1.4	1.3
Diourbel	73.5	10.4	2.2	8.3	1.0	0.5
Fatick	55.9	6.5	9.9	16.9	3.6	1.0
Kaolack	44.8	6.6	23.1	18.0	2.2	0.9
Kolda	68.1	4.4	4.5	5.6	3.2	5.8
Louga	59.1	14.2	2.8	15.4	2.5	0.8
Matam	67.1	3.7	11.4	5.2	5.9	1.6
St. Louis	59.5	12.2	3.4	17.1	2.5	0.5
Tambacounda	60.0	7.0	4.3	10.6	6.8	5.4
Thies	38.6	32.9	2.6	19.9	1.2	0.8
Ziguinchor	55.9	4.9	2.4	2.2	2.1	26.3
Total	55.9	14.9	5.9	13.6	2.2	2.6

Source: "Résultats Provisoires de la Commission Nationale de Recensement des Votes," *Sud Quotidien*, March 2, 2007, p.3.

For Niasse, Kaolack was by far the region in which he was most popular. However, Wade's ties to the Niassène *marabouts* there surely dampened some of Niasse's support. Indeed, in the first round of the 2000 presidential elections, Niasse received 32 percent of the votes in the region of Kaolack while Wade received only 14 percent.³⁰¹ The tables were turned by 2007 when Niasse received only 23 percent of

³⁰¹ Data was provided by Macoumba Coumé at the Ministry of the Interior in Dakar on Oct. 2, 2008.

the vote compared with Wade's 45 percent. As such, Wade's actions in the interim must have encouraged the Niassène leadership, and its disciples, that the incumbent was a better choice than their co-religionist. With respect to Wade, even though he did not spend much physical time in Diourbel during the two-week campaign period, the explicit support of the Mouride *Khalifa Général* helped *Gorgui* achieve his highest victories in that overwhelmingly Mouride region.

This pattern of election results illustrates that without being able to appeal to a religious brotherhood, the opposition candidates could not obtain sufficient rural support beyond their home regions. This was even true for Seck, who gained the support of the Moustarchidine and came very close to obtaining the majority of votes in the region of Thiès.³⁰² The Moustarchidine are just one sub-sect of the wider Tidiane brotherhood and they are concentrated in Thiès, which is the second most populous region but still only contains 13 percent of the national population (ANSD 2004). Like Hichilema in Zambia, Seck and other Senegalese opposition candidates failed to mobilize a sizeable enough following in the countryside that would have, in concert with support from Dakar's urban poor, provided a minimum winning coalition. As such, a populist strategy with the urban poor was untenable for members of the opposition who could not be assured of enough support from rural voters to gamble on a campaign message that explicitly focused on rectifying exclusion and improving services and jobs for deprived *Dakarois*.

Conclusion

This chapter argued that even though a populist strategy is optimal for attaining differentiation and congruence among the urban poor, it also poses some costs. First, such a strategy will not help a party win a national election if only a small

³⁰² Seck did actually obtain the majority of votes in the *département* of Thiès.

share of the national population lives in urban areas. As such, a party is more likely to employ a populist strategy with the urban poor in a country which is sufficiently urbanized. Without a sizeable, low-income, urban constituency whose experiences will resonate with a discourse oriented around the rectification of inequalities, a populist strategy is not optimal. Both Zambia and Senegal meet this necessary condition.

A second challenge for populist strategies is that they can prove alienating to other constituents. This is particularly problematic given that opposition parties must ensure that they also receive enough support from rural voters in order to obtain national majorities. With fewer resources than the incumbent, an opposition party keen to employ a populist strategy therefore needs to form a minimum winning coalition that ensures the most votes with the expenditure of the fewest resources. Such a coalition is possible if a segment of rural voters can be appealed to via clientelistic linkages based on an ascriptive identity that applies to a population group sizeable enough to offer a national victory when combined with support from the urban poor. As in Gibson's (1997) work, such a coalition depends on a metropolitan constituency around whom a policy discourse is directed and a peripheral element that provides a party with sufficient votes.

In Zambia's 2008 elections, Sata was capable of meeting this sufficient condition while other parties were not. He could use a populist strategy with the urban poor because he appealed to Bemba-speaking rural dwellers who were concentrated in Northern and Luapula provinces and who could provide a sufficient number of votes. His clientelistic linkages in Bemba-speaking areas were not based on a discourse of excluding other ethno-linguistic groups if he came to office. Rather, he implied that other leaders, such as Hichilema, would exclude Bemba-speakers if they came to office. Moreover, while he often used Bemba slogans, even in urban areas, to

communicate with voters, these slogans conveyed inclusive messages. Indeed, pleading that voters should "get on the boat" (*Pabwato*) with the PF to escape economic hardships was an appealing prospect even for those who were not co-ethnics. As such, he was able to appeal to "peripheral" interests in Bembaphone rural provinces without necessarily offending non-co-ethnics in urban areas. Ultimately, Sata did not win the presidency, but he only lost by two percentage points to Banda. If many young, urban voters had not been disenfranchised by the ECZ's refusal to re-open the electoral register, then Sata's dual coalition would more than likely have proved victorious, especially since the findings in Chapter Four illustrated that this constituency was especially likely to support Sata.³⁰³

By contrast, Figure 5.4 shows that Hichilema could not rely on appealing to solely Tonga-speakers for a majority, and his need to campaign more widely in rural Zambia implied that he could not use a potentially alienating populist strategy with the urban poor. Likewise, support from the Moustarchidines in Thiès did not offer Seck a sizeable rural coalition. Due to the presence of religious candidates and Wade's co-optation of Mouride and Niassène Tidiane *marabouts*, Niasse and Dieng also were forced to campaign more broadly in rural areas and therefore could not risk a populist strategy with poor *Dakarois*. A Christian candidate such as Robert Sagna could never hope to use religious appeals alone in a majority Muslim country if his goal was the national presidency. Consequently, these conditions in the countryside forced most of the Senegalese opposition, as well as Zambia's Hichilema, to resort to personalistic linkages with the urban poor.

³⁰³ Cheeseman and Hinfelaar (2010: 20) also suspect that given Sata's popularity among the urban youth, the decision not to re-open the electoral register most likely created an advantage for the MMD.




Figure 5.4: Conditions Conducive to a Populist Strategy with the Urban Poor by Opposition Party

Given other research on politics and cleavage structures in Africa and beyond, these findings are significant for at least three related reasons. First, in Zambia in particular, rural-urban and class cleavages have been dismissed as less salient than ethno-linguistic ones (see Posner 2005: 86-88), and parties often are portrayed as predominantly interested in coalitions that allow them to exploit ethno-regional affinities for electoral gain (see Scarritt 2006). Instead, this chapter argues that parties

conceivably can exploit multiple cleavages during the same electoral cycle and form unlikely coalitions. Ultimately, different segments of society may support the same candidate for different reasons. This in turn may lead to multiple, potentially conflicting, public expectations about performance when and if the candidate becomes president. Secondly, based on his analysis of opposition politics in Côte d'Ivoire during the 1990s, Crook (1997) observes that ruling parties can more credibly claim that they represent "the nation" rather than localized interests. By contrast, he argues that opposition parties face the challenge of trying to mobilize their ethnic or communal social bases without becoming limited by them and simply synonymous with regional strongholds. By combining a populist strategy with the urban poor and clientelist linkages with a segment of rural voters, the PF was able to confront this challenge and craft a more inclusive coalition than if it had relied on either constituency alone. Lastly, as illustrated by Torcal and Mainwaring (2003) and Chhibber and Torcal (1997), parties often play a pivotal role in exacerbating or mitigating certain cleavage structures according to prevailing circumstances. In the case of Senegal and Zambia, the direction in which a party leader ultimately decided to embark to capture rural votes depended on demographics, the choices of other parties, and a candidate's own identity.

CHAPTER SIX

Africa's Urban Poor: Agents of Political Change?

As the colonial era ended, African urban poverty was changing. The traditional poor were still there. Blind beggars still felt their way through the streets. Market-women still jostled for tiny profits...But now new categories of poor joined them in the swollen towns. Unemployed youths sat on the kerbs awaiting the chance to unload a lorry...Policemen with street urchins and old women with nothing sat in the shade awaiting the arrival of the social worker. Poverty in Africa has been a cumulative phenomenon.
(Iliffe 1987: 192).

Iliffe's observations about the intersection between demographic and socioeconomic trends in Africa continue to resonate today and, as this dissertation has shown, can impact party strategizing and voting behavior within the region. Although Nelson (1979) argued more than 30 years ago that few African political parties accorded attention to the urban poor because the electorate was predominantly rural, Africa is now on the precipice of an urban "tipping point." Not only is Africa the fastest urbanizing region of the world, but also one where urbanization has resulted in a higher share of the region's poor living in urban areas (Ravallion *et al.* 2007). At the same time, opportunities for political parties to mobilize the urban poor are more numerous given that multi-party elections now represent the norm rather than the exception in Africa. In fact, while only about eight percent of presidential elections in the 1960s involved an incumbent competing against an actual opposition party, the equivalent figure by 2005 was 98 percent (Posner and Young 2007: 130).

Based on these underlying changes in the region, this study addressed two main questions by comparing political parties within the same country, across countries, and over different time periods. First, why and when do the urban poor in African democracies support opposition parties? Chapter Two argued that the campaign strategies used by political parties to mobilize the urban poor were more likely explanations for this constituency's voting behavior than other potential

explanations, such as vote-buying by political parties, the poor's retrospective perceptions of the macro-economy, ethnic voting, and associational ties. Populist strategies in particular were believed to be more likely to mobilize the urban poor than personalistic, clientelistic, or programmatic linkages alone. Populist strategies were characterized by an anti-elitist discourse, a policy message of social inclusion focused on jobs, housing, and services, charismatic leadership, and sometimes the distribution of selective benefits. Populist strategies therefore fuse together the different modes of mobilization inherent in the three types of citizen-voter linkages. At same time, populist strategies target the same constituents as clientelistic linkages, i.e. the poor, and foster unmediated ties between leaders and voters in the same manner as personalistic linkages.

The main mechanisms facilitating the appeal of populist strategies are differentiation and congruence. Differentiation refers to the ability of a voter to determine distinctions among parties that extend beyond just the personality of the party leader. Congruence refers to the distance between the policies advocated by a party on the one hand and those desired by a constituency on the other hand. Since most African parties rely on personalistic linkages, a populist strategy provides greater differentiation. Simultaneously, purely programmatic linkages along a left-right policy spectrum may fail to provide adequate congruence.

Chapter Three relied on interviews with political elites and other local observers to illustrate the different manner in which parties interact with the urban poor in Senegal and Zambia. In Zambia, the PF's Michael Sata employed a populist strategy in both the 2006 and 2008 presidential elections. This consisted of a campaign focused on improving urban services, reducing taxes, creating jobs, and ending harassment of marketeers and shanty compound residents. Along with controversial antics designed to attract attention, Sata targeted his urban campaigns in

low-income areas of Lusaka. Furthermore, he created unmediated ties with the urban poor by using simplistic language that resonated with their plight and having an “open door” policy to make him more available to constituents. At the same time, this populism manifested through a highly autocratic management of the PF, which involved ostracizing errant party members who disobeyed Sata’s dictates. By contrast, both Hakainde Hichilema of the UPND and Godfrey Miyanda of the Heritage Party depended on more personalistic linkages with the urban poor. The inability of either of these candidates to garner a high number of votes in the capital city, and the fact that they obtained even fewer votes than the incumbent MMD, indicates that poor Lusakans are not just pro-opposition but specifically pro-Sata.

While Abdoulaye Wade of the PDS relied on a populist strategy with the urban poor to win Senegal’s 2000 presidential elections, his first term in office resulted in few tangible benefits for this constituency. In Dakar, a majority of his attention was diverted towards large-scale construction projects that primarily benefitted the urban elite. Nevertheless, no opposition party could obtain sufficient vote majorities from the urban poor during the 2007 elections. Parties such as the PS, AFP, and *Rewmi* primarily forged personalistic linkages with the urban poor that were devoid of a clear policy message and mostly focused on the personalities of the party leaders. Leftist parties relied more on programmatic linkages but their central messages were divorced from the everyday realities of the urban poor.

Chapter Four utilized surveys with informal market workers and slum dwellers to analyze the mechanisms of differentiation and congruence. The chapter revealed that the populist PF overwhelmingly was viewed by respondents as the party most concerned about improving living conditions in Lusaka, and a majority of respondents believed that the main distinction among Zambia’s political parties were their positions on social and economic conditions. By contrast, most respondents in

Senegal did not perceive any difference among their country's political parties and believed that no opposition party was concerned with improving living conditions in Dakar. The econometric results confirmed that, among other factors, those respondents who were most concerned with, and or disappointed by, service delivery and job creation under the incumbent MMD were significantly more likely to support the opposition PF in Zambia. However, in Senegal, those who were least educated and objectively poorer still supported the incumbent, despite Wade's well-known lack of attention to the needs of the urban poor during his first term.

The relative success of Sata's populist strategy in Zambia as compared to the opposition challengers in Senegal motivates the second question probed during this study: when is it feasible for an opposition party to employ a populist strategy? Chapter Five argued that this depended on two factors. First, a country needs to be sufficiently urbanized in order for a party to possess an incentive to appeal to the urban poor and in order for socioeconomic conditions to permit a populist discourse to resonate with voters. Even when a country meets such conditions, a second condition is also required. An opposition party needs to be able to form a minimum winning coalition that consists of the urban poor and a large enough segment of rural voters to deliver electoral majorities but not so large as to require extensive campaigning. In such instances, the urban poor represent what Gibson (1997) terms the "metropolitan" component of the coalition, towards whom policies are directed, while the segment of rural voters constitutes the coalition's "peripheral" element. For the reasons discussed in Chapter Five, ascriptive identity cleavages offer one of the few means of mobilizing an adequate share of rural voters without undermining an opposition party's credibility with the urban poor. Through the use of census data, it was argued that ethno-linguistic identity and Sufi brotherhood represent the politically salient cleavages in Zambia and Senegal, respectively.

By using data on campaign rallies, the study revealed that Zambia's populist candidate, Sata, concentrated his 2008 rural campaigning in Bemba-speaking provinces, and these were also the only rural provinces that he won during that election. His ability to create a metropolitan and peripheral coalition explains why the PF is alternately viewed as a populist party and a tribal one. By contrast, the Senegalese opposition could not engage in the same coalition-building with a combination of Dakar's poor and a segment of rural voters. The incumbent, Wade, had already co-opted the leaders of the Mouride brotherhood as well as those from the Niassène sect of the Tidiane brotherhood. While Seck obtained support from a sect of the Tidiane brotherhood known as the Moustarchidines, this sect's following was not sizeable enough to provide the *Rewmi* leader with a minimum winning coalition. Unable to mobilize rural voters along identity cleavages, most of Senegal's opposition needed to espouse broad messages of rural development and these messages would not resonate with rural dwellers if they had been coupled with a targeted discourse focused on rectifying urban inequalities and living conditions.

Overall then, the study emphasized how and why populist strategies are optimal for mobilizing the urban poor, as well as why parties do not always employ them. This chapter first examines how the study informed existing theories of voting behavior. Then, the study's two central arguments are applied to explain the voting behavior of the urban poor in other highly urbanized African electoral democracies, such as Kenya, Botswana, and South Africa. Thereafter, four contributions of the research are discussed with respect to democratic contestation and consolidation, party linkages, cross-regional manifestations of populism, and Africanist scholarship on elections, parties, and voting. The chapter concludes by discussing areas for further research.

Informing Theories on Voting Behavior

This study originally noted that the voting literature suggested four potential influences on the urban poor's decision about whether to support an opposition party: vote-buying, ethnic ties, retrospective perceptions of the macro-economy, and associational membership. Based on the study's findings, two variables can be discounted in the African context while two require modifications.

Associational membership had no influence on the urban poor's voting behavior. Though some were involved in credit associations, often administered by NGOs, few respondents in either country were involved in any type of work associations. They either did not know that such organizations existed for marketeers and vendors, or they felt that there was little benefit to their participation in them. Even UNACOIS in Senegal, which was politically active in the 1990s, is predominantly for informal sector workers who engage in export-import enterprises than for those who are small-scale street hawkers. Potentially, associational membership among the urban poor can at some point shape political affiliations or facilitate corporatist ties in the same way that formal trade unions have done in both other regions and at certain points in Africa's history. However, the existing results largely confirm the prevailing view (e.g. Amis 2004; Croucher 2007; Dietz 1998; Huntington and Nelson 1976; Nelson 1970, 1979; Thornton 2000) that the diverse activities, time constraints, and heterogeneous backgrounds of the urban poor simply precludes their ability and desire to organize effectively and thereby create the critical mass necessary for political influence.

Likewise, vote-buying alone, which is a sub-type of clientelism, displayed no perceivable influence on the voting behavior of the urban poor in either Senegal or Zambia. Unlike in rural areas, where fewer opposition parties can extensively campaign, multiple parties may be engaged in vote-buying in urban centers. This was

clear in both case study countries where survey respondents reported that the incumbent party and most of the opposition parties offered gifts and sometimes even money to their communities during campaign periods.

A voter may certainly be more likely to vote for any candidate who provides certain goods and services over one who does not. Indeed, Zambia's opposition candidate, Godfrey Miyanda, was known for abstaining from vote-buying practices and he received no support from the respondents surveyed in Lusaka. However, in a context where multiple parties are engaged in vote-buying, this cannot be the main means of mobilizing the urban poor. Ultimately, the urban poor need to distinguish parties according to other criteria and can still vote according to their conscience even if they accept gifts from every party.³⁰⁴ This explains why, despite the high level of vote-buying in both countries, this variable did not demonstrate a statistically significant effect in shaping respondents' support for Sata or Wade.

Retrospective views of the macro-economy also did not exhibit an influence on voting behavior in the traditional sense. However, the findings here suggest an alteration to the usual conceptualization and measurement of variables associated with this school of thought. Specifically, Chapter Two illustrated that based on traditional measures used in this literature, such as GDP and inflation, poor macroeconomic conditions did not necessarily explain when the urban poor supported the incumbent or the opposition. In fact, in Senegal, macroeconomic growth was negative before the 2007 elections and the PDS' incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade, nevertheless won a great deal of support among the urban poor. By contrast, growth was positive in Zambia before the 2006 elections but the MMD incumbent at the time, Levy Mwanawasa,

³⁰⁴ Vicente (2008: 3) quotes an anonymous voter in São Tomé e Príncipe who essentially makes a similar point: “We do like vote buying. It is essential. That is the only way we have to see anything good coming from the politicians. Anyway, I can vote for whoever I want.”

gained few votes from the urban poor. Chapter Three further elaborated on the economic climate in these two countries preceding key presidential elections. For example, Sata's popularity coincided with a period of strong economic growth under Mwanawasa. Chapter Four further illustrated that negative sociotropic and egotropic views of the macro-economy did not play a statistically significant role in determining whether a survey respondent supported the opposition or incumbent in each country's most recent presidential elections.

Yet, macroeconomic growth does not necessarily always filter down to the poor in developing countries (e.g. Lewis 2008; Thurlow and Wobst 2006) and can therefore fail to address the urban poor's main concerns over jobs, housing, services, and food prices. Not surprisingly, disappointment with incumbent performance with job creation and service provision proved a major impetus for supporting the opposition in Zambia, particularly since the populist PF specifically targeted these issues during its campaigns. As such, this voting model could be amended in ways that account for issues that are more relevant in developing countries than in OECD ones, where this school of thought originally emerged. Accurate and comparable indicators on unemployment, inequality, access to services, and treatment of informal sector workers are difficult to find but would nevertheless go a long way towards making this voting model more finely attuned to the everyday worries of the poor in developing countries.

Of the four voting models originally discussed, ethnicity played the strongest role in Zambia, where ethno-linguistic affinity has long been a factor in politics, but not in Senegal, where ethnicity rarely has represented the main salient cleavage. In particular, Bemba speakers among Lusaka's poor tended to vote for a co-ethnic leader, Sata. Yet, a majority of the survey respondents who were non-Bemba also voted for him. Moreover, even after Bemba ethno-linguistic identity was controlled for in the

statistical analyses included in Chapter Four, indicators capturing satisfaction with jobs and service delivery were also statistically significant predictors of a respondent's support for Sata.

King Cobra's populist strategy purposely targeted class concerns and represented the main reason for his success. Indeed, given that Lusaka is Zambia's most diverse city and dominated more by Nyanja than Bemba speakers, Sata's overwhelming successes there cannot simply be due to ethnic factors alone. Yet, his background as a Bemba and his use of ethnic mobilization in the countryside may have *even further increased* his appeal among poor, urban co-ethnics. In any case, national election results reveal that ethno-linguistic identity played a much stronger role in the rural areas since Sata *only* won in those rural provinces that are a majority Bemba-speaking, despite the PF's lack of an agricultural message and the MMD's agricultural subsidies to these regions. Chapter Five emphasized a similar trend in Senegal where adherence to a specific Sufi brotherhood was less relevant in Dakar than in rural areas.

These findings therefore question extreme views regarding the political influence of ethnic and other ascriptive identities among city dwellers. Urbanization does not overwhelmingly exacerbate ethnic differences, as Bates (1983) or Melson and Wolpe (1970) once speculated, nor does it entirely eradicate their salience, as Allport (1954) postulated. Instead, it allows the urban poor to adapt multiple identities, e.g. ascriptive, occupational, socioeconomic, demographic, etc., that can at times be mutually reinforcing.

The Populist Strategy in Other African Democracies

The study's central arguments can be used to explain the success of parties in other African democracies. Chapter One identified 15 countries that are considered

electoral democracies and categorized them according to their level of urbanization and whether an opposition or incumbent party obtained the majority of votes in that country's largest city during the most recent national elections for executive office (see Table 1.1). Based on that classification, three additional countries which were considered electoral democracies and which fell within the highly urbanized category are examined here. This latter characteristic is important given this study's claim that a highly urbanized populace represents a scope condition for the presence of a populist strategy with the urban poor.

These three shadow cases include Kenya, Botswana, and South Africa, which have varied on the dependent variable of opposition success in urban areas. Kenya is similar to Zambia in that it represents a case where an opposition party obtained a majority of urban votes during the last elections in 2007. Botswana is a country where the opposition was dominant in the capital of Gaborone for more than a decade but where the incumbent party gained a majority of votes in the city during the 2009 elections. As such, the case offers the opportunity to examine how changes in parties' electoral fortunes are reflective of the presence or absence of a populist strategy. Despite internal squabbles and the emergence of a new opposition party, South Africa's incumbent party retained its dominance in major urban areas, such as Johannesburg, during the 2009 presidential elections.

Collectively, the cases emphasize three points about a populist strategy. First and foremost, it is a winning strategy for mobilizing the urban poor. Secondly, it is almost always predicated on a dual coalition that consists of the urban poor and a segment of rural voters who are mobilized according to an identity cleavage. Thirdly, a populist strategy is also available to incumbent parties, whose leaders may use this strategy to reinvigorate their party's support among the urban poor.

Agwambo's Populist Strategy with Kenya's Urban Poor

Kenya officially transitioned to a multi-party system in December 1991. However, the long-ruling Kenyan African National Union (KANU) was not ousted until Mwai Kibaki won the 2002 presidential elections. Kibaki was leader of the Democratic Party (DP) as well as a broader opposition coalition known as the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). According to Kenya's Electoral Commission, Kibaki obtained approximately 76 percent of the votes in Nairobi during the 2002 elections.

Similar to Mwanawasa's first term in office, Kibaki's first five years as president were characterized by good stewardship of the macro-economy. By privatizing failing state enterprises, enforcing tax regulations, and improving Kenya's business environment, the budget deficit declined substantially and tax revenue doubled (Chege 2008). Between 2003 and 2007, economic growth increased from 3.4 to 7 percent (Chege 2008: 128).

Yet, urban poverty and inequality actually increased during roughly the same period. Over the last decade, Kenya has experienced rapid urbanization, growing at 4.4 percent in recent years (UN-Habitat 2003), and it is expected that the capital city of Nairobi will have 3.3 million residents by 2010 (Otiso and Owusu 2008). Between 1997 and 2006, two poverty studies conducted under the auspices of the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey Bureau revealed that the share of the urban population considered "food poor" increased from 38 to 41 percent (Oxfam 2009). Moreover, while the rural Gini coefficient decreased from 0.42 to 0.38, its urban equivalent increased from 0.43 to 0.45 (Oxfam 2009). In Nairobi province, the poverty incidence is 44 percent, and it is estimated that the richest decile of the city's population accrues approximately 20 times more income than the poorest decile (World Bank 2009b: 50). Youth unemployment in Nairobi alone stands at 42 percent

(World Bank 2009b: 50), and an estimated 60 percent of the city's population lives in slums that occupy only five percent of the capital's land area (UN-Habitat 2008: 10).

Moreover, the Kibaki regime's treatment of the urban poor was not particularly benevolent. For instance, in February 2004, the government threatened to evict 300,000 people from Kibera, which is considered Africa's largest slum, because houses had been built by railway tracks, under electricity pylons, or in areas marked for road construction. Though nothing ultimately happened, government authorities bulldozed and set fire to hundreds of homes in dozens of Nairobi's other informal settlements between 2004 and 2006 (COHRE 2006: 21-23). Even more controversially, gang violence within the slums resulted in heavy-handed police intervention that was resented by residents. A raid on gangs in Mathare slum in mid-2007, which resulted in the deaths of over 100 people, left the urban poor particularly incensed over Kibaki's inability to control the police (Kagwanja 2009: 371).

Raila Odinga was well-placed to capitalize on the urban poor's disenchantment. Nicknamed *Agwambo*, or "the mysterious one," Odinga is a well-established Kenyan politician. During the early 1990s, Odinga belonged to a party known as the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD).³⁰⁵ When that party split into two, he became leader of the FORD-Kenya faction. After losing internal elections to lead this faction, he left to form the National Democratic Party (NDP), from which he contested the 1997 presidential elections. Subsequently, he became a member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which in turn joined Kibaki's NARC coalition in the 2002 elections. Odinga was appointed the Minister of Roads under Kibaki's government. Yet, in 2005, in the aftermath of Kibaki's failed referendum on strengthening presidential powers, a number of cabinet ministers, including Odinga,

³⁰⁵ Raila Odinga's father, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, had been vice-president to Jomo Kenyatta during the 1960s and a stalwart of KANU until he left the party and founded FORD.

were purged. Odinga subsequently formed the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Kibaki changed the name of his own party to the Party of National Unity (PNU).³⁰⁶

Despite traversing so many parties, Odinga's constituency base is undoubtedly tied to the urban poor. Since 1992, he has been consistently re-elected as the MP for Nairobi's Langata constituency, which contains the large slum of Kibera, estimated to house from 750,000 to one million of Nairobi's population. Residents have cited unemployment, poor housing, insufficient water and sanitation facilities, and insecurity as some of their main concerns (*The Nation* 2007). The ODM also has an unofficial office located in a part of the slum known as Gatwikira (De Smedt 2009), and Odinga spent the day before the 2007 elections holding a series of rallies in Langata constituency (Barasa 2007).

Like Sata, Odinga is highly charismatic and politically ambitious. A rich businessman who formerly subscribed to socialism, he is well-known for his flamboyant outfits and for driving around Nairobi in his expensive Hummer car. During the 2007 campaign, he would improvise riddles and alter song lyrics in order to highlight the Kibaki government's failings, and he notably once emerged from his car's sunroof to exclaim, "This government needs a hammer...it needs to be hammered out" (cited in Bosire 2007). Such tactics attract large crowds to his urban rallies. In fact, his motorcade was mobbed with adoring supporters during his opening rally in Nairobi's Uhuru Park where the crowd forced people onto trees and rooftops to find space to hear his message (Odula 2007). As Lynch (2006: 255) observes, "Raila is a man who stirs up the strongest of emotions – be it 'Railamania' or 'Railaphobia'."

³⁰⁶ The origins of the ODM's name come from the 2005 referendum when an orange represented the symbol of those who opposed greater executive powers and a banana was the symbol for those who did not.

A discourse firmly targeted at ameliorating inequalities and catering to the needs of the urban poor proved central to Odinga's 2007 campaign. The interests of slum dwellers in particular have long represented one of his interests. Back in 2001, Odinga had appealed to the then-president, Daniel Arap Moi, to lower the rents in Kibera (De Smedt 2009). In 2005, when speculators were trying to obtain private ownership of land in Nairobi's Kiambiu slum, Odinga gave a speech on behalf of protecting the slum residents' interests and argued that the Kibaki government should more actively upgrade slums in both the capital and elsewhere in the country (*The East African* 2005). When accepting the presidential nomination by the ODM in September 2007, Odinga promised to end Kenya's "economic apartheid" and ensured his young supporters jobs, free schooling, and cash for the poor (Chege 2008). In a subsequent rally, Odinga announced, "Kibaki says that the economy is better, but the situation on the ground shows that inflation has grown high. Sixty percent of Nairobi residents live in informal settlements because of government mismanagement. We want to improve the economic power of the people. We want a social movement" (cited in Odula 2007). While Kibaki focused on emphasizing his government's economic achievements, Odinga placed job creation as the first priority in his party manifesto and countered that growth under Kibaki only resulted in widening income gaps. As such, Odinga promised the following:

I give you a cast-iron guarantee that I will be a champion of social justice and social emancipation – a champion of the poor, the dispossessed and the disadvantaged in our nation. I will redress the imbalance between the powerful and the weak, between the rich and the poor, between the satisfied and the hungry (Odinga 2007: 7).

Odinga also launched attacks on government corruption, which only strengthened his focus on inequality since Kibaki himself was one of the world's highest paid heads of state at the time (see Bosire and Peytermann 2007).

Such a campaign helped Odinga forge unmediated ties with the urban poor. Chege (2008: 135) observes that the ODM's lively and colorful campaign oriented around exclusion proved much more entertaining than the PNU's bland and businesslike one, which tried to appeal to voters on the basis of dry statistics. Lynch (2006) also claims that, despite being 60 years-old at the time, Odinga portrayed himself as a modern and youthful leader, which undoubtedly aimed to endear him to Nairobi's restless and relatively young population. The fact that the ODM's orange campaign T-shirts espoused that Odinga was the "People's President" (see Odula 2007) provided yet another example of the candidate's attempt to convey that he was a man-of-the-people rather than a wealthy politician. Rumors that Odinga has, for years, paid the rent for some Kibera tenants (De Smedt 2009: 595) also suggests that he has at times engaged in the distribution of selective benefits to his constituents.

By contrast, he was not particularly well-liked by the country's business community. The PNU's economic record appealed to the business class, and when share prices on the Nairobi Stock Exchange fell in early 2007, the ruling party argued that this was the consequence of international fears over an Odinga win (Chege 2008). Privately, financial actors admitted to preferring Kibaki to Odinga because the former offered continuity (Bosire and Peytermann 2007). Beyond economic stability, some Kenyans feared that Odinga conveyed a "street-brawling image," which was only reinforced by his support from young and unemployed "street thugs" in the slums (Clayton 2007).

As seen in Table 6.1 below, Odinga's populist strategy certainly proved successful in most of Nairobi's constituencies, which are known as "divisions." Parliamentary results are presented here because they are more credible than the presidential ones, which outside observers claimed were rigged. Indeed, the fact that so many PNU MPs were voted out of office in the parliamentary elections fuelled

suspensions that the presidential results had been rigged in favor of Kibaki (Gettleman 2007). Moreover, an exit poll conducted during the elections and funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) found that 46.2 percent of voters had selected Odinga for president compared with 40.2 for Kibaki (USAID 2008).³⁰⁷ The more credible parliamentary results reveal that ODM candidates received the majority of votes in five of these divisions, and Odinga did exceptionally well in Langata, where he ran again as MP.

Table 6.1: Poverty and Votes in Kenya's 2007 Parliamentary Elections

Divisions	Number of Poor People	Share of ODM Votes (%)	Share of PNU Votes (%)
Nairobi District	881,265	41.9	28.8
Central	91, 559	42.2	40.9
Dagoretti	106,177	38.1	47.7
Embakasi	170,165	32.9	26.4
Kasarani	152, 825	48.5	20.8
Langata	110,504	69.7	28.1
Makadara	108,100	32.5	33.9
Westlands	60,705	45.3	31.1

Sources: Poverty data calculated by Ndeng'e *et al.* (2003). Election data from the Electoral Commission of Kenya, www.ECK.ke, (accessed March 13, 2008).

Notes: The poverty data is based on an urban-specific poverty line, pegged at 2648 Kenyan shillings per adult per month for an urban household. This was equivalent to about 35 dollars in 2003 prices, which was when the survey was conducted. Official results in the eighth division, Kamukunji, were contested and went to court. The results were never declared but a PNU MP was appointed in August 2008.

Yet, the urban poor were not Odinga's only constituency base. Similar to Sata, he forged a coalition with a segment of rural voters who were his Luo co-ethnics or belonged to other minority groups. Of all potential cleavages, ethnicity certainly has proved the most salient in Kenya's political history (see Barkan & Chege 1989; Hultström 2004; Miguel 2004; Oyugi 1997). According to Posner's (2004: 856) PREG index, Kenya possesses a relatively high rating of 0.57. Perceived political

³⁰⁷ The poll was actually conducted by the International Republican Institute. A news statement about the poll, and a copy of the final report, can be found at <http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-statement-kenya-election-day-poll> (accessed April 5, 2010).

domination and wealth accumulation by the Kikuyu has been a key concern among other ethnic groups. The Luo largely were excluded from power during both the Kenyatta and Moi regimes, and groups such as the Luhya and Kamba often felt that their political representation was not commensurate with their share of the voting population (Branch and Cheeseman 2008). Although the victory of the multi-ethnic NARC in 2002 hinted of ethnicity's potentially declining salience, the constitutional reform in 2005 reinvigorated it as opposing camps largely divided along ethnic lines (Lynch 2006).

Although Nairobi is a very diverse city, some of Kenya's rural provinces demonstrate a greater degree of concentration by certain ethnic groups.³⁰⁸ For instance, Table 6.2 reveals that Central Province is almost entirely comprised of Kikuyu while the Luo represent almost 58 percent of the population in Nyanza.

Table 6.2: Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Kenya

Province	Dominant Ethnic Group		Share of Province in Kenya's Population (%)
	Name	Share of Province's Population (%)	
Central	Kikuyu	93.8	11.2
Coast	Mijikenda	54.4	8.8
Eastern	Kamba	53.9	15.5
Nairobi	Kikuyu	32.4	8.7
North-eastern	Ogaden	36.0	4.0
Nyanza	Luo	57.9	14.5
Rift Valley	Kalenjin	46.4	24.9
Western	Luhya	86.2	12.4

Source: 1989 Kenyan Census; Population Projections from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (see <http://www.knbs.or.ke/>, accessed January 19, 2010).

Odinga did not portray the ODM as solely an ethnic party oriented around the Luo. Instead, the ODM constructed a "pentagon" alliance with leaders representing the Luhya, the Kalenjin, the Embu, and the Coast peoples (EIU 2007d: 3).

Furthermore, his rhetoric was often couched in class terms with ethnic implications,

³⁰⁸ While the Kikuyu are the ethnic group with the largest representation in Nairobi, they comprise only 32 percent of the city's population, followed by the Luo at 18 percent and the Luhya at 16 percent (Butler 2002).

blaming the President and his “Mount Kenya mafia” for creating massive disparities between Kikuyu dominated areas and the rest of Kenya.³⁰⁹ The ODM’s campaign focused on Kikuyu domination in banking, government, commercial farming, and education (Chege 2008) as well as their influx into the Rift Valley, which historically was the home of the Kalenjin and Maasai (Kagwanja 2009:374). This storyline was reinforced by the ODM’s campaign symbol, which was an orange divided into equal eight pieces. According to Odinga’s manifesto, this symbolism represented that Kenya’s eight provinces would receive equal resources under his administration (Odinga 2007: 4). The implication was that under Kibaki, inter-provincial disparities prevailed.

This strategy proved conducive to mobilizing ethnic groups beyond Odinga’s Luo base, which was necessary for Odinga to create a minimum winning coalition. Indeed, as seen in Table 6.2 above, the Luo alone in combination with the population of the urban poor would not provide the ODM with a national majority. Nyanza, where the Luo are concentrated, represents only 14 percent of the national population. As such, attempts were made to mobilize other key groups, such as the Kalenjin and the Luhya. In fact, Odinga often claims that he is the descendant of a famous Luhya leader, named Nabongo Mumia (*The Nation* 2007). Based on an analysis of campaign rallies in 2007, Horowitz (2009) finds that Odinga concentrated most of his rallies in the Rift Valley and Western Provinces. He only visited the Kikuyu-dominated Central Province once and never visited Eastern Province, from where the Kamba leader of the ODM-Kenya party, Kalonzo Musyoka, hailed.³¹⁰ Likewise, Horowitz (2009) discovers that neither Kibaki nor Musyoka spent any time in the Luo-dominated province of Nyanza.

³⁰⁹ Mount Kenya clan refers to those politicians in Kibaki’s inner circle and who hail from predominantly Kikuyu areas in Central and Eastern Province (*Africa Confidential* 2003: 2).

³¹⁰ The ODM-Kenya party broke off from the ODM shortly before the 2007 elections.

Table 6.3 below highlights the results of the candidate's campaign strategies. Parliamentary results are used to ensure consistency with those that were presented in Table 6.1 and because, once again, they are considered more accurate than their presidential equivalents. The results show that Musyoka's party only achieved a majority of seats in Eastern Province while the PNU was most successful in Central Province. Similarly, the ODM's biggest wins occurred in Nyanza, Rift Valley, and Western Provinces. In total, the ODM obtained 99 out of a total number of 207 Parliamentary seats while the PNU received only 43 and the ODM-Kenya won 15.

Table 6.3: Distribution of Parliamentary Seats Won by Party in 2007 Kenyan Elections

Province	Dominant Ethnic Group	Number of Seats				Total
		<i>ODM</i>	<i>PNU</i>	<i>ODM-K</i>	<i>Other</i>	
Central	Kikuyu	0	18	0	11	29
Coast	Mijikenda	12	3	1	5	21
Eastern	Kamba	2	7	13	14	36
Nairobi	Kikuyu	5	2	0	0	7
North-eastern	Ogaden	5	0	0	5	10
Nyanza	Luo	25	0	0	7	32
Rift Valley	Kalenjin	32	11	1	4	48
Western	Luhya	18	2	0	4	24
<i>Total</i>		<i>99</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>207</i>

Source: "Office of Government Spokesperson: Election Results 2007"

<http://www.communication.go.ke/elections/province.asp> (accessed January 19, 2010)

Notes: The results for one seat in Nairobi were contested and the results were never publicized. As such, the results for only seven, rather than eight, seats are indicated here.

By creating a peripheral coalition oriented around Luo co-ethnics and other minority ethnic groups, Odinga could mobilize a metropolitan coalition comprised of most of Nairobi's poor by employing a populist strategy. When well-documented vote-rigging caused Odinga to lose his presidential bid, despite the ODM's parliamentary victory, violence not only erupted among ethnic groups in rural provinces but also spilled out of the city's slums, where disappointed Odinga supporters threatened "No Raila! No Peace!" for weeks thereafter (De Smedt 2009).

The violence represented an unfortunate testament to the emotional resonance of a campaign discourse that consistently focused on rectifying various manifestations of inequality.

A Populist Opposition in a Dominant Party State

With approximately 57 percent of its population living in urban areas (World Bank 2009b), Botswana has an even higher urbanization rate than Kenya. Well-managed diamonds have ensured high economic growth rates over the last few decades, but little of the diamond wealth translated into significant poverty reduction. In the capital of Gaborone, 47 percent of the population lives below the poverty line (UNFPA 2007). Official unemployment currently is estimated at around 24 percent (OECD 2006), and inequality in Botswana's cities is considered some of the highest in Africa (UN-Habitat 2009).

These circumstances, combined with Botswana's long history of democracy, help explain why the country represents one of the earlier examples of an opposition party relying on a populist strategy to win votes from the urban poor. Botswana's political system is often classified as one-party dominant (e.g. Bogaards 2000; Doorenspleet 2003) because the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) never has been ousted from the presidency. Established by cattle elites, the BDP possesses strong roots in rural areas and has long adhered to a free-market orientation (Good and Taylor 2008). Yet, between 1994 and 2009, the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) won substantial support among the urban poor in the capital city of Gaborone, and its bastion of support centered in the city's slum of Old Naledi.

Founded in 1965, the BNF's leader was Dr. Kenneth Koma, an intellectual trained in the former Soviet Union who inherited considerable wealth from his father (Makgala 2005). Like Senegal's *pôle de gauche* opposition, Koma long espoused a

programmatic message centered on socialism that held little appeal to the urban poor (van Bingsbergen 1994). The BDP often used this against the BNF, generating fear among rural peasants that the BNF would nationalize their land and enforce communal ownership of cattle (Molomo 2000).

Yet, the BNF long posed little threat to the BDP until 1994. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the party shifted to a less avowedly socialist and more populist message. In the first elections after switching its orientation, the party obtained 40 percent of the national vote, which was its highest ever (Lemon 2007). During these elections, the BNF achieved massive majorities in three of Gaborone's four constituencies, Gaborone North, South, and West, while also beating the BDP in the secondary towns of Lobatse, Francistown, Selebi-Phikwe, and Mogoditshane (Tsie 1996).

In analyses of these elections, two features proved instrumental to the BNF's successes. First, Dr. Koma was viewed as a modern "Moses" by Gaborone's poor, and his appearance in crumpled clothes and use of colloquial Setswana helped him forge unmediated ties with this constituency (see Motlogelwa 2009). Secondly, the discourse of the BNF provided congruence with the priorities of the urban poor. According to Wiseman (1998), the sense of relative deprivation in urban areas among recently-arrived rural migrants who failed to find jobs certainly explains the rise of the BNF and the attendant decline of the BDP during this period. Grievances included the shortage of accommodation in the city and the high prices for consumer goods (see Garekwe and Moloi 1994). As Tsie (1996: 31) explains:

A substantial section of the electorate supports it [the BNF] because its political message seems to be relevant to the socio-economic conditions of contemporary Botswana. The issues which it has stressed in its campaigns such as affordable housing, employment creation, better working conditions and the revamping of the education system resonate with more conviction amongst urban and peri-urban dwellers than amongst the peasantry.

Likewise, Molomo (2000: 72) observes that the BNF's message assisted the party in differentiating it from both the BDP and other opposition competitors: "It was a message focused on defining a niche for themselves [and which emphasized] defending the interests of the unemployed and the poor, largely those who stand on the losing side of rapid economic development." Among other claims, Dr. Koma argued that foreign investors should not be allowed to exploit Botswana's resources if Botswana were not receiving any profits in return (Molomo 2000), and he advocated for tax exemptions for people living below the subsistence level (Aguilar and Pacek 2000).

Since younger people were more likely to support the BNF than the BDP, the opposition party benefited in subsequent elections from a 1997 referendum lowering the voting age from 21 to 18 (Molomo 2000). For instance, in the 1999 elections, the BNF retained its dominance in Gaborone where the young are concentrated while still failing to mobilize older or rural voters (see Garekwe and Moloi 1994). Observers noted that the win reflected "a potentially dangerous polarization between the urban poor who benefit little from the country's diamond wealth, the Botswana elite, and the rural people whose cash incomes are somewhat appeased by a sense of community and government handouts" (*Africa Confidential* 1999: 4).

Party support, however, also derives from ethno-linguistic affinities in rural areas. Though Botswana frequently is deemed an ethnically homogeneous country, communal tensions are not rare (see Solway 2002). While the BDP benefits from rural support from the two largest Setswana-speaking groups, the Bangwato and the Bakwena, the BNF has long held appeal for the Setswana-speaking Bangwaketse tribe who live in the country's Southeast District. The chief of the latter tribe joined the BNF early on in 1969 because he believed the BDP-led government had neglected his region (Lemon 2007). The BNF is also popular among the Batlokwa tribe (*Africa*

Confidential 2004). Beyond disaffected tribes of the Tswana-speaking population, the BNF attracted the Bayei in the Okavango area (Rule 2000), as well as the Kalanga-speaking group who reside in the country's Northeast District and who have long resented the country's Tswana- and English-only language policies (Du Toit 1996). The BNF further sought to draw the attention of urbanites to the plight of the country's poorest minority group, the Basarwa (Wilmsen 1996), who are concentrated in areas such as Ghanzi and Kgalagadi. As Solway (2002: 726) explains, the BNF was not an ethnic party but its support of minority goals helped extend its base into rural areas.

As is typical of populist leaders, Dr. Koma inspired a personality cult around him. His authoritarian tendencies meant that he would not tolerate dissension within the BNF (Molomo 2000) or inter-party debate (Makgala 2005). He repeatedly refused to have the BNF overshadowed by participating in a larger opposition coalition, known as the Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) (*Africa Confidential* 1999). The BNF was viewed as having very little institutionalization beyond Koma, and the party effectively was synonymous with him (Somolekae 2005). This may explain why with the retirement of Dr. Koma and the ascendance of a new leader, Otsweletse Moupo, the party has experienced a high level of in-fighting and subsequent splintering. For example, ten new parties have emerged that are led by previous members of the BNF (Molefhe 2009).

Internal problems, coupled with recent attempts by the BDP to re-brand its image, have caused the BNF to lose its appeal among the urban poor. In particular, the BDP decided to start echoing the BNF's rhetoric and adopting its own populist stance. When Ian Khama took over as leader of the BDP in April 2008, he began a series of fireside chats and surprise town tours intended to demonstrate an understanding and affinity with the challenges faced by the urban electorate (see Molefhe 2009). Right before the 2009 general elections, Khama rode a bicycle into the slum of Old Naledi to

address a rally, prompting Mooketsi (2009) to observe that he had a common touch with the “grassroots.” Ultimately, the BDP grabbed the BNF’s constituency seats in Gaborone for the first time in over a decade and captured the majority of votes in Old Naledi. For the sake of symbolism, Khama decided to return to the slum to hold his party’s victory rally (Motlogelwa 2009).

As in Kenya and Zambia, the Botswana case illustrates that a populist strategy attracts the urban poor and that it is often predicated on a coalition of rural voters who are mobilized by different issues than their urban compatriots. In the Botswana case, the higher rate of urbanization meant that the opposition could focus on smaller demographic groups for support. Moreover, the BNF’s apparent downfall in the urban areas highlights that an incumbent party can just as easily adapt a populist strategy as an opposition party to win over new constituents. This latter point becomes even clearer by examining briefly the case of South Africa and the African National Congress (ANC).

A Populist Faction within a Dominant Ruling Party

South Africa represents one of Africa’s most urbanized democracies, with almost 60 percent of its population living in urban areas as of 2005 (World Bank 2009b). The country’s largest city, Johannesburg, currently has around 3.4 million residents (De Wet *et al.* 2008). Gauteng Province, in which both Johannesburg and Pretoria are located, is estimated to have approximately 14 million residents by 2015 (De Wet *et al.* 2008). Yet, the legacy of apartheid has still left massive inequalities both between rural and urban areas as well as within cities. For instance, based on surveys from 2005, there is a Gini coefficient of 0.75 in Johannesburg, 0.67 in Cape Town, and 0.72 in both Durban and Pretoria (UN-Habitat 2009). Racial disparities also still persist since approximately 25 percent of the country’s black population is

unemployed, compared with only 4 percent of the white population (Statistics South Africa 2009a). Declines in the manufacturing sector and low demand for both unskilled and semi-skilled labor has not only contributed to this unemployment but also depressed wages for those with a job (see Beall *et al.* 2000). Moreover, a quarter of the population still lives in shacks rather than safe and durable housing (Blair 2009).

Under Thabo Mbeki, the country's second democratically-elected president from the ANC, South Africa's economy experienced substantial macroeconomic growth but few improvements for the poor. For example, between 2002 and 2008, the average annual GDP growth was 4.6 percent (Statistics South Africa 2009b). However, Mbeki's neoliberal policy orientation prompted growing rifts within the ruling tripartite alliance of the ANC, the Confederation of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the South African Communist Party (SACP). In the mid-1990s, the alliance partners developed the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), which focused on growth through redistribution. The RDP called for a strategic role for the public sector, land reform, better training and a living wage for workers, and the provision of houses, electricity, and water to poor communities (Lodge 2002). Yet, without substantial foreign investment, the growth needed for these policies never emerged, prompting the ANC to shift to a more free-market plan known as Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) (Saunders 2005). Both COSATU and SACP opposed the ANC's abandonment of its *dirigiste* principles in favor of a plan that, among other things, emphasized privatization, tariff reductions, and productivity-linked wage rates (Lodge 2002; Saunders, 2005).

At the same time, these policies prompted widespread discontent among the poor. While a small number of extraordinarily wealthy black business tycoons benefitted from the ANC's Black Economic Empowerment initiative (BEE) (Gumede

2008), most of the poor were still grappling with insufficient service delivery. In fact, between 2004 and 2006, the number of protests over substandard services in poor townships and informal urban settlements increased from 5800 to over 10,000 (Gumede 2008). While water and electricity infrastructure were extended to millions of customers after the end of apartheid, the policies of cost-recovery, which required customers to pay the full cost of these services, meant that hundreds of thousands of residents effectively could not afford them (see Khunou 2002; Pape and McDonald 2002). Illegal reconnections of electricity subsequently became the source of violent conflict between the police and members of poor communities (Bassett and Clarke 2008). Moreover, while the ANC increased the number of people living in proper housing, the rate of progress disappointed many slum and squatter dwellers. Movements such as *Abahali baseMjondolo* (“shack dwellers”) in Durban organized marches under the banner of “No Land, No House, No Vote” (Pithouse 2006) while shack dwellers outside Johannesburg admitted losing faith in the ANC (Georgy 2007). During 2008, tensions over insufficient jobs erupted into xenophobic riots within Johannesburg’s townships.

Jacob Zuma, who had been vice-president until 2005 when he was forced to resign because of his involvement in a fraud case, blamed the government’s failures on Mbeki’s style of leadership rather than on the ANC. In December 2007, when the ANC held its first internal party elections since 1958, Zuma benefitted from both popular disillusionment as well as inter-alliance squabbling. With the help of leftist allies, Zuma unseated Mbeki as president of the ANC, and therefore as president of South Africa, by obtaining 2329 delegate votes to Mbeki’s 1505 (Foster 2009). The vice-president, Kgalema Motlanthe, took over as interim president of the country until the next general elections could be held in April 2009. Furthermore, all of Mbeki’s supporters were removed from the National Executive Committee, which is the party’s

main decision-making body (Bassett and Clarke 2008). Mbeki's followers eventually split from the ANC and left to form a more economically conservative and business-friendly opposition party, named the Congress of the People (COPE).

Zuma's internal support, particularly from COSATU and SACP, derived from his espoused pro-poor orientation. During the campaign period before the 2009 general elections, Zuma wandered around urban townships, promising greater public spending to create jobs and to improve services and welfare for the poor. In a study of voters' intentions in the country's largest township of Soweto, Ceruti (2008) found that those who supported Zuma were more likely to be poorer in both objective and subjective terms. Having grown up as a goat-herder with no formal education, he was able to endear himself to the poor, who viewed him as much more approachable than Mbeki. Indeed, Hart (2007: 97&98) observes that Zuma held widespread appeal to the poor by simultaneously portraying himself as a liberation hero, a leftist, a traditionalist, and as an anti-elitist: "His [Zuma's] regular reference to himself as 'not educated' – but, by implication, extremely smart – is a direct attack on the technocratic elite surrounding Mbeki, often portrayed by Zuma supporters as arrogant and self-serving, and as not having served in the trenches of the revolutionary struggle." Ceruti (2008: 322) likewise finds a widespread perception that Soweto supporters viewed Zuma as someone "like them."

In addition to his "man of the people" persona, Zuma both generates controversy and exudes charisma. He was not only implicated in the corruption case that cost him the vice-presidency, but also went on trial for rape in 2006. During his trial, masses of supporters gathered outside the Supreme Court each day to sing Zuma's signature song from his days in the liberation movement, "Bring Me My Machine Gun," as well as other songs that symbolized the marginalization of the poor and the distance of the ruling elite (Gunner 2008). Zuma's campaign rallies also

attracted massive crowds where the politician often danced on stage, thereby affirming the legitimacy of his clan name of *Msholozzi*, which means dancer. According to Foster (2009: 78), poor voters who attended these rallies saw the 67-year-old politician as a type of messiah who could revolutionize their lives. Meanwhile, the business community and foreign investors proved less enthusiastic about Zuma, fearing that his promises to intervene on behalf of the poor and the trade unions would involve compromising the country's macroeconomic fundamentals. In early 2009, when Zuma's prospects of becoming the next president appeared inevitable, the Rand depreciated considerably and the value of shares fell on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Gunnion 2009).

In addition to Zuma's reputation as a champion of the poor, he also appealed to rural voters with his unabashed promotion of his Zulu ethnic identity. Importantly, Zuma did not portray the ANC as an exclusionary party. In fact, unlike his predecessor, Zuma actively courted white Afrikaners during the campaign, a community which had at one time included some of the most ardent supporters of apartheid policies (*Business Day* 2009). Yet, as a polygamist who readily dons animal skins to participate in Zulu ceremonies, Zuma showed that he was comfortable with his heritage. While Mbeki rarely mentioned his Xhosa background, Zuma explained in an interview that he was "A South African who grew up here in KZN [Kwa-Zulu Natal province], who is a Zulu with Zulu traditions and Zulu values pushed into myself" (cited in Foster 2009: 75). This of course resonated with the Zulu community, which long felt excluded from political power because Mandela, Mbeki, and Motlanthe were all presidents from the Xhosa community (Johnson 2008). In Kwa-Zulu Natal, which is not only where the largest concentration of Zulus is found but also one of South Africa's most rural provinces (Kersting 2009), such Xhosa

dominance in the ANC explained why many residents historically had instead aligned with the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

Yet, in the 2009 election campaign, Zuma was able to attract such voters to the ANC. Before the campaign officially even began, Zuma supporters began wearing T-shirts with the politician's face and which stated "100 percent Zulu boy." He often threw Zulu phrases into his speeches, and his final campaign rally in Johannesburg was labeled the *Siyanqoba* rally, meaning "to conquer" in the Zulu language. In a country with eleven official languages, the use of Zulu for national rallies reinforced the impression that Zuma was not simply an ANC candidate but also a Zulu one. The tactic certainly succeeded in wresting away voters from the IFP. In 1999, the ANC only obtained 39 percent of the vote in Kwa-Zulu Natal province compared with 42 percent for the IFP. In the 2009 elections, the ANC obtained 64 percent of the vote in Kwa-Zulu Natal, more than triple the IFP's 20.5 percent.³¹¹

At the national level, the ANC was never at risk of losing the 2009 elections. However, at a time when many South Africans were disappointed with the ANC's performance, the emergence of COPE and the growing success of the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) did threaten to reduce the party's sizeable parliamentary majority. Zuma's ability to reinvigorate the party's image by fusing a populist strategy towards the poor with appeals along identity lines demonstrates that this tactic of building dual coalitions is not only available to Africa's opposition parties but also to incumbents.

³¹¹ Election results from South Africa's Independent Electoral Commission. See:<http://www.elections.org.za/>

Implications and Contributions

Democratic Contestation and Consolidation

The contributions of this research span at least four different domains. First and foremost, the study speaks to the broader literature on democracy and political parties. According to Dahl (1971), the two underlying dimensions of political democracy are public contestation and inclusiveness. However, the nature of opposition parties in Africa's young democracies rarely allows for genuine contestation in a manner that reflects a clear articulation of citizens' preferences. In fact, few have heeded Stepan's (1990: 44) advice that opposition parties can only defeat ruling regimes by providing a "credible democratic alternative."

In turn, the lack of credible opposition alternatives has significant consequences for participation and inclusiveness. Indeed, if parties are irrelevant for voters, then parties' survival is threatened (Crisp 2000) and disillusionment with the democratic process could ensue. Hagopian (2005) further argues that if parties do not provide credible alternatives, this can lead to a diminished interest in politics and a decline in citizen participation. Likewise, according to Huntington and Nelson (1976: 158), "Standard theory argues that people must view politics as relevant and their own participation as potentially effective, as a prerequisite to political participation."

By targeting the preferences of the urban poor, parties that employ populist strategies present a viable alternative to the *status quo* for this particular constituency, thereby ensuring that their economic marginalization does not result in political exclusion. The policies espoused in such strategies do not correspond to a typical programmatic orientation along a left-right ideological spectrum, which tends to advocate greater or less government intervention in economic and social institutions. As noted in Chapter Two, such programmatic policies are rare in the African context, which lack the historical experiences that shaped these ideologies in North America

and Western Europe, possess small private sectors, and must often adhere to the policy dictates of foreign donors. The examples of the *pôle de gauche* in Senegal and even the early days of Botswana's BNF highlight the inability of programmatic orientations aligned along traditional left-right ideological spectrums to attract the urban poor. However, populist strategies do nonetheless incorporate a policy discourse as one means of mobilizing the urban poor, and these policies tend to exhibit greater congruence to their contemporary working and living conditions than a traditional programmatic stance could.

Both contestation and meaningful participation are in turn essential for achieving democratic consolidation, as measured by Huntington's (1991) two turnovers of political leadership following a democratic transition.³¹² During the 1990s, urbanites in general facilitated the move to multi-party democracy in Africa. Since then, many scholars have lamented how the party which was victorious during the transition rarely has been ousted (Bratton 1998; Doorenspleet 2003; Nohlen *et al.* 1999; van de Walle 2003). Yet, as noted in Chapters Three and Four, official turnout rates were higher in urban Senegal and urban Zambia than they were for either country as a whole, implying that urban voters turn up at the polls more often than rural ones. Furthermore, turnout rates among survey respondents, who exclusively consisted of the urban poor, were even higher than the official rates for urban areas, suggesting that the urban poor in particular are more likely to vote than other constituents. As such, the urban poor can be particularly instrumental in achieving the critical second turnover in most African electoral democracies, and this study has argued that such

³¹² Huntington's (1991) two turnover test has been criticized because of its narrow focus on elections. A number of other scholars have described consolidation as a broader process that involves deep, attitudinal changes on behalf of citizens (Linz and Stepan 1996; Schmitter 1992) and an acceptance of democratic institutions as "the only game in town" (Przeworski 1991: 23). While not disputing these alternative conceptualizations of consolidation, Huntington's narrower indicator is referred to here because of the dissertation's central concern with voting behavior and election outcomes.

turnovers are most likely to happen when they are mobilized by an opposition party employing a populist strategy.

Party Linkages

A second contribution of this study is to provide a comparative analysis of party linkages and to emphasize the feasibility of combining different linkages. Kitschelt (2000: 855&856) laments the lack of comparative research on the rise and decline of different linkage strategies, noting that existing scholarship either focuses on linkages in one particular case study or engages in comparative analyses of parties and elections without examining linkages. This study aims to fill that gap by representing the only known attempt to detail how disparate political parties in Africa, both ruling and opposition, mobilize various constituents across countries and over time. It does not just focus on these linkages from the party perspective but also surveyed the political behavior of African informal sector workers to examine how well these modes of mobilization actually capture the sentiments and preferences of the urban poor. As such, it begins to address Hagopian's (2007: 599) qualm that too little is known about the "demand side" of the party-voter relationship.

Moreover, as detailed throughout the study, a populist strategy represents an amalgam of programmatic, personalistic, and clientelistic linkages. Specifically, the programmatic element emerges through the advocacy of policies of social inclusion. Personalistic linkages manifest through a politician's charisma and the existence of vertical ties between a leader and his/her followers. The distribution of selective benefits and a constituency base oriented around sub-altern groups are both key elements of clientelist linkages.³¹³ However, based on his observations of parties in

³¹³ While a sub-type of clientelism, vote-buying, was shown not to influence voting behavior on its own, this does not contradict the fact that clientelistic linkages are a component of a populist strategy.

Western Europe, Kitschelt (2000: 855) claims that these three linkages cannot be combined: "At low dosages, all linkage mechanisms may be compatible. As politicians intensify their cultivation of a particular type of linkage, however, they reach a production possibility frontier at which further intensifications of one linkage mechanism can occur only at the expense of toning down other linkage mechanisms." In his view, charisma is incompatible with programmatic linkages because the routinization of authority requires the abandonment of theatrical antics. Similarly, clientelistic linkages require the distribution of selective benefits that undercuts the credibility of a traditional programmatic message.

Because the populist strategies presented here rely on mobilization through policies that are not purely programmatic in the traditional sense, the three types of politician-citizen linkages are compatible. In fact, it is difficult to imagine the PF's appeal being just as robust without either Sata's charisma or his very pro-poor policy pronouncements. Likewise, Abdoulaye Wade's 2000 campaign would have proved less remarkable without the combination of theatrical antics, represented most clearly by his *marches bleues*, and his targeted appeals to Dakar's youth and informal sector workers.

Furthermore, Kitschelt (2000) only examines the linkages forged by politicians with the *general* citizenry, rather than with different *segments* of the citizenry. The present study, however, emphasizes that parties and politicians can employ different linkages with the urban poor than they may with rural constituents. For example, Sata used a sub-type of clientelistic linkages with rural Bemba-speakers that relied on ethno-linguistic appeals, even as charisma and targeted policy promises proved essential for mobilizing the urban poor. In other words, the various linkages can be compatible when a party derives its credibility and support from different groups of constituents.

Cross-Regional Contrasts and Comparisons of Populism

A third contribution of the work lies in highlighting how citizens' preferences and parties' strategies in Africa compare and contrast with other regions of the world. Demographic and socioeconomic dynamics have long represented the impetus for shifts in voters' behavior and their relationships with political parties. For instance, in Europe, the decline in farming and manufacturing that began in the 1970s led to the rise of service sector workers whose differing priorities altered the nature of class-based voting (Mair, Muller, and Plasser 2004; Clark and Lipset 2001). Growing unemployment and informalization of the workforce during the same period created a class of "outsiders" whose preferences largely were ignored by Western Europe's traditional leftist parties (Rueda 2005). Similarly, Dietz' (1998: 33) observation about Latin America's earlier experience with urbanization holds relevance for contemporary Africa:

Following the end of World War II, most Latin American and Third World cities found themselves the targets of large-scale cityward migration, a phenomenon that not only produced rapid population growth but an exploding demand for services such as jobs, housing, transportation, and physical infrastructure. Such services might not be essential in rural areas, but in an urban setting, low-income inhabitants-migrants or otherwise-came to expect such services and to react in politically sensitive ways if they were not delivered.

During the 1980s and 1990s, these processes of urbanization and informalization in Latin America even further eroded organizational ties between laborers and parties, thereby generating greater fluidity in cleavage structures and higher electoral volatility (Roberts and Wibbels 1999). Importantly, this volatility offered the political space for populist leaders to emerge in certain countries, such as Peru and Venezuela (Roberts 1995; Roberts 2003). Volatility has long been a notable feature of Africa's party systems (e.g. Bogaards 2008; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001;

Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005).³¹⁴ As the cases presented in this study highlight, this volatility and lack of party institutionalization likewise has created a window of opportunity for the emergence of parties reliant on populist strategies and aimed at targeting the priorities of sub-altern groups.

Other important similarities and differences exist between Africa's populist leaders and those of other regions. For instance, in order to reconcile the diverse policy orientations espoused by neo-populist leaders in Latin America, scholars such as Weyland (2001) have argued that the defining feature of populism is the plebiscitarian relationship and unmediated ties it fosters between a leader and his/her followers. Instead, this study has illustrated that in the African context, populism cannot be divorced from its programmatic content, which is defined by the goal of social inclusion for economically marginalized groups.

Moreover, in the cases presented in this study, African party leaders who employed populist strategies alternately were well-educated or possessed little formal schooling, came from humble backgrounds or inherited wealth and prestige. Yet, in every case, they portrayed themselves as "men of the people" who were just as comfortable wading into slums, townships, and squatter compounds as they were attending high-level political meetings. Unlike their contemporary Latin American counterparts, who gained credibility from their status as political outsiders (e.g. Madrid 2008; Roberts 1995, 2007), Africa's populists were all insiders in their country's political scene for decades and often collaborated with those they ultimately came to oppose. Nevertheless, they succeeded in creating the image of outsiders who loathed the existing political establishment for its alleged perpetuation of vast socioeconomic inequalities. They combined class appeals in urban areas with

³¹⁴ In the European context, Dalton (2000) also found that younger people were less likely to have partisan attachments than older voters. This is especially relevant for Africa given that the population pyramid for most of the region's countries is highly skewed towards the young.

overtures to ascriptive identities in rural areas, mobilizing both groups with either a real or imagined story of exclusion from political and economic power structures.

The impact of these dynamics over time on African party systems remains to be seen. One possibility is that ultimately, political parties within the region may be encouraged to focus more on programmatic appeals and less on purely personalistic or clientelistic ones, creating greater alignment with the policy preferences of low-income citizens and reducing electoral volatility. These appeals do not need to be programmatic in the typical North American or Western European sense, which typically involves parties espousing a certain degree of state intervention in society and markets. As shown in this study, such appeals can have little congruence with the priorities of low-income and poorly-educated citizens and are limited by the interference of international donors in African political economies. Instead, programmatic appeals in the African context might involve practical proposals for improving the living conditions of the poor that involve an eclectic set of policy levers which collectively defy neat classification along a left-right continuum.

African Elections and Parties

A final contribution of this study is its focus on the interactive relationship between political parties and citizens in Africa, as well as the study's differentiation of opposition parties. Thus far, much of the Africanist scholarship on elections falls into at least three categories. Detailed public opinion data and innovative field experiments have motivated micro-level studies of voting behavior (e.g. Bratton and Kimenyi 2008; Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Wantchekon 2003; Young 2009b). These studies reveal key influences on individual voting decisions. At the more macro-level, scholars have engaged in various classifications of party systems, such as multi-party, two-party, and dominant-party regimes (e.g. Bogaards 2000;

Doorenspleet 2003; Giliomee 1998; Manning 2005). Such work often helps to inform even larger themes within this literature regarding whether countries are experiencing democratic transitions, consolidation, or reversals (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Fomunyoh 2001; Joseph 1998; Lindberg 2006a; Randall and Svasand 2002; Von Doepp and Villalón 2005).

Each of these studies is valuable on its own, and many of the insights from this scholarship have been drawn on in the present study. This dissertation, however, combines these micro and macro perspectives by illustrating how African parties mobilize different types of constituents, and how voters react to such strategies. The case studies emphasize the dynamic nature of this relationship, highlighting that the preferences of the urban poor can inform the policy messages of a party using a populist strategy, which in turn enables that particular party to obtain more votes from this sector of society.

In addition, notwithstanding recent scholarship on opposition parties (e.g. Lindberg 2006b; Rakner and van de Walle 2009), there is a tendency in the literature to discuss African opposition parties in monolithic terms, thereby portraying multi-party competition as simply a struggle between "the" opposition and the incumbent. By contrast, the present study actually distinguishes opposition parties according to the way in which they mobilize various constituents, such as the urban poor and rural dwellers. This is valuable for illustrating under what conditions an opposition party will be able to not just defeat an incumbent party but also why one opposition party proved more appealing than alternative competitors.

Areas for Further Research

The above contributions of the present study provide a useful starting point for considering at least three areas of further research on populism, the urban poor, and

voting behavior in Africa. First, populist strategies proved the most effective means for mobilizing the urban poor in those African democracies with a highly urbanized populace. However, do the urban poor ultimately benefit from having a party which used a populist strategy during electoral campaigns enter national office?

On the one hand, the urban poor may benefit from having their policy priorities squarely brought into the political arena and from becoming increasingly targeted by elites for votes. Indeed, the urban poor's growing importance as an electoral constituency may increasingly reduce the amount of harassment they face by state authorities who are hesitant to alienate this constituency base. On the other hand, as discussed in Chapter Two, populist parties tend to view their constituents as a source of votes rather than as agents of social reform (Mouzelis 1985). Moreover, populism is a particularly short-lived mode of mobilization, and once in office, a former opposition party must respond to national issues, manage the macro-economy, attract investors, and in the African case, often court donors. As Weyland (2001: 14) notes, "Political success therefore transforms populism into a different type of rule that rests on nonpopulist strategies. Populist leadership therefore tends to be transitory. It either fails or, if successful, transcends itself." Similarly, Collier (2001: 11815) observes that populist "politicians find fertile ground in the actual or threatened grievances and social dislocation resulting from new economic models, but once in office often adopt marketizing policies." Furthermore, coalitions built on populist strategies cannot be sustained for indefinite periods if the urban poor fail to see any tangible improvements in their lives or experience policies that are directly antithetical to their own interests.

The existing evidence is not particularly positive for the urban poor. Wade's commitments to the urban poor remained unfilled seven years after his first term as president began. Shortly after Raila Odinga became Kenya's prime minister in 2008, he abandoned his position as protector of the poor and told Kibera residents that those

who were illegally squatting in the slums would face legal action by the government (De Smedt 596-597). Three months after Zuma was elected South Africa's president, riots over poor service delivery and lack of jobs flared up throughout the country's townships where residents felt the ANC failed to deliver promptly enough on its populist campaign messages (see Lindow 2009).

This is not to suggest that democratic, African governments are completely disinterested in improving living conditions for their citizens. As noted earlier, many African governments have made concerted investments in the agricultural sector under the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP) to improve agricultural growth and alleviate rural poverty. Moreover, research by Stasavage (2005) covering 44 African countries has illustrated that where multi-party democracy exists, governments spend more on education, particularly primary education.³¹⁵ Yet, whether parties that rely on populist strategies to win the votes of the urban poor actually improve outcomes for this particular constituency when they enter national office remains an open question and one that will naturally depend on country-specific circumstances.

Future research could examine how natural resource endowments and macroeconomic conditions intersect with the ability to deliver on populist promises. For instance, Hugo Chávez's sustained commitment thus far to Venezuela's urban poor largely has depended on oil revenues. Research in this area would benefit from greater data collection at the city level on the distribution and quality of water, refuse collection, sanitation facilities, electricity availability and affordability, and formal job creation.

³¹⁵ Since primary education is the main form of schooling for rural populations, Stasavage (2005: 344) further argues that democratization particularly improves expenditures for rural constituents.

Secondly, how does the use of a populist strategy in one election condition the urban poor's expectations in future elections? Once voters become accustomed to a populist strategy, they may actually demand that the opposition adheres to this strategy in subsequent elections in order to gain their attention and support. This effect may have played an important role in the Senegalese case where the populist campaigning of Wade as an opposition leader created an expectation about how the opposition should subsequently act in the 2007 elections. When the opposition failed to follow Wade's example, the urban poor chose to continue supporting the candidate who had won them over in 2000.

Thirdly, what does urbanization imply for the voting behavior of Africa's rural poor? The rural poor were not the primary focus of the present analysis and thus assumed to possess relatively static preferences. Yet, there is greater scope for analyzing whether rural voting behavior is influenced by how urban compatriots respond to opposition candidates and whether rural voting preferences are changing over time. In Zambia, Larmer and Fraser (2007) suggest that urbanites exhibit little influence over the voting behavior of their rural cousins largely because of the former's diminished ability to send back remittances and declining interest to retire in rural areas. As such, rural-urban linkages regarding voting behavior may vary according to the nature of a country's urbanization processes. In countries where rural-to-urban migration still drives urbanization, there may be greater latitude for feedback from urban residents to rural kin than in those countries where urbanization largely depends on natural population growth within the cities. Surveys focused on the rationale for rural voting decisions across countries encountering these disparate urbanization processes may help illuminate these issues.

Conclusion

Historically, the urban poor have been sidelined by governments in Africa. During colonial times, authorities viewed the poor urban masses as dangerous and violent (Cooper 1987), and they aimed to discourage African settlement in urban areas (Njoh 2003). The urban bias literature of the 1970s and 1980s stressed rural-urban cleavages while obscuring intra-urban disparities. Consequently, urban poverty was overlooked by both national governments and international donors as attention shifted to rural development. To ease population pressures, African governments have also at times encouraged the urban poor to return to the countryside (Pieterse 2010) or have built new capital cities instead of addressing chronic problems in the old ones. Abdoulaye Wade's dream of creating a new capital for Senegal, rather than ameliorating living conditions in Dakar, represents only the most recent example of this phenomenon.

Yet, rapid urbanization will continue to proceed apace in the years to come, particularly in those countries which are still predominantly rural. Given the high concentration of young people in the region's urban areas, concern with unemployment and under-employment will persist as more and more students leave school. Crises in the provision of electricity and water, garbage collection, housing availability, and affordable food will likewise test the managerial capacities and priority-setting abilities of African governments. How well political parties respond to such challenges and effectively tap into popular discontent will certainly influence their fortunes at the ballot box, thereby ensuring that the urban poor will continue to represent a powerful force in African politics for the foreseeable future.

APPENDIX ONE

Share of Vote (%) by Largest City in Most Recent National Elections³¹⁶

Country (Sub-national unit containing largest city)	Election Type (Year)
<i>Benin (Littoral Département³¹⁷)</i>	<i>Presidential (2006)</i>
Adrien Houngbédji (PRD)	32.7
Boni Yayi (Independent)	28.3
Léhady Soglo (RB)	14.0
<i>Botswana (Gaborone Constituency)</i>	<i>Parliamentary (2009)</i>
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)	41.2
Botswana Congress Party (BCP)	36.8
Botswana National Front (BNF)	19.6
<i>Ghana (Accra Metropolis District)</i>	<i>Presidential (2008)</i>
John Atta Mills (NDC)	54.0
Nana A D Akufo-Addo (NPP)	46.0
Papa Kwesi Nduom (CPP)	1.2
<i>Kenya (Nairobi Province)</i>	<i>Parliamentary (2007)</i>
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)	41.9
Party of National Unity (PNU)	28.8
<i>Lesotho (Maseru Constituency)</i>	<i>Parliamentary (2007)</i>
All Basotho Convention (ABC)	46.9
Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD)	39.0
<i>Malawi (Blantyre District)</i>	<i>Presidential (2009)</i>
Dr. B wa Mutharika (UDF)	74.8
John Tembo (MCP)	23.5
Walter Chibambo (PETRA)	0.5
<i>Mali (Bamako District)</i>	<i>Presidential (2007)</i>
Amadou Toumani Touré (ADEMA-PASJ) ³¹⁸	54.0
Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (RPM)	38.5
Tiébilé Dramé (PARENA)	2.4
<i>Mozambique (City of Maputo)</i>	<i>Presidential (2009)</i>
Armando Guebuza (FRELIMO)	80.7
Davíz Simango (MDM)	14.9
Alfonso Marceta Dhlakama (RENAMO)	4.4

³¹⁶ The results of presidential elections are provided here for those countries with presidential systems. Parliamentary results are provided for the following four countries that are not purely presidential: Botswana (executive presidency linked to parliament), Ethiopia (parliamentary republic), Lesotho (parliamentary, constitutional monarchy), and South Africa (executive presidency linked to parliament). The one exception to this rule is Kenya, which is a presidential system but given the controversy over the most recent elections, parliamentary results are provided here.

³¹⁷ For those countries with a two-round majority run-off system (TRS), the results of the first-round are presented here. Except for elections in Benin, Ghana, and Sierra Leone, a second round was unnecessary for most TRS countries because one candidate was able to attain more than 50 percent of the votes in the first round.

³¹⁸ Touré ran as an independent but was supported by ADEMA-PAJ.

<i>Namibia (Khomas Province)</i>	<i>Presidential (2009)</i>
Hifikepunye Pohamba (SWAPO)	64.2
Hidipo Hamtenya (Rally for Democracy & Progress)	21.1
Katuutire Kaura (DTA)	2.6
<i>Nigeria (Lagos State)</i>	<i>Presidential (2007)</i>
Alhaji Atiku Abubakar (AC)	50.3
Alhaji Umar Yar'Adua (PDP)	32.2
Muhammadu Buhari (ANPP)	5.6
<i>Sénégal (Dakar Region)</i>	<i>Presidential (2007)</i>
Abdoulaye Wade (PDS)	55.9
Idrissa Seck (Independent)	19.1
Ousmane Tanor Dieng (PS)	14.0
<i>Sierra Leone (Western Area Urban District)</i>	<i>Presidential (2007)</i>
Ernest Bai Koroma (APC)	60.5
Solomon Berewa (SLPP)	32.0
Charles Francis Margai (PMDC)	5.5
<i>South Africa (City of Johannesburg)</i>	<i>Parliamentary (2009)</i>
African National Congress (ANC)	63.2
Democratic Alliance (DA)	20.8
Congress of the People (COPE)	9.5
<i>Tanzania (Dar es Salaam Region)</i>	<i>Presidential (2005)</i>
Jakaya Kikwete (CCM)	70.6
Prof. Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba (CUF)	22.8
Freeman Aikaeli Mbowe (CHADEMA)	5.6
<i>Zambia (Lusaka District)</i>	<i>Presidential (2008)</i>
Michael Sata (PF)	60.7
Rupiah Banda (MMD)	25.6
Hakainde Hichilema (UPND)	13.2

Own calculations based on the following sources:

Benin: Commission électorale nationale autonome (CENA), cited in *Economist Intelligence Unit* (EIU) April 2006 Country Report.

Botswana: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), <http://www.iec.gov.bw/>

Ghana: Ghana Electoral Commission, found at <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/election2008/elections.results.runoff.php>

Kenya: Kenya Electoral Commission, <http://www.eck.or.ke>

Lesotho: Lesotho Independent Electoral Commission, <http://www.iec.org.ls/about/default.php>

Malawi: Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC), <http://www.mec.org.mw/>

Mali: La Cour Constitutionnelle du Mali

Mozambique: Center for Public Integrity (Centro de Integridade Publica), <http://www.elections2009.cip.org.mz>

Namibia: Electoral Commission of Namibia, <http://www.ecn.na/>

Nigeria: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), http://www.nigeriannews.com/elections/2007/national/presidency/lagos_results.htm

Senegal: <http://www.sénélections.org>

Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone National Election Commission, http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/7_elect/7_1elections.htm

South Africa: Independent Electoral Commission, <http://www.elections.org.za>

Tanzania: The National Electoral Commission of Tanzania, <http://www.nec.go.tz/>

Zambia: Electoral Commission of Zambia, <http://www.elections.org.zm>

APPENDIX TWO

Description of Data Sources for Table 1.2

This appendix discusses the data sources and notes that accompany Table 1.2 of Chapter One. Table 1.2 attempts to provide a more disaggregated view of voting behavior within the largest city of selected countries by analyzing the share of votes accruing to both the ruling party and the main opposition party in constituencies within the largest city that are known to contain a high level of poverty. Below, the sources and notes for how this table was constructed are discussed for each country displayed within the table:

Botswana

The election data for Gaborone South is based on the 2009 presidential elections and available from Botswana's Independent Electoral Commission at www.iec.gov.bw/. Old Naledi is Gaborone's largest slum, and the poorest area of the city (see Mazonde, 1996; Gaotlhobogwe, 2009).

Ghana

The election data for Odododiodoo is based on the 2008 presidential elections and available from <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/election2008/>. Although there was a two-round vote for those elections, the results presented in the table are based on the second-round that occurred on December 28, 2008. However, the NDC still had the majority within that constituency after the first-round polls. Old Fadama contains about 30,000 people and is considered Accra's, and possibly Ghana's, largest squatter settlement (see "Settlement Story: Old Fadama" available at <http://www.homeless-international.org/> and "People's Dialogue on Human Settlements (PD)& The Ghana Homeless People's Federation (GHPF)" at <http://www.sdinet.org/documents/doc1.htm>).

Kenya

The election data for Langata is based on Kenya's December 27, 2007 presidential elections and available from the Electoral Commission of Kenya at <http://www.eck.or.ke/index.php/Election-Results-Database/>. Langata Division is within Nairobi district and sometimes alternatively referred to as Kibera Division. Kibera is widely recognized as Africa's largest slum with about 56 percent of its population living below the poverty line (see Ndeng'e et al. 2003).

Namibia

The election data for Katutura were calculated by combining the election results for both Katutura East and Katutura Central constituencies in the Khomas region where

Windhoek is located. The vote shares are the proportion of total valid votes. This data is from the 2009 presidential elections and available from the Electoral Commission of Namibia at <http://www.ecn.gov.na/>. Information on deprivation in Windhoek was primarily derived from Frayne (2007).

South Africa

The election data is for Ward 3 of Region G in the municipality of Johannesburg in Gauteng Province. The data is for the April 22, 2009 national elections, and can be accessed at South Africa's Independent Electoral Commission at www.elections.org.za. According to a multiple deprivation index that captures peoples' unmet needs with respect to food, housing, household facilities, fuel, education, health, and work, Orange Farm is considered the most deprived ward in Johannesburg and the 22nd most deprived ward out of the total 420 wards within Gauteng Province (De Wet et al. 2008). Many informal settlers from Soweto re-located to Orange Farm in the early 1990s and today, the area is considered to be South Africa's largest informal settlement. The broader Region G has Johannesburg's highest rates of unemployment and lacks adequate housing and infrastructure (Visser 2007).

Tanzania

Election data for Temeke constituency is for the 2005 presidential elections and available from Tanzania's National Electoral Commission at <http://www.nec.go.tz/>. Temeke was identified as Dar es Salaam's poorest area from a World Bank study by Muzzini and Lindeboom (2008).

Zambia

The 2008 presidential election data for Mandevu constituency was obtained from the Zambian Electoral Commission and available at <http://www.elections.org.zm/>. Simler (2007) combined census data with poverty data from Zambia's 2002-03 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS) in order to determine that within Lusaka district, Chaisa is the poorest ward with approximately 68 percent of its population living below the poverty line.

APPENDIX THREE

Interview Respondents

Interviews conducted with political elites, journalists, development experts, academics, and civil society representatives are presented in this appendix. Unless otherwise indicated, the interviews were recorded.

LUSAKA, ZAMBIA

<i>No.</i>	<i>Last Name, First Name(s)</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Affiliation</i>	<i>Date Interviewed</i>
1	Bazin, Benoist	Social and Governance Sector	European Commission Delegation to the Republic of Zambia	March 17, 2009
2	Beyani , Dr. Choolwe	Director of Policy and Research and Deputy Chairman for International Relations; Professor of History	United Party for National Development; University of Zambia	February 24, 2009
3	Chibamba, Musonda	News Correspondent	British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)	January 28, 2009
4	Chibwe, Winstone*	Deputy Secretary General	United Party for National Development	February 17, 2009
5	Chifuwe, Sheikh	Journalist, General Secretary of the Press Freedom Committee	<i>The Post</i> newspaper	January 29, 2009
6	Chitala, Dr. Mbita	Executive Campaign Manager; Former Ambassador to Libya	Movement for Multi-party Democracy	January 29, 2009
7	Chisenga, Edward*	Publicity Director	Street Vendors Association	March 3, 2009
8	Chiwama, Sally	Journalist	Zambia Media Women's Association	January 21, 2009
9	Henriot, Father Peter	Director	Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection	January 30, 2009
10	Hichilema, Hakainde	President	United Party for National Development	February 17, 2009
11	Kabimba , Wynter*	Chairman for local government; Former Lusaka Town Clerk	Patriotic Front	February 5, 2009

12	Kalumba, Dr. Katele	National Secretary; Minister of Parliament for Chiengi Constituency; former Deputy Minister of Health, Minister of Health, Minister of Finance, Minister of Tourism, Minister of Home Affairs, and Minister of Foreign Affairs	Movement for Multi-party Democracy	March 5, 2009
13	Lubinda, Given	Minister of Parliament for Kabwata constituency, Party spokesperson	Patriotic Front	January 22, 2009
14	Malido, Webster*	Former editor and journalist	<i>The Post</i> newspaper	February 5, 2009
15	Matawe, Bornwell	Deputy Director of Housing and Social Services	Lusaka City Council	April 8, 2009
16	Mulenga, Dr. Chileshe	Director of Research and Deputy Secretary General	Patriotic Front	February 24, 2009
17	Mumbwatasai, Morgan*	Governance Advisor	UK Department for International Development	March 11, 2009
18	Nchito, Wilma*	Professor of Geography, Research on markets	University of Zambia	January 22, 2009
19	Ncube, Nelson	Director	People's Process on Housing and Poverty in Zambia	February 17, 2009
20	Palale, Patricia	Public Sector Management Specialist	World Bank	February 25, 2009
21	Phiri, Rose	Director of Housing and Social Services	Lusaka City Council	April 8, 2009
22	Phiri, Victor	National Coordinator & Organizer for Lusaka District	Workers Education Alliance of Zambia	February 25, 2009
23	Phiri, Wazziah	Spokesman	Heritage Party	February 28, 2009
24	Rubvuta, Elijah	Executive Director	Forum for Democratic Process (FODEP)	February 11, 2009
25	Sata, Michael	President	Patriotic Front	January 28, 2009

26	Scott, Dr. Guy	Vice President and Member of Parliament for the constituency of Lusaka Central	Patriotic Front	January 21, 2009
27	Sikota, Sakwiba	President, MP for Livingstone Constituency	United Liberal Party	March 31, 2009
28	Simutanyi, Dr. Neo	Executive Director	Centre for Policy Dialogue	February 3, 2009
29	Simuusa, Wilber	Member of Parliament for Nchanga constituency	Patriotic Front	January 21, 2009
30	Soko, Michael	Assistant Resident Representative/Governance Advisor	United Nations Development Program	March 10, 2009
31	Zulu, Brenda	Journalist	Zambia Media Women's Association	January 21, 2009

Notes: *Indicates that notes for interview were handwritten.

DAKAR, SENEGAL

<i>No.</i>	<i>Last Name, First Name(s)</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Affiliation</i>	<i>Date Interviewed</i>
1	Abdoul, Dr. Mohammadou	Urban Development Researcher	Endapol of ENDA-Tiers Monde	October 3, 2008
2	Bâ, Abdoul Wahab	Team leader of Governance Unit	United Nations Development Program	November 18, 2008
3	Balde, Demba	Social Development Specialist	World Bank	November 14, 2008
4	Coulibaly, Abdou Latif	Political Analyst & Journalist	<i>Sud Quotidien</i> newspaper	October 10, 2008
5	Coumé, Macoumba*	Director de la Formation et de la Communication in the Direction Generale des Elections	Ministry of the Interior	October 2, 2008
6	Diop, Mame Bou	Secretary General	<i>Union Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels du Sénégal</i> , (UNACOIS)	September 17, 2008
7	Diop, Dr. Alioune Badara	Political Scientist	University of Gaston-Berger of St. Louis, Department of Juridical and Political	December 1, 2008

			Science	
8	Diop, Dr. Momar Coumba*	Sociologist and Researcher	University of Cheikh Anta Diop/ West African Research Center	October 9, 2008
9	Fall, Dr. Abdou Salam	Sociologist and Researcher, Laboratory for the study of poverty and social transformation	University of Cheikh Anta Diop and <i>Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire</i> (IFAN)	August 28, 2008
10	Fall, Waly	In charge of communication for <i>Rewmi</i> and Mayor of Dieuppeul-Derklé	<i>Rewmi</i>	November 25, 2008
11	Faye, Ibrahima*	Journalist	<i>Sud Quotidien</i>	August 29, 2008
12	Gaye, Babacar	Spokesperson for the PDS, Director of the Political Affairs Cabinet	<i>Parti Démocratique Sénégalais</i> (PDS)	September 30, 2008
13	Guèye, Cheikh	Geographical Researcher	ENDA Tiers Monde	November 19, 2008
14	Martin, Nicolas	Governance team member	United Nations Development Program	November 18, 2008
15	Mboup, Khalifa	Secretary General	Association of Senegalese Mayors	December 2, 2008
16	Sall, Aissata Tall	In charge of communication for the PS	<i>Parti Socialiste</i> (PS)	September 15, 2008
17	Sall, Ebrima	Senior Program Officer, Head Department of Research	CODESRIA	September 9, 2008
18	Sall, Ibrahima	Former Minister of Planning under Abdou Diouf	<i>Parti Socialiste</i> (PS)	November 11, 2008
19	Sall ,Seydou Sy	Former Minister of Urbanization	<i>Ligue-Démocratique-Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail</i> (LD-MPT)	September 23, 2008
20	Sarr, Omar	Spokesperson	<i>Rewmi</i>	November 11, 2008
21	Sène, Ibrahima	In charge of economic and social affairs for PIT	<i>Parti de l'Indépendance et du Travail</i> (PIT)	September 25, 2008
22	Sow, Malick*	Director	Malick Sow &	October 8,

			Associates	2008
23	Tall, Dr. Serigne Mansour	Program Manager	UN-HABITAT for Senegal	October 29, 2008
24	Thior, Mamadou	Chief News Editor	Radio Television Senegal-RTS	November 6, 2008
25	Thioub, Dr. Ibrahima	Historian	University of Cheikh Anta Diop	September 10, 2008
26	Tine, Hélène	Spokesperson	<i>Alliance des Forces du Progrès (AFP)</i>	September 16, 2008
27	Vasseur, Mathieu	In charge of Urban Development and Decentralization	Agence France de Développement	November 6, 2008
28	Vilane, Abdoulaye	Spokesperson	<i>Parti Socialiste (PS)</i>	September 11, 2008
29	Wade, Aiwa	Spokesperson	<i>Ligue- Démocratique- Mouvement pour le Parti du Travail (LD-MPT)</i>	September 21, 2008

Notes: * Indicates that notes for interview were handwritten.

APPENDIX FOUR
Campaign Photos and Satirical Cartoons

Figure A4.1: Rupiah Banda (MMD) Distributing Sugar in Eastern Province in 2008 Presidential Campaign



Source: Nsama, Thomas. 2008. "MMD presidential candidate Rupiah Banda becomes a 'sugar daddy'." *The Post*, September 14: 1.

Figure A4.2: Michael Sata amid Supporters at the Zambian High Court



Source: <http://www.michaelsata.co.zm/> (accessed Oct. 28, 2009). Sata is the man in the middle with his arm outstretched.


Figure A4.3: Cartoon Deriding Abdoulaye Wade's *Très Grands Projets*



Source: *Le Quotidien*. 22-23 Novembre 2008, p.1.

Notes : The title of the picture translates as “To be led in a boat or in a horse-drawn carriage: the youth of the [Dakar] suburbs has a choice.” A caricature of Wade is presented in the middle, hoping to convince the prospective emigrant to stay and benefit from Wade’s TGP. Wade says, “With my TGP, I will take you to a Senegal of dreams.” Unconvinced, the departing emigrant replies, “Our only hope is everything except Wade.”

Figure A4.4: 2007 PDS Campaign Poster in Dakar



Source: Photo by C. Berger, displayed in Magrin, Géraud. 2007. "Sopi or not sopi?: A propos des élections présidentielles de février 2007 au Sénégal." *EchoGéo*, Juillet-Septembre (3).

Notes : The slogan “Le meilleur reste à venir” means “The best is yet to come.” Notably, even those the poster is hanging in Dakar, the pictures in the poster focus on modernizing the agricultural sector.

LUSAKA, ZAMBIA

E. Do you currently live in Lusaka?

1. _____ Yes

2. _____ No

F. If so, in which constituency do you reside?

1. _____ Chawama

5. _____ Mandevu

2. _____ Kabwata

6. _____ Matero

3. _____ Kanyama

7. _____ Munali

4. _____ Lusaka Central

8. _____ Other

G. If so, in which ward do you reside?

H. In your opinion, what are the poorest wards in Lusaka?

I. Were you born in Lusaka province?

1. _____ Yes

2. _____ No

J. If you were not born in the province of Lusaka but currently reside here, in which province were you born?

1. _____ Central

6. _____ Northwest

2. _____ Copperbelt

7. _____ Southern

3. _____ Eastern

8. _____ Western

4. _____ Luapula

9. Other _____

5. _____ Northern

K. If you were not born in the province of Lusaka, when did you move there?

1. _____ One year ago or less

2. _____ More than 1 year ago but no more than 5 years

3. _____ More than 5 years ago but no more than 10 years

4. _____ More than 10 years ago

L. If you were not born in the province of Lusaka, what was the main reason for why you decided to move here ?

1. _____ A part of your family already lived here

2. _____ A lack of employment in the province where you were born

3. _____ To study

4. _____ Marriage

5. _____ Work transfer

6. _____ Husband or family members had a work transfer

7. _____ Brought by parents as a child

8. Other reason _____

M. What is your main occupation?

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. _____ Street hawker | 10. _____ Store/restaurant owner |
| 2. _____ Artisan | 11. _____ Student |
| 3. _____ Sell merchandise in permanent stall | 12. _____ Unemployed |
| 4. _____ Sell merchandise in temporary structure | 13. _____ Professor/Teacher |
| 5. _____ Sell merchandise in the street | 14. _____ Beggar |
| 6. _____ Maid | 15. _____ Other services (i.e. hairdresser, shoe-shiner, etc.) |
| 7. _____ Taxi driver | 16. _____ Other non-services (i.e. tailor, etc.) |
| 8. _____ Professional, private sector | 17. _____ Trader |
| 9. _____ Professional, public sector | |

N. Approximately how much money do you spend per day?

1. _____ Less than 10,000 ZMK
2. _____ Between 10,000 and 30,000 ZMK
3. _____ Between 30,000 ZMK and 50,000 ZMK
4. _____ More than 50,000 ZMK
5. _____ Refused to respond
6. _____ Don't know

III. Living Conditions

A. In general, how would you describe *the economic conditions in Zambia* today compared with this same time last year ?

1. _____ Conditions are much better
2. _____ Conditions are a little better
3. _____ No change
4. _____ Conditions are worse

B. If you believe that conditions became better or worse, what is the principal reason for this change?

1. _____ Policies of the Zambian government
2. _____ The global economy
3. _____ The weather
4. Other _____
5. _____ Don't know

C. In general, how would you describe *your own economic conditions* today compared with this same time last year ?

1. _____ Conditions are much better
2. _____ Conditions are a little better

3. _____ No change
4. _____ Conditions are worse

D. If you believe that conditions become better or worse, what is the principal reason for this change?

1. _____ Policies of the Zambian government
2. _____ The global economy
3. _____ The weather
4. _____ Your family situation
5. Other reason _____
6. _____ Don't know

E. Do you have a water tap within your household?

1. _____ Yes
2. _____ No

F. Do you have electricity within your household?

1. _____ Yes
2. _____ No

G. How many people live in your home ?

1. _____ 2 or less
2. _____ Between 3 and 4
3. _____ Between 5 and 6
4. _____ More than 6

H. How many rooms are in your home ?

1. _____ 1 room
2. _____ 2 rooms
3. _____ 3 rooms
4. _____ 4 or more rooms
5. _____ Don't know

I. In your opinion, who should be responsible for the delivery of public services, such as water and electricity, in your neighborhood ?

1. _____ The national government
2. _____ The Lusaka City Council
3. _____ Ward authorities
4. _____ National utility companies
5. _____ Don't know
6. Other _____

J. In general, how would you describe the housing conditions in your neighborhood during the period in which you have lived there ?

1. _____ Conditions are much better
2. _____ Conditions are a little better
3. _____ No change

4. _____ Conditions are worse

K. Within the last five years (or within the period that you have lived there, if less than five years), has your house or any houses in your neighborhood ever been demolished without warning by government authorities?

- | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| 1. _____ Yes | 2. _____ No |
| 3. _____ Refused to respond | 4. _____ Don't know |

IV. Working Conditions & Associational Membership

A. Are you satisfied with your working conditions?

1. _____ Yes, very much so
2. _____ No, not at all
3. _____ Sometimes/ A little bit

B. If you work in one of Lusaka's markets, have you or someone that you know ever been harassed by the government authorities?

1. _____ Yes
2. _____ No
3. _____ Refused to respond

C. If so, which of the following have the government authorities done to you or someone that you know (check all that apply):

1. _____ Destroyed stall(s) or merchandise
2. _____ Forced you to work in a different place
3. _____ Forced you to pay certain taxes or other fees
4. _____ Arrested you
5. Other _____
6. _____ Refuse to respond

D. If so, which level of government do you believe is responsible for such harassment?

1. _____ The national government
2. _____ The Lusaka City Council
3. _____ Constituency-level authorities
4. _____ Ward-level authorities
5. _____ Market chairperson
6. _____ Doesn't know

E. If so, how often does such harassment occur?

1. _____ At least once every 6 months
2. _____ At least once a year
3. _____ At least once every 2 years

4. _____ Very infrequently

F. Are you a member of any work organizations?

1. _____ Yes

2. _____ No

G. If so, which one (s)?

H. If yes, why did you decide to become a member of this organization?

1. _____ It has a good record of protecting the rights of workers

2. _____ It has a close relationship with the local authorities

3. _____ A friend convinced you to become a member

4. _____ A member of your family convinced you to become a member

5. Other reason _____

I. If not, why have you decided not to join any work organizations ?

1. _____The benefits of membership are not clear

2. _____Membership fees are too high

3. _____ The existing work organizations are too closely tied to the ruling party

4. _____ The existing work organizations are too autocratic

5. _____ You didn't know that any work organizations existed

6. Other reason_____

7. _____ Don't know

J. Recently, the role of the Chinese in the Zambian economy has been controversial. What is your opinion of the growing Chinese presence in Zambia?

1. _____ Beneficial: They bring skills and resources that improve Zambia's development

2. Harmful: They are taking away opportunities from Zambians

3. Mixed: They bring both benefits and disadvantages

4. _____ No opinion

V. Presidential Elections

A. Did you vote in the 2006 presidential election?

1. _____ Yes

2. _____ No

B. If not, why not ?

1. _____ None of the candidates appealed to you

2. _____ You did not have enough time to vote

3. _____ You thought that the elections would not be fair and transparent
4. _____ You thought that your favorite candidate would not win
5. _____ You did not know the manifestoes of the candidates
6. _____ You thought that, no matter who wins, nothing will change
7. _____ You didn't have necessary documents (NRC, voter's card, or both)
8. _____ You were too young to vote
9. _____ You cannot vote for religious reasons (e.g. Jehovah's Witness)
10. _____ Other

C. If yes, who did you support during the 2006 presidential election?

1. _____ Levy Mwanawasa (MMD)
2. _____ Michael Sata (PF)
3. _____ Hakainde Hichilema (UDA)
4. _____ Godfrey K. Miyanda (HP)
5. _____ Winright K. Ngondo (APC)
6. Other candidate _____
7. _____ Don't know
8. _____ Refused to respond

D. What was the main reason why you supported this candidate in the 2006 presidential election?

1. _____ You recognized his name
2. _____ You preferred the manifesto of this candidate
3. _____ You had experienced a change in your own economic conditions
4. _____ The candidate's ethnicity
5. _____ The candidate's party campaigned in your neighborhood
6. _____ The candidate promised a change
7. _____ A member of your family voted for him
8. _____ A neighbor/friend/acquaintance voted for him
9. _____ This candidate had a lot of experience
10. _____ You preferred the personality/characteristics of this candidate
11. Other reason _____
12. _____ Don't know

E. Did you vote in the 2008 presidential election?

1. _____ Yes
2. _____ No

F. If not, why not?

1. _____ None of the candidates appealed to you
2. _____ You did not have enough time to vote
3. _____ You thought that the elections would not be fair and transparent
4. _____ You thought that your favorite candidate would not win
5. _____ You did not know the manifestoes of the candidates
6. _____ You thought that, no matter who wins, nothing will change
7. _____ You didn't have necessary documents (NRC, voter's card, or both)

8. _____ You were too young to vote
9. _____ You cannot vote for religious reasons (e.g. Jehovah's Witness)
10. _____ Other

G. If yes, who did you support during the 2008 presidential election?

1. _____ Rupiah Banda (MMD)
2. _____ Michael Sata (PF)
3. _____ Hakainde Hichilema (UPND)
4. _____ Godfrey K. Miyanda (HP)
5. Other candidate _____
6. _____ Don't know
7. _____ Refused to respond

H. What was the main reason why you supported this candidate in the 2008 presidential elections?

1. _____ You recognized his name
2. _____ You preferred the manifesto of this candidate
3. _____ You had experienced a change in your own economic conditions
4. _____ The candidate's ethnicity
5. _____ The candidate's party campaigned in your neighborhood
6. _____ The candidate promised a change
7. _____ A member of your family voted for him
8. _____ A neighbor/friend/acquaintance voted for him
9. _____ This candidate had a lot of experience
10. _____ You preferred the personality/characteristics of this candidate
11. Other reason _____
12. _____ Don't know

VI. Perspectives on the ruling party (MMD)

A. Did the MMD campaign in your neighborhood during the 2008 presidential elections ?

1. _____ Yes
2. _____ No
3. _____ Don't know

B. If yes, did the MMD give a speech in your neighborhood ?

1. _____ Yes
2. _____ No
3. _____ Don't know

C. If yes, did the MMD hang up signs in your neighborhood ?

1. _____ Yes
2. _____ No
3. _____ Don't know

D. If yes, did the MMD give out gifts, such as T-shirts, hats, etc. in your neighborhood?

1. _____ Yes 2. _____ No 3. _____ Don't know

E. If yes, did the MMD give out money in your neighborhood?

1. _____ Yes 2. _____ No 3. _____ Don't know

F. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

«The MMD has improved the availability of electricity in Lusaka »

1. _____ Yes 2. _____ No 3. _____ Don't know

G. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

«The MMD has improved the cost of electricity in Lusaka »

1. _____ Yes 2. _____ No 3. _____ Don't know

H. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

«The MMD has improved the availability of water in Lusaka »

1. _____ Yes 2. _____ No 3. _____ Don't know

I. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

«The MMD has improved the cost of water in Lusaka »

1. _____ Yes 2. _____ No 3. _____ Don't know

J. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

«The MMD has improved the cost of transport in Lusaka »

1. _____ Yes 2. _____ No 3. _____ Don't know

K. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

«The MMD has done a lot to improve the conditions of the poor in Lusaka »

1. _____ Yes 2. _____ No 3. _____ Don't know

L. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

«Thanks to the MMD, unemployment has declined »

1. _____ Yes 2. _____ No 3. _____ Don't know

M. Why did the MMD win the 2008 presidential elections?

1. _____ The MMD has had good policies for improving the living conditions of many
Zambians
2. _____ The opposition parties were not competitive enough
3. _____ The election was not fair
4. _____ The MMD gave money and/or other goods to certain voters in order to obtain their
support
5. _____ Sympathy for the loss of Levy Mwanawasa

6. Other reason _____
7. _____ Don't know

VII. Perspectives of the opposition parties

A. Which opposition parties campaigned in your neighborhood during the 2008 presidential elections ?

1. _____ Patriotic Front (PF)
2. _____ United Party for National Development
3. _____ Heritage Party
4. Other party _____
5. _____ None
6. _____ Don't know

B. Did any of these opposition parties give a speech in your neighborhood ?

1. _____ Yes
2. _____ No
3. _____ Don't know

C. Did any of these opposition parties hang up signs in your neighborhood?

1. _____ Yes
2. _____ No
3. _____ Don't know

D. Did any of these opposition parties give out gifts, such as T-shirts and hats, in your neighborhood ?

1. _____ Yes
2. _____ No
3. _____ Don't know

E. Did any of these opposition parties give out money in your neighborhood ?

1. _____ Yes
2. _____ No
3. _____ Don't know

F. Which opposition parties do you think are the most interested in improving the living conditions of those living in the province of Lusaka ? (check all that apply)

1. _____ Patriotic Front (PF)
2. _____ United National Independence Party (UNIP)
3. _____ United Party for National Development (UPND)
4. _____ Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD)
5. _____ Heritage Party (HP)
6. Other party _____
7. _____ None

G. In your opinion, what is the major difference between Zambia's political parties ?

1. _____ The personalities of the party leaders
2. _____ The parties' positions on important social and economic issues
3. _____ The parties' links with a particular region of Zambia
4. _____ There is no difference
5. Other factor _____

6. _____ Don't know

H. If elections took place tomorrow, would you support the MMD?

1. _____ Yes
2. _____ No
3. _____ Don't know
4. _____ Refused to respond
5. _____ Not Applicable (e.g. Jehovah's Witness, etc.)

I. How would you define what a "political party platform/manifesto" is?

Time that interview ended:

DAKAR, SENEGAL

I. Détails concernant l'entrevue

- A. Numéro du Répondant:
- B. Date d'entrevue:
- C. Heure à laquelle l'entrevue a commencé:
- D. Marché :

II. Détails concernant le répondant

A. Le genre du répondant

1. _____ Femme 2. _____ Homme

B. Quelle est votre première langue ?

- | | |
|-------------------|------------------|
| 1. _____ French | 5. _____ Serer |
| 2. _____ Jola | 6. _____ Soninke |
| 3. _____ Mandinka | 7. _____ Wolof |
| 4. _____ Pulaar | 8. Autre _____ |

C. Quel âge avez-vous ?

- | | |
|----------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1. _____ 18-24 | 5. _____ Plus de 40 ans |
| 2. _____ 25-30 | 6. _____ Vous ne savez pas |
| 3. _____ 31-35 | 7. _____ Vous ne voulez pas répondre |

4. ____36-40

D. Quel est le plus haut niveau d'éducation que vous avez atteint ?

1. ____ Vous n'êtes pas allé(e) à l'école
2. ____ Coran
3. ____ Langue (Arabe/Pulaar)
4. ____ Ecole primaire
5. ____ Ecole secondaire
6. ____ Post-secondaire
7. ____ Ne sais pas

E. Est-ce que vous êtes né(e) dans la région de Dakar ?

1. ____ Oui
2. ____ Non

F. Sinon, quand est-ce que vous êtes venu(e) à Dakar?

1. ____ Il y a un an ou moins
2. ____ Il y a plus d'un an mais pas plus de cinq ans
3. ____ Il y a plus de cinq ans mais pas plus de dix ans
4. ____ Il y a plus de dix ans

G. Si vous n'êtes pas originaire de Dakar, vous venez de quelle région ?

- | | |
|------------------|---------------------|
| 1. ____ Diourbel | 7. ____ Saint Louis |
| 2. ____ Fatick | 8. ____ Tambacounda |
| 3. ____ Kaolack | 9. ____ Thiès |
| 4. ____ Kolda | 10. ____ Casamance |
| 5. ____ Louga | 11. Autre _____ |
| 6. ____ Matam | |

H. Si vous n'êtes pas originaire de Dakar, quelle était la raison principale de venir ici ?

1. ____ Une partie de la famille déjà habitait ici
2. ____ Une manque d'emploi dans la région d'origine
3. ____ Etudier
4. Autre raison _____

I. Quelle est votre profession principale ?

- | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| 1. ____ Commerçant(e) ambulant(e) | 9. ____ Propriétaire d'un magasin |
| 2. ____ Artisan | 10. ____ Étudiant(e) |
| 3. ____ Vendre les marchandises dans un magasin | 11. ____ Pêcheur |
| 4. ____ Vendre les marchandises dans la rue | 12. ____ Chômeur/Chômeuse |
| 5. ____ Domestique | 13. ____ Professeur ou Enseignant (e) |
| 6. ____ Chauffeur de taxi | 14. ____ Mendiant (e) |
| 7. ____ Travail dans le secteur privé | 15. ____ Autre -services |
| | 16. ____ Autre-non services |

8. _____Travail dans le secteur publique

J. Approximativement, vous dépensez combien d'argent par jour ?

1. _____ 1000 CFA ou moins
2. _____ Plus de 1000 mais pas plus de 3000 CFA
3. _____ Plus de 3000 mais pas plus de 5000 CFA
4. _____ Plus de 5000 CFA
5. _____ Vous refusez de répondre
6. _____ Vous ne savez pas

III. Les Conditions de la Vie

A. Dans quel département habitez-vous ?

1. _____Dakar
2. _____Pikine
3. _____Guediawaye
4. _____Rufisque
5. Autre _____

B. Dans quelle commune habitez-vous ?

C. Dans quel quartier habitez-vous ?

D. A votre avis, quels sont des quartiers plus défavorisés dans Dakar ?

E. En général, comment décririez-vous les conditions économiques au Sénégal aujourd'hui par rapport à la même époque l'année dernière ?

1. _____ Les conditions sont beaucoup meilleures
2. _____ Les conditions sont un peu meilleures
3. _____ Il n'y a pas de changement
4. _____ Les conditions sont pires

F. Si vous croyez qu'elles sont devenues meilleures ou pires, quelle raison est responsable pour le changement?

1. _____ Les politiques du gouvernement sénégalais
2. _____ L'économie mondiale
3. _____ La météo
4. Autre raison _____
5. _____ Au moins deux choix ci-dessus sont responsables

6. _____ Ne sais pas

G. En général, comment décririez-vous vos propres conditions économiques aujourd'hui par rapport à la même époque l'année dernière ?

1. _____ Les conditions sont beaucoup meilleures
2. _____ Les conditions sont un peu meilleures
3. _____ Il n'y a pas de changement
4. _____ Les conditions sont pires

H. Si vous croyez qu'elles sont devenues meilleures ou pires, quelle raison est responsable pour le changement?

1. _____ Les politiques du gouvernement sénégalais
2. _____ L'économie mondiale
3. _____ La météo
4. _____ Votre situation familiale
5. Autre raison _____
6. _____ Au moins deux choix ci-dessus sont responsables
7. _____ Ne sais pas

I. Est-ce que vous avez des robinets dans votre maison ?

1. _____ Oui
2. _____ Non

J. Est-ce que vous avez l'électricité dans votre maison?

1. _____ Oui
2. _____ Non

K. Combien de gens y-a-t-il dans votre maison ?

1. _____ 2 ou moins
2. _____ Entre 3 ou 4
3. _____ Entre 5 ou 6
4. _____ Plus de 6

L. Combien de chambres y-a-t-il dans votre maison ?

1. _____ Un
2. _____ Deux
3. _____ Trois
4. _____ Quatre ou plus
5. _____ Ne sais pas

M. En général, comment décririez-vous les conditions de logement dans votre quartier pendant la période que vous avez habité ici ?

1. _____ Les conditions sont beaucoup meilleures
2. _____ Les conditions sont un peu meilleures
3. _____ Il n'y a pas de changement

4. _____ Les conditions sont pires

N. A votre avis, qui doit être plus responsable pour la prestation des services publics, comme l'eau et l'électricité, dans votre quartier?

1. _____ Le gouvernement national
2. _____ Le gouvernement municipal
3. _____ Le gouvernement de commune d'arrondissement
4. _____ SENELEC/SDE/Les compagnies d'utilité
5. _____ Vous ne savez pas
6. Autre _____
7. _____ Au moins deux acteurs ci-dessus sont responsables

IV. Les conditions de travail

A. Est-ce que vous êtes satisfait avec vos conditions de travail ?

1. _____ Oui, beaucoup
2. _____ Non, pas du tout
3. _____ Parfois/ un peu

B. Est-ce que vous êtes membre de l'UNACOIS ?

1. _____ Oui
2. _____ Non

C. Si oui, pourquoi avez-vous choisi d'être membre de l'UNACOIS ?

1. _____ Parce que l'UNACOIS a une bonne réputation
2. _____ Parce que l'UNACOIS a des liens proches avec le parti au pouvoir
3. _____ Un(e) ami(e) vous a convaincu d'être membre
4. _____ Un membre de votre famille vous a convaincu d'être membre
5. Autre _____

D. Sinon, pourquoi pas ?

1. _____ Les honoraires sont trop hauts
2. _____ Les bénéfices d'être membre ne sont pas clair
3. _____ L'UNACOIS a des liens trop proches avec le parti au pouvoir
4. _____ L'UNACOIS est trop autocratique
5. _____ Vous n'avez pas connu que l'UNACOIS existe
6. Autre _____
7. _____ Vous ne savez pas

E. Est-ce que vous êtes membre d'une autre association de travail ?

1. _____ Oui
2. _____ Non

F. Si oui, laquelle ?

V. Les élections présidentielles de 2007

A. Avez-vous voté pendant la dernière élection présidentielle ?

1. _____ Oui 2. _____ Non

B. Sinon, pourquoi pas ?

1. _____ Aucun des candidats n'a fait appel à vous
2. _____ Vous n'avez pas eu assez de temps à voter
3. _____ Vous avez pensé que les élections ne seraient pas justes
4. _____ Vous avez pensé que votre candidat favori ne gagnerait pas
5. _____ Vous n'avez pas connu les plat-formes des candidats
6. _____ Vous avez pensé que, quoi qu'il gagne, rien ne changerait
7. _____ Vous n'aviez pas votre pièce d'identité/carte électorale
8. _____ Vous étiez trop jeune à voter
9. Autre raison _____

C. Si oui, qui est-ce que vous avez soutenu pendant la dernière élection présidentielle ?

1. _____ Abdoulaye Wade, (PDS)
2. _____ Ousamane Tanor Dieng (PS)
3. _____ Moustapha Niasse (AFP)
4. _____ Idrissa Seck (Rewmi)
5. _____ Robert Sagna (Démocratie-Solidarité)
6. _____ Talla Sylla (APJ-JJ)
7. _____ Abdoulaye Bathily (LD-MPT)
8. _____ Vous ne voulez pas répondre
9. Autre parti _____
10. _____ Vous ne savez pas

D. Pourquoi est-ce que vous avez soutenu ce candidat ?

1. _____ Vous avez reconnu son nom
2. _____ Vous avez préféré la plate-forme du parti du candidat
3. _____ Vous avez éprouvé un changement des vos propres conditions économiques
4. _____ L'ethnicité du candidat
5. _____ Le candidat a fait campagne dans votre quartier
6. _____ Le candidat a promis un changement
7. _____ Les raisons religieuses
8. _____ Un membre de votre famille a voté pour lui
9. _____ Vos connaissances/voisins ont voté pour lui
10. _____ Le candidat avait beaucoup d'expérience
11. _____ Vous avez préféré la personnalité de ce candidat
12. _____ Autre raison _____
13. _____ Vous ne savez pas

VI. Perspectives sur le parti au pouvoir (le PDS)

A. Est-ce que le PDS a fait campagne dans votre quartier pendant les élections présidentielles de 2007 ?

1. ☐ Oui 2. ☐ Non 3. ☐ Ne sais pas

B. Si oui, est-ce le PDS a prononcé un discours dans votre quartier ?

1. ☐ Oui 2. ☐ Non 3. ☐ Ne sais pas

C. Si oui, est-ce le PDS a accroché des affiches dans votre quartier ?

1. ☐ Oui 2. ☐ Non 3. ☐ Ne sais pas

D. Si oui, est-ce le PDS a donné des cadeaux (comme T-shirts, chapeau, etc.) dans votre quartier ?

1. ☐ Oui 2. ☐ Non 3. ☐ Ne sais pas

E. Si oui, est-ce le PDS a donné l'argent dans votre quartier ?

1. ☐ Oui 2. ☐ Non 3. ☐ Ne sais pas

F. Etes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :

«Le PDS a amélioré la disponibilité de l'électricité dans Dakar »

1. ☐ D'accord 2. ☐ Pas d'accord 3. ☐ Ne sais pas

G. Etes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :

«Le PDS a amélioré le coût de l'électricité dans Dakar »

1. ☐ D'accord 2. ☐ Pas d'accord 3. ☐ Ne sais pas

H. Etes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :

«Le PDS a amélioré la disponibilité de l'eau dans Dakar »

1. ☐ D'accord 2. ☐ Pas d'accord 3. ☐ Ne sais pas

I. Etes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :

«Le PDS a amélioré le coût de l'eau dans Dakar »

1. ☐ D'accord 2. ☐ Pas d'accord 3. ☐ Ne sais pas

J. Etes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :

«Le PDS a amélioré le transport dans Dakar »

1. ☐ D'accord 2. ☐ Pas d'accord 3. ☐ Ne sais pas

K. Etes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :

«Le PDS a fait beaucoup de choses pour améliorer les conditions de vie pour les populations plus défavorisées dans Dakar »

1. ____ D'accord 2. ____ Pas d'accord 3. ____ Ne sais pas

L. Etes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :

«Grace au PDS, le taux de chômage a diminué »

1. ____ D'accord 2. ____ Pas d'accord 3. ____ Ne sais pas

M. Etes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :

« Le PDS s'est seulement engagé dans les projets qui bénéficient les riches»

1. ____ D'accord 2. ____ Pas d'accord 3. ____ Ne sais pas

N. Etes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :

« Le PDS devient plus répressif vers la presse »

1. ____ D'accord 2. ____ Pas d'accord 3. ____ Ne sais pas

O. Etes-vous d'accord ou en désaccord avec les affirmations suivantes :

« Le changement du mandat présidentiel de 5 à 7 ans c'est bon pour la démocratie sénégalaise »

1. ____ D'accord 2. ____ Pas d'accord 3. ____ Ne sais pas

P. A votre avis, pourquoi est-ce que le PDS a gagné les élections présidentielles de 2007 ?

1. ____ Le PDS a eu des bonnes politiques pour améliorer les conditions de vie des Sénégalais
2. ____ Les partis d'opposition n'étaient pas assez compétitifs
3. ____ L'élection n'était pas juste
4. ____ Le PDS a donné l'argent à quelques communautés importantes pour qu'elles le soutiennent
5. Autre raison _____
6. ____ Vous ne savez pas
7. ____ Le candidat de PDS a promis un changement

Q. L'année dernière, le gouvernement a essayé de déguerpier des commerçants ambulants. Que pensez-vous de cette tentative du gouvernement ?

1. ____ C'était une bonne idée ; Les commerçants ambulants sont un problème dans Dakar
2. ____ C'était une mauvaise idée ; Le gouvernement doit laisser les commerçants ambulants tranquille
3. ____ Le gouvernement doit trouver une espace permanent pour les commerçants ambulants
4. ____ Aucune opinion

VII. Perspectives sur les partis d'opposition

A. Quels partis d'opposition ont fait campagne dans votre quartier pendant des élections présidentielles de 2007 ?

1. _____Parti Socialiste (PS)
2. _____Alliance des forces de progrès (AFP)
3. _____Rewmi
4. _____Alliance pour le progrès et la justice –Jëf-Jël (APJ-JJ)
5. _____Ligue démocratique – Mouvement pour le parti du travail (LD-MPT)
6. _____Démocratie-Solidarité
7. _____Aucuns
8. Autre parti _____
9. _____ Ne sais pas

B. Est-ce que ces partis d'opposition ont prononcé un discours ?

1. _____Oui
2. _____Non
3. _____Ne sais pas

C. Est-ce que ces partis d'opposition ont accroché des affiches ?

1. _____Oui
2. _____Non
3. _____Ne sais pas

D. Est-ce que ces partis d'opposition ont donné des cadeaux (comme T-shirts, chapeau, etc.) ?

1. _____Oui
2. _____Non
3. _____Ne sais pas

E. Est-ce que ces partis d'opposition ont donné l'argent?

1. _____Oui
2. _____Non
3. _____Ne sais pas

F. Quel partis d'opposition pensez-vous sont les plus intéressé à une amélioration des conditions de vie dans la région de Dakar? (Vous pouvez choisir plus d'un parti)

1. _____Parti Socialiste (PS)
2. _____Alliance des forces de progrès (AFP)
3. _____Rewmi
4. _____Alliance pour le progrès et la justice –Jëf-Jël (APJ-JJ)
5. _____Ligue démocratique – Mouvement pour le parti du travail (LD-MPT)
6. _____Démocratie-Solidarité
7. _____Aucun des partis politiques
8. Autre parti _____

G. Selon vous, quel est le facteur clé qui distingue des partis politiques sénégalais ?

1. _____Les personnalités des chefs des partis

2. _____ Leur position politique sur des sujets sociaux et économiques importants
3. _____ Leur liens proches avec une région particulière du Sénégal
4. _____ Il n'y a pas de différence parmi des partis
5. _____ Autre
6. _____ Ne sais pas

H. Si les élections auraient lieu demain, est-ce que vous soutiendrez le PDS ?

- | | |
|--------------|--|
| 1. _____ Oui | 3. _____ Ne sais pas |
| 2. _____ Non | 4. _____ Vous ne pouvez pas voter
(e.g. à cause de la religion, etc.) |

K. A votre avis, qu'est-ce que c'est une plate-forme d'un parti politique ?

L. Est-ce que vous connaissez l'Assise Nationale ?

- | | |
|--------------|--------------|
| 1. _____ Oui | 2. _____ Non |
|--------------|--------------|

M. Si oui, qu'est-ce que vous pensez de cette initiative ?

1. _____ C'est une bonne idée et ça va changer la scène politique sénégalaise
2. _____ C'est une bonne idée mais rien ne changera
3. _____ Ce n'est pas nécessaire
4. _____ Aucune opinion
5. Autre

Heure à laquelle l'entrevue a terminé :

APPENDIX SIX:
Detailed Description of Selected Markets and Survey Procedures

A6.1: Description of Selected Markets

LUSAKA, ZAMBIA

Chelstone Market - Located in the Northeastern corner of the city, Chelstone Market is relatively small compared with many of the cities other markets. Established stores, intermixed with welders, mechanics, and hairdressers provide a rectangular perimeter of the market while vegetable vendors are located in the market's center. Temporary shacks where vendors sell second-hand clothes, shoes, and DVDs, are set up along the market's periphery. Many of the marketers with whom we spoke noted that the current market was only temporary and they were waiting to move into a larger and more permanent market that has been under construction for a number of years. Some expressed worry that moving into the new structure will require them to pay higher market fees. All of the workers in this market came from the immediate area, particularly from Munali Constituency.

Kaunda Square – This market is similar in structure to Chelstone, except that is much bigger. As in Chelstone, the center of the market consists of vegetable sellers with surrounding stalls containing vendors of clothes and household appliances as well as tailors. The market streams out into the dirt street with many street vendors selling groundnuts, vegetables, fruits, and popcorn. Many of the vendors on the street at this market noted that they had been harassed by the city council and told to move inside the market. However, there is not enough space for them in the already over-crowded market stalls. Most residents are from Munali constituency, with a few from Mandevu.

Mandevu Market - This market is overwhelmingly dominated by *salaula*, or second-hand clothes and shoes, vendors. Within the market, the stalls consist of precariously-built, wooden structures covered by a plastic roof. The market spreads out over a few polluted brooks of water, over which hand-made log bridges have been constructed. Some carpenters line the outer periphery of one side of the market while those selling clothes in the street or hot food are stationed on the other side. When it rains, the marketers have little cover since the plastic roofs often have holes and those in the street have to completely halt their business activities in such weather. Most of the marketers are from the surrounding constituency of Mandevu, with a few also from Matero.

Matero Market - Matero market, located in the Northwestern outskirts of the city, has a different structure than some of the other markets. Specifically, the market does not appear to have any center but rather contains a labyrinth of little stores selling hardware, candy, basic foodstuffs, and some second-hand clothes and shoes. Interspersed amongst these stores are tailors and hairdressers. Amongst the permanent

stalls and temporary/hand-built ones are some rondavels that also serve as stores. Towards the back of the market are some live chicken vendors and a large covered concrete area where women sell vegetables and bread. On the edge of the market are charcoal vendors. As with most of the markets in Lusaka, Matero market is very closely intertwined with the housing townships that border it. Most of the marketers are from the constituency of Matero.

Chilenje Market – The Chilenje market is located in the Southeastern part of Lusaka in Kabwata constituency on the edge of the Merzaf flat project initiated by Sata during his time as the Minister of Local Government and Housing. This market has a number of layers to it. Vegetable vendors selling in the street mix with minibus drivers and bar owners at the entrance of the market, followed by vendors of second-hand clothes, hardware supplies, and staple goods. At the center are brand-new stalls surrounding a clean courtyard, the corner of which is located a modern office for the market chairman. However, immediately behind this modern market area, vegetable vendors and other vendors continue selling under temporary stands, interspersed with tailors, hairdressers, and welders.

Kabwata Market – Kabwata market is located in the Southern part of Lusaka in Kabwata constituency, not very far from most of the government offices and bordering the relatively affluent Woodlands neighborhood. When Sata was the National Secretary for the MMD, he was also the MP for Kabwata constituency. The market was formerly a cooperative but now is under control of the Lusaka City Council. Along the front of the market are temporary stalls with vendors of second-hand clothes as well as trailers where vendors sell maize and other food staples. Right beyond the entrance to the market are vegetable, kapenta, groundnut, and fritter vendors while the inner portion of the market consists of the usual array of vendors, tailors, and hairdressers. Although the chairwoman of the market mentioned that there had previously been violence in the market because of peoples' different political views, this did not come through during our interviews. Unlike many markets that grow out of compounds, the vendors in this market come from a variety of constituencies around the city, including Chawama, Kabwata, Kanyama, Lusaka Central, and Munali. The customers at this market also tend to span a variety of different social classes.

Chipata Market – Chipata market is an outgrowth of Chipata compound on the Northern edge of the city. This is one of the city's poorest compounds and the area's name comes from the fact that the original settlers in this area came from Eastern Province, the capital of which is Chipata. The market actually consists of two markets, centered along the main thoroughfare. Charcoal and firewood sellers and vendors of alcohol and food staples jostle with minibuses along this route. The entrance of both markets is found behind established bars and stores and paved with predominantly woman vendors of peanuts, roasted maize, and kapenta. The inside of one of the markets consists almost entirely of foodstuffs while the other includes tailors, hairdressers, and vendors of various hardware, mechanical, and electrical

supplies. The market is a cooperative rather than under control of the Lusaka City Council.

Chawama Market – Located in the Southwest of the city in the constituency of Chawama, the Chawama market is incredibly sprawling. It is a co-operative market, though the chairman implied that there was contention with the Lusaka City Council over its status. Directly across the street from the entrance to the market, the LCC built a Spar supermarket, which resulted in evicting vendors that were selling on the plot of land allocated to Spar. The entrance to the market is crowded by vendors selling vegetables, kapenta, peanuts, and worms from makeshift wooden tables or the ground. The market then turns into a labyrinth of permanent and temporary stalls, filled with vendors, butchers, carpenters, tailors, and hairdressers. Towards the eastern side of the market there are rows and rows of temporary structures with vendors selling second-hand clothes. The market is directly adjacent to the new and old Chawama compounds, which is where most of the vendors live.

Kanyama Market - As another one of Lusaka's poorest constituencies, located south of Cairo Road, Kanyama has a number of markets. However, we visited the main Kanyama market, known as Sekhelela Market. This market directly serves the immediate community, with all of its vendors coming from one of the incredibly poor surrounding compounds. Indeed, in the surveys, Kanyama compound was considered by most respondents as being amongst Lusaka's poorest neighborhoods. Unlike many of the other markets, this one is unique for having a majority of its vendors selling along the streets, often selling in muddy conditions and near open sewerage streams, rather than within the established market. As usual, the wares along the street include secondhand clothes, food staples, and mobile phones. The interior of the market is relatively empty, with a number of closed shops. Nevertheless, a scattering of tailors, vegetable sellers, and shop-owners could be found within.

Old Soweto Market – In the city center, only a few blocks from Cairo Road, lays the New City Market and the New Soweto Market. The Old Soweto Market, which predominantly specializes in *saluala* is wedged between these two modern markets. Along the main road behind the New City Market, the street is completely covered with hawkers, including those who showcase their wares in a perambulatory fashion and others who remain stationary. Then, the outer edges of the market are dominated by temporary structures piled high with second-hand clothes and vendors standing on tables, shouting the price of their goods. On the back side of this market, facing the New Soweto Market, is a field of litter and polluted puddles of muddy water lying under electricity pylons. Inside the market are hairdressers and small restaurants and some selling computer supplies. Unlike most of the other markets surveyed for this study, Old Soweto Market attracts vendors from all over Lusaka because it is near the center of the city rather than adjacent to a compound. Probably for the same reasons, harassment of marketeers is particularly intense here. Many of those surveyed indicated that when the New City Market was initially built, they were pushed away. More recently, authorities have been harassing them to move into the New Soweto

Market. However, there are only few stalls available there and the fees are too high for most vendors to afford. Apparently, when the New Soweto Market opens, the Old Soweto Market is supposed to be demolished.

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Ouakam - Ouakam is a relatively small market that caters to those living within the immediate Ouakam neighborhood and whose workers all come from that area. The market contains a wide range of goods, and there are a number of craftspeople engaged in carpentry, metalwork, jewelry-making, and tailoring who are mixed amongst the merchants selling clothes and food.

Grand Yoff - This market is very much a large-scale version of the Ouakam market in terms of the variety of goods that are sold. However, most workers here are engaged in commerce rather than producing their own goods. Besides coming from the Grand Yoff area, most workers are from the suburbs of Pikine and Guédiawaye.

HLM - HLM is well-known as a fabric market, and while a vast range of goods can be found here, fabrics, jewelry, shoes, and other clothes are the main focus. A number of street hawkers also concentrate in front of the market stalls. Very few workers are actually from the immediate area but rather come from the suburbs, Grand Yoff, Parcelles, Medina, and Grand Dakar.

Sandaga - Sandaga is Dakar's central market, located in the middle of the downtown Plateau area. Anything one would want can be found here. The stores range from well-constructed, air-conditioned stores in the Sandaga commercial center, to ramshackle stands buried in the thick of the overcrowded market, to wooden carts set up on the side of Avenue Pompidou. Moreover, Sandaga is the center of hawking activity and was where the PDS-led government controversially attempted to clear the streets of hawkers in November 2007 in preparation for its stint hosting the International Islamic Conference. Given its proximity to the city center, this market attracts more foreigners than any of the others. Most workers here live in the suburbs, Parcelles, Medina, Grand Dakar, and Yoff.

Kermel - Nicknamed "*marché toubab*," Kermel is predominantly an artisan's market that caters to tourists. Jewelry, paintings, and handcrafted goods are the focus here. Prices are often a bit higher than elsewhere and workers speak more French and even some English than in some of the other markets in order to improve their chance of selling to the tourists. However, food sellers are also scattered amongst the artisans and the merchants. Most workers here live in the suburbs, Medina, Grand Dakar, Grand Yoff, and SICAP.

Syndicat - This market is much less formally organized than those in the center of the city. The market basically extends outside of residents' living area and flows into the

surrounding streets. A majority of workers either sell their goods from self-constructed stands or simply display their wares on the ground. Fresh fruit and nuts are the main specialty here, although there are also quite a few individuals who earn a living by selling hot meals to other workers during lunch. Almost all the merchants are from the immediate neighborhood or nearby regions of the interior, such as Thiès.

Marché Zinc - Very close to Syndicat and much more formally organized, the merchants in Marché Zinc specialize in selling live chickens, fabric, and jewelry.

Thiaroye – Located in one of the poorest communes of the Greater Dakar region, known as Thiaroye, this market is Dakar's largest in terms of surface area, surpassing the size of Sandaga. Like Syndicat, the market is very disorganized, with merchants streaming out into the dusty streets and spanning the Thiaroye railroad to sell their goods. Some use the underbelly of disused trucks as shade for selling their goods. Most of the workers are from the surrounding neighborhoods, such as the very poor Guinaw Rail, or commute daily from Thiès. Vendors specialize in selling fruit, fish, vegetables, salt, and hardware.

Tilène – Located in the Medina commune of the city off of Avenue Blaise Diagne, Tilène is best known for being a food market that, along with exotic fruits and vegetables, specializes in fish, spices, gold and silver, and marabout trinkets. The exterior of the market is lined with shops selling second-hand merchandise and the interior contains numerous hawkers who try to convince the passer-by to purchase a T-shirt, sunglasses, or watch from him. Due to its location, it caters to a mixture of local residents and tourists. Most of the sellers live in Medina, although some also come in from the suburbs of Pikine.

Gueule Tapée - This market is located in the Cambérène commune of the Parcelles Assainies arrondissement, an area that was originally created to house those who were removed from slums in the city center under the PS regime. It is located on the outskirts of the Dakar city center before reaching the suburbs of Pikine and Guédiawaye. The exterior of the market is dominated by fruit and vegetable vendors while the interior is filled with tailors and fabric shops. The back of the market contains numerous shops constructed out of corrugated iron and wood where vendors specialize in selling meat and poultry. Most of the workers in this market come from the immediate neighborhoods of Parcelles and Cambérène or from the suburb of Guédiawaye.

A6.2: Detailed Description of Survey Procedures

Chapter Four provided an overview of when and how the ten markets in each city were selected for the surveys. This section offers a few more details on the actual surveying process, including specific challenges that one encounters when surveying in the markets as opposed to a household survey.

In Senegal, I worked with a research assistant from the University of Cheikh Anta Diop who was recommended by the center with which I was affiliated, the West African Research Center. She and I pre-tested the questionnaire three times, discovering issues that were too sensitive to discuss or language that was prone to misinterpretation. When the questionnaire was finalized, we could begin the surveying in earnest. I accompanied her on each and every survey interview, ensuring that questions were asked in a similar manner across respondents and asking follow-up questions whenever the respondent appeared to contradict him- or herself. Before each interview, potential respondents received a paper summarizing my research project, highlighting that I was a student and not affiliated with any government organization, and providing email and phone details in case the respondent ever needed to contact the Cornell Institutional Review Board. When the respondent agreed to participate, s/he would sign the consent form or, if illiterate, would have a nearby witness sign for her/him. All respondents received a small bag of sugar as compensation for their participation.

In Zambia, I worked with a research assistant from the University of Zambia who was recommended by a professor there who focuses on urbanization and markets in Lusaka and the Copperbelt. She and I only needed to pre-test the questionnaire once since most of the same questions from the Senegal survey were asked in Zambia. Again, I accompanied her on every survey interview. While the same exact procedure was used to obtain consent from respondents, the Lusakan case was somewhat

different in that the markets tend to be much more politicized than in Dakar. As such, we requested permission from the market chairperson in each market before beginning our survey work. No chairperson denied our request, though one claimed that we should be careful not to generate political tensions within her market. Since an ethics review board at the University of Zambia further approved my survey materials, I was able to provide respondents with a local contact number at the University in case they had any questions about their participation after our departure. As in Dakar, we distributed small bags of sugar as a token of appreciation for respondents' participation.

In both cities, a few challenges occurred when conducting the surveys. In addition to noise and the lack of places to sit and discuss in privacy, a main problem is that marketeers can be extremely busy trying to court customers. In order to ensure their participation, the survey questionnaires were kept relatively short, around twenty minutes long, and respondents were told to give priority to vending if a customer came along. Secondly, many individuals work in close proximity in the markets, increasing the possibility that potential respondents may hear survey questions and answers in advance. In order to avoid this bias, respondents were chosen from different segments of the market such that the samples included those both at the entrance to the markets as well as those who plied their trade at a deeper location therein. In Lusaka, an additional difficulty was that a majority of the surveys were conducted in February and March, which are the height of the rainy season. Since most of the markets have no drainage and people work out of temporary stalls with little cover, it was quite difficult navigating through these markets to talk to people, although certainly revealing of the abysmal work conditions they must endure for part of the year.

APPENDIX SEVEN
Robustness Tests

Table A7.1: Logit Analysis of Probability of Voting for Rupiah Banda in 2008

Independent variables	Demo- graphic & Education (1)	Campaign Conduct (2)	Economy & Service Delivery (3)	Full Model (4)	Weighted Full Model (5)
Female	0.508 (0.441)	---	---	---	---
Age: 18-30 years ^a	-1.202** (0.580)	---	---	-1.886*** (0.670)	-1.159 (0.799)
Age: 31-40 years	-0.548 (.498)	---	---	---	----
Low education ^b	0.449 (0.669)	---	---	---	----
Medium education	-0.514 (0.513)	---	---	---	
Bemba language group	-0.844 (.518)	---	---	-1.036* (0.544)	-0.639 (0.745)
Nyanja language group	-0.058 (0.515)	---	---	---	---
Handouts by MMD	---	-0.055 (0.680)	---	---	---
Handouts by opposition	---	-0.829 (0.528)	---	---	----
Household access to water	---	---	1.493 ** (0.603)	1.535** (0.670)	2.804*** (0.756)
Household access to electricity	---	---	-1.841*** (0.599)	-1.734*** (0.646)	-2.817*** (0.734)
Poor performance by MMD in creating jobs	---	---	-0.984 (0.957)	-1.803* (1.081)	-2.453 (1.624)
Poor performance by MMD in improving conditions for the poor	---	---	-1.619*** (0.567)	-1.757*** (0.626)	-2.822*** (0.797)
Poor performance by MMD in improving transport	---	---	-0.705 (0.500)	-1.067* (0.547)	-1.124 (0.923)
Worsened economic conditions over previous 12 months	---	---	-0.603 (0.623)	-0.395 (0.672)	1.105 (1.107)
Worsened personal economic conditions over previous 12 months	---	---	0.138 (0.490)	-0.349 (0.549)	-0.045 (0.657)
Constant	0.051	-0.122	2.560	4.541	3.913
Number of obs.	123	123	123	123	123
Pseudo R-squared	0.084	0.023	0.211	0.288	0.462
Prob >chi2	0.080	0.180	0.000	0.000	0.000

Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors are in the parentheses.

Notes: ^aThose who were older than 40 years of age constituted the excluded reference category for the age dummy variables.

^b The reference category excluded for the education dummy variables was those who had 12 or more years of education.

Table A7.2: Multi-collinearity Diagnostics on Independent Variables for Zambia

Variable	VIF	Sqrt VIF	Tolerance	R-squared
Age: 18-30	1.13	1.06	0.888	0.112
Bemba language group	1.02	1.01	0.978	0.022
Household access to water	1.24	1.11	0.805	0.195
Household access to electricity	1.23	1.11	0.813	0.187
Poor performance by MMD in creating jobs	1.20	1.10	0.831	0.169
Poor performance by MMD in improving conditions for the poor	1.24	1.11	0.807	0.193
Poor performance by MMD in improving transport	1.08	1.04	0.926	0.075
Worsened econ conditions over previous 12 months	1.15	1.07	0.870	0.130
Worsened personal econ conditions over previous 12 months	1.25	1.12	0.800	0.200

Mean VIF = 1.17

Table A7.3: Internal Consistency of Subjective Performance Variables in Zambia

Variables	Average inter-item covariance	Scale reliability coefficient
Poor performance by MMD in creating jobs	0.0299121	0.4877
Poor performance by MMD in improving conditions for the poor		
Poor performance by MMD in improving transport		
Worsened econ conditions over previous 12 months		
Worsened personal econ conditions over previous 12 months		

Notes: This table uses Chronbach's Alpha to test internal consistency of the subjective performance variables included in the binomial logit regressions. When the scale reliability coefficient is less than 0.70, this indicates that the variables are not all measuring the same underlying variable dimension

Table A7.4: Alternative Logit Analysis of Probability of Voting for Abdoulaye Wade in 2007

Independent variables	Demographic & Education (1)	Campaign Conduct (2)	Socioeconomic Conditions (3)	Full Model (4)
Female	0.670 (0.495)	---	---	---
Age: 18-30 years ^a	0.949 (0.610)	---	---	---
Age: 31-40 years	0.549 (0.589)	---	---	---
Koranic education ^b	-2.225*** (0.819)	---	---	-2.450*** (0.795)
Language education	-1.469* (0.773)	---	---	-1.609** (0.761)
Primary education	-1.241* (0.656)	---	---	-1.076* (0.582)
Secondary education and above	-1.424** (0.673)	---	---	-1.674** (0.686)
Wolof language group	-0.126 (0.663)	---	---	---
Pulaar language group	-0.195 (0.816)			
Handouts by PDS	---	-0.261 (0.502)	---	---
Handouts by opposition	---	-0.196 (0.479)	---	---
Household access to water			-1.273 (1.076)	-1.106 (1.156)
Poor performance by PDS in creating jobs	---	---	-0.339 (0.961)	-0.443 (1.107)
Poor performance by PDS in improving conditions for the poor	---	---	-0.346 (0.567)	-0.396 (0.618)
Poor performance by PDS in improving transport	---	---	-0.187 (0.618)	-0.546 (0.680)
Worsened econ conditions over previous 12 months	---	---	1.243 (1.119)	1.400 (1.253)
Worsened personal econ conditions over previous 12 months			-0.797 (0.671)	-1.078 (0.699)
Constant	1.643** (0.758)	1.614*** (0.353)	2.753* (1.472)	4.054** (1.600)
Number of observations	147	147	147	147
Pseudo R-squared	0.108	0.006	0.032	0.127
Prob >chi2	0.064	0.636	0.576	0.042

Significance levels: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Standard errors are in the parentheses.

Notes: ^aThose who were older than 40 years of age constituted the excluded reference category for the age dummy variables.

^b The reference category excluded for the education dummy variables was those who had no schooling at all.

Table A7.5: Multi-collinearity Diagnostics on Independent Variables for Senegal

Variable	VIF	Sqrt VIF	Tolerance	R-squared
Koranic education	1.11	1.05	0.905	0.095
Language education	1.10	1.05	0.910	0.090
Primary education	1.20	1.09	0.835	0.165
Secondary education and above	1.15	1.07	0.870	0.130
Spend 3000 CFA or less per day	1.04	1.02	0.965	0.035

Mean VIF = 1.12

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